

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THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF INDIA

SRI RAMAKRISHNA CENTENARY MEMORIAL

VOLUME I

SRI RAMAKRISHNA CENTENARY COMMITTEE,
BELUR MATH, CALCUTTA

1939

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We have the pleasure of bringing out the Sri Ramakrishna Birth Centenary Memorial Volume in three parts under the significant title, 'The Cultural Heritage of India.' The book, consisting of exactly one hundred articles covering over two thousand pages of double crown octavo, contains learned contributions from the pens of distinguished scholars and thinkers of India bearing on different phases of the progressive career of Indian culture through the vast expanse of scores of centuries since the Vedic age. Philosophical systems and religious movements with special reference to practical values in the life of our people have been treated in the first two parts, and the third part has been devoted mainly to the delineation of the secular achievements of our countrymen in the past as well as in the present in the fields of arts, letters and science.

The idea of this Memorial Volume was mooted for the first time more than twelve years ago, though it actually began to take a practical shape towards the beginning of 1932, when a small preliminary committee was appointed to work out the idea.

Several alternative suggestions were made regarding the appropriate form of the Sri Ramakrishna Birth Centenary Memorial Volume. One was to bring out a special edition of the Life and Teachings of Sri Ramakrishna in one volume; but this idea was rejected as there were many such books already before the public. Another idea was to present a picture of the culture and civilization of India epoch by epoch, and, if possible, to get the entire volume written by one person. This suggestion too had to be given up simply because a person competent to write almost an encyclopædia of Indian culture could hardly be found, and also because, even if such a person were available, the work might not be expected to claim the impartiality and authoritativeness that it ought to possess.

The scheme that was taken up after a good deal of deliberation has been worked out in the present publication. It was decided that the Memorial Volume should be dedicated to the developments in the soul and culture of India, so that the numerous topics dealt with might all be viewed in the light of the eternal theme of Indian spiritual thought, namely, to seek, know and realize "the one in the many." In addition

to a treatment of the several epochs of Indian philosophical thought on the lines thus indicated, the book, it was decided, must also attempt to represent how the life of the Indian people found expression in art, literature and science as well as in social, political and economic institutions. And in order to make a synthetic historical presentation of the spiritual culture of our Motherland and also of its expression in the various departments of life, the Publication Committee deemed it necessary that the articles dealing with the different aspects should be written by eminent scholars who had made a special study of the subject.

The aim of the publication as conceived by the Publication Committee and intimated to the writers while inviting articles was stated clearly in the following words: "So far as the philosophical aspects are concerned, the aim of the proposed volume is not to bring out a new book on the history of Indian philosophy, nor merely to describe the various religious systems and sects, but to attempt to show the hopes and aspirations of the race, the meaning and value of life as the great teachers, saints and propounders of the different schools taught and illustrated in their own lives, and how their respective followers understood these teachings and strove to live up to them in their everyday life and conduct. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that the exposition and interpretation of the different schools of thought should lay special emphasis on their bearing on the life and conduct of the people and set forth the *sādhanās* or the ways and means prescribed by each system for the realization of the supreme goal of life." The central object of undertaking such a task, as stated by the Committee, was "to help forward the promotion of mutual understanding, goodwill and amity among the followers of different faiths, as they believed that behind the apparently differing and dissimilar faiths and creeds there was a solid foundation of common interest, unity and ultimate identity in the aims and goal of life." Hence they appealed to the writers to bear in mind the fact that in a volume meant to perpetuate the memory of Sri Ramakrishna, the harbinger of Love and Harmony, it was essential that there should be no room for any word or suggestion which might be interpreted as disparagement of any person or school of thought.

The task before the Publication Committee was undoubtedly a very stiff one, and they had to face innumerable difficulties in the way of executing it. Co-operative enterprise in literary fields, particularly with such an encyclopædic theme, is surely something out of the ordinary and

involves enormous risks and difficulties. However, the Publication Committee have spared no pains to work out their scheme by approaching all eminent scholars belonging particularly to the different universities and cultural centres of India for their precious co-operation. Barring a few who, in spite of their hearty appreciation of the endeavour, could not for unavoidable reasons put in their quota of contribution, all of them gladly accepted our invitation and addressed themselves seriously to the task. It is their generous response that has enabled the Publication Committee to bring out the Memorial Volume in its present form.

Though the work, we are afraid, has not come up to our expectations, we believe that its aim and central object have been fairly achieved, and trust that this pioneer venture will be accepted by the public with due indulgence, at least for the ideal set before them. Having regard to the moderate price of the book its get-up has been made as attractive as possible; and it is confidently hoped that notwithstanding its obvious shortcomings the work will form a unique and really valuable contribution to the permanent literature of the world.

It is a matter of profound regret that three of our contributors, namely, Kirtanacharya Srinivasa Aiyangar, Dr. Prabhat Chandra Chakravarty and Sj. Atal Behari Ghosh passed away while the book was going through the press.

We take this opportunity to convey our grateful thanks to all who have sent their learned contributions and also to those who have kindly placed at our disposal blocks, photographs, etc., for illustrations. Our thanks are also due to those who have kindly helped us financially and in various other ways to bring out the book in its present shape.

Hints on the Pronunciation of Sanskrit and Vernacular Words

a stands for अ and sounds like *o* in *come*.
ā ,, ,, आ ,, ,, ,, *a* ,, *far*.
i ,, ,, इ ,, ,, ,, *i* ,, *bird*.
ī ,, ,, ई ,, ,, ,, *ee* ,, *feel*.
u ,, ,, उ ,, ,, ,, *u* ,, *full*.
ū ,, ,, ऊ ,, ,, ,, *oo* ,, *cool*.
ṛi ,, ,, ऋ ,, may be pronounced like *ri*.
e ,, ,, ए ,, sounds like *e* in *bed*, only longer.
o ,, ,, ओ ,, ,, ,, *o* ,, *note*.

' (apostrophe) stands for ऽ (elided *a*).

ṅ stands for ङ्, ñ for ञ् and ṇ for ण्, and all the three may be pronounced like *n*.

ṭ and ḍ stand for ट् and ड् and are hard like *t* and *d* in English.
t ,, d ,, ,, त् and द् and are soft as in French.
ḷ stands for ळ and sounds somewhat like *r* in *bird*.
v ,, ,, व् ,, ,, like *w*.
ś ,, ,, श् ,, ,, ,, *sh*.
sh ,, ,, ष् ,, may be pronounced as in English.
ṁ ,, ,, ं (*anusvāra*) and sounds like *ng*.
ḥ ,, ,, ः (*visarga*).

The rest of the consonants sound as in English.

Whenever there is any difficulty, the reader is advised to pronounce the words in English, ignoring the diacritical marks, if any.

N.B. Diacritical marks have not generally been used in names of persons belonging to recent times as well as in well-known geographical names.

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
I love India, not because I cultivate the idolatry of geography, not because I have had the chance to be born in her soil, but because she has saved through tumultuous ages the living words that have issued from the illuminated consciousness of her great sons—*Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahma*: Brahma is Truth, Brahma is wisdom, Brahma is infinite; *Śāntam Śivam Advaitam*: Peace is in Brahma, goodness is in Brahma, and the unity of all beings.

Brahma-nishṭho grihasthaḥ syāt
Tattvajñāna-parāyaṇaḥ,
Yad yat karma prakurvīta
Tad Brahmaṇi samarpayet

The householder shall have his life established in Brahma, shall pursue the deeper truth of all things, and in all activities of life dedicate his works to the Eternal Being. Thus we have come to know that what India truly seeks is not a peace which is in negation, or in some mechanical adjustment, but that which is in *Śivam,* in goodness; which is in *Advaitam,* in the truth of perfect union; that India does not enjoin her children to cease from *karma,* but to perform their *karma* in the presence of the Eternal, with the pure knowledge of the spiritual meaning of existence; that this is the true prayer of Mother India:

Ya eko'varṇo bahudhā śaktiyogād
Varṇān anekān nihitārtho dadhāti,
Vichaiti chānte viśvam ādau sa devaḥ
Sa no buddhyā śubhayā saṁyunaktu

He who is one; who is above all colour distinctions, who dispenses the inherent needs of men of all colours, who comprehends all things from their beginning to the end, let Him unite us to one another with wisdom which is the wisdom of goodness.



RAMAKRISHNA

By Frank Dvořák

INTRODUCTION

I

This Centenary Volume brings together the different systems of thought, belief and practice which have developed in India from the dawn of reflection. Though this amorphous mass appears at first sight to be more an encyclopædia of varying philosophies and sects than a continuous and uninterrupted development of one system, closer second thought reveals a pervading unity which binds together the bizarre multiplicity of beliefs and practices. The different systems described in this volume possess a unity of character and attitude which makes the manifold a single whole, which we might describe as the Hindu spirit. The civilization which is inspired by the spiritual insight of our sages is marked by a certain moral integrity, a fundamental loyalty, a fine balance of individual desires and social demands, and it is these that are responsible for its vitality and continuity. To a departure from the ideals can be traced the present weakness and disorder of the Hindu civilization.

Spiritual life is the true genius of India. Those who make the greatest appeal to the Indian mind are not the military conquerors, not the rich merchants or the great diplomats, but the holy sages, the *ṛishis* who embody spirituality at its finest and purest. India's pride is that almost in every generation and in every part of the country, from the time of her recorded history, she has produced these holy men who embody for her all that the country holds most dear and sacred. Though they generally remain away from the main stream of life, kings and commoners pay reverent homage to them and take their advice in the problems of their personal lives as well as in public affairs. By their lives they teach us that pride and power, wealth and glory are nothing in comparison with the power of spirit. It is those who scorn their own lives, that raise life above our scorn.

Sri Ramakrishna is one such *ṛishi,* though not the only one of his kind. He is one of those rare beings in whom the flame of spiritual life burns so brightly that all who come near are able to share the illumination and see the world new-born as on the first day. He is an illustrious

example of the mystical tradition which runs right through the religious history of this country from the days of the Vedic *ṛishis*. This tradition may sometimes have been overcome by a ceremonial piety or by a rationalist dogma. Yet it always reappears faithful to its original pattern. Its characteristic tendencies are those set forth in the Upanishads.

II

Religion is a matter of experience. It is not an awakening from a swoon, but a transformation of one's being. It is not an addition to one's intellectual furniture, but an exaltation of one's personality into the plane of the universal spirit. It is *Brahmadarśana*—insight into reality, a direct awareness of the world of values.

Religious experience is not to be confused with the pursuit of truth, beauty or goodness. It is a life of adoring love transcending these. The Divine is not a mere sum of knowledge, love and beauty. The ultimate Reality which responds to our demands is more than rational. Religion means awe more than service, holiness more than virtue. We worship not what we can, but what we cannot understand. There is the unknown, the reserve of truth, which the intellect cannot reach and yet feels to lie behind. There is an element of mystery in all religion, an incomprehensible certainty which is not to be explained by grammar or logic. Life is open only to life. Religious experience, when genuine, is characterized by vividness, directness, freshness and joy. In it we feel the impact of Reality. It is spiritual discovery, not creation. The men of experience feel the presence of God and do not argue about it. The shoals and shallows of existence are submerged in a flood-tide of joy.

We do not infer God from our feeling of dependence or an analysis of the self. The reality of God is revealed in an immediate intuition of the essential dependence of all finite things, of the priority of absolute to relative being.

Though the experience is beyond reason, it is not opposed to reason. While the Upanishads emphasize the direct awareness of the world of spirit, they also adduce reasons in support of the reality of spirit. Their approach is both objective and subjective.

Each order of reality known to us is only truly apprehended from a standpoint higher than itself. The significance of the physical world (*anna*) is disclosed in the biological (*prāṇa*); that of the biological in

the psychological (*manas*); that of the psychological in the logical and ethical (*vijñāna*). The logical finds its meaning in the spiritual (*ānanda*). The drift of the world has an underlying tendency, a verifiable direction towards some implied fulfilment. If the vast process of the world leads up to the spiritual, we are justified in finding in the spiritual the best clue to the understanding of the world.

It is now admitted that the forms and properties of matter, animals and plants in their varied classes and orders, human beings with their power of choice between good and evil, did not come into existence in their present form by a direct act of Almighty God, but assumed their present forms in slow obedience to a general law of change. The higher exerts a curious pressure on the happenings of the lower and moulds it. This fact requires explanation and modern philosophers confirm the suggestions of the Upanishads on this question. Professor Lloyd Morgan, who studies the problem from the biological side, affirms that while resultants can be explained as the results of already existing conditions, emergents like the advent of life, mind and reflective personality cannot be explained without the assumption of divine activity. The progressive emergence, in the course of evolution, of life, mind and personality, requires us to assume a creative principle operative in nature, a timeless reality in the temporal.

Professor A. N. Whitehead argues, after Plato, that there are eternal objects, answering to the eternal forms or patterns of Plato, and makes God transcend both the eternal objects and the concrete occasions. He is the active source of limitation or determination. For Plato also, the ideal world ruled by the supreme Idea of the Good is different from the creative God. The Supreme Being is the Ideal world and the Demiurge contemplates the Ideas and their unity in relation to the Idea of the Good and reproduces this heavenly pattern as far as is possible in time and space. Plato does not tell us what exactly the relation of form to sensible fact is; nor does Whitehead tell us what exactly the relation of eternal object to concrete occasion is. Is a sensible thing a mere assemblage of forms or eternal objects or universals or is it more? Aristotle felt that Plato's mistake lay in separating the universal characters from sensible things and setting up these supersensible abstractions as the source of the things we see. Aristotle believes that he gets over the difficulty by affirming that the form exists only in the individual thing and is just its essential character. The solution is not quite so simple. We still ask,

what is the status of scientific objects and how are they related to the things we perceive? What is the position of moral ideas and how are they related to moral facts? Whatever these difficulties may be, it is agreed that the universe is not self-explanatory.

When we consider the nature of cosmic process with its ascent from matter to spirit, we are led to the conception of a supreme Being who is the substantiation of all values. These values are not only the revealed attributes of God but the active causes of the world. Till these values are realized, God is transcendent to the process, though he inspires it. God is the creator, destroyer and sustainer of this universe. He transcends all creatures as the active power in which they take their rise.

An analysis of the self yields the same result. The Upanishads undertake an analysis of the self and make out that the reality of the self is the divine universal consciousness. It is needless to repeat here the careful accounts which the *Chhāndogya* and the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishads* relate.[1] Some modern thinkers arrive at similar results. The *jīvātman* is not a *substance,* but an activity, what Aristotle calls *energeia* or self-maintaining activity. We have to distinguish the logical subject from the substratum of qualities. The former is a logical problem while the latter is an ontological one. So long as we adopt the 'substance' theory of the self, difficulties arise. Locke was obliged to reduce substance to an unknowable substratum, a something he knows not what, which supports its attributes, he knows not how. It becomes a superfluous entity and rightly did Berkeley abolish material substance altogether. Its attributes which he called ideas could just as well be said to inhere in one divine mind as in a multitude of unknowable substrata. But Berkeley retained spiritual substance, for, according to him, the essence of any existent thing is to be perceived by a mind. Hume applied a more rigorous analysis. He breaks up the self into a succession of impressions and ideas. He would recognize nothing in the mind except these: "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself," he said, "I always stumble on some particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." He infers that "were all my perceptions removed by death, I should be entirely annihilated." For him there is nothing

[1] See the writer's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*—Allen and Unwin. Revised second edition, 1935.

"simple and continued." "The successive perceptions only constitute the mind."[1] But Hume's analysis does not account for the continuity of self and the feeling of identity. How can a series of feelings be aware of itself as a series? Hume has no answer to this question but takes shelter under "the privilege of a sceptic." Kant, however, was greatly disturbed by the precarious position in which Hume left the problem of knowledge. He started with Hume's analysis and tried to cure its defects by the use of *a priori* principles. But he conceived the self on the analogy of material substance, as the permanent in change, which is necessary for the perception of change. He did not raise the question of the relation of changing attributes to the unchanging substance. Does the substance itself change when the attributes do?

We must seek for the source of substance not in the external persistence in space, but in the internal continuity of memory. The question, why do the contents of the mind hang together, how are they unified, he answers by referring us to the transcendental subject, to which all experiences are finally to be referred. It is the subject which is the correlate of all objects. But it is only the logical subject, and is not to be confused with the metaphysical soul or a spiritual substance which is simple and indissoluble and therefore immortal. Even McTaggart in the second chapter of his *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology* attempts to establish the immortality of the self on the ground of its immutability. But that which is immutable and therefore immortal is not the empirical self. This transcendental self is the Paramātman, functioning in all minds. It is not capable of existing in the plural. There is only one transcendental self and our empirical selves are psychical facts, streams of change. The *jīvātman* is not a substance, but an activity, whose nature is to change continuously. Whether we look at the real from the objective or the subjective point of view, the real can be defined only as spirit.

Though the being of man is spirit, his nature is complex and unstable. There are other grades and kinds of life in the human individual. That is why he has the creaturely sense over against the transcendent majesty of God, the spaceless spirit of all individual spirits.

III

Those who live in God do not care to define. They have a peculiar confidence in the universe, a profound and peaceful acceptance of life

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature*—Ed. Selby Bigge, pp. 252-3.

in all its sides. Their response to ultimate Reality is not capable of a clear-cut, easily intelligible formulation. The mystery of God's being cannot be rationally determined. It remains outside the scope of logical concepts. Its form does not lie in the field of vision, none can see it with the eye. There is no equal to it. An austere silence is more adequate to the experience of God than elaborate descriptions.

The Upanishads often give negative accounts of the supreme Reality. God is nothing that *is*. He is non-being. Pagans like Plotinus, Christians like Nicholas of Cusa support the negative theology of the Upanishads. This negative theology also gives us a knowledge of Divinity. It affirms that Divinity is not perceived by the categories of reason. It is grasped by the revelations of spiritual life.

When positive accounts are given, we abandon concepts in favour of symbols and myths. They are better suited to life which is inexhaustible and unfathomable. God is regarded as father, friend, lover. Infinite power and infinite love are both revelations of God. God is infinite love that pours forth at every time and every place its illimitable grace on all that ardently seek for it. The divine solicitude for man is easy of comprehension when we look upon the Divine as Mother. She wishes to possess us and so will pursue and track us down in our hiding places. God is in search of us. This conception has been made familiar to us by Francis Thomson's *The Hound of Heaven*.[1] Among the worshippers of the Divine as Mother, Ramakrishna holds a high place.[2] In polytheistic religions, the nature of the Divine becomes as it were divided into fragments.

[1] Cf. Pascal's *Mystere de Jesus*. "I have loved thee," said Christ to Pascal, "more ardently than thou hast loved thy defilements."

[2] Compare the lines of *Any Mother* by Katharine Tynan:

"There is no height, no depth, my own, could set us apart
Body of mine and soul of mine; heart of my heart!

. . . .

If some day you came to me heavy with sin,
I, your mother, would run to the door and let you in.
I would wash you white again with my tears and grief,
Body of mine and soul of mine, till you found relief.
Though you had sinned all sins there are 'twixt east and west,
You should find my arms wide for you, your head on my breast.
Child, if I were in Heaven one day and you were in Hell—
Angels white as my spotless one stumbled and fell—
I would leave for you the fields of God and Queen Mary's feet,
Straight to the heart of Hell would go seeking my sweet,
God mayhap would turn him round at sound of the door,
Who is it goes out from me to come back no more?
Then the blessed Mother of God would say from her throne:
Son, 'tis a mother goes to Hell seeking her own."

The positive descriptions are variations of the central theme that God is a person. The negative theology makes out that even personality is a symbol. In later Vedānta, a distinction is drawn between the Absolute Brahman and the Personal Īśvara. Śaṅkara says: "Brahman is realized in its twofold aspect: In one aspect it is endowed with the *upādhis* (adjuncts) of name and form, that are subject to modification and cause differentiation; and in the other it is just the opposite (bereft of all *upādhis*), *i.e.* the transcendental Reality." The Absolute answers to the essential deity of which Eckhart speaks, deeper than God himself and the groundlessness of Boehme. Brahman and Īśvara, Absolute and God, are not contradictory, but complementary to each other. Each is the perspective offered to the mental standpoint of the seeker. Religious experience also lends support to this dual conception. It has normally two sides, an experience of personal intercourse with a personal God as well as a sense of rest and completeness in an absolute spirit which is more than personal. If the latter alone were experienced, we should not lapse from the condition of absolute freedom. It is because our natures are rooted in the world of space-time as well, that we look up to the Absolute as something different from us, with whom it is possible for us to have personal relations. There are experiences of men who are convinced that they are working with God, thinking and striving under pressure from him. For them God is not an unchanging Absolute, a Being perfect in nature and realization. God is aiming at something through the medium of the human. There is a sense in which God has real need of us and calls us to share in his increasing victories and another in which God is timeless, and completes our being. When we emphasize the former aspect, we call it the Supreme God: when we lay stress on the latter, we call it the Absolute.

There are three terms in constant use in the Indian religious vocabulary, which bring out different aspects of the Supreme: Brahman, Ātman and Īśvara. These words are used with little appreciation of the distinctions implied by them. Brahman is the immense, the vast, the ultimate, permeating all the universe and yet eluding any conceptual definition. We experience its living reality, its otherness, its unconditionedness by all that is of this world. To the logical mind its character is not clear and yet its reality is apprehended as something which contrasts with the time-series. We have direct relationship with it. Brahman is the name we give to that substantial and eternal Being. It is the object

of our metaphysical quest. It is the transcendent and abiding reality which is far beyond the world of succession, though it gives meaning to the process and supports it all through.

Since it is apprehended by us it is clear that we have in us a quality which apprehends it. It is we that possess the ineffable consciousness of the eternal. The soul it is that becomes aware of Brahman. The Absolute is spirit. Though unspeakable in its transcendence, the Supreme is yet the most inward part of our being. Though Brahman in one sense entirely transcends us, in another sense it is intimately present in us. The Eternal Being, Brahman, is spirit, Ātman. That which we indicate with awe as the Absolute, is also our own transcendental essence It is the ground of our being, that in which our reality consists.

Off and on, in some rare moments of our spiritual lite, the soul becomes aware of the presence of the Divine. A strange awe and delight invade the life of the soul and it becomes convinced of the absoluteness of the Divine, which inspires and moulds every detail of our life. To bring out that God is both transcendent and immanent, that he is a presence as well as a purpose, the conception of Īśvara is used. It affirms the ever-present pressure of God on the here and now. He is the lord and giver of life, in this world and yet distinct from it, penetrating all, yet other than all. Īśvara is the Absolute entering into the world of events and persons, operating at various levels but most freely in the world of souls. Īśvara as the divine presence is maintaining, helping and preserving the whole world to move up, at every plane, in every person and at every point, to reach towards greater perfection, to get into conformity with its own thought for the world. It is the pure Absolute, Brahman acting. The religious sense that spiritual energy breaks through from another plane of being, modifying or transforming the chain of cause and effect finds its fulfilment in the concept of Īśvara. As the Upanishad has it: "The divine Intelligence is the lord of all, the all-knower, the indwelling spirit, the source of all, the origin and end of all creation."

IV

In Hinduism the descriptions of the Supreme are many-sided and comprehensive. A catholic religion expresses itself in a variety of forms and comprehends all the relations which exist between man and God.

Some of the great religions of the world select one or the other of the great relations, exalt it to the highest rank, make it the centre and relate all else to it. They become so intolerant as to ignore the possibility of other relations and insist on one's acceptance of its own point of view as giving the sole right of citizenship in the spiritual world. But Hinduism provides enough freedom for a man to go forward and develop along his own characteristic lines. It recognizes that the divine light penetrates only by degrees and is distorted by the obscurity of the medium which receives it. Our conception of God answers to the level of our mind and interests. Hinduism admits that religion cannot be compressed within any juridical system or reduced to any one single doctrine. The different creeds mark out the way of the spirit. Religious life has to be built through their aid. Ramakrishna practised forms of worship not only of the different Hindu sects but also those of Islam and Christianity. From actual experience he established that the goal of all religions is the same. "As the same sugar is made into various figures," Ramakrishna used to say, "so one sweet Mother Divine is worshipped in various climes and ages under various names and forms. Different creeds are but different paths to reach the Almighty. As with one gold various ornaments are made having different forms and names, so one God is worshipped in different countries and ages, has different forms and names."[1] Real contradictions are found more often in mediocre minds, but the vastness of soul of the spiritually profound gathers within itself opinions and tendencies profoundly contradictory.

Idolatry is a much abused term. Even those who oppose it are unable to escape from it. The very word brings up to our mind thoughts of graven images, strange figures of frightful countenances, horrid animals, and shapes and so long as the worshippers confuse these outer symbols with the deeper divine reality, they are victims of idolatry.

But as a matter of fact, religion cannot escape from symbolism, from icons and crucifixes, from rites and dogmas. These forms are employed by religion to focus its faith, but when they become more important than the faith itself, we have idolatry. A symbol does not subject the infinite to the finite, but renders the finite transparent. It aids us to see the infinite through it. When, however, we confuse the symbol with the reality, exalt the relative into the Absolute, difficulties arise and an unjustified idolatry develops.

[1] Max Müller: *The Life and Sayings of Ramakrishna*, p. 100.

It is this idolatry that stands in the way of religious fellowship and understanding to-day. Every dogmatic religion overlooks the spiritual facts and worships the theological opinions. It is more anxious for the spread of its dogmas than for the spiritual education of human race. If we realize the true place of symbolism, then we shall not bother about how men reach the knowledge of spiritual reality.

The different religious groups bound within themselves by means of rites and ceremonies militate against the formation of a human society. Intuitive religion rebels against these communal and national gods, confident in the strength of the one spirit whose presence works and illuminates the whole of mankind.

V

The Absolute which is timeless is reflected in some fashion in our world of space and time. The world is the appearance of the Absolute. It is the *vivarta* of the Absolute. The unity of the Absolute is not affected by the plurality of existent worlds, though the world is an expression of the Absolute. Of course the nature of the Absolute is by no means exhausted by this world or for that matter by any number of such worlds, and the changes of the varied worlds do not in any way affect the unity of the Absolute. We cannot, however, say that the empirical universe is the result of the apprehending consciousness, for that would mean the Absolute is a thing in itself and the world a mere appearance, and there is nothing to tell us whether it is an appearance or whether there is a thing in itself at the back of it. Much the best solution is to admit that the world expresses the Absolute without in any way interfering with its unity and integrity. Such a kind of relationship is what is called *vivarta* by Indian thinkers.

Without being content with such a view we sometimes make out that the real is not pure being which excludes all negation, but a self-conscious principle which involves a certain negation of absolute reality. God is a form of Absolute Being. Even as the world is distinct and is in a sense a negation of the Absolute Being, God is a limited expression of the Absolute. So far as God is concerned, the world is as necessary to God as God is to the world. God would not be God but for the world which expresses him. The world is an expression or *pariṇāma* of God, though a *vivarta* of the Absolute.

VI

The idea of *karma* has been with us from the beginning of philosophic reflection. The self is a composite of mind, body and activities.[1] Surely "one becomes good by good action, and bad by bad action."[2] When a man dies, the two things that accompany him are *vidyā* and *karma*.[3] "According as one acts, according as one conducts, so does one become."[4] Desire becomes action and actions determine the course of life. Evolution of life goes on until salvation is attained.

Salvation or *mukti* is life eternal and has nothing to do with continuance in endless time. No adequate account of *mukti* can be given since it transcends the limitations with which human life is bound up. So the question of the nature of salvation, whether it is individual or universal, has no relevance or meaning when applied to life eternal, which is altogether a different life.

The question becomes important when we attempt to describe the state of salvation from the standpoint of the empirical world. Whether salvation is individual or universal has significance only on the basis of the plurality of individual souls on the empirical plane. If in this universe we have only one soul, then salvation of that soul means the redemption of the whole universe. In the *ekajīvavāda*, universal salvation and individual salvation are identical.

Though some later Advaitins adopt this position, Śaṅkara is opposed to it. If all the different souls are only one *jīva*, then, when, for the first time, any soul attains liberation, bondage should have terminated for all, which is not the case. He says: "No man can actually annihilate this whole existing world. . . . And if it actually could be done, the first released person would have done it once for all, so that at present the whole world would be empty, earth and all other substances having been finally annihilated."[5]

From the empirical standpoint a plurality of individuals is assumed by Śaṅkara and many of his followers. On this view salvation does not involve the destruction of the world. It implies the disappearance of a false view of the world. The idea is further elucidated by Śaṅkara in the *Sūtra-bhāshya:* "Of what nature is that so-called annihilation

[1] *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, I—6-1.
[2] *Ibid.* III—2-13.
[3] *Ibid.* IV—4-2.
[4] *Ibid.* IV—4-5.
[5] *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*, III—2-21.

of the apparent world? Is it analogous to the annihilation of hardness in congealed clarified butter (*ghee*), which is effected by bringing it into contact with fire? Or is the apparent world of names and forms which is superimposed upon Brahman by nescience to be dissolved by knowledge, just as the phenomenon of a double moon which is due to a disease of the eyes is removed by the application of medicine?"[1]

Śaṅkara admits that the world appearance persists for the *jīvanmukta* or the *sthitaprajña* of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. The *jīvanmukta*, though he realizes *moksha* or *Brahmabhāva*, still lives in the world. The appearance of multiplicity is not superseded. It is with him as with a patient suffering from *timira* that, though he knows there is only one moon, he sees two. Only it does not deceive the freed soul even as the mirage does not tempt one who has detected its unreal character. Freedom consists in the attainment of a universality of spirit or *sarvātma-bhāva*. Embodiment continues after the rise of the saving knowledge. Though the spirit is released, the body persists. While the individual has attained inner harmony and freedom, the world appearance still persists and engages his energies. Full freedom demands the destruction of the world appearance as well. Śaṅkara's view of the *jīvanmukta* condition makes out that inner perfection and work in the finite universe can go together.

It is usually thought that at death the soul attains final liberation or *videhamukti*. It is not easy to reconcile this view with Śaṅkara's other statement that Apāntaratamas, Bhṛigu and Nārada even after death work for the saving of the world.[2] These are said to be the "possessors of the complete knowledge of the Vedas." Śaṅkara writes: "The continuance of the bodily existence of Apāntaratamas and others depends on the offices which they discharge for the sake of the world. As the sun, who after having for thousands of ages performed the office of watching over these worlds, at the end of that period enjoys the condition of release in which he neither rises nor sets, so Apāntaratamas and others continue as individuals, although they possess complete knowledge which is the cause of release and obtain release only when their office comes to an end." So long as their offices last their *karmas* cannot be said to be exhausted. Śaṅkara here admits that *samyagdarśana*, though it is the cause of release, does not bring about final release and the liberated individuals are

[1] *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*, III—2-21.
[2] *Ibid*. III—3-32.

expected to contribute to *lokasthiti* or world maintenance. Their *karma* can never be fully exhausted, so long as the world demands their services.

This view is not to be confused with *kramamukti* or gradual release which is the aim of those who are devoted to *Kārya-Brahma* or Hiraṇyagarbha.[1] Śaṅkara is discussing not gradual release, but release consequent on *Brahmajñāna* which is attainable here and now: and for even such released souls, persistence of individuality is held not only as possible by Śaṅkara but necessary in the interests of what is called *lokasthiti*. In other words, the world will persist as long as there are souls subject to bondage. It terminates only when all are released, *i.e.* absolute salvation is possible with world redemption.

Such a view of Śaṅkara's philosophy is by no means new. Appaya Dīkshiṭa, for example, takes his stand on those passages in Śaṅkara where the *jīva* is said to be of the nature of Īśvara and not Brahman, and holds that the liberated individuals attain communion with Īśvara and not union with Brahman. "The Self of the Highest Lord is the real nature of the embodied self" (III—4-8), and so he contends that Śaṅkara supports the view of *moksha* as attaining the nature of Īśvara. He also suggests that when all the *jīvas* attain liberation, the world with the liberated souls and Īśvara lapse into the Absolute where there is neither subject nor object, neither world nor God. But so long as some souls are unredeemed, even the liberated are in the world, which is governed by Īśvara, though filled by the spirit of oneness of all, and fulfil their redemptive functions.

That the individual does not become identical with Brahman but only with Īśvara comes out from what is called the theory of reflection or *bimbapratibimbavāda*. When a face is reflected in a number of mirrors, the destruction of a particular mirror means only its lapse into the reflecting face and not the face in itself. It is only when all reflection ceases, *i.e.* when all mirrors are destroyed that the reflecting face disappears and the face in itself appears. The full release or the attainment of Brahman is possible only when all *avidyās* are destroyed. Until then, release means only identity with Īśvara.

If such a view is adopted, two conditions are essential for final salvation: (1) inward perfection attained by intuition of self, (2) outer perfection possible only with the liberation of all. The liberated souls which obtain the first condition continue to work for the second and will

[1] These attain liberation when the office of Hiraṇyagarbha terminates.

attain final release when the world as such is redeemed. To be saved in the former sense is to see the self all in all, to see all things in the self and to live in the self with all things. To be perfect is to be oneself and all else; it is to be the universe. It is to give oneself so that all might be saved. Commenting on the *Muṇḍaka Upanishad* text (III—2-15), Śaṅkara says: "He who has reached the all-penetrating Ātman enters into the all." Kumārila in his *Tantravārttika* quotes Buddha as saying: "Let all the sins of the world fall on me and let the world be saved."[1]

The liberated individual has the consciousness of the timeless infinite and with that as his background, takes his place in the temporal world. He has what the seers called *trikāladṛishṭi*, an intuition of time in which past, present and future exist together for ever in the self-knowledge and self-power of the Eternal. He is no more swept helplessly on the stress of the moments. He lives in the consciousness of the universal mind and works for the welfare of the world in an unselfish spirit. True renunciation is not abandonment of action, but unselfish conduct.

CONCLUSION

While the sayings of Ramakrishna did not penetrate so much into academic circles, they found their way into lonely hearts who have been stranded in their pursuit of pleasure and selfish desires. Under the inspiration of this great teacher there has been a powerful revival of social compassion. Educational and medical work is done throughout the country. He has helped to raise from the dust the fallen standard of Hinduism, not in words merely, but in works also.

[1] See the writer's *An Idealist View of Life*, Ch. VII.

I

THE VEDAS AND THE UPANISHADS

THE VEDAS AND THEIR RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS

A Hindu is taught by tradition and belief to trace the original source of his cultural life to the dim prehistoric past of the Vedic age. The Vedas are held to be divine truths revealed from time to time to the *ṛishis* in their supra-normal consciousness. It is believed that they *saw* the Supreme Truth and so they are glorified by the name *ṛishi*. The religion, philosophy, ritualistic practices, civic conduct and even social relations of a Hindu are supposed to be guided by those codes which are now known as Smṛitis, but all of them are based upon the sacred sanction of Vedic authority. Even the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are to be read as commentaries on the sacred Vedas. Manu, the greatest lawgiver of India, has explicitly told us that these should be considered as an elaboration of the Vedas. It is a recognized rule of procedure that whenever there seems to be a difference between the Śruti (the Vedas) and the Smṛiti (the Purāṇas and other works), the Śruti has to be upheld as the supreme authority and the Smṛiti has to be interpreted in consonance with that. No school of orthodox philosophy will be recognized as valid and be acceptable by an Aryan of cultured mind, if it is not supported by the authority of the Vedas. The whole life of a Hindu from the conception up to the last rites on the funeral pyre, has to be sanctified by the recitation of Vedic *mantras* (sacred texts). From these facts it may easily be conceived how profound has been the influence of the Vedas upon this great and most ancient of the civilized nations of the world.

Modern Vedic scholars, both of the West and the East, have attempted to reinterpret the Vedic scriptures in a way different from the traditional mode of exegesis and belief. In this new departure they are mainly guided by the thought of primitiveness of the age, when the human mind could not have formed higher conceptions of life and reality than what obtain to-day in human society. Further, their principal basis for the interpretation is comparative philology and records of contemporaneous thought-life in other parts of the world. Moreover, as the human mind can seldom emancipate itself from certain predilections and prejudices due to upbringing and the environment, these are often found to colour the interpretation of the Vedas by modern scholars. If they are bent

upon seeing in the early sacred pronouncements of the Indo-Aryans nothing but the gibberings of a primitive mind crudely expressed and clumsily followed, perhaps it will not be out of place here to take into consideration the viewpoint of the Hindu himself about his most sacred scriptures which he has learnt to revere and interpret in the light of the tradition handed down from generation to generation through scores of centuries. Even if it be not taken as a corrective to the modernistic interpretation, it can at least open an avenue of thought, the pursuance of which will surely repay the labour bestowed on the study of these sacred books.

The Vedic scriptures, broadly speaking, comprise four great works, viz. *Ṛig-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda* and *Atharva-Veda.* Each of these again has three main divisions, viz. the Saṁhitās (collections of sacred texts), the Brāhmaṇas (commentaries) and the Āraṇyakas (forest-books). According to the Vedic lexicographer Yāska, there are only two divisions of the Vedas, *i.e.* the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas forming only a part of the latter; this is the view also of Āpastamba, one of the most reputed lawgivers of ancient India. The famous Upanishads are mostly different chapters of the Āraṇyakas. Some scholars include in the Vedic literature a body of *Sūtras* (aphorisms) known as *Kalpa-sūtras.* The Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇas are loosely designated as *karmakāṇḍa* (the portion pertaining to rituals), the Āraṇyakas as *upāsanākāṇḍa* (the portion relating to meditation) and the Upanishads as *jñānakāṇḍa* (the portion dealing with supreme knowledge).

There are five Saṁhitās in all, viz. *Ṛig-Veda Saṁhitā, Taittirīya Saṁhitā* or *Black Yajur-Veda, Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* or *White Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda Saṁhitā* and *Atharva-Veda Saṁhitā.* And these collections of sacred texts called *mantras* are both in prose and in verse of different metres, and are mostly addressed in prayer to various gods and goddesses. They are meant to be recited in different ritualistic performances, and often express the loftiest sentiments that man can feel. But as the mere recitation of these sacred texts is supposed to have a spiritual value, their application is mostly in relation to some ritual or sacrifice (*yajña*). Hence they are included in the *karmakāṇḍa* or ritualistic portion of Vedas.

The Brāhmaṇas are mostly in prose, containing detailed descriptions of the sacrificial rites and the modes of their performance. They con-

tain, according to the great commentator Sāyaṇa, eight classes of topics, viz. Itihāsa, Purāṇa, Vidyā, Upanishad, Śloka, Sūtra, Vyākhyāna and Anuvyākhyāna (*i.e.* history, old stories, esoteric knowledge about meditation, supreme knowledge, verses, aphorisms, explanations and elaborations). Each of the Vedas possesses one or more Brāhmaṇas. The *Ṛig-Veda* has four, viz. *Kaushītaki, Aitareya, Paiṅgirahasya* and *Śāṭyāyāna*. The *Sāma-Veda* has eight, viz. *Sāma-vidhāna, Mantra, Ārsheya, Vaṁśa, Daivatādhyāya, Talavakāra, Tāṇḍya* and *Saṁhitopanishad*. The *Black Yajur-Veda* has four, viz. *Taittirīya, Vallabhī, Satyāyanī* and *Maitrāyaṇī*. The *White Yajur-Veda* has only one, viz. *Śatapatha*, having two recensions—*Mādhyandina* and *Kāṇva*. The *Atharva-Veda* also has one, viz. *Gopatha*.

The Āraṇyakas are mostly independent works, although they are considered to be a part of the Brāhmaṇas, as Yāska would divide Vedic literature only into two groups, the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas. But these Āraṇyakas are for all practical purposes quite independent of the Brāhmaṇas, excepting perhaps the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* of the *Black Yajur-Veda* which forms the latter part of the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*. The Upanishads, as already said, are mostly chapters of these Āraṇyakas, excepting the *Īśa*, which forms the fortieth and last chapter of the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* (*White Yajur-Veda*). Many Āraṇyakas belonging to different Vedas are now lost. In most cases only the Upanishadic chapters of these wonderful books have survived the onslaught of time. Though at present there are more than one hundred and eight Upanishads claiming to belong to one or the other of the Vedas, the most ancient commentator of the Upanishads, Saṅkarāchārya, has recognized only sixteen of them to be authentic and authoritative. Of these Upanishads, *Aitareya* and *Kaushītaki* belong to the *Ṛig-Veda; Kaṭha, Taittirīya, Kaivalya, Śvetāśvatara* and *Nārāyaṇa* belong to the *Black Yajur-Veda; Īśa, Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and *Jābāla* belong to the *White Yajur-Veda; Kena* and *Chhāndogya* belong to the *Sāma-Veda* and *Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍūkya* and *Nṛisiṁhatāpanī* belong to the *Atharva-Veda*.

According to the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, the original Veda, first revealed by God to the *ṛishis*, consisted of one hundred thousand verses, and had four divisions. With the efflux of time these divisions got mixed up and many portions of the Vedas fell into obscurity. So in the beginning of the Dvāpara Age, Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana resuscitated the Vedic study and classified the work according to the four ancient divisions of *Ṛich, Yajus,*

Sāman and *Atharvan*. In order to perpetuate the study of the Vedas in a proper form, he taught them to his four principal disciples. He gave the *Ṛig-Veda* to Paila, the *Yajur-Veda* to Vaiśampāyana, the *Sāma-Veda* to Jaimini, and the *Atharva-Veda* to Sumanta. As he reclassified the Vedas, he became renowned by the name of Veda-Vyāsa, *i.e.* classifier of the Vedas. This tradition is so strong among the Hindu scholars that it cannot but be accepted as having some historical basis.

The word 'Veda' literally means knowledge and supreme knowledge too. But secondarily it is applied to the above-mentioned books which are considered to be direct revelations from God, embodying the Supreme Truth that could not be gained by any effort of the human mind. So they are called *apaurusheya*, *i.e.* of non-human origin. The great Sāyaṇāchārya has defined 'Veda' in the very beginning of his commentary on the *Black Yajur-Veda* as "a book which reveals the knowledge of supernatural methods (*alaukika upāya*) for the achievement of the desired object and avoidance of the undesirable." Probably taking their stand upon this view, the ancient schools of India classified the Vedic literature into three groups, viz. the *karma*, *upāsanā* and *jñāna kāṇḍas*, as mentioned before. By the first two, men are able to acquire mundane values including the heavenly enjoyments (*abhyudaya*) and through the third, the highest end of human life *niḥśreyasa*, *i.e.* complete emancipation from the thraldom of matter.

There is a consensus of opinion among modern scholars that the *Ṛig-Veda Saṁhitā* is the most ancient record of the religious thoughts of mankind or at any rate of the Indo-Aryans. The orthodox Hindus also hold that it stands first among the Vedic revelations, because wherever mention is made of the Vedic scriptures, the name of the *Ṛig-Veda* comes first. From internal evidence also we notice that the other Saṁhitās are more or less enlargements of certain portions of the *Ṛig-Veda*. Both the *Yajur-Veda* and the *Sāma-Veda* contain considerable portions of the *Ṛig-Veda* with slight additions and alterations. And even the religious import of the other Vedas is only a reflex of what is already contained in the hymns of the *Ṛig-Veda*. The *Atharva-Veda*, which is considered to be the last of the Vedas, also contains many *mantras* of the *Ṛig-Veda*. The very word "*trayī*" which is commonly used to signify the Vedic scriptures, denotes that originally the Vedas were only three in number and that the *Atharva-Veda* was a later addition. It is also a significant fact of Hindu society that while the great

bulk of Brāhmins belong to one or the other of the first three Vedas, the Atharva-Vedic Brāhmins are few and far between at present in India. Pāṇini, the greatest grammarian of India, also supports this view when he describes the Vedas as three. The Vedas are called Śruti, because the traditional method of studying and getting them by heart is by hearing them recited by the preceptor.

These four Saṁhitās were generally used for recitations during the performance of a sacrifice like *soma-yāga* by the four principal priests who sat on the four sides of the sacrificial altar. *Brahman*, the main priest who presides over the entire sacrificial function, sits on the northern side of the altar; on his right side sits the priest called *udgātṛi*, on his left side the priest called *hotṛi* and on the side opposite to him the priest named *adhvaryu*. *Brahman* performs his function by reciting the *Atharva-Veda; hotṛi*, the *Ṛig-Veda; udgātṛi*, the *Sāma-Veda* and *adhvaryu* pours oblations into the sacrificial fire by reciting the *mantras* of the *Yajur-Veda*. Besides these, the various other *mantras* belonging to different Saṁhitās are recited on different occasions either to sanctify persons or things or the departed spirits of the dead. Certain texts of the *Yajur-Veda* and the *Atharva-Veda* are concerned with black magic.

These are, in short, the different applications of the Saṁhitās or the Mantra portion of the four Vedas. Therefore they are considered parts of rituals belonging to the *karmakāṇḍa*. And the notion was so deep-rooted and general among the ancients in India that a particular school of Vedic scholars, known as the Mīmāṁsakas, holds the view, as Jaimini has codified it in his aphorisms, that "the main purpose of the Vedas is to denote some *karma* or rite and therefore all those portions which do not explicitly speak of rituals should be considered as redundant or figurative." But there is still another school of Vedic scholars who hold that the main purpose of the Vedas is twofold, namely, the attainment of mundane welfare including heavenly enjoyments and the realization of the supreme spiritual beatitude; whereas the *karmakāṇḍa* and the *upāsanākāṇḍa* speak of the former attainments, the Upanishads or the Vedānta (the final part of the Vedas) deal principally with the knowledge of the Transcendental Reality, the 'really Real,' the realization of which alone can dispel the ignorance that leads man to bondage and misery. It may be noted here that these two principal divisions of Vedic scriptures are generally accepted by all Hindu scholars, both ancient and modern. And all the different orthodox systems of philosophy as well as the various

ritualistic observances that sprang up from time to time within the fold of orthodox Hinduism, known as *sanātana-dharma*, own allegiance to one or the other portion of the Vedas in order to show their authenticity and thus gain a divine sanction, as it were.

But it becomes clear from the contents of both the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas that this division into the *karmakāṇḍa* and *jñānakāṇḍa* is rather loose and artificial, although much emphasis has been laid upon the rule of exegesis which asserts that the real meaning of a particular chapter of Vedic text should be determined by noting the trend of its introduction and conclusion as well as by the constant repetition of the theme in between. This, according to the orthodox commentators, should settle to which *kāṇḍa* a particular text belongs. Thus the *Īśa Upanishad* occurring in the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā*, the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* forming the seventeenth chapter of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* consisting of the last eight chapters of the *Mantra Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kena Upanishad* covering chapters 135 to 145 of the *Talavakāra Brāhmaṇa* are all considered Upanishads, *i.e.* within the *jñānakāṇḍa*, in spite of their being placed right in the midst of the Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇas. Sometimes we notice texts interspersed throughout the Brāhmaṇa and Saṁhitā literature, which express philosophical and religious thoughts of an exceedingly exalted type, quite on a par with those of any text of the Upanishads. For instance, we have in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, "Agni is fixed in speech, speech in the heart, the heart in me, myself in the immortal, the immortal in the Brahman,"[1] and so on. Here we notice the wonderful synthesis of the physical world with the individual soul and the cosmic soul. Similarly, there are innumerable texts in the Saṁhitās themselves which sound a transcendental note and are of high spiritual value.

The Indo-Aryans, being placed in the midst of the grandeur and sublimity of nature, turned poetic in mind. The towering snow-peaks of the Himalayas, vast green meadows, gigantic rivers, boundless seas encircling the land on three sides, the ineffable splendour of the seasons—all produced an abiding effect upon the early Aryan's mind and turned him into a poet, a sage, a seer. Nurtured amid such environments, the Aryan in India must have been developing, from a very early period of his racial life, a spiritual temperament and a deep introspective mind which separated him from the rest of the world. In the pre-Vedic period his

[1] *Tait. Br.* III.10.8.4.

poetic temperament must have been deeply stirred by some of the grand aspects of nature, and in his childlike simplicity he began to feel in these outstanding natural phenomena expressions and emblems of some spiritual beings and offered worship unto them with awe and reverence. Mitra —the sun, Varuṇa—the god of the night or blue sky, Dyu and Pṛithvī—the sky and the earth, and Agni or fire—all these are pre-Vedic deities who were worshipped with simple or complex rites from the most ancient days of Aryan history. Even the so-called pre-Vedic civilization of the Indus valley, as is evidenced from the Mohenjo-daro and Harappa finds, does not exhibit any alien or different type of culture or religion, but only earlier expressions of the thought-life of the Aryans which in later days got developed, sublimated and crystallized in the form of Vedic civilization. There is hardly any single item among the finds of these two places which could not be linked with the early cultural life of the Aryans as we glean it from the Vedas. On the other hand, the presence of the *liṅga*, the *yūpa*, etc., among the finds, as well as of some articles of domestic use, reminds us of the Vedic age as we understand it from the hymns of the *Ṛig-Veda*. The worship of animals, birds and reptiles is almost universal with primitive humanity and their existence does in no way connote a departure from the early Aryan type of religious culture. In every human society and at all times there must be men of different levels of understanding, feeling and culture. Even to-day, along with the noblest type of spiritual ideal we notice in every nation the presence of the crudest type of animism. So we need not wonder that even in those prehistoric days of Aryan life there were thinkers of sublime thought and men of high culture living side by side with persons who were rank animists and fetishists.

In the *Ṛig-Veda* we find a wonderful process of sublimation of all those pre-Vedic gods. The Vedic sage, while contemplating upon the true significance of Dyu and Pṛithvī, caught a glimpse of infinity and he called it Aditi. She is considered the mother of all other gods, the Ādityas. Prof. Max Muller says, "Aditi, an ancient god or goddess is in reality the earliest name invented to express the Infinite; not the Infinite as the result of a long process of abstract reasoning, but the visible Infinite, visible by the naked eye, the endless expanse, beyond the earth, beyond the clouds, beyond the sky."[1] The root meaning of the word 'Aditi' is 'unbroken, indivisible or infinite.' Yāska describes Aditi

[1] *Ṛig-Veda*, translation, Vol. I, p. 230.

as 'mother of gods.' It is very significant that the Vedic bards could intuitively understand the one indivisible, immanent Principle even in that early period of Ṛig-Vedic age, and could feel its existence not only as a reality but also as the progenitor of all other spiritual entities controlling this inscrutable physical universe around us which we loosely call nature. Though there are not many hymns in the *Ṛig-Veda* dedicated to this 'mother of gods,' still the names 'Aditi' and 'Ādityas' are often met with in all the Vedic texts. In one place we find the following pronouncement: "Aditi is the intermediary space; Aditi is the celestial sphere; Aditi is the mother, the father, the son; Aditi is all gods, the five classes of beings, the created, and is again the cause of creation."[1] And on the strength of this name and its supposed connection with the origin of gods, grand legends were manufactured subsequently in the Purāṇic age.

Next, we notice that the *rishis* of the *Ṛig-Veda* looked upon the universe as possessed of three different strata or planes of existence: The topmost plane is called *dyuloka* or celestial sphere; next comes the *antarikshaloka*, the sphere of intermediary space; the third is the *bhūrloka* or the terrestrial sphere. In these spheres there are three presiding deities: Savitṛi or Sūrya (the sun) is the god of the celestial world; Indra or Vāyu (air) is the god of the intermediary space; and Agni (fire) is the god of the terrestrial region. These three gods again were multiplied into thirty-three, there being eleven in each sphere.[2] There are innumerable passages in the *Ṛig-Veda* as well as in the other Vedas indicating the existence of these thirty-three gods. According to the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* they consist of the eight Vasus, the eleven Rudras, the twelve Ādityas, Dyu (sky) and Pṛithivī (earth).[3] The following are the eight Vasus: Dhava, Dhruva, Soma, Āpa, Anila, Anala, Pratyūsha and Prabhāsa. The twelve Ādityas are: Dhātṛi, Mitra, Aryaman, Rudra, Varuṇa, Sūrya, Bhaga, Vivasvat, Pūshan, Savitṛi, Tvashtṛi and Vishṇu. According to the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, these twelve Ādityas are the twelve names of the sun for the twelve months of the year.[4] The names of the eleven Rudras are not clearly mentioned in the Vedas; but they have been variously referred to in the *Yajur-Veda* and *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*. We get the following names of the eleven Rudras from the *Mahābhārata*, viz. Mṛigavyādha, Sarpa, Niṛiti, Ajaikapāda, Ahirbudhna,

[1] *Ṛ. V.* I.89.10 [2] *Tait. Saṁ.* I.4.10; *Ṛ. V.* I.139.11.
[3] *Śat. Br.* IV.5.7.2. [4] *Ibid.* XI.6.3.8.

Pinākin, Dahana, Īśvara, Kapālin, Sthāṇu and Bhaga.[1] These thirty-three gods were augmented again into three thousand three hundred and thirty-nine gods, as we read in the *Ṛig-Veda*.[2] The great commentator Sāyaṇa, while commenting on this passage, tells us that the original gods are only three, and these three thousand three hundred and thirty-nine gods are but enumerations of the glories of the thirty-three gods referred to above. The number was afterwards increased to thirty-three crores, meaning the countless number of deities presiding over the different aspects of both life and nature. But the original conception of one developing into three, then into thirty-three and subsequently into infinite aspects of the spiritual force is never lost sight of. This point has been very beautifully explained by *ṛishi* Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* (III.9.1-3).

It has been the unique realization of the Indian sages from very early days to recognize the existence of one in the many: "The golden-winged is one, the wise Brāhmins call it by various words."[3] The Vedic sages, while contemplating upon the different aspects of nature and the workings of the mighty elemental forces, could not help conceiving the existence of spiritual entities behind inert matter. It has been already mentioned that Mitra was a pre-Vedic god, so also was the sun. Of all the natural phenomena, the sun is the most engaging and dominant expression of grandeur. Moreover, since with its rising the whole living world awakes to life, and with its setting it goes back to the inactivity of sleep, the seeming death, therefore the primitive man was not only struck by the sun's grandeur, but contemplated it as the one source of life and energy. Sun-worship was almost universal in ancient times. But in Vedic India we find the sun-god of the primitive age transformed and sublimated. It was first imagined that the celestial god, *i.e.* Āditya—the sun, one of the Trinity, had twelve aspects, according to the twelve months of the year, or it may be, as some hold, according to the different hours of the day. In the *Ṛig-Veda* we meet with the names of six Ādityas[4] only. Of these the most important ones are Mitra, Varuṇa, Bhaga, Savitṛi, Vishṇu and Indra.

Some of the most sublime hymns of the *Ṛig-Veda* are dedicated to Mitra and Varuṇa. Mitra symbolized light and was considered to be the god of day and Varuṇa the deity of the deep blue sky; the root meaning of the word 'Varuṇa' is 'one that covers.' Evidently from these ideas

[1] *Mahābh.* I.121. [2] *R. V.* III.9.9. [3] *Ibid.* X.114.5. [4] *Ibid.* I.9.114.

the Vedic sages gave a turn to their previous conceptions of these gods and considered them first as dual aspects of some potent and mysterious principle that hides its true nature from the popular gaze. If Mitra was the god of light and the day, Varuṇa became his counterpart, the god of the blue sky or night (nocturnal heaven). Here are a few specimens of the beautiful hymns addressed to these two deities: "O Mitra and Varuṇa, you are mighty ones and increase the might (of the devotees). You hold the three celestial regions, the three shining worlds and the three terrestrial worlds. O Mitra and Varuṇa, it is under your command that the cows give milk, the rivers give sweet waters, and the three shining gods (*i.e.* Agni, Vāyu and Āditya) exist while carrying and raining waters."[1] Another very beautiful hymn on Varuṇa occurs in the *Atharva-Veda* (IV.16): "The mighty ruler of these worlds beholds as though from close at hand the man who thinks he acts by stealth: all this the gods perceive and know. If a man stands or walks or moves in secret, goes to his bed or rises, or what two men whisper as they sit together, King Varuṇa knows: He as the third is present. This earth, too, is King Varuṇa's possession, and the high heaven whose ends are far asunder. The loins of Varuṇa are both the oceans, and this small drop of water, too, contains him. If one should flee afar beyond the heaven, king Varuṇa would still be round about him." In the words of Roth, we may say that there is no hymn in the whole of Vedic literature which expresses divine omnipresence and omniscience so forcibly.

The next god in importance among the Ādityas is Savitṛi or the sun. Though the commentators Sāyaṇa and Yāska try to differentiate between Savitṛi and Sūrya, calling them two different aspects of the sun, yet in the whole of the *Ṛig-Veda* both the terms were used for one identical god. The sun is often described as golden-handed and is conceived to be seated in a chariot moving on one wheel to which are yoked seven horses (rays of the sun); he has been presented as the great giver of life, wealth and energy. But just like Varuṇa, Mitra and other gods, even the conception of Sūrya or Savitṛi was sublimated into a transcendental Principle as indicated in the following *gāyatri-mantra* of the *Ṛig-Veda*: "We meditate upon the glorious effulgence of that Savitṛi; may he direct our intellect towards him."[2] In this *ṛich* the *ṛishi* indicates the unity of the Principle which shines as the light of the sun in heaven as well as the light of intelligence in man. This *mantra*

[1] *R. V.* V.69.1-2. [2] *Ibid.* III.62.10.



SŪRYA



VARUNA

Courtesy Mr. O. C. Gangoly

occurs also in the *White Yajur-Veda* (IV.35) and the *Sāma-Veda* (II.8.12) and is regarded as the most sacred formula for meditation among the upper three castes. There are ample evidences both in the Saṁhitās and in other parts of the Vedas that the Vedic sages treated the physical sun only as a symbol (*pratīka*) of the Supreme Being whose spiritual rays of intelligence they adored.[1]

Another Āditya who occupies a prominent place in the *Ṛig-Veda* and whose worship has become a matter of very great importance in the subsequent development of the Vedic religion is Vishṇu. Though there are not many *ṛiches* in the *Ṛig-Veda* dedicated to him, yet those hymns are full of sublime thought and spiritual meaning. Vishṇu is often described as covering the whole universe in three strides. Though he was conceived as identical with the sun, yet this was with a different implication as the following *ṛiches* show:

"Three of these worlds Vishṇu strode; thrice did he plant his foot. The whole of this universe was gathered in the dust of his footsteps.

"Vishṇu, the guardian of all, he whom none can deceive, made three strides and thenceforth established the *dharma*."

"As eyes behold the all-encompassing sky, so do the wise ones see the supreme state of Vishṇu.

"The ever prayerful and awakened wise realize that supreme state of Vishṇu."[2]

In these verses the sage clearly identifies Vishṇu with the Supreme Being. The third verse is very important with the orthodox Hindus, as it is always uttered before offering prayers to God. Prof. Max Muller tells us that "the stepping of Vishṇu is emblematic of the rising, the culminating and the setting of the sun."[3] But it signified also the immanence of Vishṇu. Yāska says on this passage, "All this is the expression of the power of Vishṇu. His three strides are the threefold aspect of existence, namely, the terrestrial, the etherial and the celestial."[4] Another commentator, Durgāchārya, says, "Vishṇu is no other than the sun. His . . . . three strides are but his three aspects presiding over the three spheres. He exists in terrestrial region as Agni, in the etherial region as lightning and in the celestial region as the god Savitṛi." But the root meaning of the word Vishṇu must have played a very important part in enlarging the inner significance of the deity. Vishṇu

[1] *Vājasaneyi Saṁ.* (*Mādh.*) XI 15 16. [2] *R. V.* I.22.17, 18, 20, 21.
[3] *R. V.*, translation, Vol. I, p. 117. [4] *Nirukta* 12 19.

means the immanent, all-pervasive Principle. So the Vedic sage, while contemplating a particular deity with a limited conception, soared far above the limitations of the sensuous world and beheld the true nature of the deity as an all-pervading immanent Principle analogous to the pervasive sky. Thus we see how the conception of a divinity is sublimated in the *Ṛig-Veda*.

By far the most important god of the *Ṛig-Veda* is Indra, and he is a purely Indo-Aryan god. Though he was included in the twelve Ādityas, and as such was a celestial deity, still he is always conceived as associated with Maruts, the wind gods, whose chief sphere of action is the etherial middle region. Indra is the mighty god who kills the demon Vṛitra, the *asura* of the form of a black serpent (dark monsoon cloud) which holds up the timely rain so viciously. Indra's one performance is to kill this demon Vṛitra and release the sacred rain of heaven so that it may renovate life with green verdure and fresh crops. As the following *ṛich* tells us:

"The darkness withheld the flow of rain. In Vṛitra's hollow side the rain-cloud lay concealed. But Indra released the flowing water, thus gathered up by Vṛitra, into the regions down below."[1] There are innumerable hymns in the *Ṛig-Veda* sung in praise of Indra. But it is often found that the *ṛishis*, while praying to Indra, soared far above the common conception of the deity and caught a glimpse of the eternal Principle in him as well. We give below a few texts in illustration of this point:

"Thou art the limit of this limitless earth. Thou art the ruler of the adorable celestial ones. Thou, in truth, pervadest the whole of the etherial region with thy greatness. None indeed exists like thee."[2]

"O Protector of men, thou art the limit of power of all like the threefold rope (or the thrice twisted rope). Thou art the threefold luminosity in the three regions (sun, lightning and fire). Thou alone canst sustain this universe. Thou art without beginning and foeless."[3]

Though the main bulk of the hymns of the *Ṛig-Veda* dedicated to this particular god is for the achievement of mundane welfare as well as heavenly enjoyments, yet such intuitional flashes of transcendental import are not wholly absent from the meditation of the *ṛishis*.

Of the gods belonging to the etherial region, *i.e.* the intermediary

[1] *Ṛ. V.* I.54.10. [2] *Ibid.* I.52.13. [3] *Ibid.* I.102.8.

space, Vāyu is the most prominent. Marut, the god of storm, and Mātariśvan are but other aspects of the same god.

According to the author of the *Nirukta,* Indra is also the god of space. The eight Vasus, Parjanya (god of cloud), Yama and Yamī (god and goddess of death) and the twin Aśvins, who are variously supposed to be gods of the two twilights or the gods of the early morning, also belong to the intermediary space. Besides these, the Viśvedevas are regarded as the gods responsible for rain, that is, they also belong to the etherial region. The goddess Ushas (the dawn) was considered to be the deity that interlinks both the celestial and the etherial regions. Ṛibhus were originally men but were subsequently changed into gods of space for their good deeds.

Agni, the god of fire, is the greatest of the terrestrial gods. He perhaps, next to Indra, got the largest number of prayers from the Vedic *ṛishis.* Agni is also one of the universally acknowledged pre-Vedic gods whose worship was prevalent among all the different branches of the Aryan race. To the primitives fire was the most useful, yet the rarest phenomenon of nature, and that naturally evoked in the simple mind of the early Aryans a feeling of deep reverence. The very first hymn of the *Ṛig-Veda* opens with the utterance:

" Praise be to Lord Agni, the chosen priest, the shining one, minister of sacrifice and inviter of gods, possessor of great wealth."

" Ruler of sacrifices, god of law eternal, radiant one increasing in thine own abode (sacrificial altar), be unto us easy of approach, ever as of sacrifice and inviter of gods, possessor of great wealth."[1]

In another place he is praised as follows: " O Agni, thou art the giver of joy, lord of men's house, messenger and inviter of gods. Whatever great deeds gods perform, all gather in thee."[2]

In this passage Agni has been called the lord of the house, that is, the terrestrial abode of men, and he was conceived to be the mouth of all gods as the oblations poured into fire reached them through his aid.

Agni was worshipped by another name, Rudra. The Rudras, as already said, were eleven in number. Probably they were the various aspects of fire. Both Sāyaṇa and Yāska take 'Rudra' to mean Agni.[3]

Besides these principal deities there is mention of many minor gods and goddesses in the *Ṛig-Veda.* The full import of their worship is not very clear from the passages we have in record. But from what has been

[1] *Ṛ. V.* I.1.1, 9. [2] *Ibid.* I.36.5. [3] *Ibid.* I.27.10; I 72.4.

stated above in connection with the larger and smaller numbers of the gods, it is obvious that originally these gods may have been conceived to be different deities, but they were afterwards synthesized by the most advanced among the Vedic sages.

At no time all members of a society belong to the same cultural level. As it is noted from actual observation that each society of modern times has men belonging to different levels of cultural life, so it must have been in the prehistoric period also. Nay, this disparity in cultural life must have existed in human society in all ages, even during the very infancy of the human race. It is the belief of the orthodox Hindus that even at the beginning of human society there existed perfected souls and seers of a very high order, and through them spiritual truths and rules of right conduct (*dharma*) were revealed to man from time to time. We can safely conjecture that in the early Vedic period of Indian history there might have existed persons of advanced thinking and high spiritual realization as well as men of crude understanding and simple beliefs. From the hymns of the *Ṛig-Veda* as well as of other Saṁhitās we note that the conception of gods and goddesses as definite spiritual persons having forms and discharging different functions in the economy of nature, must have been prevalent among the people. There were some who avowed that they actually saw the forms of gods. But there were others who disbelieved in their corporeal forms; nay, some even doubted the existence of gods.[1] Then again, there was the idea of sublimation of these gods and goddesses, as we have already seen, in the minds of not a few *ṛishis*. Some of them reached the giddy height of the transcendental and understood the unity of divine essence or spiritual being behind the whole universe. Some *ṛishis* conceived the entire universe as an organic whole and the different aspects of creation as parts of the macrocosmic unity. There was yet another type who synthesized human society into one being, the Purusha.

The following are some of the oft-quoted *mantras* of the *Ṛig-Veda* which signify the unity of the Godhead:

"The wise call Him Indra, Agni, Varuṇa, that heavenly golden-winged Marutvat (the sun). To what is one, sages give many a name: they call Him Agni, Yama and Mātariśvan."[2]

"The great divinity of the gods is one."[3]

In the whole of this *Sūkta* the *ṛishi* takes a grand synthetic view

[1] *Ṛ. V.* VIII 100.3, 4, 5 [2] *Ibid.* I.164.46 [3] *Ibid.* III 55.

of the spiritual force which is responsible for such a beautiful harmony in the different activities of nature: The same fire that burns on the sacrificial altar blazes also as the jungle fire; it flashes as lightning in the sky, and shines as the celestial sun. He ripens the corn as heat, produces the day and night by the rising and setting sun; it is the same principle that produces rain, expresses the lightning, produces vegetation and sustains life.

In the famous *Haṁsavatī ṛich* it is mentioned: " As light he dwells in the luminous sky; as Vasu (air) he dwells in the mid-space; as a *hotṛi* (fire) he exists on the sacrificial altar; as a guest he exists in the house; (as life) he exists in man; as right (*ṛita*) he exists (everywhere); as Supreme Entity he exists. He shines in sacrifices, in the sky, in water, in light, in mountains and in Truth."[1] In this *mantra*, the *ṛishi* has synthesized all divinities into one ensouling Principle, the Supreme Spirit or Paramātman. Further, as Sāyaṇa points out, it tells us the identical unity of the human soul, the gods and the Supreme Soul. It is really wonderful of the Vedic *ṛishis* that while praising their gods they get sudden flashes, as it were, intuitively of the existence of one unitary Principle behind the whole of this universe. The worshippers of Varuṇa and Indra, as we have seen, realized this Unity, so also did the devotees in their praise of Vishṇu.

The *ṛishis* in their metaphysical enquiries conceived an original Creator as the efficient cause of the universe, as is evident in the following lines:

" He who is the father of us all, the procreator, the great Providence, He who knows the whole universe, He is one, yet assumes many names of gods; about Him all people of the world become desirous to know."[2]

In conceiving this metaphysical genesis of creation, the *ṛishis* first caught a glimpse of the Cosmic Mind (Hiraṇyagarbha) or Viśvakarman as the great progenitor of the entire universe. In this conception their mind was plainly struggling between the logical implications of the First Cause in both its material and efficient aspects and the touch of a personal concept as implied by deism and theism:

" At the time of creation what was His basis? How and whence did He start creation, the great Viśvakarman, the Seer of all? How could He extend the sky above and the earth below? His eyes are

[1] *Ṛ. V.* IV.40.5. [2] *Ibid.* X.82.3.

everywhere, His face is everywhere, and He is of all hands and all feet. He, that one God, moves His hands and wings and creates the sky and the earth. What was that forest and what was that tree (material) out of which have been manufactured the earth and the sky? O wise ones, enquire into these in your mind and realize on what basis He created the universe."[1]

From the *Ṛig-Veda* as well as other Vedic literature it becomes clear that the serious thinkers of the Vedic age tried to unravel the mysteries of the universe by three different methods, namely, the theological, the metaphysical, and the psychological methods of analysis. The first and foremost was the theological method by which they realized intuitively through intense devotion, as has already been shown, that their particular god of adoration and worship was ultimately no other than a transcendental impersonal Principle that stands at the back of the whole universe and yet appears to be related to it as its Creator and Preserver. Further on, in their full comprehension of that Supreme Principle they could realize Him as a Cosmic Being (Parama Purusha) and the whole universe as His body:

" The Purusha is of a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet. He exists pervading the whole terrestrial regions and above it by ten fingers (ten quarters or space). Whatever was or whatever will be—all that is Purusha. He is also the master of Immortality, as He is untouched by the fruits of action (*karma*). All these (creation) are His grandeur, but the Purusha is ever superior to all these (in His transcendental aspect). The whole of the universe is only one-fourth (a portion) of his being, the remaining three-fourths remain in celestial immortality,"[2] etc.

In these famous *mantras* the Vedic sage clearly visualizes the immanency of the Intelligent Principle, whose physical vesture is composed of this material universe, but whose inner nature is transcendental.

In the previous hymns of Hiraṇyagarbha and Viśvakarman, the sages were contemplating the theistic origin of creation. The *Purusha Sūkta,* on the other hand, promulgates the pantheistic view of creation. But it tells also of the transcendental aspect of the First Cause. So the theistic view made room for a metaphysical understanding of the problem with all its logical implications. Its consummation we notice in the famous *Nāsadīya Sūkta*:

[1] *Ṛ. V.* X.81.2-4. [2] *Ibid.* X.90.1-3.

" At that time (before creation) there was neither aught nor naught (the manifest and the unmanifest). There was neither this terrestrial region, nor the far expanding etherial region above. Was there anything that covers (the mist or *māyā*)? Who lived where? Was there austerity (knowledge or will).

" Then there was neither death nor immortality (mortals and immortals); nor were there the night and day and their difference. Then there existed that sole One (Supreme Self) without a stir or breath (action or change). There was nothing else but the One.

" Then there was darkness enveloped in darkness. All was undifferentiated, engulfed in water (the primal cause). What existed was enveloped with unreality (*māyā*). His grandeur was manifested by austerity (knowledge or will).

" There first appeared desire (will) in the mind (cosmic mind) and from that first one sprang the seed (of creation). The wise sages realized in their heart the birth of the real (manifest world) from the unreal (unmanifest or *māyā*)."[1]

In the above hymn two or three points are specially to be noted: First, the Vedic sages realized the existence of a Transcendental Entity beyond all limitations of the physical universe. The last verse clearly shows the substantive unreality of the created universe as is hinted also by the epithet "unreality" for the stuff that shrouded the First Principle as expressed in the preceding verse. Here we find the origin of the *māyā* theory of the Vedāntins.

In another hymn which is dedicated to the goddess *Māyā* we note: " The sages in their mind realize that the Bird (all-pervasive God) is covered up by the *māyā* of the Mighty One. The seers describe it as happening in the ocean (Infinity of being); they all feel desirous to reach the Supreme Abode of life. . . . I saw the herdsman (individual soul) who never falls, but, sometimes near and sometimes far, is traversing by various paths. Sometimes he wears many clothes together and sometimes he puts them on severally and thus he is going and coming to this world again and again."[2]

" In order to make himself visible, Indra assumes various forms according to every form. He assumes many forms by his *māyā*. He is endowed with a thousand rays."[3]

In these verses there is a clear indication of the fact that the

[1] *R. V.* X.129.1-4. [2] *Ibid.* X.177.1, 3. [3] *Ibid.* VI.47.18.

individual soul is deluded by the *māyā* which belongs to the Supreme Deity, and it exists all the time in the Supreme Being which has been called the Ocean. Though this *jīvātman* or individual soul is essentially immortal, yet it is made to wear clothes of different *guṇas* or bodies, and as such is forced to be born in various forms of life and undergo the infinite process of metempsychosis.

Though the metaphysical thoughts are not so well developed in the *Ṛig-Veda* as we find them in the later stages of Vedic culture, particularly in the Upanishads, yet there are sufficient indications to show that even in those early days the Aryan mind definitely caught a glimpse of the transcendental, and tried to explain the relative and temporal in terms of the Absolute.

The psychological approach to the ultimate problem was also discussed in the *Ṛig-Veda,* although its later development in the Upanishads was much more extensive and far-reaching in its effect on the cultural life of ancient India. In the *Ṛig-Veda* we notice at first that a doubt is raised about the reality of the physical man. A *ṛishi* questions:

" Who saw the first-born, when the bony covered the boneless (the spirit was covered by matter or *māyā*)?. . . .

" From earth arose the breath and blood, but whence is the *ātman* (soul)? Who enquired about this of the sages?

" Am I really this (the physical body), that I know not? For I am not of clear mind and wander about being in doubt and bondage."[1]

Then in the very next verse he avows:

" The immortal, residing with the mortal in the same place and having got the physical body, sometimes goes to upper regions and sometimes to lower. Both of them always remain together and move about together. People can recognize one of them, the other is not recognized."

In the same hymn it is further said: " Two birds reside in friendship on the same tree; one of them eats the fruit of the tree, the other eats not, but only looks at them."[2] Again we read, " The immortal *jīva,* though associated with the mortal (body), moves about with its cause while enjoying the fruits."[3]

These passages clearly indicate that the individual soul is immortal and transmigrates in various ways to different planes of existence. Further, the identity of the individual soul with the cosmic spirit has been revealed by two well-known hymns of the *Ṛig-Veda.* One is the

[1] *Ṛ. V.* I.164.4, 37, 38. [2] *Ibid.* I.164.20. [3] *Ibid.* I.164.30.

utterance of Saint Vāmadeva and the other that of the woman *ṛishi*, Vāch. Vāmadeva through his realization of the Supreme Self says:

"I am Manu, I am the sun, I am the intelligent sage Kakshīvat. . . . I am the poet Uśanas, behold me. I have offered the terrestrial regions to the Aryans, I have given rain to the men who offer oblations. I am the giver of water with thunderous sounds. All gods obey my command."[1]

Vāch also speaks in the same strain:

"I am the queen of the whole universe, the omnipotent and possessor of all wealth. The gods have placed me in various regions. So diverse are my abodes. I am existing in various living beings,"[2] etc.

The ritualistic aspect of the Vedic sacrifice (*yajña*) which attained so much complexity in the Brāhmaṇas, originated from the simple belief that the Supreme Being, Parama Purusha, had sacrificed Himself in creating the universe, as is described in the ***Purusha Sūkta***. And whenever references are made to creation, the origin of the seasons or any other natural phenomena, it is done in the language of sacrifices and oblations. This clearly indicates that the ancient Vedic *ṛishis* looked upon the entire cosmic process as the performance of a great sacrifice, and believed that man's spiritual nature can best be quickened if he tries to mould himself in consonance with that cosmic order.

Self-abnegation and harmony were the key-notes of the spiritual life of the Vedic sages. In fact, this spirit of sacrifice, restraint and harmony through love, and the desire for the attainment of immortality in life, came to be the dominant factors of the cultural life of the Indo-Aryans from the earliest days of the *Ṛig-Veda*. No one can understand the full significance of the spiritual culture of India, both ancient and modern, unless he keeps in view these predominant trends of the inner thought-life of the land. One in the many, unity in variety, harmony and not discord, is the perennial message of the Vedic India. The last ***Sūkta*** of the ***Ṛig-Veda*** breathes this out unequivocally thus:

"Assemble, speak together, let your minds be all of one accord...... Let all priests utter the ***mantras*** in a common way. Common be their assembly, common be their mind, so be their thoughts united......United be the thoughts of all, that all may live happily, that ye may all happily reside:"[3]

[1] *Ṛ. V.* IV.26.1-2. [2] *Ibid.* X.125.3. [3] *Ṛ. V.* X.191.2-4.

THE VEDIC CULTURE

The Vedic literature consists of four main divisions, namely, the *Ṛig-Veda*, the *Yajur-Veda*, the *Sāma-Veda* and the *Atharva-Veda*. Each of these divisions is again divided into the Saṁhitā portion (being the original text of the Vedas), the Brāhmaṇa portion which deals mainly with ritualistic details and the Upanishad portion which contains philosophical speculations. This entire literature is known as the Śruti. For each of these four Vedas, there are attached to them works known as the Kalpa literature. They consist of *Śrautasūtras* which deal with sacrifices, *Gṛihyasūtras* which deal with domestic rites and *Dharmasūtras* which deal with social and civic laws. Each of these four Vedas is again divided into various recensions, which are enumerated in detail in a later work called the *Charaṇavyūha*. What deserves mention here is the division of the *Yajur-Veda* into the *Black* and the *White Yajur-Veda*, the division of the latter again into the *Kāṇva* and the *Mādhyandina* recensions. The *Atharva-Veda* has the Paippalāda and the Śaunaka recensions.

The Saṁhitā portion of the *Ṛig-Veda* consists of a little over ten thousand stanzas grouped into 1017 hymns collected in ten *maṇḍalas* of unequal length. These hymns are composed by various poets or *ṛishis*, as they are usually called. The second *maṇḍala* is composed by Gṛitsamada and the poets of his family, the third by Viśvāmitra and others of his family, the fourth by Vāmadeva and others of his family, the fifth by the poets of the Atri family, the sixth by Bharadvāja and others of his family and the seventh by Vasishṭha. The eighth *maṇḍala* is composed by various poets, most of them belonging to the Kaṇva family. The entire ninth *maṇḍala* is devoted to singing in praise of Soma Pavamāna and consists of hymns composed by poets of various families. The tenth *maṇḍala* is a miscellaneous collection of hymns composed by various poets. So is also the first *maṇḍala*. Thus, of the ten *maṇḍalas*, we find a clear unity only in the six *maṇḍalas*, II to VII, so far as the authorship is concerned, and in the ninth *maṇḍala* so far as the subject-matter is concerned. In the eighth *maṇḍala*, the poets of the Kaṇva family predominate and as such it is added after the six family *maṇḍalas* (so called). In the first and the tenth *maṇḍala* there are 191 hymns in

each and thus they are put at either end of the whole collection. *Maṇḍalas* II to VII are arranged more or less in the ascending order of the length of the *maṇḍalas*. Where this principle is not followed, there is some other principle for the order. Thus, as explained by Mādhava, an ancient Indian commentator on the Veda (Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 2, Part I, VI.v.29), the third *maṇḍala* by belonging to Viśvāmitra is longer than the fourth *maṇḍala* by Vāmadeva, but is placed before the fourth since Viśvāmitra, being the seer of the *Gāyatrī Mantra,* supersedes Vāmadeva; but Viśvamitra does not supersede Gṛitsamada, who and the poets of whose family composed the second *maṇḍala,* because Gṛitsamada was originally a Kshatriya and later became a Brāhmaṇa and through the grace of Indra was endowed with high poetic vision. The ninth *maṇḍala* being composed entirely of hymns addressed to Soma Pavamāna has a unity of its own, and as such it comes after the eighth. As between father and son, the hymns composed by the father come before the hymns composed by the son. But in the fifth *maṇḍala, sūktas* 52 and the rest were composed by Śyāvaśva and then *sūktas* 63 and 64 were composed by his father Archanānā. Here the order is reversed because the son had composed a far larger number of hymns than the father. Thus the whole of the *Ṛig-Veda* is arranged on some definite principle. Further, in all the *maṇḍalas* except the eighth, the hymns addressed to Agni come first and then follow the hymns addressed to Indra. The hymns addressed to other gods follow afterwards. But in the ninth *maṇḍala* all the hymns being addressed to Soma Pavamāna, this principle does not apply.

In the whole of the *Ṛig-Veda* there are only metrical passages; there is no prose portion. Most of the verses are composed in simple metres: three or four lines of eight syllables, with an occasional four syllables extra, and four lines of eleven or twelve syllables. But there are a large number of complicated metres coming in, especially in the eighth *maṇḍala*.

As against the *Ṛig-Veda,* the *Yajur-Veda* is essentially a prose work. There are some occasional metrical passages, mostly stanzas quoted from the *Ṛig-Veda* with an occasional variation in reading, as for example:

satyaṁ chitraśravastamam (*Y. V.* III.iv.11.5).

dyumnaṁ chitraśravastamam (*Ṛ. V.* III.59.6).

The entire work is about two-thirds the size of the *Ṛig-Veda* and is

arranged according to the rituals described in the Veda. While in the *Ṛig-Veda* one meets mainly with hymns addressed to the various gods, in the *Yajur-Veda* one meets with short prose formulas addressed to the various articles used in sacrifices. The *Ṛig-Veda* begins: "I worship Agni the *purohita*"; the *Yajur-Veda* begins: "For the fulfilment of my desire I welcome thee." This short formula is addressed to the twig of the *palāśa* tree when it is cut, which is one of the preliminary rites of the new and full moon sacrifices. There are passages like: "Oh knife, do not hurt him" and "Oh stones, listen." These are addressed to the razor and to the stones respectively, which are to be utilized in sacrifices.

The *Sāma-Veda* is a metrical work, nearly half the size of the *Ṛig-Veda*, with a considerable part borrowed from it. The first stanza in the *Sāma-Veda* occurs in the *Ṛig-Veda* (VI.16.10). The order in the *Sāma-Veda* follows the sequence of the sacrifices.

Whereas in the *Black Yajur-Veda*, the sacrificial formulæ are interspersed with explanatory passages, in the *White Yajur-Veda* there are only these formulæ. The two recensions, the *Kāṇva* and the *Mādhyandina*, of the *White Yajur-Veda* differ in readings.

The *Ṛig-Veda* is essentially a sacrificial literature; but its arrangement is historical. The *Yajur-Veda* and the *Sāma-Veda* are both sacrificial literature and they are arranged in the order of the sacrifices. But when we come to the fourth Veda, we see a different form of literature. The *Atharva-Veda* is mainly a metrical work; but there are some prose passages in the second half of the work. In the *Atharva-Veda* we meet with charms and spells to drive away diseases, to injure the enemy, to bring prosperity and long life to the king, to bring about domestic harmony and peace and for such purposes. The work is divided into twenty sections or books. While in the *Ṛig-Veda* the greater portion is of use in sacrifices and in the *Yajur-Veda* and the *Sāma-Veda* the entire purpose is sacrificial, the *Atharva-Veda* has practically no connection with the sacrifices, except in its last portions. The work is about half the size of the *Ṛig-Veda* and about a fifth portion of this is taken from the *Ṛig-Veda*, with variations in reading.

The first thirteen books of the *Atharva-Veda* are arranged according to the length of the hymns constituting the books. The first book contains short hymns and in the subsequent books the length of the hymns gradually increases. The subject-matter in these books is of a mis-


cellaneous nature. The fourteenth book consists mainly of *mantras* to be used in marriages; (the *mantras* are mostly borrowed from the *Ṛig-Veda*). The fifteenth book is highly philosophical, being a glorification of the Supreme Being. The sixteenth and seventeenth books contain many conjurations; these two books are very short too. The eighteenth book is devoted to burial rites and consists mainly of portions borrowed from the *Ṛig-Veda*. The nineteenth book is again of a miscellaneous nature and the twentieth book contains hymns mostly addressed to Indra and is practically borrowed bodily from the *Ṛig-Veda* (with little variation in reading). The following specimens are taken from recognized translations of the *Atharva-Veda*:

> Just as the soul with soul-desires swift to a distance flies away,
> So even thou, O cough, fly forth along the soul's quick-darting course (*A. V.* VI.105.1).
>
> As, rising in the east, the sun the stars' bright lustre takes away,
> So both of women and of men, my foes, the strength I take away (*A. V.* VII.13.1).
>
> Rise up from hence, O man, and straight away casting
> Death's fetters from thy feet, depart not downward;
> From life upon this earth be not yet sundered,
> Nor from the sight of Agni and the sunlight (*A. V.* VIII.1.4).
>
> O assembly, we know thy name,
> "Frolic" truly by name thou art;
> May all who meet and sit in thee
> Be in their speech one with me (*A. V.* VII.12.2).
>
> All that the world's Lord made, all that for creatures Prajāpati and Mātariśvan fashioned,
> All things within the quarters and their spaces, let all these be my manifold defences (*A. V.* XIX.20.2).
>
> Thereafter rose Desire in the beginning, Desire the primal seed and germ of Spirit,
> O Kāma dwelling with the lofty *kāma*, give growth of riches to the sacrificer (*A. V.* XIX.51.1).
>
> All arms and every arrow, all the power and the might that bows possess,
> The warlike weapon, axes, swords, the plan and purpose in heart,
> All this, O Arbudin, make thou visible to our enemies, and let them look on mist and fog (*A. V.* XI.9.1).

Of the one thousand odd hymns in the *Ṛig-Veda* a little over half the number consists of hymns addressed to Indra and Agni. The other important gods are the Aśvins, Savitṛi, Sūrya, Varuṇa, Ushas, Pūshan, Maruts, Rudra, Soma, Vishṇu and the Viśvedevas. Besides hymns addressed to the gods, there are some philosophical hymns; for example there is the Hiraṇyagarbha hymn (X.121), the well-known *Purusha-sūkta* (X.90) and the hymn of creation (X.129); there is funeral hymn (X.14) and the hymn addressed to the departed fathers (X.15)—both having a great philosophical importance. Besides these, there is a hymn dealing with gambling (X.34) and there is another hymn addressed to frogs (VII.103). One hymn is a dialogue between Yama and Yamī (X.10) and another is a dialogue between Urvaśī and Purūravas (X.95), an episode well known in later Hindu mythology. The entire hymn I.164 by Dīrghatamas, addressed to the Viśvedevas, is highly philosophical in tone. There are individual stanzas scattered about in the *Ṛig-Veda* which have a secular value; some stanzas even border on obscenity (see I.126.6, 7; VIII.1.34). Apart from this small portion scattered here and there, the *Ṛig-Veda* is essentially a sacrificial literature; the *Yajur-Veda* and the *Sāma-Veda* are entirely sacrificial in nature. The *Atharva-Veda* has no value for sacrifices (except for the presence of the last portion).

Considering the nature of the literature available for our study of the ancient Indian civilization, we can have a fair idea of the period only in so far as the religion and the religious practices are concerned. But when we come to the secular life of the nation—their political and social institutions, their material conditions, their civic life, their domestic life, the position of women, their occupation, their sports and other recreations—we can have nothing but a superficial idea about them as gathered from occasional and incoherent allusions in these Vedic texts.

The religion of the Vedic Aryans was essentially a polytheistic one, as it has ever been even in the later stages of Hindu religion. The Vedic Aryans worshipped many gods,—Indra, Agni, Varuṇa and others. Each god was in his turn the Highest God, the creator and sustainer of the universe, the best giver of happiness to man, the protector of man from evils and the enricher of man. Thus about Indra it is said: "Who alone is the Lord of man and wealth" (*Ṛ. V.* I.7.9). There are many places where Indra is spoken of as the sole Lord of the universe. Of Agni it is said: "Who like Varuṇa is the sole Lord of wealth?" (*Ṛ. V.*



AGNI

Courtesy Mr. O. C. Gangoly



INDRA

I.143.4). Of Hiranyagarbha it is said: "He was the sole Lord" (*R. V.* X.121.1). Of Indra again it is said: "He supported and spread the earth" (*R. V.* I.103.2). Soma is called "The supporter of heaven" (*R. V.* IX.76.1). There is the prayer to the Viśvedevas: "May we complete the god-ordained life" (*R. V.* I.89.8). To Sūrya is the prayer: "May we live a hundred years" (*R. V.* VII.66.16). Thus nearly all the great divine qualities are attributed to all the gods. This is true of the Purāṇic age too in the history of Indian civilization: Vishṇu, Śiva, Ganeśa, Kārtikeya are all extolled as the Highest God.

Side by side with this polytheism, we find an extreme monism also. The Ṛig-Vedic passage: *ekaṁ sad viprā bahudhā vadanti* (*R. V.* I.164.46) "Truth is one; the sages call it by various names"—has ever been the foundation of Indian monism through the entire history of Indian philosophy. From the most ancient times the philosophy and religion of the Vedas has been understood as one of monism and monotheism. Each god being an aspect of the One God, is really the Highest God, and as such the so-called polytheism is a natural corollary of the real Vedic religion. While dealing with the gods of the Veda Yāska in his *Nirukta* says that there is only One God. On the earth He appears as the Fire, in the mid-region He appears as Indra and in the celestial region He appears as Savitṛi. The various gods in each of these three planes are only aspects of these three manifestations of the One God (*vide* Ch. VII in Yāska's *Nirukta*).

Agni is the manifestation of the One God on the earth. His chief function is to carry the oblations to the gods and also to bring the gods to the sacrifices. Thus Agni is called the *dūta* (messenger) of the gods. He is the mouth of the gods. He is the mediator between gods and men. He is the lord of the home (*gṛihapati*). He brings in all the worldly benefits to man.

The manifestation of the One God on the plane higher than this earth is Indra. He is the chief god in the *antariksha* plane. His great function is to kill Vṛitra and to let loose the waters that were obstructed by him. He is the great *soma*-drinker. He wields his mighty thunderbolt (*vajra*). He is described as having fixed the earth in its position and to have raised the sun to his position to illuminate the worlds. He is associated with the rain, and the epithet Vṛishan, the sprinkler, is associated with him very prominently.

In later mythology, Indra, in many of his aspects, became merged

in Śrī Kṛishṇa. Many of the stories current in later mythology about Śrī Kṛishṇa are traceable to the Ṛig-Vedic Indra. Thus the killing of the dragon Vṛitra in the *Ṛig-Veda* developed into the story of trampling the dragon Kālīya in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. In the *Ṛig-Veda*, Indra is spoken of as having killed many demons and all these events found their way into the story of the early life of Śrī Kṛishṇa in Vṛindāvana, where he is spoken of as having killed a large number of demons. Indra as the wielder of the *vajra*, Indra as the giver of rain, Indra as the head of the gods, remained as such in later mythology; but Indra as the slayer of Vṛitra got merged in the conception of Śrī Kṛishṇa in the later phases of Hindu mythology.

Savitṛi, the sun-god, is the manifestation of the One God on the still higher plane, called the *dyuloka* in the *Ṛig-Veda*. Though in the *Ṛig Veda* the gods Savitṛi, Sūrya, Mitra and others are conceived of as different gods, in later mythology they all became one, and in later Sanskrit all these words are synonyms. There is one god on this plane, the *dyuloka*, namely, Vishṇu, who appears to occupy a subordinate place in the Vedic pantheon when we consider the number of hymns that are addressed to him. But even in the *Ṛig-Veda*, Vishṇu is the Highest God. There is mention of " the highest place " of Vishṇu (*Ṛ. V.* I.22. 20), a statement that is not made with reference to any other god.

Vishṇu of the *Ṛig-Veda* has come down to later mythology with practically few changes. The great achievement of Vishṇu, as described in the *Ṛig-Veda*, is his three great strides (*trivikrama*) and this is well-known in later mythology in the story of Vishṇu subduing Bali having encompassed the three worlds with his strides.

Another god who has a great affinity with the Vishṇu conception of later mythology is Bṛihaspati. The killing of the demon Vala, and the recovery of the cows concealed behind the mountains, which is associated with Bṛihaspati in the *Ṛig-Veda*, gave the basis for the later mythological story of Śrī Kṛishṇa having protected the cows under the mountain Govardhana and brought them out free from danger. This gave rise to the later epithets of Śrī Kṛishṇa such as Govinda and Gopāla; and this was at the basis of the tales of Śrī Kṛishṇa describing him as tending cows on the banks of the Yamunā. It is true that Śrī Kṛishṇa as a god does not appear in the *Ṛig-Veda;* but the personality of Śrī Kṛishṇa in later mythology is constituted of the elements gathered from the concepts of the various other gods that appear in the *Ṛig-Veda*.

On these three planes there are many other gods. The total number of gods is thirty-three according to Yāska. He divides them into three groups of eleven each, each group occupying the three planes of the universe, with one god as the chief on that plane. The other important gods are the Earth, the Rivers, Soma (on the terrestrial plane), Apāṁnapāt, Mātariśvan, Ajaikapād, Rudra, the Maruts, Parjanya, Waters (on the atmospheric plane), Dyu, Varuṇa, Ushas and Aśvins (on the celestial plane).

These three planes of the universe, as described in the *Ṛig-Veda*, should not be taken to mean the three visible regions of the world, though these terms have been used to designate them in the absence of better ones. Really, the earth, the atmosphere and the heavens, as seen by us, are only different regions of what is called *prithivī* (earth) in the *Ṛig-Veda*. The *antarikshaloka*, the next higher plane of the universe, is a finer aspect of the universe of which the essential nature is what is meant by the term " waters." In later Hindu philosophy, this is the second of the five elements (*pañchabhūtas*) and in later mythology this is called the *svargaloka* with Indra as the chief. The next higher plane is the *svarloka*, of which the essential feature is lustre; in later philosophy, this corresponds to the third element, fire; in mythology, this may correspond to the *vaikuṇṭhaloka* where Vishṇu resides.

It is difficult to settle the exact nature of the gods. They are represented as human in form and they possess various attributes which relate them to the various natural phenomena. They have arms and noses and jaws (limbs that are very often referred to in the Vedic poetry). They travel in chariots drawn by animals. They wear ornaments and carry arms. Indra kills Vṛitra with his *vajra* and lets loose the waters, which may be equated with the breaking up of clouds and the consequent fall of rain. The Maruts are storm-gods. Ushas is the dawn. Vishṇu, Savitṛi, Sūrya and Mitra represent the sun who rises and sets every day. But there are gods whose relation to such phenomena of nature is not so clear. This is the case with Varuṇa and the Aśvins. As for the latter, there have been various views held even from the earliest days of Vedic interpretation in India. We find a discussion of it even in the *Nirukta*, and various theories about their identity with the sun and moon, with the day and night and with other natural phenomena are mentioned there. No attempt at identifying the gods with any natural phenomena can give an absolutely

satisfactory result. The safest thing is to assume that the Vedic poets were aware of certain forces invisible and incomprehensible to ordinary man, and that in describing the gods they were trying to represent these forces in the light of natural phenomena known to ordinary man and thereby to give an idea of what the poets saw and experienced, to the ordinary man who cannot understand them in their reality.

The Vedic poets saw the gods and they described what they saw. It is only a man who could see the gods that is called a *ṛishi*. The *Bṛihaddevatā* narrates the story of Śyāvaśva, the son of Archanānā, who was not a *ṛishi*, but who after *tapas* could see the Maruts and then was recognized as a *ṛishi*. There are many similar stories which show that the experience of the Vedic poets in so far as their communion with the gods is concerned is a peculiar one, and that when they wrote the Ṛig-Vedic poetry they were not writing about any visible natural phenomena like the rain-clouds and morning-dawn.

Although the gods are thus only the objects of an inner experience of a few specially gifted *ṛishis*, still they are not absolutely beyond the experience of ordinary men. Ordinary men can have some kind of experience of the gods; only they cannot see them in their real nature. The gods play an important part in the life of the ordinary man. Even he can invoke them through the *mantras* composed by the *ṛishis* who could see the gods. The essential feature of the Vedic religion is this direct communion between the gods and man. The worship of gods by the Vedic Aryans did not spring from the fear of natural phenomena like thunder and storm or the wonder of such other phenomena like the morning-dawn and the clear starry nights; it was inspired by the direct experience of certain powers by some gifted *ṛishis*—powers that transcend the common knowledge of man. The obvious relation between the gods described in the Vedic *mantras* and certain of the visible natural phenomena is no authority for concluding that the Vedic religion was essentially one of nature worship; it is only the result of the Vedic *ṛishis* trying to interpret the nature of the gods they saw, in terms of objects that are known to the ordinary man.

The essential nature of the gods is benevolence. They are invoked for receiving favours. Power is only an inevitable attribute of a protecting agency and is not the chief feature of the gods. The Vedic Aryans were not afraid of the gods; they were the friends of man. As a matter of fact, gods were at one time like other mortals. They were all



YAMA

born. There are frequent mentions of the birth of the gods: "Indra was without a foe from his birth." The Ṛibhus were the sons of Sudhanvan who belonged to the Aṅgiras family. The Maruts were originally men, who later became immortal and partakers of *soma*-offering. There is mention of the birth of the Aśvins. Most of the gods are the sons of the goddess Aditi. Thus the gods were only human beings who had risen to higher levels. This is another channel for communion between the gods and men.

Through the favour of the gods, man lived a happy life for his full period allotted to him by them, which was one hundred years. We often and often come across prayers like: "May we complete the god-ordained period of life" (*Ṛ. V.* I.89.8); "May we live a hundred years" (*Ṛ. V.* VII.66.16). Gold, cattle, sons and grandsons are the objects which the Vedic Aryans requested of the gods. There is absolutely no touch of pessimism in their outlook on life. There is no idea that the world is a place of misery. There is no yearning to get rid of the body and to escape from the shackles of this world. This world was conceived as a place where one can have happiness through the favour of the gods.

After death, man went to the next world, the place of higher happiness. This world is the *pitṛiloka,* the place where the forefathers had gone. In this place, Yama rules. There is a beautiful description of this world in the ninth *maṇḍala* of the *Ṛig-Veda*:

> "O Pavamāna, place me in that deathless undecaying world, wherein the light of heaven is set and everlasting lustre shines;
>
> Make me immortal in that realm where dwells the King, Vivasvān's son, where is the secret shine of heaven, where are those waters young and fresh;
>
> Make me immortal in that realm where they move even as they list, in the third sphere of inmost heaven where lucid worlds are full of light;
>
> Make me immortal in that realm of eager wish and strong desire, the region of radiant moon, where food and full delight are found;
>
> Make me immortal in that realm where happiness and transports, where joys and felicities combine, and longing wishes are fulfilled."

There is nothing explicitly and definitely said about the future of man who enters this realm. According to later Indian philosophy and religion, this higher world is as unstable as the physical world of man. There is an end for man's life in both these worlds. Man lives in this physical world for some time and after death he goes to the higher world. After some time, he returns to this physical world. This is what is called the transmigration of the soul. In the Vedic literature, there is no express mention of this doctrine. We come across it for the first time in the Upanishads. But there is enough evidence even in the earlier Vedic literature to show that the Vedic Aryans knew of this transmigration of the soul.

The Ṛig-Vedic *ṛishis* recognized an entity which continued to exist when the body dropped down at the time of death. This entity goes to another world and there enjoys the fruits of its good deeds—of what are called *ishṭāpūrta*. This entity is eternal. It is also clear that this entity assumes another body when it enters the higher world after death. If this is the case, what is the distinction between mortality and immortality? Every soul after death becomes immortal. Yet we find a difference between mortals and immortals. The Maruts were originally mortals and later they became immortal. The Ṛibhus were men and later they became gods and partakers of *soma*.

On account of this mention of immortality, it has to be assumed that after death, the normal condition of the soul is one of permanence. After death some have found the Path: "Yama was the first to find the Path." The *ṛishis* called the Aṅgirasas, too, had known the Path. The Ṛig-Vedic sages speak of a place where only those who had found the Path could go. These statements have to be consistently interpreted. The Ṛig-Vedic sages had advanced very much in civilization and they knew what they were speaking about. Above the physical world there are two worlds, one of which has the feature of water and the other that of light. Vṛitra is killed and waters are let loose; Bala is killed and the lights are regained. Then there is the distinction between gods who are intimately related to sacrifices and *soma* and those who are related to songs and praises. The Ṛig-Vedic *ṛishis* speak also of the *devayāna* and the *pitṛiyāna*.

The only way in which we can explain such references is to assume that after death the souls have two courses. One is to go along the Path, after which there is no return; they become immortal. The other course

is to return to this physical world, when the fruits of the good deeds of the previous life are enjoyed in a higher world, which is, however, lower than the world to which the Path leads. Unless we make this distinction, the entire difference between mortals and immortals and all the references to the two upper worlds become meaningless. Consistently with such an assumption there is at least one stanza in the *Ṛig-Veda* which is capable of being interpreted as clearly mentioning a return to this world after the enjoyment of the fruits of one's good deeds in the *pitṛiloka*. The stanza is usually translated:

> "Unite with the fathers, unite with Yama, with the reward of thy sacrifices and good deeds in the highest heaven; leaving blemish behind, *go back to thy home;* unite with thy body full of vigour."

This interpretation assumes that for the souls, the real home is the heavenly world. It is the word *ehi* which is here translated as "go back." Expressions like *ehi* and *āyāhi* occur several times in the *Ṛig-Veda* and in all such places the translation should be "come here" and not "go back." It is also very difficult to find out another parallel for the conception of heaven being the home of the soul. A more natural interpretation will be:

> "Unite with the fathers, unite with Yama in the highest heaven, with the reward of thy sacrifices and good deeds; free from blemishes, *come again here to this home;* full of vigour, unite with a body."

This is the only portion of the *Ṛig-Veda* where there is an occasion for the mention of a return to this world after death. This stanza occurs in the funeral hymn. To say that it cannot mean a return to the world after death because the doctrine of transmigration of the soul was unknown to the Ṛig-Vedic Aryans and that the doctrine of transmigration was unknown to them because there is no mention of it, is arguing in a circle.

Although the Upanishadic texts are later than the Ṛig-Vedic texts and the Brāmaṇas, still the culture that is found in the two sets of texts is the same; it is homogeneous and harmonious. The Upanishadic doctrine of an eternal soul, of heaven being the fruit of sacrifices and being temporary in nature, of a return to this world after death after the enjoyment in a higher world of the fruits of one's good deeds, of the final

position being attainable only through knowledge—all these doctrines lie at the base of the Ṛig-Vedic religion and philosophy.

There are two things frequently met with in the *Ṛig-Veda:* one is the story of Vṛitra obstructing the flow of water and Indra killing him and letting the waters flow; the other is the story of Bala hiding the cows behind the mountain and Bṛihaspati recovering them. The cows are nothing but light. This shows the Ṛig-Vedic conception of three regions in which the characteristic features are, respectively, *pṛithivī, ap* and *tejas.* The more frequent story is that of Indra killing Vṛitra and letting the waters flow. This is the central theme. This is what the sacrifice brings about—to break the barrier between this *loka* and the next higher *loka.* The breaking of the barrier between that and the next higher *loka* is not effected through sacrifice, but through *jñāna.*

This difference between sacrifice and *jñāna* is very noticeable in the *Ṛig-Veda.* The sacrifice is represented by the bull, the *vṛishabha* (the sprinkler). This brings into prominence the characteristic feature of the region acquired through sacrifice, namely, waters. *Jñāna* is represented by the horse. Dadhyach, a *ṛishi,* gives out the highest knowledge, the *madhuvidyā,* with a horse's head. The Aśvins (possessors of the horse) are also the possessors of this highest knowledge. There is a hymn addressed to the horse Dadhikrāvan. At the end of this hymn comes the statement, "May he (Dadhikrāvan) make our mouths fragrant or sweet; may he take us across our lives." The sweetness of the mouth is only the *madhuvidyā,* or the highest knowledge; and this is connected here with the horse. Then comes the famous stanza, "*haṁsaḥ śuchiḥ.*" *Soma* is connected with the gods of ritual and *madhu* is connected with the gods of *jñāna.* The Aśvins are always connected with *madhu,* and Indra is connected with *soma.* Yāska draws a distinction between gods who receive oblations and gods who receive hymns. There are many gods who are pleased with a song (thereby showing their preference of *jñāna*); other gods delight in *soma* (thereby showing their preference of sacrifice).

A careful study of the *Ṛig-Veda* shows that even at that time *karma* and *jñāna* were recognized as two factors in the spiritual progress of man's soul. *Karma* is connected with the *loka* immediately above the *loka* in which we live and *jñāna* is connected with the *loka* further above that. Agni and Indra are connected with sacrifices and the gods of the highest *loka* are connected with prayer, with *jñāna.* Since the Vedic Saṁhitās are intimately connected with sacrifices, it is but natural that

the deities connected with sacrifices, the deities of the two lower regions, should be more prominent in the Saṁhitās. This explains the apparent predominance of the two gods, Agni and Indra, in the *Ṛig-Veda,* and the apparently subordinate position assigned to the god of the highest region, namely, Vishṇu.

It is only through *jñāna* that the soul gets to everlasting bliss. This *jñāna* is an esoteric knowledge. Indra confided it to the sage Dadhyach. Indra also made it a condition that he should not give out the secret knowledge to any one; the penalty for breaking this obligation was that his head would burst. The Aśvins wanted to get at this knowledge. They gave the sage a horse's head and with that head he gave out the secret knowledge to the Aśvins. This is a story that is frequently alluded to in the *Ṛig-Veda.* The name Aśvins, the description of Dadhikrāvan, the horse deity, the white horse which the Aśvins gave to Pedu the king, the occurrence of the famous stanza, "*haṁsaḥ śuchiḥ*" at the end of the Dadhikrāvan hymn and various other facts in the *Ṛig-Veda* show that at the Ṛig-Vedic time the *ṛishis* had evolved a high philosophy and that the value of *jñāna* as a means to final release from the world of bondage had been well established.

From the *Ṛig-Veda* we understand that the people enjoyed a very high degree of material comfort. There was plenty and luxury. Gold and ornaments and fine robes were in plenty. Music, dancing and other arts had attained a high degree of perfection. There is nothing to show that the Ṛig-Vedic *ṛishis* considered the world as an evil. There is no indication of an eagerness to escape from this world. It is true that they sing in praise of the happiness in a future world. But that does not mean that they fought shy of this world. To them this world was a good world. Gods helped man during his sojourn in this world. We find from the *Ṛig-Veda* that the *ṛishis* conceived of this world as a fit place for virtuous men to lead a good life under the protection of beneficent gods. This world formed the true stepping-stone to a higher life in other regions. There is no tinge of pessimism in the Ṛig-Vedic religion or philosophy. There is little mention of evil and the fate of evil men. The emphasis was on the glory that awaited the virtuous man after death. There is mention of this world, the heaven and the still higher abodes. But the Ṛig-Vedic sages were practically silent over a hell. Thus the world was to them a rung in the ladder of the true progression of man's soul along his spiritual path. There is no conflict between man's future

and his present. There was no conflict between *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. Man's life was conceived of as a harmonious unit.

The *Yajur-Veda* and the *Sāma-Veda* are of little importance to a student of ancient Indian culture. The *Sāma-Veda* consists of hymns similar to the hymns of the *Ṛig-Veda*, and mostly identical too, with only slight variations in reading. The *Yajur-Veda* consists of mostly prose formulas addressed to the various objects like grass, *ghee*, milk and curd, which are utilized in the sacrifices. There are many Ṛig-Vedic passages also occurring in the *Yajur-Veda*. One notes the same optimistic tone in the *Yajur-Veda* regarding man's life in this world and his future in the other world. Material plenty is also quite noticeable. Gold and ornaments are spoken of freely as covetable objects. Cows are mentioned in thousands. So far as the culture is concerned, so far as religion and philosophy go, there is no difference between the *Ṛig-Veda* and the other two Vedas.

The *Atharva-Veda* brings in a new note. There we find signs of a gloomier side of man's life. Black magic, injury to one's enemies and various other aspects of life which we are wont to call more primitive are in the forefront in the *Atharva-Veda*. There is considerable scope for dispute regarding the right of the *Atharva-Veda* to be counted as a Veda at all. Even in Indian literature, there is side by side mention of three Vedas and of four Vedas. In the literature connected with sacrifices, only three Vedas are recognized. Jaimini in his *Mīmāṁsāsūtras* defines only the *Ṛig-Veda*, the *Yajur-Veda* and the *Sāma-Veda;* he ignores the *Atharva-Veda*. The *Atharva-Veda* has no place in the sacrifices. In a sacrifice there are four kinds of priests--the *hotṛi* connected with the *Ṛig-Veda*, the *adhvaryu* connected with the *Yajur-Veda* and the *udgātṛi* connected with the *Sāma-Veda*, and also the *Brahman*. This last is sometimes connected with the *Atharva-Veda*. This relation is not natural; it is only the result of an attempt at equation. If one may risk an opinion, it may be said that the *Atharva-Veda* represents a stage in the current of Indian culture that runs parallel to the current represented by the other Vedas and it is the earlier stage of a current that culminated in the Āgamic and Tantra literature. The Upanishads belonging to the *Atharva-Veda*, later in date, are of a sectarian nature.

Although the *Atharva-Veda* was not one of the Vedas, if by Veda we mean the sacrificial literature, yet it will ever remain one of our richest heritages from our forefathers. Just as the other three

Vedas represented the sacrificial aspect of the ancient Indian civilization, the *Atharva-Veda* represents the secular and the intellectual aspect. This does not mean that the other Vedas are deficient from the intellectual point of view. What is meant is that the *Atharva-Veda* is pre-eminently the intellectual heritage of ancient India. The term *atharvan* was even from the very beginning associated with intellectualism. The hymn composed by Dīrghatamas in the *Ṛig-Veda* (I.164), is highly philosophical, and the passages, "Truth is one; the sages call it by various names" and "There are two birds, with fair wings, knit with bonds of friendship," etc., (which has been the basic text for the later philosophy of the Supreme Soul and the individual soul) occur in this hymn; and the author Dīrghatamas is associated with Atharvan. At a later period of the history of Indian civilization, when so many works called Upanishads[1] were being composed, each of them was tagged on to the *Atharva-Veda*. In the *Raghuvaṁśa* of Kālidāsa, in the first canto where the king Dilīpa goes to his teacher Vasiṣtha to consult him on some State affairs, Kālidāsa refers to Vasiṣtha as the reservoir of Atharva-knowledge (*atharvanidhi*).

There was no conflict between the civilization represented by the three Vedas and the civilization of the *Atharva-Veda;* these two texts represent the two aspects of a single civilization. One can safely say that the three Vedas represent mainly the aspect of ancient civilization dealing with the goal of man in a future life, and the *Atharva-Veda* represents chiefly the other aspect dealing with the life of man in this world. The other three Vedas deal with gods and sacrifices. The *Atharva-Veda* deals with man and his protection from enemies, destruction of foes, kings and politics, welfare in this life and such things. This is the chief aspect of the *Atharva-Veda*. There is another aspect, namely, that of high philosophy. The other three Vedas are not so related to the problems of the Absolute as the *Atharva-Veda*. Even if we reckon the number of hymns in the two sets of Vedas, we find a larger number of philosophical hymns in the *Atharva-Veda* than in the *Ṛig-Veda,* and nearly all the philosophical stanzas in the *Ṛig-Veda* are common to the *Atharva-Veda*. Thus from the point of view of certain problems connected with the Absolute also, the *Atharva-Veda* is very important.

[1] There are ninety-eight of these minor Upanishads, recognized as such enumerated in the *Muktikopanishad* and printed as forming part of the 108 Upanishads; there are also a larger number too, recently published by the Adyar Library.

The other three Vedas represent the sacrificial religion of the Vedic Aryans and the *Atharva-Veda* represents the secular life of man and the philosophical aspect of that civilization.

From the Brāhmaṇa literature one can understand the high moral standards of the ancient Vedic *ṛishis*. Here also one finds the optimism of the *ṛishis* regarding the life of man in this world. The whole life of man was organized with a single objective, namely, the common good of man. The Brāhmaṇas contain elaborate rules for the performance of sacrifices. There are numerous places where the beneficial results accruing from the sacrifices are mentioned. In this connection one meets with various legends and anecdotes. All these sections of the Brāhmaṇa literature have a great value to the student of ancient Indian culture. Here one finds the life of great men reflected as in a mirror. The relations between the various strata in the social life of the nation, the relation between gods and men, the relation between this world and the higher worlds—all these things one can learn from the Brāhmaṇas. There are also philosophical speculations, theological teachings, fantastic and hairsplitting textual interpretations and various other things from which one gets a clear vision of the intellectual level of the Vedic *ṛishis*; and no impartial student can but be impressed by the high intellectual level of the nation.

While the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas are related to sacrifices in the main, we come to the third division of the Vedas, namely, the Upanishads. This section of the Vedas is concerned with *jñāna* as opposed to *karma*. Through sacrifices one attains to *svarga*, and there is a return to this world after a period. But through *jñāna* one gets to a position from which there is no return. The main theme of the Upanishads is the nature and destiny of man's soul. In the ceremonial portion of the Veda there is little scope for singing in glory of a condition transcending the normal life of man, which is between this world and the heavenly world. But when we come to the Upanishads, we come to the description of a condition that transcends our normal life. That condition is far higher than the normal condition and as such, in a description of that condition, there is the necessity of bringing in a tone of pessimism regarding the worldly life of man. Although there is no mention of this world being in itself a misery, in comparison with the higher state of life it is an abode of misery. This pessimism is relative and not absolute. Although one meets with a stern silence in the

Saṁhitās regarding *vairāgya* and *sannyāsa,* in the Upanishads one meets with *vairāgya* and *sannyāsa* quite frequently.

There is absolutely no conflict between the religion of the *karma* section of the Vedas, namely, the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas, and the *jñāna* section, namely, the Upanishads. They represent the two stages in the growth of a soul. Through good conduct man enjoys his life in this world and earns a right for the heavenly world after death. When this cycle of enjoyment in this world and in the next world continues for a long time, man comes to a stage when he has no more attachments for the enjoyments of this world or of the heavenly world. This is the time for *vairāgya* and *sannyāsa.*

The world and its entanglements are not things which man can throw away at will. One has to go through the course of one's life in this world and the next world. If one tries to discard one's responsibilities, one is only delaying one's attainment of the final goal. It is the illegitimate *sannyāsa* that the *ṛishis* have condemned. The conflict comes in only if one tries to enter the *jñāna*-stage when one ought to be in the *karma*-stage. Both the Mīmāṁsakas who developed the *karma* doctrine and the Vedāntins who developed the *jñāna* doctrine accepted the entire Vedic literature as a unit, as a harmonious unit, comprising the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas and the Upanishads. At the time of performing the sacrifices, the purpose of the Upanishads is to make the sacrificer understand his own nature. And so far as the cultivation of *jñāna* is concerned, the purpose of the other two sections, namely, the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas, is to make an aspirant after *jñāna* understand the stage through which he has to pass, to become eligible for it. Thus, looked at from all points of view, the ancient Indians saw unity and harmony among the various parts of the Vedic literature. There is, therefore, no conflict among these parts.

There are many minor problems which one has to consider in dealing with the Vedic literature. It is generally assumed that there was no caste distinction in the Vedic period. The first mention of the four castes in the *Ṛig-Veda* is in the hymn well known as the *Purushasūkta* which is considered to be a later hymn in this Veda. There is the word *pañchajana* appearing in the *Ṛig-Veda.* According to traditional Indian interpretation, this means the fivefold nation, divided into the four castes and the fifth caste of the Nishādas. There is no doubt about the fact that there was a gradation in the civic, social and spiritual life of the

nation. Perhaps the caste difference was not so rigid at that time as at a later period when the nation had lost its life and power of adaptation. There is no literature at that period corresponding to the *Dharmasūtras* of the later period where we find rigid rules for the conduct of the various castes, duties, prerogatives and disabilities attached to various castes. But a division of the nation into various gradations is a feature which we see even in the Iranian literature. So something like a caste system existed even in the earliest period. Perhaps it was more elastic.

The position of women was not one of subordination. There is no hint to show that women as such occupied a lower position than men. In intellectual and spiritual life they occupied the same position as men. Some of the Vedic poets were women. There were women warriors. There were women philosophers. Gods and goddesses occupied the same rank. This equality between men and women is noticeable in all the portions of the Vedic literature, viz. Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads.

It is supposed that human sacrifice was practised at that time. The story of how Śunaḥśepa was offered to Varuṇa and how by prayer he was rescued by the gods from the slaughter, as mentioned in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa,* is taken as an evidence to show that human sacrifice was practised at that time. But the whole trend of the narration of the story in the Vedic literature shows an abhorrence of the practice. Perhaps it was practised among non-Aryan tribes. But in the Vedic civilization there was no sanction for it.

Nothing definite can be said about child marriage. There is a hymn describing the departure of the bride after marriage from the parent's home to the bridegroom's home. The whole trend of the hymn is that the marriage was after the girl had attained to age. There is the frequent mention of the marriage of Sūryā with the Aśvins. This also gives the impression of marriage at a grown up stage of the girl. There is no reliable evidence on the point in the Vedic literature.

There is mention of social evils like gambling and drinking of intoxicating beverages. There is a hymn devoted to gambling. The whole spirit of the hymn is in condemnation of it as an evil. It is supposed that the favourite drink of the day, the *soma,* was an intoxicating beverage. But there is mention of another drink, the *surā*. This is mentioned as an evil drink. Further there is nothing to show that *soma* caused intoxication. The word *mada* used along with *soma* does not

mean intoxication. There is no place where the word should mean intoxication and there are many places, as in the case of *mada* produced by the possession of children, where the word can only mean happiness. Intoxicating drinks like *surā* were condemned.

Animal killing was not prohibited. The Vedic Aryans ate flesh, even beef. Much has been written on this point in modern times. But there is one thing which must be borne in mind. Although beef was eaten, *milch* cows were not slaughtered. The word for cow is *aghnyā*, what should not be killed. It is only bulls, barren cows and calves that were killed; the prohibition was in the matter of killing *milch* cows.

In the period of the *Ṛig-Veda* and Aryans had already reached a high stage of civilization. In knowledge, in power and in social organization they had attained a high stage. The Vedic literature does not mark the starting of a civilization; on the other hand it marks the starting of the decadence of a high civilization. The Indians have ever been conscious of a past high civilization. In the whole history of India, the Vedic age has been recognized as the ideal, and the attempt in all subsequent ages has been to approximate the life of man to the conditions of the Vedic age. Thus in later periods everything that was valuable in man's life was traced back to the Vedas. Philosophy, religion, codes of conduct, all the sciences, everything was traced to the Vedas. The Purāṇas describe the lives of Vedic and pre-Vedic kings and *ṛishis*. The entire mythology of the later period is based on that of the Vedic period. All the stories narrated in later Purāṇas about Vishṇu, Śiva and Indra have their root in the Vedic mythology. The main philosophical doctrines are based on Vedic conceptions. The entire religion is Vedic in tone from the beginning. In short the entire Sanskrit literature of the later period records the attempt of ancient Indians to understand the Vedic civilization, to revive that culture and at least to approximate their lives to the ideals of the Vedic civilization. To understand this civilization, the present times are not quite suited. Modern ideas are in entire conflict with the ideas of ancient India. Whatever be the value attached to the Vedic literature by modern scholars, whatever be the stage of civilization represented by the Vedas as judged by modern sciences and modern standards, no one can deny the fact that the Vedas satisfied the needs of the intellect, of the imagination and of the emotion of a great nation for a long period extending over at least three thousand years, and the records of that nation in the fields of intellect and imagina-

tion are not below the achievements of any other nation that has appeared on the face of the earth till now.

The Vedas formed the foundation of the Indian civilization for all ages. They have been the subject of commentary by later authors throughout the ages. Commencing from Yāska, who lived centuries before the Christian era, there were great commentators of the Vedas. The kings have been patrons of Vedic learning. Under the kings of Valabhi, Skandasvāmin and his disciples have written an extensive commentary on the Vedic literature. Under a certain Chola king, a Vedic commentary was written by one Mādhava. Under the patronage of the Vijayanagar kings, Sāyaṇa wrote his now famous commentary on the Vedas.

Apart from these direct commentaries on the Vedic texts, all the later intellectual activities of Indian thinkers in ancient times have been attempts to present some aspect or other of the Vedic thought. All the Purāṇas were written to present the life of the Vedic Aryans and thus to attract the thought of men in a stage of decadence through higher channels and towards higher goals. All the philosophical systems in Hinduism are presentations of the Vedic conception of the nature and goal of man and his relation to the universe. Even ordinary sciences like astronomy and medicine were associated with the Vedas. Such was to the ancient Indians the value of the Vedic civilization and its influence on their life throughout a very long period of their cultural existence.

A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE UPANISHADS

The religion of the two hundred and fifty million people who call themselves Hindus is based on the Vedas, that most ancient and most wonderful body of literature which, it is claimed, is not the production of man, but the voice of God Himself and co-eternal with Him. At first sight it may sound strange that any book can be called eternal. But by the word 'Veda,' which literally means knowledge, no books are primarily meant, but the sum total of the knowledge of God, which, concerning itself, as it does, with abstract principles, is necessarily eternal: Just as gravitation existed before Newton, and would have remained just the same even if he had not discovered it, so these principles existed before man, and will remain for ever. Their connection with man is that they were revealed to certain exceptionally gifted persons called *ṛishis* or sages, who visualized them and handed them down through a succession of disciples. Of course, the orthodox view regards the entire mass of recorded experience of these sages as supreme authority in religious matters, to which all other literature is subordinate, and must give way whenever it is in conflict with the former, the revealed knowledge or Śruti. The other literature is called Smṛiti, which includes the Purāṇas, the Tantras and everything.

The Vedas have two principal divisions, called Mantras and Brāhmaṇas. The former tell us about things we could not know but for them, and the latter are explanatory to the former. Though the Brāhmaṇas are thus subsidiary to the Mantras, both are held to be equally authoritative. The Mantras are of three classes. Those that are metrical and are used in invocation to the gods, are called *ṛich;* those that are in prose and are applied to the sacrificial acts, are called *yajus;* while the *ṛiches* that are lyrical and are sung in sacrifices, are called *sāman*. These three classes of Mantras have been compiled into four books or Saṁhitās, called the *Ṛig-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda* and *Atharva-Veda Saṁhitās,* respectively. Some part of the Brāhmaṇas used to be taught in the forest to those who observed particular vows on the occasion. This was called Āraṇyaka. The Vedas fall into two distinct portions according to their themes: one dealing with the performance of rituals, called *karma-kāṇḍa,* and the other mainly devoted

to knowledge, called *jñāna-kāṇḍa*. The Upanishads come under this second class.

The Vedic literature was vast and was divided into innumerable branches, only a portion of which has come down to us, the bulk having been destroyed either during the Buddhistic cataclysm or through the natural extinction of those Brāhmin families who were the custodians of them. Hence it is impossible to say definitely how many the Upanishads were in number, and which part of the Vedas contained them. In the extant Upanishads we find that of those which are stated to belong to any particular portion of the Vedas, all except one form part of the Brāhmaṇas, and often of their Āraṇyaka section. The exception is the *Īśāvāsya*, which forms the last chapter of the *Śukla Yajur-Veda*.

The *Muktika Upanishad* (I.30.39) gives a list of one hundred and eight Upanishads in the following order:

Īśā(vāsya), Kena, Kaṭha(vallī), Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍūkya, Taittirīya, Aitareya, Chhāndogya, Bṛihadāraṇyaka, Brahma, Kaivalya, Jābāla, Śvetāśva(tara), Haṁsa, Āruṇi, Garbha, Nārāyaṇa, (Parama)-haṁsa, (Amṛita)bindu, (Amṛita)nāda, (Atharva)śiras, Atharvaśikhā, Maitrāyaṇi, Kaushītaki, Bṛihajjābāla, (Nṛisiṁha)tāpanī, Kālāgnirudra, Maitreyī Subāla, Kshuri(kā) Mantrika, Sarvasāra, Nirālamba, (Śuka)-rahasya, Vajrasūchikā, Tejo(bindu), Nāda(bindu), Dhyāna(bindu), (Brahma)vidyā, Yogatattva, Ātma(pra)bodha, (Nārada)parivrājaka, Triśikhi(brāhmaṇa), Sītā, (Yoga)chūḍā(maṇi), Nirvāṇa, Maṇḍala-(brāhmaṇa), Dakshiṇā(mūrti), Śarabha, Skanda, Mahānārāyaṇa, Advaya(tāraka), (Rāma)rahasya, Rāmatāpanī, Vāsudeva, Mudgala, Śāṇḍilya, Paiṅgala, Bhikshu, Mahat, Śārīraka, (Yoga)śikhā, Turīyātīta, Sannyāsa, (Paramahaṁsa)parivrājaka, Akshamālikā, Avyakta(Vajra?), Ekākshara, (Anna)pūrṇā, Sūrya, Akshi, Adhyātma, Kuṇḍikā, Sāvitrī, Ātma, Pāśupata, Parabrahma, Avadhūta, Tripurātapana, Devī, Tripurā, Kaṭha(rudra), Bhāvanā, Hṛidaya, Kuṇḍalī, Bhasma(jābāla), Rudrāksha-(jābāla), Gaṇa(pati), Darśana, Tārasāra, Mahāvākya, Pañchabrahma, (Prāṇā)gnihotra, Gopālatapana, Kṛishṇa, Yājñavalkya, Varāha, Śāṭyāyanī, Hayagrīva, Dattātreya, Garuḍa, Kali(santaraṇa), Jābāli, Saubhāgya, (Sarasvatī)rahasya, (Bahv)ṛicha and *Muktika*.[1]

[1] For the sake of metre some of the titles in this list are in an abridged form. The portions in brackets are filled in by a comparison with the second list, which is in prose. The word *rahasya* occurs thrice in list 1. The distribution of the words *Sarasvatī*, *Rāma* and *Śuka* to them is a matter of guess-work. Similarly, with the word *parivrājaka* occurring twice, *Nārada* has been prefixed to the first and *Paramahaṁsa* to the second; and the second *Haṁsa* has been enlarged into *Paramahaṁsa*. *Bhasma(jābāla)* and *Avyakta* of list 1 are probably to be equated with *Brahmajabala* and *Vajra* of list 2.

These have been classified as follows:

Aitareya, Kaushītaki, Nādabindu, Ātmaprabodha, Nirvāṇa, Mudgala, Akshamālikā, Tripurā, Saubhāgya and *Bahvṛicha*—these ten belong to the *Ṛig-Veda*. *Īśāvāsya, Bṛihadāraṇyaka, Jābāla, Haṁsa, Paramahaṁsa, Subāla, Mantrika, Nirālamba, Triśikhibrāhmaṇa, Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇa, Advayatāraka, Paingala, Bhikshu, Turīyātīta, Adhyātma, Tārasāra, Yājñavalkya, Śāṭyāyanī* and *Muktika*—these nineteen belong to the *Śukla Yajur-Veda*. *Kaṭhavallī, Taittirīya, Brahma, Kaivalya, Śvetāśvatara, Garbha, Nārāyaṇa, Amṛitabindu, Amṛitanāda, Kālagnirudra, Kshurikā, Sarvasāra, Śukarahasya, Tejobindu, Dhyānabindu, Brahmavidyā, Yogatattva, Dakshiṇāmūrti, Skanda, Śārīraka, Yogaśikhā, Ekākshara, Akshi, Avadhūta, Kaṭharudra, Hṛidaya, Yogakuṇḍalinī, Pañchabrahma, Prāṇāgnihotra, Varāha, Kalisantaraṇa* and *Sarasvatīrahasya*—these thirty-two belong to the *Kṛishṇa Yajur-Veda*. *Kena, Chhāndogya, Āruṇi, Maitrāyaṇi, Maitreyī, Vajrasūchikā, Yogachūḍāmaṇi, Vāsudeva, Mahat, Sannyāsa, Vajra, Kuṇḍika, Sāvitrī, Rudrākshajābāla, Darśana* and *Jābāli*—these sixteen belong to the *Sāma-Veda*. *Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍūkya, Atharvaśiras, Atharvaśikhā, Bṛihajjābāla, Nṛisiṁhatāpanī, Nāradaparivrājaka, Sītā, Śarabha, Mahānārāyaṇa, Rāmarahasya, Rāmatāpanī, Śāṇḍilya, Paramahaṁsaparivrājaka, Annapūrṇā, Sūrya, Ātma, Pāśupata, Parabrahma, Tripurātapana, Devī, Bhāvanā, Bhasmajābāla, Gaṇapati, Mahāvākya, Gopālatapana, Kṛishṇa, Hayagrīva, Dattātreya* and *Gāruḍa*—these thirty-one belong to the *Atharva-Veda* (*Muk.* I.50).

It is evident that all the titles mentioned above have not the same importance. Some, particularly the sectarian Upanishads, appear to be of later origin, although a plausible argument can be put forward in support of the orthodox claim about their simultaneity, viz. that those Upanishads only got a coating of new matter at places at a subsequent date. In any case, there is very little reason for doubt that at least the important Upanishads are antecedent to the Buddhistic movement. In deciding which of the Upanishads are important, we may take a clue from the great commentator Śaṅkarāchārya, who has commented on only eleven of them, although he has quoted passages from about half a dozen more. The eleven that he has commented on are the first ten of list I of the *Muktika Upanishad* as also *Nṛisiṁhapūrvatāpanī*. The commentary on the *Śvetāśvatara* may be safely dismissed on textual evidence as not being his. The other great

commentator Rāmānuja has not commented on the Upanishads, but in his writings has quoted from about the same number of Upanishads as Śaṅkara, though somewhat different ones beyond the first eleven. That new Upanishads were produced from time to time may be inferred from the case of the *Allopanishad,* which was composed during the reign of Akbar at his instance. The Sanskrit of the Upanishads is so archaic and its grammar so flexible, that a clever imitator can easily manufacture some work that will look like a genuine Upanishad. One thing, however, is clear from this tendency of imitation. It is the high regard with which the Upanishads are looked upon by all sects in Hinduism.

There is nothing to wonder at in this for the Upanishads represent the quintessence of the wisdom that is embedded in the Vedas, those marvellous records of the spiritual experience of man. They treat not of secular knowledge, which any science can teach, but of *Brahma-vidyā,* the knowledge of Brahman, the ultimate Reality of the universe. The province of the scriptures is a unique one. They are one of the means of valid knowledge, known as *śabda pramāṇa,* along with perception, inference, etc.; and their special field is the supersensuous plane. Perception deals with objects that come within the range of our senses, in which field it is paramount. Inference, which is based on perception, is operative regarding things that are not so perceived, but are accessible to the mind. But where perception, inference, etc., all fail to give us definite knowledge, scriptures like the Upanishads are our only guide. In that domain they have infinitely greater validity than even perception, upon which we rely so much in our everyday life. Such questions as whether our personality survives death, whether there is a future life and a world called heaven where a man goes after death, whether he ever returns to this world, what is his final goal and what is the goal of the world, what is the ultimate truth of existence—obviously come under this description, and the Upanishads give us the last word on all such matters. Through no other means is it possible for us to get convincing answers to our queries regarding them. In fact, God has been declared in the Śrutis as 'the Being that is to be known only through the Upanishads.' Not being the work of man, they are free from the usual shortcomings of all human endeavour such as error, doubt and deception. It is open to us all to verify their statements by actual experience along the line prescribed by them. The

truths included in them are not mere theories, but facts, and as such are invulnerable.

The Upanishads, like the rest of the Vedas, were handed down orally, writing being a thing of later introduction. We find the same subject treated, with some variations, in different Upanishads, which is quite natural; as for instance, the philosophy of the five fires in the *Chhāndogya* (V.iii-x) and the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* (VI.ii); or the meditation on *prāṇa* in the same two Upanishads (in sec. i of chs. V and VI respectively); or the *Vaiśvānara-vidyā* in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* (II.i) and the *Kaushītaki* (ch. IV). Identical verses also occur in different Upanishads, naturally enough. But we cannot explain how a whole section is repeated almost verbatim in the same Upanishad, viz. the touching episode of Yājña-valkya and Maitreyī in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* (II.iv and IV.v). Obviously it is due to the exigencies of oral tradition in the course of so many millenniums.

The word 'Upanishad' is derived from the prefixes *upa* (near) and *ni* (perfectly), joined to the verb *sad* (to shatter, attain or destroy), and means the knowledge of the Reality, expounded in books of that name. As Śaṅkara says in his introduction to the *Kaṭha Upanishad*, "Those seekers after liberation who being averse to things of the senses, whether here or hereafter, *take up* this knowledge and practise it with *steadfast* devotion, have their ignorance etc., which are the seeds of their transmigration, *shattered* or destroyed...... Or it makes those aspirants attain the Supreme Brahman," etc. In the introduction to the *Taittirīya Upanishad* he says, " 'Upanishad' means knowledge, either because it *slashes* or *shatters* (the miseries of passing through the mother's womb, birth, decay, etc., or because the highest good *is established* in it. Books also are so designated, as they contribute to that knowledge." So the word primarily means knowledge or philosophy, and secondarily books relating to that. The Upanishads are also called Vedānta, literally 'the end of the Vedas,' either on account of their position at the end of certain books of the Vedas[1] or on account of their representing the essence or conclusions of the Vedas. They are also called *rahasya,* or secret, as only qualified initiates of the upper three castes of Hindu society had access to them under the direct guidance of the teacher.

[1] Compare the synonym *Vedaśirsha,* the top of the Vedas, the beginning being considered the root.

The Upanishads develop ideas that are in germ in the Saṁhitās, and in so doing refine them and raise them to a higher level. For instance, heaven looms large in the Saṁhitās. People want to go there after death under the belief that they will get everlasting joy uncontaminated by sorrow. And the performance of sacrifices is thought to be the chief means of attaining heaven. The Upanishads take into consideration this desire on the part of man for prolonged enjoyment, but they show the fallacy of clinging to heaven as a permanent source of bliss. They tell him that the joys of heaven, like all other joys, are also evanescent; so he must look elsewhere for abiding bliss, and yet it is right within his reach. Again, coming to the means, the Upanishads do not snatch away all those aids to which man has been accustomed; they only substitute better forms of them. For example, the horse-sacrifice was considered the greatest of sacrifices. So the Upanishads do not taboo it, but show a better way to perform it. Instead of the ordinary horse that is sacrificed, they point out one "whose head is the dawn, whose eye is the sun,......whose back is heaven," and so on (*Bṛih.* I.i.1). Instead of the common sacrificial fire in which offerings are made, a number of extraordinary fires are pointed out, beginning with the heaven, which has 'the sun as its fuel, the solar rays as its smoke, the moon as its cinder,' and so on (*Chhānd.* V.iv.1). The object is gradually to withdraw the aspirant's mind from external things and direct it inwards—to make him more and more introspective, so that he may get rid of his dependence on the objective world. This is the method of *upāsanā* or meditation, which occupies an intermediate position between ceremonial worship at one end and the highest philosophical abstraction at the other. It is already in vogue in the Āraṇyakas. The principle underlying it is that man with all his imperfections is to be led step by step from his naïve conceptions of things to the realization of the highest truth. Accordingly, in many of the Upanishads, we find some portion of them devoted to *upāsanās* of various kinds, so that there may be a choice of symbols to suit different temperaments and capacities. But the emphasis is always on the eternal principles, which it is the aim of the Upanishads to teach, and to which all other things are subsidiary.

The central theme of the Upanishads is to seek unity in the midst of diversity. "What is that by knowing which everything in this universe is known?" (*Muṇḍ.* I.i.3). The answer to it is found in the conception of God or Brahman ('the Greatest') as the ultimate Cause

of the universe. "From whom indeed these beings are born, through whom they live, and unto whom they return and merge in" (*Tait.* III.1). Since the effect is not different from the cause, it is possible to know the universe by knowing Brahman, "as by knowing one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known; for the modification is but an effort of speech, a name, and the only reality in it is clay" (*Chhānd.* VI.i.4). Two things should be noted here. The first is that the universe is not considered to have come out of zero or non-existence. The nihilistic view that it has come out of nothing is put forward only as a *prima facie* proposition, which is at once set aside as absurd in favour of the correct view: "Indeed this universe, my child, was previously existence alone, one only without a second" (*Chhānd.* VI. ii.1-2). Hence it would be entirely misleading to render the word *sṛishṭi*, occurring in texts describing the manifestation of the world, as 'creation,' which, as commonly used, suggests something coming out of nothing. The nearest equivalent would be 'projection.' The universe has emanated from God, a positive entity, not from nothing. The second thing to be noted is that the universe is conceived as returning in the end to God, the source from which it sprang. Thus even in the dim ages of the Upanishads, not only evolution, which is the watchward of modern science, but also involution, the retrograde march of the universe to its primal state, was whole-heartedly believed in. In this latter point the Upanishads seem to have gone ahead of science. So not only have they no ground for quarrel with science, but on the contrary they welcome its contributions towards a better understanding of their ancient discoveries by the modern mind. The religion of the Upanishads is *par excellence* a scientific religion. We shall return to this point later.

But though the universe is declared to have come out of God, the human soul or *ātman*, which is really the starting point of all our enquiry, is nowhere stated to be an emanation from Him. The Upanishads always speak of it as an eternal verity. It is never an effect, never a part of the universe, but co-existent with God Himself. "The intelligent One is never born nor dies, it is neither produced from anything nor itself produces anything; it is birthless, eternal, undecaying and ancient. It does not die with the death of the body" (*Kaṭha* II.16). Naturally the question of its relation to Brahman arises. And it is here that difficulties present themselves. For the Upanishads

abound in statements that are apparently contradictory in their nature. Some describe the soul as essentially different from God: God is omnipotent and omniscient, but the soul has limited power and knowledge; God is all-pervading, but the soul is confined to the body and goes from one world to another; God is absolute bliss, but the soul is sometimes happy and sometimes miserable; God is inactive, but the soul is active; God is the goal, but the soul is the seeker, and so on. There are other texts that describe the essential identity of the two. In between these two extreme positions there are varieties of other views. But all these divergent conceptions are based on the Upanishads. Śaṅkarāchārya is the great exponent of the identity between the *jīva* and Brahman, the doctrine of *advaitavāda* or monism. Of the diametrically opposite view, *dvaitavāda* or dualism, which holds the two entities to be eternally separate, we may take Madhvāchārya as the typical representative. While among the upholders of intermediate positions, Rāmānuja stands prominent with his *viśishṭādvaitavāda* or qualified monism. One point we must bear in mind in connection with these different schools of thought. None of the great men chiefly associated with them were the originators of these schools. They were merely the outstanding spokesmen of those systems, which had been traditionally handed down from time immemorial in India. The same thing holds good of the six systems of Indian philosophy, viz. Nyāya and Vaiśeshika, Sāṁkhya and Yoga, Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. None of the great sages with whom these are associated were their founders; they were simply their best expounders or codifiers. Although everyone of these six systems claims to derive its authority from the Upanishads, yet it is the Vedānta that bases itself wholly on the Śrutis. The *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa seeks to collect and systematize the teachings of the Upanishads and build a full-fledged philosophy on them. In the Upanishads the highest truths are given out almost as they were glimpsed by the *ṛishis*. Being direct communications, as it were, of actual experiences just as they came, they often lack that systematic arrangement which can be expected of leisurely deliberation. This task of introducing order into the Upanishadic thought-pictures was taken up by Bādarāyaṇa. But the too cryptic way of writing that was unfortunately the fashion with the composers of aphorisms has made it impossible for any one to know with certainty what exactly his meaning was, and as a consequence the *Brahma-sūtra* also has suffered the same

fate in the hands of the commentators as the Upanishads, each one trying to interpret the aphorisms in his own way. So we have all those *isms* cropping up also from Bādarāyaṇa's masterly work—the book that was intended to present the salient thoughts of the Upanishads in a lucid and methodical way!

Everyone of the commentators seems to have been obsessed with the idea that the whole literature of the Upanishads speaks only one thing, be it monism, dualism, qualified monism, or whatever else it may be, and according to his own predilections and training he seeks to bring out that one thing from the whole range of the Upanishads. They are hardly to blame; being ardent enthusiasts of a particular system, they could not entertain the notion that there might be many facets to a truth, and that other people's points of view might be just as true as their own. So they have put forward their own reading of the truth as the only possible one. The effect of holding such one-sided views is that a dualistic commentator finds no trouble with passages that clearly have a dualistic import, but when he comes to those texts, perhaps in the same Upanishad, that clash with his line of thought, being palpably monistic in their trend, he is at a loss to explain them, and the only way he can dispose of them is by twisting their meaning—trying to square a circle. The result is a travesty of truth. The same thing applies to the monistic commentator also, as indeed to those of any particular denomination. Taking it for granted that the monistic position is the soundest and explains all other positions effectively, and admitting that it comes nearer the mark than any other school, is that any reason for torturing texts that will not bear the monistic interpretation? Would it not be better to find out a way whereby the passage in question can fit in, as it is, with the rest of the teachings? Take for instance *Kaṭha* II. 23: "This *ātman* is not to be attained through study of the Vedas, nor through intelligence, nor through much hearing. It is attainable by whomsoever it chooses; to him this *ātman* manifests its form"—a clearly dualistic passage. But even a genius like Śaṅkara has made the hopeless attempt of explaining the second sentence thus: 'Whomsoever,' *i.e.* his own soul, 'this' aspirant 'chooses' or prays to, 'by that' *ātman* who prays, the *ātman* himself 'is attained' or known, and he who has no desires prays only to himself; that is to say, the *ātman* is attained by the *ātman*. Any one with even a cursory knowledge of Sanskrit will see the incongruity of explaining *yameva* as "his own

soul"—as if there were many such to choose from! Besides, the correlation between *yameva* and *tena* is entirely ignored in the above explanation, which interprets the former as the object prayed to and the latter as the person praying. The same verse also occurs in the *Muṇḍaka* (III.ii.3), where Śaṅkara explains *tena* as 'by that choice or desire to attain,' which drops the correlation altogether. Our object in dealing with this passage at some length is to show that while we must follow the commentators, particularly Śaṅkara, the foremost of them, in our wanderings through the Upanishads, we should at the same time keep our eyes open to detect text-torturing, where any such occurs.

If the monistic commentator is sometimes put to straits by dualistic passages, his brothers of the dualistic persuasion in any of its forms are faced with difficulties on many more occasions by monistic passages that defy all their powers of sophism. No amount of casuistry is of any avail against the unmistakably *advaitic* import of such texts as *Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi* (I am Brahman: *Bṛih.* I.iv.10), *Tattvamasi* (Thou art That: *Chhānd.* VI.viii.7), *Ayamātmā Brahma* (This self is Brahman: *Māṇḍ.* 2), *Sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ Brahma* (All this is verily Brahman: *Chhānd.* III.xiv.1) and "He goes from death to death who sees diversity in This" (*Kaṭha* IV.ii; *Bṛih.* IV.iv.19). We need not multiply instances.

What then is the proper attitude? It is to understand that different parts of the Upanishads express different phases of the same truth, according to the degree of realization on the part of the seer. Being intended for humanity at large, among whom there is an infinite variety of gradations as regards the capacity for understanding as well as temperamental differences, the Śruti like an affectionate mother prescribes different courses for different people. She does not give us one standard dish that we must all eat whether it suits us or not. That would be to no purpose. So we have in the Upanishads a progressive course of instruction suited to different aptitudes and tastes. But is this possible? Can truth be various? If one religion or philosophy is true, then all other religions and philosophies must necessarily be false. This seems to be the prevailing notion even among the most cultured. And this it is that has been at the root of all recrimination, fight and bloodshed in the name of religion all over the world in times past, and unfortunately things are no better to-day. Even on the soil of India where in days of hoary antiquity the prophetic eye of the Vedic sage caught a vision of the unity of all life, so beautifully expressed in the words,

Ekaṁ sad viprā bahudhā vadanti (*Ṛig.* I.164.46) (Existence is one, sages call it variously), religious feuds are still in evidence. This intolerance persists although sage after sage has reiterated the message for our benefit. Nay, the Lord Himself, as Śrī Kṛishṇa, the greatest expounder of the Upanishads, has echoed those words in the memorable *Lord's Song*: "Howsoever people may take refuge in Me, I accept them. In every way, O Arjuna, they follow My path" (*Gītā* IV.ii). And within living memory Sri Ramakrishna emphasized the same idea in his characteristic style, "Each faith is a path to God." Yet we seem to behave no better. But the truth is that—unity and not difference. We have to bring home to ourselves this cardinal teaching of the Upanishads.

There is a way to harmonize the apparently conflicting statements. We find it so difficult to do this because we are so far removed from the age when the Upanishads were recorded; we are out of touch with the technique that was quite familiar in ancient India. We are referring to what is called the *arundhatī-darśana-nyāya*, "the method of spotting Arundhatī," a tiny-looking star, which even to-day the Brāhmin bride at the time of marriage has to see. The practice is first to show her a bright star somewhere near Arundhatī and tell her that it is Arundhatī. When she has seen it, she is told that that is not the star, but another near it. And this process is repeated till she comes to the real Arundhatī. We moderns would probably have chosen a different method and called a spade a spade. But this was not the method of the ancient sages. Therefore in trying to understand them we had better familiarize ourselves with their method, instead of quarrelling with them over it. The analogy, applied to the point at issue, would mean that we have to accept the various theories put forward in the Upanishads as so many presentations of the same truth from different angles. In other words, we have to approach the subject psychologically, rather than logically. The common illustration of the rope and the snake will help us to understand how it is that we see only one aspect of the Reality at any particular time. When in the dark we mistake a rope for a snake, for us the rope has altogether vanished, and only the snake remains. But when with the help of a light we see the rope as it is in truth, then there is no more snake, but only the rope. So the two are never present to us at the same time. Similarly, for us ordinary people who see duality, there is no unity; but the perfected man sees only unity—for him there

is no duality. This is the paradox of existence. If we understand it, then there will be no antagonism between statements as widely divergent as monistic and dualistic, since they will be understood as referring to individuals at different levels of thought, or to different mental conditions of the same individual even. This is what is meant by *adhikārivāda,* the need of qualifications for one aspiring to supreme knowledge.

We shall now deal with the principal teachings of the Upanishads, some of which have been hinted already in the foregoing pages. Soul, God and Nature form the three main topics of these teachings. Let us begin with the soul. The eternal problem of problems, the mystery of death, has been solved once for all in the Upanishads. The *Kaṭha Upanishad,* for instance, starts with that question. A little boy, Nachiketas by name, meets Yama, the ruler of the other world, face to face and extorts from him an effective solution of the whole riddle of the life after death. The gist of it is that in addition to the body, which we all see, there is a soul (*ātman*), which is distinct from and independent of the organs, sensory and motor, from the mind in its twofold aspect of vague consideration and determination (*manas* and *buddhi*) and from the vital force with its different functions; that being immaterial and uncreated it is indestructible and as such outlives the body; that it has normally three states—waking, dream and deep sleep; that it goes after death to different worlds, high and low, according to its past work and knowledge, and may return to this world. In connection with this the nature of the soul is also discussed, the conclusion being that its limitations are only for a time, that is, as long as it is under the spell of ignorance, which again is self-imposed; that in reality it is omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient, in other words, that it is essentially identical with God or Brahman. And these are the teachings of all the Upanishads regarding the soul in a nutshell, some part of which is elaborated more in one than in another, often in very picturesque language. Take for instance *Kaṭha* III.3-4, 10-11: "Know the soul as the rider, the body as the chariot, the intellect as the charioteer and *manas* as the reins. The organs are called the horses, and the sense-objects the roads for them. The soul joined to the body, organs and mind is designated by the sages as the experiencer (*bhoktṛi*)...... The objects are higher than the organs, *manas* is higher than the objects, the intellect is higher than that, *mahat* (cosmic intelligence or Hiraṇyagarbha)

is higher than the intellect, the unmanifested (*avyakta*, the causal state of the universe) is higher than *mahat*, and the infinite being (*i.e. purusha* or *ātman*) is higher than the unmanifested. There is nothing higher than *purusha*. That is the limit, the supreme goal." Here we have a series of entities arranged according to their increasing subtlety, beginning with the sense-objects, passing through the different constituents of the human body and mind, and ending with the *ātman*, which is clearly stated to be the highest entity that exists, thereby showing its oneness with God. It should be noted that all the items in the series except the soul are material. Śaṅkara, in explaining how the objects—colour, taste, smell, touch and sound—are superior to the organs, significantly observes that the latter are "the effects of the former, being fashioned by the objects for their own revelation," which anticipates a conclusion of modern science. The mind, according to the Upanishads, is also material; only it is finer than the gross objects that compose the body. Therefore the question of its relation to the body is no puzzle to the Hindus, as it is to students of Western philosophy, which treats the mind as immaterial and defines it as 'that which is not matter,' which is popularly expressed in the well-known conundrum: "What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind."

Man lives after death. What happens to the soul after it leaves the body? "Some in order to get a body enter into the womb, and others into stationery objects (plants etc.), according to their past work and their knowledge" (*Kaṭha* V.7). The idea of retrogression into sub-human states of existence as a result of bad deeds frightens many a person. But since the soul is eternal and its desires infinite in number, it stands to reason that until they are exhausted, or given up, we must have to work them out, and that different types of desires would require different kinds of bodies for their satisfaction. If they are such that their fulfilment would be possible neither in an angelic nor in a human body, but in an animal body, or something still lower—for even plants were known to be living and sentient by the ancient sages of India—it would accelerate the progress of the soul if it is born in a suitable body amid proper environments, however queer they may appear to us. So the theory of reincarnation is thoroughly scientific, and it, together with the law of *karma*—"as you sow, so you must reap"—to which it is a corollary, gives man something definite to stand upon, instead of ever being at the mercy of extraneous forces. For his present condition he

has only himself to thank or to blame. There is no chance for his pleading alibi. The moral law is inexorable.

The references to the *ātman* in the Upanishads have a particular characteristic. They often begin with the individual aspect of it—because that is how we all know ourselves—and presently raise it to the status of the Supreme Self, in order to show that that is its real nature. Sometimes the transition is so sudden that it is presented in the same short dictum, as in *So'ham* (I am He); and one is perplexed to relate the two parts of the sentence, the subject and the predicate, together. But that is the chief task of the Upanishads. They want to remove our ingrained misconceptions and rehabilitate us in our true status. So the popular notion is put first, and this is then co-ordinated with the truth as it is.

The smallest of the important Upanishads, the *Māṇḍūkya*, describes the different states of the soul. In the waking state it experiences the outside world, in dreams the internal world of mind, and in deep sleep only its natural bliss. In these lower aspects it is called *viśva*, *taijasa* and *prājña* respectively. Then its *turīya* (lit. fourth) or transcendent state is described by the negation of all attributes characteristic of the other three states as follows: "Having neither internal nor external experience nor both combined, nor mere consciousness either, neither (fully) conscious nor unconscious, invisible, incapable of being dealt with or seized, without indications, unthinkable, unnamable, to be traced only through the abiding notion of the one self, where the phenomenal world is at rest, serene, gracious, free from duality, it is considered the fourth. That is the *ātman*, that is to be known" (*Māṇḍ*. 7). This is the *kūṭastha* or immutable aspect of the Self, which is identical with the unconditioned Brahman, the impersonal God. We shall now pass on to the next topic—God.

Let us begin with this beautiful story from the *Kena Upanishad* (III, IV.1): "Brahman won a victory for the gods, who glorified themselves at this victory of Brahman. They thought, 'Ours is this victory, ours indeed this glory.' Brahman understood their mind and appeared before them. They did not know who it was. They said to Fire, 'Go and find out what this venerable thing is.' 'All right,' said he and approached it. Brahman said to him, 'Who are you?' He said, 'I am fire, I am Jātaveda.' 'Ah, and what is your power?' 'I can burn everything there is in this world.' Brahman put a straw

before him saying, 'Burn it.' He rushed towards it with all speed, but could not burn it. He thereupon returned and said, 'I could not find out what this venerable thing is.' Then they asked Air to do the same. When he approached, Brahman said to him, 'Who are you?' He replied, 'I am Air, I am Mātariśvan.' 'Is that so, and what is your power?' 'I can seize whatever there is in this world.' Brahman put a straw before him saying, 'Seize it.' He too rushed towards it with all speed, but was unable to seize it. At this he returned and reported his failure to the gods. Then they deputed Indra (their king). As soon as he approached, Brahman disappeared (without even accosting him). Indra (humbled) saw in that very space an exceedingly beautiful woman, Umā, the daughter of Himālaya, and said to her, 'What is this venerable thing?' She said, 'Brahman. It was at His victory that you glorified yourselves.' Then he understood it was Brahman."

The Brahman of the Upanishads, however, is both personal and impersonal (*saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*). In the former aspect, which corresponds to the God of dualistic religions like Christianity and Mohammedanism, "He is the Lord of all, omniscient, the internal Ruler. He is the cause of all; from Him indeed all beings proceed and in Him they merge"[1] (*Māṇḍ.* 6). Brahman is the ruler of the universe. He projects it, maintains it and dissolves it at the end. He guides the destinies of the multitudinous beings that dwell in it. He rewards the good according to their merits, leading them to prosperity or liberation, and He also punishes the wicked according to their misdeeds. He is termed Īśvara, whose body is the sum total of all bodies in the universe, and whose mind is the aggregate of all minds—in which latter phases He is called Virāj and Hiraṇyagarbha respectively. Through all hands He works, through all feet He walks, through all eyes He sees, through all ears He hears. But in His impersonal aspect He is devoid of all attributes, He is the eternal witness, "the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, the vocal organ of the vocal organ, the vital force of the vital force, the eye of the eye" (*Kena* I.1). He is Existence Absolute, Knowledge Absolute, Bliss Absolute. These are not His attributes, which sometimes may come and sometimes may go, but His very essence. "There the sun shines not, nor the moon and stars, nor this lightning; of what count is this fire? He shining, everything shines;

[1] All this, it may be noted, is said of the soul in a state of deep sleep—which brings out the underlying oneness.

through His lustre all this shines" (*Kaṭh.* V.15; *Muṇḍ.* II.ii.10; *Śvet.* VI.14). The impersonal God can only be indicated by the negation of all attributes. "It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, neither redness nor moisture, neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor ether, neither taste nor smell, unattached, non-luminous, without eyes or ears, without the vocal organ or mind, without the vital force or mouth, not a measure, and without interior or exterior. It does not eat anything, nor is It eaten by anybody" (*Bṛih.* III.viii.8). And with this impersonal God the individual soul is fundamentally identical. Their apparent difference but essential unity is admirably presented in the following oft-quoted *mantras*: "Two birds of beautiful plumage (the soul and God) who are friends and always joined together, cling to the same tree (the body). One of them (the soul) eats sweet fruits (experiences the results of its past work), but the other only watches without eating. Buried in the self-same tree (wholly identified with the body), the infinite being (*purusha*, the soul) is overwhelmed by his impotence and suffers. But when he beholds the other, the Lord, the adorable One, and the glory (the world) as His, he is free from grief." (*Muṇḍ.* III.i.1-2). Nothing short of a realization of identity can banish all grief and misery, for "a second entity indeed causes fear" (*Bṛih.* I.iv.2).

No contradiction is involved in this. If we remember what has been stated a little earlier, viz. that the teachings of the Upanishads are relative to the conditions of the aspirant's mind, we shall find no difficulty in harmonizing these positions. So long as we consider ourselves embodied beings, we live in a world, and this world has its ruler. In other words, so long as we are persons, the personal God exists for us. But when we transcend the limitations of our personality, which the Upanishads assure us we can if we follow their directions, the personal God as well as the world vanishes for us, and only the impersonal God remains, and we are one with That. Then there is no more duality, but Existence Absolute. It is in this sense that the *jīva* (soul) is one with Brahman, not that it, with all its limitations, is at any given moment identical with Brahman in all His aspects. The clay mouse is not the clay elephant; but dissolved in water, both become clay. Naturally, therefore, all the power, knowledge and bliss of God exist potentially in the soul. If they were not there, they would never be manifested as they do in the perfected sage. The moment its self-

hypnotism is gone, the divinity that is always latent in it would manifest itself.

We must bear in mind that when the Upanishads speak of evolution, they refer only to our material part, the body—be it gross or fine—and never to the soul. It is this outer part, the covering or 'sheath' (*kośa*) as it is called, which becomes better and better through experience, in other words, evolves. But the soul in its essence remains unchanged; only it *manifests* itself more and more through these bodies. So between an amœba and Christ there is a world of difference as regards the body, but none whatsoever as regards the essence, the soul, which is identical. Of course, through the Christ body we see much more of the soul than through the amœba, but the difference is only in the degree of manifestation, like the same sun peering through a thin or a thick veil of clouds.

Modern science is wrong in its hypothesis that man is descended from the ape. According to the Upanishads he is descended from God. A simple illustration will show where the mistake lies. Suppose there is an endless chain with alternate white and black links. Now, which is the beginning? No one can tell. He who begins with a black link goes on repeating black—white, black—white, and so on. But he who starts with a white link repeats white—black, white—black, and so on. Nature presents both phenomena—the movement from the subtle to the gross and back from the gross to the subtle. The former is the downward course of degradation and the latter is the upward course of elevation. Now, which of the two views appeals more to reason? Which explains the largest number of phenomena by a reference to their nature? Obviously the Upanishadic view. For we cannot get out of a machine anything that we have not already put into it. The ape cannot produce a Christ. But the reverse is possible on account of self-hypnotization.

From what has been stated above it is easy to settle the question whether the soul is one or multiple. In the state of ignorance one and the same *ātman* appears as many, the difference being caused by the adjuncts (*upādhis*), viz. the body and mind, which are themselves the creation of ignorance. The very idea of manifoldness is an illusion, as a person while dreaming sees himself as many. But when the dream breaks, he finds himself the only reality in it. Similarly in the state of realization there is absolute unity.

Let us now pass on to Nature. It too, like the soul, is held to be without beginning, but not exactly in the same sense; for the soul has

no origin in the absolute sense of the word, because it is immaterial and therefore beyond space, time and causation (*deśa-kāla-nimitta*), under which everything material exists. All change is in time; so how can it affect the soul? But the universe, being material, must have a beginning. Nevertheless the Śruti speaks of it as beginningless, because we cannot trace its beginning. It is analogous to the tree and the seed—which comes first, the tree or the seed? The tree presupposes the seed, and there can be no seed without the tree. So the universe extends backwards like an infinite chain, and whenever we hear of its origin, it only means the beginning of a cycle (*kalpa*). Says the *Muṇḍaka* (I.i.6), "As a spider projects and withdraws (its web), as herbs grow on earth, or hair comes on a living person, so does this universe here proceed from the Immutable." In the first illustration, that of the spider, we are given a hint about the dissolution also of the universe. The same Upanishad (II.i) describes the order of manifestation thus: "From this very *ātman* which is identical with That (Brahman) the ether was produced, from the ether air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth." The details have been worked out later by the philosophers on the basis of texts scattered here and there. The ether has only one property, viz. sound; air has the additional property of touch; fire has a third property, colour; water a fourth one, taste; and earth has in addition the property of smell—the idea being that the properties of the cause are transmitted to the effects. These elements combine in different proportions to produce all bodies, and also minds. Nay, all those principles that have been enumerated in the quotation from the *Kaṭha* (Ch. III.10-11), are the result of this kind of combination. The Lord's part in it as the efficient (as well as the material) cause of the universe is described in the following passage: "He desired, 'Let me be many, let me multiply.' He reflected, and after reflection He projected all this—whatever there is. Having projected it, He penetrated into that very thing, and became the gross and the subtle" (*Tait.* II.6). The dissolution of the universe, as may be expected, proceeds in the inverse order, each succeeding element dissolving in its cause, the preceding element, till there is no vestige left of the manifested universe with name and form, and Brahman alone remains. This is the state of *pralaya*, as opposed to *sṛishṭi*, both of which are described in great detail in the Purāṇas and other Smṛitis. Thus the world alternately comes out and goes back, with all the infinite

number of beings of various grades that dwell in it. This is the Lord's eternal play.

There are various worlds in the universe, the highest of which is that of Brahman (*Brahmaloka*). The Upanishads (e.g. *Chhānd.* IV. xv, V.x; *Bṛih.* VI.ii; *Kaushī.* I.2-3) describe the journey of a man after death to these various worlds according to his deserts. There are two routes, one of which is called the path of the gods (*devayāna*) and the other that of the manes (*pitṛiyāna*), along which the soul is led by various angel guides. Those that have lived pure lives devoted to meditation and truthfulness go by the former route, and after reaching the blissful world of Brahman, they continue their meditations, become perfect and ultimately merge in the Supreme Brahman. But those who have done some good deeds mechanically, follow the second route; they reach the moon and living and enjoying there, come back, to be reborn as men. It may take them a very long time to get a favourable opportunity for this. Those who have a balance of good deeds in their favour are soon born in good families; while those who have a store of bad deeds to work out are born in low families, or go further down to the state of lower animals. But those who have done neither, remain on earth and are born very low in the scale of life.

To those who are burning with the desire for liberation, the way of gradual emancipation (*kramamukti*) set forth above may appear to be very disconcerting. For these fortunate few, who sincerely want to go straight to the haven of everlasting peace, the Upanishads prescribe a much speedier way, which can be traversed even in one life-time. The moment a person realizes his identity with Brahman, the whole relative universe disappears for him. Then there is no more coming or going in his case. "His organs do not depart. Having been nothing but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman" (*Bṛih.* IV.iv.6). "He who knows that Supreme Brahman verily becomes Brahman" (*Muṇḍ.* III. ii.9). And there is no discrimination of sex in this. In fact, it is not the real objective of the Śruti to describe either these journeys to the various worlds or, for the matter of that, the order of projection of the universe itself. All that she wants is to make us realize our unity with Brahman. Therefore, if we are really disgusted with this transitory world, let us plunge into a life and death struggle for realization, without frittering away our energies in vain pursuits. "Knowing Him alone one transcends death. There is no other way to go by" (*Kaṭh.*

VI.15, *Śvet.* III.8). So we see that the universe, though without a beginning, ends with the realization of Brahman.

Various means have been recommended for leading us to our destination. They all centre round self-abnegation. " After examining (the transitoriness of) the worlds attained through rites, a Brāhmin should culture a spirit of renunciation, (considering that) that which is not produced (*i.e.* is eternal) cannot be attained through work " (*Muṇḍ.* I.ii.12). Here we find mention of two of the four great aids to a spiritual life enumerated in the Vedānta philosophy, viz. discrimination and renunciation (*viveka* and *vairāgya*). The world is full of allurements, but they are short-lived. Let us turn our gaze away from them to the Supreme Self, which is never separated from us. Let us give up our petty desires and be of subdued minds, *dhīra*—an important word, which we come across again and again in the Upanishads. " He who is devoid of intelligence, unmindful and always impure never attains that status (of Brahman) and transmigrates. But he who is intelligent, alert and always pure attains that status from which he is no more born....... The intelligent man should merge his speech (*i.e.* all organs) in the mind (*manas*), the mind in the intellect, the intellect in cosmic intelligence, and that again in the placid self" (*Kaṭh.* VI.7-8, 13). It will be noticed that the process of absorption here recommended is aptly in the inverse order to that of manifestation. Concentration with the help of *Om* is beautifully portrayed in the following verses: " Taking the great weapon, the bow, mentioned in the Upanishads, fix the arrow sharpened by meditation. Drawing it with the mind rapt in the Immutable, pierce, my boy, that target, that very Immutable. *Om* is the bow, the soul is the arrow, and Brahman is called its target. One must pierce It with a concentrated mind, and become, like the arrow, one with It " (*Muṇḍ.* II.ii.3-4). " Therefore, he who knows it as such becomes self-possessed, calm, withdrawn into himself, enduring and concentrated, and sees the Self in his own self (the body); he sees all as the Self " (*Bṛih.* IV.iv.23). Here we are given five of the six " assets " for an aspirant—*śama, dama, uparati, titikshā* and *samādhāna*—the other item being faith (*śraddhā*), that rare quality of being true to one's self which inspired Nachiketas. Last, but not the least, of the great requisites for realization is the yearning for liberation (*mumukshutva*). It is the driving force in the spiritual path. To quote again from the *Muṇḍaka* (I.ii.12), " With a view to realizing that

(Brahman) he must, with faggot in his hands, approach a teacher who is versed in the Vedas and steadfastly devoted to Brahman." This not only indicates the yearning for liberation, but also enjoins that one must learn the great truths of the Upanishads from a qualified teacher, who is necessarily sinless and unselfish, by serving him with all humility and devotion. This method is laid down in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka,* where Yājñavalkya, after describing to his spiritual-minded wife how everything in the world is held dear because of the *ātman,* says, "The *ātman,* my dear Maitreyī, should be realized—should be heard of, reflected on and meditated upon. By the realization of the *ātman,* ....all this is known" (*Bṛih.* II.iv.5; IV.v.6). The aspirant should then reflect on the meaning of what he has heard, weigh it in his mind from all angles to get an intellectual conviction of it, and then sit down to meditate on it—concentrate on it to the exclusion of all other thoughts, till he becomes one with the idea. Though the path is "sharp as the blade of a razor," yet through the grace of the Lord and his teacher he is sure to succeed if he perseveres. "To the noble soul who has supreme devotion to Brahman and also to his teacher, these truths that have been taught surely manifest themselves" (*Śvet.* VI.23).

From the above short sketch the reader may have got a glimpse of the treasures that are strewn broadcast in the Upanishads. The value of these ancient records for all seekers after truth can scarcely be overestimated. Their message of strength, fearlessness and hope is as necessary for us now as it was for those who lived in the past. Their appeal is universal, for they probe the very depths of the inner being of man. They call upon every man and woman, in whatever station of life, to stand up and assert their divine heritage. In this they recognize no limits, geographical, racial or any other. They are the greatest unifying factor in the world for all time. They break all the fetters of mankind and raise them to their true status as "children of immortality." "The regeneration of man the brute into man the God," is their ambitious programme. They are not unethical, as, on account of their not preaching sin, they are supposed to be by some, but supra-ethical. They only, of all the religious literatures of the world, give us the *rationale* of morality—why we should do good to others. Because we are all one! In helping others we help ourselves, and in hurting them we hurt none but ourselves. They help us to grasp the significance of the lives and teachings of the great prophets of all religions.

In their light we understand that Christ's exhortation, " Love thy neighbour as thyself," was not a mere figure of speech. We *must* love him, for he, like the rest of the world, is literally our self. The Upanishads speak out unflinching truths, regardless of consequences. They do not even spare themselves. " After studying the scriptures and realizing the Truth, an intelligent person should discard them entirely, as one who cares for the rice does with the chaff " (*Amṛita-biṇdu Up.* IV.3). They declare that it is open to any one to become a *ṛishi*, a perfected saint. The Upanishads are the Magna Charta of human rights. They ask us to desist from our mad search for happiness in the outside world; for the musk-deer will never find the source of that fragrance which drives him hither and thither outside of himself. " There is no bliss in finite things, the Infinite alone is bliss " (*Chhānd.* VII.xxiii.1). Whatever bliss there is, is borrowed from the Self. " On a particle of this very bliss other beings live " (*Bṛih.* IV.iii.32). No wonder Schopenhauer remarked: " In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upanishads. It has been the solace of my life—it will be the solace of my death."

The goal as well as the way has been pointed out to us: " Know that one Ātman alone and give up all other talk. This is the bridge to immortality " (*Muṇḍ.* II.ii.5). It is now left to us to move on. Let us not be overwhelmed with the thought that we are powerless. Are we not the Infinite Spirit whose glories even the Vedas can at best only indicate negatively, by the method of *neti neti* (not this, not this)? In the words of Swami Vivekananda, " This infinite power of the spirit brought to bear upon matter evolves material development, made to act upon thought evolves intellectuality, and made to act upon itself makes of man a god." We must struggle patiently, perseveringly. The well-being of the modern world depends on a proper understanding of the Upanishadic teachings and on their sincere application to the practical problems of our daily life. Thus only can materiality, which is the common enemy of the world, be conquered, and love instead of hate be our guiding principle. Even age-long darkness, as Sri Ramakrishna used to say, disappears as soon as a light is brought in. It behoves us, like true followers of the Upanishads, to assert our birthright and, armed with the strength of realization, make a determined effort to establish the reign of peace and harmony on earth.

GLIMPSES INTO THE UPANISHADS

The Upanishads form the basis of the Hindu thought and spirituality. Although they have not given any definite philosophy as understood in the light of modern thought, still the important structures of Indian thought owe their origin and their appeal to the deeper realization of the spirit of the Upanishads. They attract all by their sublime simplicity and rich suggestiveness. The images which they apply are sometimes poetic and mystical. They reveal profound flashes of thought, but any systematic development of philosophical ideas in the terms of intellect is missed in the Upanishads.

There are different kinds of Upanishads and from their differences in teachings and thoughts it could easily be inferred that their origin is not simultaneous. The Upanishads claim to record the intuitive realizations of the great seers of different periods. Hence all of them do not always record the same methods to realize them. But this should not lead us to suppose that the Upanishads differ among themselves in forwarding divergent ideas regarding truth. The fundamental object of spiritual life has always been the same, although emphasis has been laid upon the different approaches and disciplines. And it must be so, for the approach to truth must suit the psychic make-up of our being and unless there are power and patience to continue the search up to the end, the finest and deepest layer of our being cannot be fathomed. Since the Upanishads insist more on the direct apprehension of truth, they have laid deep stress on psychic unfolding. The steady perusal of the texts surely leaves this impression upon the mind that there is a method of psychic development which finally impresses us with the ultimate truth. We indeed come across in different places sublime philosophic teachings and philosophic dissertations, but their appeal lies more in categorically defining truth than in establishing it in terms of logic. But this absence of logic does not take away from their value, for the human soul in its aspiration after truth transcends conceptual thinking. It has got its place in reasoning, but reasoning only indicates its inability to grasp Reality and prepares us for discovering another pathway to truth. Intuition follows dialectics. Yājñavalkya anticipated long before Plato the importance of intuition. But intuition has got different

phases, since it does not always arise from the same part of our being. We may distinguish these intuitions as pre-reflective and post-reflective, sub-conceptual and supra-conceptual, sub-mental and supra-mental. The difficulty of systematizing the different texts of the Upanishads is due to the inelastic being which cannot be responsive to the graded experiences. It has been customary to distinguish and classify spiritual experiences as (1) the experience of the Absolute, and (2) the experience of the cosmic Unity. But these are supra-mental and supra-conceptual experiences. They indeed represent philosophic intuitions of different orders. Besides these intuitions of the soul the Upanishads also take into account vital and psychic intuitions. We see, therefore, different kinds of *upāsanās* (meditations) laid down in the Upanishads.

Scholars either in the East or in the West have neglected to take into account the complete development of our psychic being as laid down in the Upanishads and its importance in the setting of life. The Upanishads give a definite moulding and formation to our being in order that the finest psychic unfolding may be possible, and therefore they present a systematic attempt of penetrating into the mysteries of the vital, the mental, the psychic and the spiritual life. When our complete structure with all its forces stands completely exposed, then the possibility arises of appraising the values of the different forces of our constitution.

Spiritual seeking does not always arise from the same inspiration, for there are infinite demands in our being which call for satisfaction; and unless the nature of the forces be completely revealed to our knowledge, we cannot always overcome their influence and prepare ourselves for the final goal. For the true aspirant there is necessity of bringing all forces under control and regulating them in such a way that a mental and psychic harmony of our being may be established before we can think of the finest and the highest spiritual realization.

The Upanishads, through developing intuitions, have unearthed the mysteries of existence. They have thrown various suggestions regarding the nature of ultimate Reality, from crude matter to the transcendent Absolute, and it is only natural, because in our anxiety to know truth the value of the different forces is to be clearly envisaged to find out their nature and their place in our experience and in the order of reality.

For this the Upanishads give us clear ideas of all the forces, and sometimes it appears that they have anticipated some of the conclusions of modern energism and vitalism in their doctrine of *prāṇa* and some forms of idealism in their doctrine of *vijñāna*. But the Upanishads, while recognizing their value as psychic and cosmic principles, have not characterized them as ultimate truths. They throw much light on the development of vital and higher mental intuition, but their great services lie in going beyond them and in emphasizing supra-mental intuitions and supra-mental truths. In short, the supreme interest of the Upanishads is fixed in the central truth of being, and all their efforts converge thereto.

There is a prevailing mistake that the Upanishads do not lay stress on the dynamic aspects of life. Whatever may be the final objective in spiritual life, the Upanishads show due regard to the dynamic spiritual life. The finest spiritual art in them has been to appraise all kinds of spiritual experiences, and the dynamical experiences could not have been completely ignored.

But even in this form of spiritual approach the insistence has been made upon identification between the seeking self and the objects of worship. This sense of identification is a great secret in the life of spiritual ascent and unfoldment. It has in it the final outlook of not only enjoying the touch of a particular cosmic force, but it has the final objective of moving the *cosmic nature* sleeping in man, and of ushering in the *divine nature* as well. The final realization of Transcendence cannot come at once, unless there are perfect ease and harmony in our vital, mental and psychic being. It should be made free from all obscurities and imperfections before it can be fit for the cosmic realization and intuition.

The forces of the sub-mental life cannot be left ignored in spiritual life, for in the integral life which spirituality indicates the demand is to estimate the value of all the forces and their economy in life, and to remove the conflict from our divided existence. There is no higher or lower being from the spiritual view-point; for they serve a purpose in the setting of life, and short-sightedness is due to our ignorance; and if the veils of ignorance could be lifted up, these forces will be seen to have direct connection with the dynamic divine, serving a divine purpose.

The Upanishadic seers thought that the sub-mental vital forces should be divinized before the higher ascents in the spiritual life could

be undertaken. To this end they prescribe a course of discipline called *prāṇa-upāsanā*. In this way the other forces are next to be divinized in the discipline called *vijñāna-upāsanā, mana-upāsanā*. But in everyone of them the secret is to go deep within and to touch and seize immediately the link between the psychic forces and the cosmic forces; there is a close unity between them. And this is taught in the theory of correspondence. This correspondence is not merely a parallelism, it is something more. Parallelism indicates separation and distinction in a common background. But the correspondence theory in the Upanishads implies the unity more than the distinction. There has been no separation between the inner and the outer. It is more seeming than real. This correspondence allows the realization of the identity of forces working in nature and man; and of drawing greater power, strength, vision and wisdom through the finer infusion of the forces into us. This allows us the possibility of waking up the potentialities in man by removing inertia and stiffness from our nature and by making our nature more plastic.

The immediate effect of such an adaptation is that it removes the usual distinction of the higher and the lower from our nature, for each force is felt to have a cosmic function and character. And the regulation of the forces becomes natural with the removal of obscurities; the lower ones then do not set up opposition to the higher; they become the channel of their expression, for they realize that they are vehicles of manifestation of the supra-mental forces in earth-consciousness. They move now in new grooves and with refined impulses.

But this correspondence does not mean that the restraint is removed from our inner life which is exposed to the play of chaotic instinctive forces. Every form of psychic or vital opening has that possibility, for unless there is complete opening of our whole being it cannot be completely organized. But happily the whole of our vital or instinctive life is not completely chaotic. There is law and order, for it is never cut off from the cosmic psychism. Nature is not completely blind, there is the immanent consciousness in it.

But the organization of our being is the least thing. It is the preliminary requisite for the finer opening. The internal equilibrium is the basis and the ground for the higher illumination and it is indeed a necessity for the final realization of the correspondence of forces. It is this psychic understanding which alone can give us a wide range of

comprehension, fine elasticity of movement, and vastness of being. This psychic opening is a necessity, for it not only carries conviction but allows freedom from the limitation of our nature. The correspondence of the *adhyātma*, the *adhibhūta* and the *adhidaiva*[1] does not present only a unity which has some philosophic importance for the spiritual aspirant. It presents the unity of psychic and cosmic nature which helps our adaptation and enlarges our vision and being.

This is the reason why the Upanishads have laid so much stress upon *upāsanā*, for *upāsanā* gives the right attitude which can put us in touch with the radiant forces that vibrate everywhere. The *upāsanā* not only elevates our feelings, it also widens our being. This latter effect is most often ignored. Devotion gives us a delightful feeling, and a radiant psychic opening as well. The Upanishads, by insisting upon the fundamental change of our being, give us the sure foundation of mysticism, for there must be change in the fundamental being before any enjoyment in the delicacies of feeling can be entertained. They emphasize, therefore, in *upāsanā* more a knowledge-attitude than a feeling-attitude. The feeling-attitude curbs wide comprehension and fundamental change of our being. The ripples of the heart, no doubt, give delightful ecstasies, but they prevent that silence of being which can make the deeper penetration successful.

This knowledge-attitude enables us to assess the forces rightly and to pass successfully through the different layers of being, showing their right nature and exact function, their psychic and cosmic character. And it is a great requirement, for right knowledge can make us free from all clinging to the forces and their play in life and make the supernal ascent easy and delightful.

This widening of being becomes possible when the object we meditate upon is received under the aspect of eternity. For really that only can establish largeness of vision and gradually lead on to the finer imagination which can feel the immanental intensity and vastness of existence. The Upanishads advance symbols indicating aspects of eternity and possessing the dynamic potency of ultimately giving fine spiritual opening and realization.

These symbols are centres of psychic forces and have their value in making us responsive to psychic vibration. And their importance has

[1] Pertaining to the body, the elements and the gods, respectively.

not been recognized only because psychic opening has been almost forgotten. But before the finer transcendence can be established, psychic opening has much meaning and significance. It exhibits the radiant currents of life manifesting through cosmic vibrations which affect our being and make it responsive to the finer and more expansive life. It exhibits wider intuition. It moves the finer dynamism and eventually idealizes experience and existence, resolves the rigidity of life and removes the inner obstructions of nature. It impresses us with the immanence of spirit. And this realization extends up to the throbbing of cosmic life, pervading through the mutable and immutable, through personal and impersonal existences.

The ascent of the soul through the mystic opening across the intermediate planes of existence is the invariable consequence of *upāsanā* which makes us acquainted with finer values of existence. The psychic intuition deepens the feeling which gradually passes into highest wisdom and establishes in us a harmony which reveals the rhythms of cosmic life. It is indeed an exalted experience, for it reveals the symmetry, the beauty and the dignity of life, and the Upanishads emphasize the deepening of consciousness in order that the immanental beauties and immensities may not be lost upon us. This world of immensity extends to the subtle and causal existence. Hence the Upanishads have drawn a distinction between the realizations of the nature-deities, of Hiraṇyagarbha and of Īśvara. This is the ordered succession of spiritual realization of the immanent powers and immanent unity; but these experiences and insights, however finely radiant and mystical they are, exhibit only the fine dynamism of life running through the various grades of existence. Some of the symbols, e.g. *Om*, reveal the graded existences by making us responsive to the cosmic vibrations. But the flowering in spiritual life does not stop here.

For these realizations are spiritual events in time; they only indicate the widening of consciousness, which is a delightful experience; but the consciousness is not freed from the time-sense. Spiritual life gives indications to go beyond time, for it is essentially the movement in consciousness to transcend time. It then becomes a unique experience.

Life and time are eternally associated and hence it becomes difficult to understand experience which oversteps time. The Upanishads emphasize the kind of spiritual experience that transcends time as the most pregnant of all, for it offers an experience which, by its uniqueness,

is totally different from the psychic experiences, either of life, love or beauty. But life is rooted in truth, and unless the widening of consciousness is such as can embrace the total reality, the mystical opening is not complete. In the Upanishads, the seeking has been essentially directed towards the grasping of the Transcendence beyond all relative verities and values. This Transcendence is a supra-conceptual realization and is, therefore, unique in itself. For it oversteps the mental and the vital truths and even the highest demand for an intellectual and spiritual unity.

Here the demand is to forgo not only all relative verities and creative ideals, but also immanental spiritual values and truths, for these have hold in personal consciousness and not in the Absolute. The absolute consciousness is a unique experience, inasmuch as it implies the freedom of consciousness from the polarity of knowledge and all psychic mutations. It presupposes the merging of the personal consciousness in the absolute background, with the meaning and importance of personality for ever lost. More properly, it is the awakening in transcendent consciousness, when the finite together with the infinite vanishes away. It is in this sense a unique experience and is not to be identified with any kind of experience associated with personality. Personality vanishes, so also personal experience. It is supra-personal, supra-conceptual and supra-temporal experience.

Tattvamasi (Thou art That) does not suggest a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, which is a personal experience and can at best put forth a fellowship with the *saguṇa* (conditioned) Brahman. This is no doubt the flowering of spiritual consciousness, carrying with it exquisite experience, fine knowledge, chastened feeling and a final synthetic vision of reality; but such an experience is not the realization of the transcendent Truth. To reach the transcendent summit of being, an approach different from realizing cosmic consciousness is necessary. The experience of cosmic consciousness is supra-logical or alogical, but this experience is only a freedom from the circumscribed finite sense and a passing into the vastness of the infinite, transcending the limits of space and time, but not necessarily the absolute. It is the realization of the one including and embracing the many, in which the touch of the one can be felt and realized at the ultimate fringe of existence. But the transcendent realization is not like that. It is not the experience of an enlarging consciousness. It is not the experience of consciousness in the ecstasy of love or beauty.

It is consciousness dissociated from all psychic feeling, psychic expansion and psychic seeing and intuition. It is to reach the pivot or the frontal point of consciousness.

Naturally, it is to be distinguished from ordinary religious consciousness and even from mystical exaltation. It is not akin to our normal spiritual experience. Such an experience inspires our whole being and transforms our whole nature, adding grace to holiness, divine charm to beauty, divine experience to knowledge. Such an experience implies the fine movement of the psychic dynamism under the divine inspiration and force. But these expressions of the spirit, however lofty and soaring, lack in the spiritual value of the transcendence which gives us the taste of freedom from the hold of personal consciousness and experience.

The Upanishads lay great emphasis upon such experience because it frees the soul from all such dynamic concreteness and restriction of a centralization. The idea of *saṁsāra* or the cycle of existence originates from the sense of a false individuality, and even in the dynamic aspiration of the soul no complete radiance from this is possible. Again, the radiance is not so much the point with the Upanishads as the fuller and the completer life.

And it is for this that there is a place for the dynamic divine in the Upanishads, the God of attributes, which allows an experience of the vastness of being, richness of life and wide amplitudes of harmony and reveals the secrets of an ideal unity behind the apparent divided concreteness of life. The realization of such a unity has a metaphysical and a spiritual importance. Metaphysically it unites the causal and the effectual world, the world of potentiality and actuality; spiritually it reveals the immanent dignities of life and blessedness. And if these are not much emphasized, it is only because the finest objective is so unique a promise and so elevating a state that the sublimities of the immanent life are completely shadowed and eclipsed.

The metaphysical and the spiritual realization of God in nature and God in soul has its importance, for it removes the idea of a separate existence from thought and it reveals the wide commonalty of spirit.

But the Upanishads could not confine our intellectual and spiritual aspiration to this stage. Intellectually the insight into the same principle immanent in all things and existence prepares the ground for the highest intellectual intuition of the Absolute existence. The transition is very easy and the demand for this transition is very logical. It is easy

because the fundamental sameness of being in all existence pleads its integral identity and the intellectual apprehension is raised from synthetic unity to transcendental sameness; logical, because the human mind in its search after reality cannot be satisfied with any indefinite conception and nothing could be more definite than the idea of the Absolute which synthesizes all experiences and yet at the same time transcends them.

The relation of time to Reality is an interesting theme. The Upanishads make the spatial-temporal setting located in the Absolute, but the Absolute transcends space and time. So long as the human knowledge is confined to the spatial-temporal setting it cannot transcend the world of relative verities; the final objective in our metaphysical and spiritual adventure is reached when we can transcend our experience through space and time. The final knowledge is attained when the synthetic view has been transcended and the higher reaches of intuition beyond space and time have been attained.

This intuition gives a new knowledge which it is not possible for reason to give: Here the previous experience and insight are changed totally and we are made free from the self-centric reference of knowledge and experience. The self now becomes dislocated from its limited centre and encompasses the whole existence, and finally transcends it. In other words, its existence apart from the reference to space-time becomes a clear realization. And our knowledge is released from the movements of experience and life.

This experience has its effect upon life: It makes it free from its normal restrictions. It makes life supra-ethical. The ethical dualities and contraries are possible of the divided life, but not of the integral existence. Where the knowledge of such an existence has been direct, it leaves its effect upon life. It frees it from limitation natural to unenlightened existence, and makes its movements and adaptations cosmic. The ethical discipline is necessary to illumination, but the illumined soul is beyond the contraries of normal life and experience. It is elevated to a point of existence which remains untouched by them. And the cosmic energies and powers are released by the cosmic vision.

Intelligence becomes unlimited and will cosmically efficient. The one sees cosmically, the other works cosmically. And the liberated soul becomes the centre of knowledge and power. Since will can work only

in the order of manifestation, this movement also is not real, but only apparent. The emancipated soul is fixed in its unfettered being.

It can exercise its power through the forces of environment for any cosmic purpose. And when the time is ripe for the final plunge into the depth of being after the exhaustion of its previously commenced *karma,* it gets into complete silence, which is its being and essence. And the veil drops for ever.

The release of a particular soul does not mean the release of all. But the release of the one soul has a collective as well as an individual effect. Psychically the difference between the individual and the race is not so sharp, and when the individual has the release, it affects the life of the race. It inspires the race for the goal. And thus it helps the evolution and the redemption of collective humanity. Philosophically the question is a thorny one, dependent as it is upon that of the relation between the individual and the collective self, but spiritually the liberation of a unit has importance inasmuch as it infuses humanity with new life and aspiration, and fills it with new psychic energies that are released when the soul passes into illumination. It affects the whole existence, for it brings in the joy of victory and the message of victory makes repercussions through the whole scale of life.

It has been pointed out by the Western scholars that the Upanishadic ideal of a wise man is more of an autocrat, more of a man of power than anything. The ideal is the ideal of power. This is a mistake. No doubt, we read in the texts that to the wise man nature unlocks the secrets and at will he can penetrate into the different realms of existence. And naturally the ideal of *jīvanmukti*[1] cannot be reached unless man has the access to transcendence through the finest psychological opening. The liberated soul develops in time a transparent psychic being which lays bare all the aspects of existence and naturally he has the first-hand knowledge of all the forces. Hence the deeper knowledge gives greater powers; but power is not the end sought. It comes naturally with knowledge. The wise man is indifferent to the values of relative verities, intellectual, moral, or religious. They are side-shows which must impress themselves upon him as he goes into the deeper recesses of his being. And since he is released of all limitations of being and nature, he is expected to be powerful. The difficulty of understanding this position

[1] Liberation in life.

rises from our inability to correctly appraise the height of liberated existence and from the natural habit of clinging to our usual humanistic ways of living and thinking. The too much humanistic appeal of religion makes us demure of power; but really power is as much divine as knowledge, the one difference being that it is utilized rarely in cosmic transfiguration. Religious attitude has wrongly been identified with mere love or sympathy. It should cover the wider and the deeper urges of life, wisdom and power. It is the central and comprehensive movement of our being.

In many Upanishads (especially the latter-day texts) mention is made of yogic discipline and purities. They are necessary to make our being responsive to the higher currents of the soul, and to discover the finer movements which reveal to us the supra-conscious move of life. *Yoga* is the art to open the unconscious parts of our being and to feel the direct touch of cosmic consciousness, nay, sometimes to inspire ourselves with the touch. The Upanishads take note of this approach; but it does not go against its final objective, provided that the spirit of true search and quest is not lost in the seeking of powers which *yoga* reveals. *Yoga* makes our dynamic nature finer and more rhythmical, and naturally a vaster comprehension and a wider power are the result. But the goal cannot be reached unless there is a greater concentration on consciousness. This can alone help us to reach its transcendent silence, neglecting the transcendent power. Generally, in the Upanishads, *yoga* is treated as a preliminary discipline for concentration and clarification of mental being. But it soon reveals finer psychic movements towards the enriching of life, and unless the seeking soul can distinguish between the values of conscience and power, he may be carried away by the latter. But a constant watchfulness and a stern regard for the absolute truth can keep the seeker safe and save him from the domination of powers. Knowledge provides the surest anchor to save us from the labyrinth of powers.

II

THE EPICS AND THE GĪTĀ

THE CULTURE OF THE RĀMĀYAṆA

The *Rāmāyaṇa* gives a many-sided picture of a perfect life. We are accustomed to regard such a life as one led far away from the turmoils of the workaday world in some forest retreat and characterized by an unbroken course of introspection or meditation leading up to a state of mental equipoise or illumination. The *Rāmāyaṇa,* however, does not stop with this partial view. For along with the ascetics who embarked upon such severe discipline, we are always shown the figure of Rāma himself, towering above them all and honoured by these very ascetics as the special manifestation of the Lord for the protection of *dharma.* We are brought face to face with a series of difficult, baffling and tragic situations, and shown how Rāma and the other principal characters react to them and ultimately tide over them without swerving in the least from the highest principles of spiritual life laid down in the scriptures. Inner perfection issuing out in virtuous action which overcomes evil and transforms the evil-doer is thus the sage's main theme.

THE PROSPERITY OF THE KINGDOM

When the reins of government are grasped by the hands of kings possessed of such heroic and noble outlook, there is bound to be progress in every department of the country's activities. The descendants of Ikshvāku were all without exception noted for their devotion to piety and to the welfare of their subjects. During Daśaratha's long reign in particular, Ayodhyā and the provinces attained a high level of prosperity; and it is again and again pointed out by Vālmīki that people had then a plentiful supply of the good things of life, of horses and cattle and corn and wealth.[1] Under his efficient administration the various orders of society discharged their proper responsibilities; and the high virtues practised by the king and his principal officers led smoothly and inevitably to the raising of the cultural level of the subjects. What better tribute can be paid to any ruler and his ministers than what Vālmīki, for example, repeats in the case of Daśaratha, namely, that there was none during his reign who was atheistic or untruthful or slenderly read or illiterate?[2]

[1] *Bāla* VI.7. [2] *Ibid.* VI.8, 14-15.

The capital itself was in every way a source of attraction. Its roads were spacious, well laid out and regularly watered to keep down the dust. Everything was clean, the food eaten was pure, and the water available was "sweet as the juice of the sugarcane." Agriculturists and traders received special attention and protection. From various countries merchants naturally flocked to take advantage of the conveniences offered, and the streets looked beautiful with well arranged rows of shops. When Bharata goes to the forest to persuade Rāma to return to the palace, we find the latter putting him a series of searching questions, of which many relate to this department of the administration. "Are not the provinces," asks Rāma, among other things, "filled with prosperous people and graced with abodes of the deities and tanks and places for distributing water? Depending on tanks for their water-supply, decked with mines, freed from all fear of fierce animals and unrighteous men, do not the provinces remain happy and contented? Do not agriculturists and cowherds find favour in your eyes? And do they not, remaining in their respective vocations, receive from you what they want and get over what they find harmful?"[1] Undue competition and oppression being thus removed through the vigilance of the king and his ministers, it became possible for all classes of society to breathe freely and strive successfully for full self-expression.

MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND EFFICIENCY

This state of affairs was maintained partly with the help of a thoroughly trained and equipped army. It was stationed in the various forts which were carefully provided with enough wealth, corn, water, arms, machines and artisans. The capital itself was the abode of mighty warriors of straightforward ways, of great learning and culture. There were great car-warriors by thousands, whose arrows sped with irresistible force, but who would never degrade themselves by striking the fugitive or in any other manner violating the rules of chivalry.[2] Faithful and loyal because of their own sense of duty and honour, they were doubly attached to their king and country owing to the kind and dignified treatment given to them. "Do thou so act, my brother," says Rāma to Śatrughna before the latter's march against Lavaṇa, "that the soldiers might be well fed and delighted and never annoyed with thee. Do thou please them with sweet words. For the soldiers,

[1] *Ayodhyā* C.43-48. [2] *Bāla* VI.21; V.20-22.

when they advance against their foes, have not with them their friends or wives to cheer them up. Sufficient food and presents are thus the only things which can afford them comfort and pleasure." To Bharata also he speaks in a similar strain. "Dost thou not," he asks, "at the proper time grant thy soldiers what thou shouldst, namely, provision and pay?" And he wisely adds the warning, "Remember that if the proper time for these be passed, the servants get angry with their master and tax him; and great is the evil that springs therefrom."[1]

The description of Bharata's march to the forest[2] and of the construction of the bridge by the *vānaras*[3] (monkeys) can be taken as typical examples showing the high level of efficiency attained by the military engineers of those days. "I have despatched," says Bharata in the assembly, "persons who serve for love as well as those who serve for money, with layers of roads and their keepers to prepare my way." And these included among others, as the poet shows, those who had a knowledge of the humidity or otherwise of the soil, brave delvers, architects and experts in the construction of canals and watercourses. By their organized work trees were set up where there was none before; high grounds were levelled; hollows filled up; rocks cut through; bridges thrown over watery expanses; and tracts devoid of water made to overflow with it. In putting up the bridge across the deep, remarkable speed and dexterity were displayed by the forces of Rāma. Uprooting trees and crags, the *vānaras*, we are told, took them to the edge of the water by means of machines and threw them in, making the sea swell up to the sky. Some took lines for ensuring straightness while others took the measuring rod; and the co-operation was so perfect that within the short period of five days the marvellous structure stood complete and nicely finished.[4]

SHARE OF THE PUBLIC IN STATE AFFAIRS

The king's personality was no doubt the mainspring of the progress which the country made; but it was by no means a case of one-man show. The East is often described as having known and relished only despotic monarchy. The *Rāmāyaṇa*, however, presents an entirely different picture. For at every turn we find the ministers, learned men and the principal officers of the army consulting together and shaping

[1] *Ayodhyā* C.32-33. [2] *Ibid.* LXXX (whole chapter).
[3] *Yuddha* XXII.50-76. [4] *Ibid.* XXII.75-76.

the policy of the State. On important occasions people from different parts of the land assembled and took part in the discussions. Free expression of opinion was allowed; and mutual consultation and independent thinking were expected to take place before any one spoke out his views. In the matter of Rāma's installation as king, for example, there was an exceptionally large gathering. Then in a mighty voice, solemn and resonant, Daśaratha announced his intention of retiring from the heavy duties of administration and giving his aged frame its much-needed rest. "If what I have proposed is proper," said he by way of conclusion, "and is to your liking, do you accord approval to it, and advise me as to what else I am to do and in what manner. But if I have thought thus solely owing to a desire for personal satisfaction, do you find out some other means for my welfare."[1] He then invited free discussion, that being acknowledged on all hands to be the surest method of obtaining dispassionate decisions. Even when the leaders, the citizens and the inhabitants of the provinces took counsel together and gave their unanimous support, the king wanted to make them think a second time and spoke as if he had not known their minds. "You have wished for Rāma," said he, "as soon as you have heard my speech. This raises doubts in my mind. Do you, therefore, speak out your minds truly. Why, while I am righteously ruling the land, do you wish to see my son installed?"[2]

This principle of ascertaining the opinion and seeking the advice of the people on all important occasions was observed invariably by every ancient king. As an extreme example of it the *Mahābhārata* describes the aged and blind Dhṛitarāshṭra discussing with his subjects and persuading them to permit him to retire to the woods. "This Gāndhārī also," he pleads, "is old and cheerless. She, too, has lost her children and is helpless. Afflicted with grief for the loss of her sons she solicits you with me. Knowing all this, grant us the permission we seek. Blessed be you, we seek your protection."[3] Even such an obstinate and wilful ruler as Rāvaṇa is shown as allowing free discussion in his assembly; and we find not only Vibhīshaṇa but also Kumbhakarṇa vehemently criticizing from different standpoints his conduct towards Sītā. Although Kumbhakarṇa is determined to stand by his brother to the last, he does not hesitate to address him in public in his characteristically blunt and fearless manner. "All this that thou hast done,"

[1] *Ayodhyā* II.15-16. [2] *Ibid.* II.23-25. [3] *Mahābh.* IX.8-9.

says he to Rāvaṇa, "is not worthy of thee. If thou hadst at the outset consulted us in the matter, we would have done what was proper and dissuaded thee. By luck it is that Rāma hath not yet slain thee who hast done this tremendous thing without serious reflection."[1] Rāvaṇa's maternal grandsire, Mālyavān, also speaks frankly in the assembly and rebukes him for his defiance of duty, his addiction to carnal pleasures and his unrighteous ways in general.[2]

SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION

Constitutional methods and military efficiency, however, were not the sole factors connected with the welfare of the people. Rather, one might put it the other way about: the king and his ministers remained constitutional, and the soldiers and other sections of the subjects discharged their functions conscientiously and without mutual encroachment, as a result of the high standard of education common in those days. Governmental methods and cultural level reacted on each other and became so interdependent that it was difficult to say which was the cause and which the result. Education got so organized that each section of the society knew not merely the details of fulfilling its own special function but also the relative place of its contribution in the general scheme. It was also a part of the training to create the mental attitude needed to keep competition within specified and healthy limits. The work of the ruler and the leaders was thus to see that the proper kind of education was given to the different sections of the society, and also to help all individually and collectively to blossom forth and spread their fragrance from within their own particular spheres. To the Brāhmaṇa, the king's question, for example, always ran: "Do your disciples regularly wait upon you during their period of study?" To the Kshatriya it was modified into: "Do your disciples always remain mailed?" And so on to each of the other sections with the necessary variation.[3] The king's training had to be all-comprehensive; for he was the chief executive officer and had to know the art of bringing out the best from the varied temperaments that constituted his country's real wealth. He had to be a patron in every department of its activities and to arrange festivities and demonstrations calculated to stimulate the powers of originality and invention.

[1] *Yuddha* XII.29. [2] *Ibid.* XXXV.15-17. [3] *Ayodhyā* II.38-40.

ROYAL PATRONAGE

The extent to which the members of the royal family afforded opportunities to specialists in every line can be gathered from the instructions issued by Rāma to Lakshmaṇa on the eve of their departure to the forest. "I want," said he, "to distribute with thee my wealth amongst the Brāhmaṇas, ascetics and many others who depend upon me for their maintenance." And going into details, he says among other things: "Do thou confer upon that good Brāhmaṇa, the preceptor of the *Taittirīya* portion of the Vedas, who showers blessings on Kauśalyā every day, silk cloth, conveyances and the like till he is satisfied." Similar fitting gifts were made also to those who lived under Rāma's protection, carried staffs in their hands and studied the *Kaṭha* section of the *Yajur-Veda*.[1] While Lakshmaṇa was carrying out these commands, there occurred an amusing yet touching incident. A certain learned but poor Brāhmaṇa, Trijaṭa by name, urged by his wife and accompanied by her, went up to Rāma and asked for the wealth needed to feed his numerous children. In a vein of humour not common with him, Rāma asked the Brāhmaṇa to hurl a certain rod with as much force as he could summon. Seeing it fall strangely on the opposite side of the Sarayū, Rāma begged his pardon for the joke and most generously pressed him to take home all the cows standing in the intervening space, thereby removing his sorrows even as Kṛishṇa did in the case of his friend Kuchela.[2]

MANY-SIDED NATURE OF SACRIFICES

Every sacrifice was an occasion for making all sections of society meet together, dedicate their skill to the success of the function and receive adequate presents. It was more or less a "World's Fair" or a "Parliament of Religions" of ancient days. There were some sacrifices in which a powerful king through friendship or conquest collected tribute from brother rulers who had hoarded wealth, brought it to a central place of his own choice and distributed it to experts in every department of activity according to his standard of justice and merit. Rāma performed such a sacrifice; and as the *Uttara-Rāmacharita* puts it, it was the fight over the sanctified horse that created the opportunity for Rāma to recognize his sons Lava and Kuśa and take them to the palace. The best type of sacrifice was of course considered to be that in which

[1] *Ayodhyā* XXXII.13-22. [2] *Ibid.* XXXII.29-43.

the sacrificer spent not only all that he managed to collect by the methods sanctioned in the *Śāstras*, but also the original wealth he had been enjoying. On the day after the ceremonies, then, he would be obliged to start life afresh and struggle hard for his bare subsistence. The poverty which became the lot of a paramount emperor as a result of performing the *viśvajit* sacrifice, which involved such renunciation,[1] was regarded as highly auspicious. Raghu was in such a state, with only earthen pots wherewith to serve his guests, when Kautsa, disciple of Varantanu, approached him for the wealth to be given to his teacher. Heroic soul that he was, the monarch did not hesitate to give the assurance needed. How could he give room for the unprecedented scandal that a master of the Vedas came to Raghu's door to get some wealth for his preceptor, but was disappointed and had to go to another donor? The crisis was got over through the help of the gods; and the people of Sāketa assembled to witness the remarkable scene of Kautsa refusing to accept anything more than what was due to his teacher and Raghu insisting that he should.[2]

Without *dakshiṇā* and presents no sacrifice was thought complete; and if wealth, power, long life, progeny and even heaven were the results the performer had in view for himself, food, kind treatment, honour, rewards for merit, chances to compete in the display of skill and a redistribution of riches and political power were none the less benefits which sacrifices conferred upon society as a whole. In that sacrifice, for instance, which Daśaratha performed for being blest with children, Vasishṭha took particular care to summon not merely the priests well versed in the ceremonials but also "experienced car-makers, highly pious and aged people, servants to assist in the various functions, artists, carpenters, diggers, astrologers, artisans, dancers, conductors of theatres as well as pure and learned persons proficient in the numerous branches of study." "Provide comfortable and spacious buildings," his mandate ran, "for the Brāhmaṇa, the citizens and the dwellers in the provinces. Let there also be separate quarters for the princes coming from foreign parts; and stables for the horses and dressing rooms and wide apartments for native and foreign soldiers." All these were to be specially stocked with the best viands and the distribution was to be made with proper respect and not with the indifference natural on festive occasions. No one was to be disregarded out of anger, but each visitor,

[1] *Bāla* XIV.42. [2] *Raghuvaṁśa* V.24, 31.

irrespective of rank, was to be highly honoured and entertained.[1] These instructions were carried out to the letter; and we are told that while the deities were being given their share of sanctified offerings, human beings were equally receiving the best that the culinary art could supply. "Brāhmaṇas and Śūdras having among them ascetics and *śramaṇas*, and the aged and infirm, and women and children were continuously fed by persons adorned with ornaments and wearing pendants." The intervals between the ceremonies were utilized in beneficial ways. Mild and eloquent scholars would then, for example, engage in diverse arguments desirous of getting victory over one another.[2] It was while Rāma himself was celebrating a similar grand sacrifice that he chanced to see Kuśa and Lava singing in the streets and thought of securing their services for providing good music for all and an intellectual feast for those who could appreciate poetry. Being himself proficient in music,[3] he was very particular to invite all the musical experts attending the sacrifice. Persons well versed in literature and history and the various branches of the *śāstras* were also specially summoned to attend the performance. All were soon struck with the sweetness of the music, the grandeur of the theme and the graceful appearance of the singers, and expressed their desire to hear them again and again. Accustomed to reward greatness wherever met with, and especially at a sacrifice where eminent men from all provinces gathered, Rāma forthwith ordered Lakshmaṇa to give them eighteen thousand gold coins and numerous other valuable presents.

SERVICE RENDERED BY THE FOREST-DWELLERS

"We are dwellers of the forest," came their significant reply, "and we live upon fruits and roots. Living there, what shall we do with gold and with coins?" This was characteristic of all cultural education in ancient days. The training of the young was fittingly taken up by men who led sublime lives themselves and who had the broadness of heart to give their best absolutely free. Society realized the value of such training and wherever the teachers took up their residence, in the cities or in the forests, it voluntarily supplied them with the necessary means for the maintenance of their families as well as disciples. Kings and noblemen took advantage of their hunting expeditions to visit the forest dwellings and after personal enquiry arranged for the comforts of the teachers and

[1] *Bāla* XIII.6-17. [2] *Ibid.* XIV.12-19. [3] *Ayodhyā* II.35.

students. The teachers too, who were mostly *ṛishis*, would in their turn continue to enquire if the people were not maintaining the *dharma* as they had been taught in their younger days. Disturbed in their pious observances or their work of training and protection, these *ṛishis* often went to the rulers and asked for military aid against the wicked. Rāma's life, not merely during his exile but also before and after it, was full of instances of such aid rendered. In more silent yet equally valuable ways the forest dwellers also contributed actively to the welfare of the householder section of the population. They gave shelter, as in the case of Pāṇḍu and his family, to those who wanted for various reasons to lead a life of retirement. And what Vālmīki did towards Sītā and her children and what Kaṇva did in the case of Śakuntalā are typical examples showing how these renouncers of the world poured forth their disinterested love in the service of the forlorn and the afflicted, disdaining at the same time to accept any wealth that might be offered to them in exchange.

THE IDEAL OF DHARMA

Dharma was then the chief factor that shaped men's lives. As the artistic sense colours the entire outlook of the artist and gives a touch of individuality and beauty not merely to his painting or music but also to his writings and discourses, nay, even his walking, eating and sitting, so also *dharma* was meant to give a holy, blissful, loving and heroic turn to the outlook of its votary and introduce its distinctive fragrance and sweetness into all the activities of his daily life. Through his thoughts and manifold contacts each individual was to evolve steadily and dedicate his virtues to the service of society. Different groups had their special *dharmas* too; but neither an individual nor a group was looked upon as having acted in pursuance of *dharma*, if clash, oppression, misery and obstruction of spiritual evolution resulted in actual practice. It was recognized that development of personality could come about through religious rituals, gifts, civic duties, studies, discrimination, renunciation and the like. But since each of these was capable of being accepted by one for a time, consciously or unconsciously, for acquiring eventual mastery over others and exploiting them for one's own selfish gains, the hidden motives as well as effects upon society as a whole had also to be weighed before deciding whether a particular form of activity constituted *dharma* or ran counter to it.

Rāvaṇa, for example, had all the advantages of Brāhmin descent and Vedic studies. In due course he himself, his son and Kumbhakarṇa underwent the hardest austerities for obtaining divine favour and they got it, too, much more speedily than many of the *ṛishis* who succeeded only with their lifelong efforts. Yet, when the divine vision had disappeared and the boons had been secured, they employed their enhanced powers for the oppression of the virtuous instead of the betterment of the world. Rāvaṇa's son, especially, had his own favourite grounds for offering oblations; but when boons had relaxed his artificially kept up piety, his mind, like that of his father and of every demon, quickly gravitated towards its naturally aggressive and murderous levels. The extraordinary prowess which divine grace conferred was, therefore, systematically made to serve wicked ends and not to further the cause of *dharma*. Hence the very Rāma who fought for protecting the rituals of Viśvāmitra and other *ṛishis* of the forest, was forced to order the destruction of Meghanāda after first obstructing his rituals and thereby cutting off the source of his irresistible power. Rituals or sacrifices, penances and visions of the deities are, no doubt, characteristics of religious life; but they were considered to be in consonance with *dharma*, only if they broke down the barriers of the limited and aggressive ego and issued out in virtuous activities conducive to the welfare of all creatures.

VIBHĪSHAṆA

In striking contrast was the behaviour of Vibhīshaṇa. Born of Nikashā, like Rāvaṇa, he yet differed from his brother in the underlying motives for his penances. *Dharma* being his guiding principle, he could think only of the highest evolution as the gift worth accepting from the hands of the Lord. "May my mind," said he with joined palms, "remain ever fixed on righteousness even when I shall happen to fall into great peril! May I also obtain true knowledge without any instructions!" In Vibhīshaṇa, as in Prahlāda, we have a signal example of *dharma* manifesting itself, transcending the limitations imposed by demoniacal birth and natural affection towards relatives, king and country. Endowed with strength and clearness of vision, as every follower of *dharma* invariably becomes, Vibhīshaṇa quickly perceived the ruinous extent to which his brother was deviating from the path of virtue. Fearlessly he spoke out his mind in the assembly; and he

surrendered to the mercy of Rāma and his forces only after exhausting all his resources to make his brother alter his resolve. A true devotee and man of action that he was, he fully vindicated the trust Rāma had placed in him. He always fought in the van of the army; and in every moment of crisis, as on the occasion of Indrajit's second overthrow of Rāma and Lakshmaṇa,[1] or his special rites in Nikumbhilā or the illusion of Jānakī's execution, it was Vibhīshaṇa's calmness, wisdom and resourcefulness that revived the courage of the troops and changed the fortunes of the battle. If Rāvaṇa represents divine grace and the higher elements in heredity getting dissipated in self-aggrandizement, Vibhīshaṇa stands for the heroic soul's clinging to *dharma*, overcoming systematically the baser elements in heredity and the numerous temptations and dangers of a vicious environment.

HANUMĀN

Like Vibhīshaṇa from the *rākshasa* camp there was Hanumān from the *vānara* camp. Faithful, devoted, mighty, intelligent and blest with long life, they typify one of the many beautiful parallels presented by Valmīki. Rāma entertained high regard for Hanumān from their very first meeting. Said he turning to Lakshmaṇa, "None can speak thus without mastering the Vedas with their branches. Nor is there any defect in his countenance, eyes, forehead, brows or any of his limbs. His accents are wonderful, auspicious and captivating. Even an enemy who has his sword uplifted is moved. Indeed success awaits the monarch whose emissaries are so accomplished."[2] Just as the lotus opens its petals before the rising sun, Hanumān felt himself drawn irresistibly to the feet of Rāma who represented *dharma* in its manifold aspects. Rāma became his chosen spiritual ideal and he resolved forthwith to dedicate himself heart and soul to the promotion of Rāma's welfare. Rāma's name or that of Sītā brought inexhaustible energy into his limbs and was the secret of all the wonderful things he accomplished. The *rākshasas*, he argued, ought to be impressed with the might of Rāma through a signal demonstration of the havoc which he, a single follower, could cause unaided within their fortified city. He, therefore, destroyed Rāvaṇa's pleasure garden and broke down the superb edifice dedicated to Laṅkā's deities, beating back the *rākshasa* hosts with the bold challenge: "I am the servant of the sovereign of

[1] *Yuddha* LXXIV. [2] *Kishkindha* III 28-34.

the Kośalas, Rāma of heroic deeds. A thousand Rāvaṇas cannot cope with me in conflict. In the presence of all the *rākshasas* I will coolly lay waste the city and go back, having paid my respects to Sītā and achieved my end."[1] A strict *brahmachārin* that he was, Hanumān became uneasy since, during his search for Sītā, he had to let his eyes fall on many a lady in her sleeping condition; and he carried on vigorous introspection and reasoning till he was satisfied that his mind had not been tainted or *dharma* violated in the least.[2] Freedom in the sense of shuffling off the gross and subtle bodies with the remembrance of the Lord did not appeal to him as the goal of existence. "May my devotion to thee remain unshaken," he therefore prayed to Rāma after the latter's coronation at Ayodhyā, "and may my mind never conceive attachment unto any other object! Vouchsafe also that I may continue to live so long as thy stories continue to be told on earth!" Conversant with *dharma* and its subtle manifestations, Rāma graciously granted this prayer of his devotee just before he departed with others for the final plunge in the waters of the Sarayū.

VĀLI AND SUGRĪVA

Vāli and Sugrīva, the royal brothers, form another pair of characters, whose relations with each other and with Rāma reveal the working of *dharma* in some other aspects. Knit together by love for a long time, they yet became mortal enemies owing to a little misunderstanding. It was honestly believed by all that Vāli had been killed in the cave by the *asura* Māyāvin; but even then Sugrīva agreed to rule the country only because the ministers and the citizens unanimously and by force installed him on the throne. Vāli, however, after his victory and escape from the cave, could not have the patience or generosity to elicit all the facts or believe the explanations offered by his submissive brother. To fly into a rage was pardonable in such circumstances, provided brotherly love was allowed to overcome it in a reasonable time; but instead Vāli employed all his prodigious strength in pursuing Sugrīva and wreaking utmost vengeance on him. Sugrīva and his handful of friends including Hanumān were able to keep themselves alive only because there was a solitary spot in the forest where Vāli's entrance had been effectively prevented by a sage's curse. In spite of Rāvaṇa's valour he stooped to carry away Rāma's wife by stealth, while Vāli, superior to Rāvaṇa in

[1] *Sundara* XLII 35-36. [2] *Ibid.* XI.39-45.



VĀLI-VADHA
Rama Killing Vali



HANUMAN MEETING SITA



RAVANA FIGHTING RAMA

From Souvenir du Cambodge. L. Crespin, Saigon

prowess, utilized that very prowess to capture his brother's wife by force. If the recovery of Sītā by some means—and not *dharma*—were the only consideration, Vāli was undoubtedly the better and surer ally for Rāma, since Vāli had vanquished and humiliated Rāvaṇa once before. But if the achievement of Rāma's personal end was to fit in, as it ought to, with the scheme of maintaining *dharma* in its wider aspects, Sugrīva's friendship was the better alternative. Sugrīva's evolution would then take place through the risk he would take on behalf of Rāma with a devoted mind, while the evolution of Vāli could be complete only with the humbling of his pride and the refusal to accept his more certain though patronizing protection. That Sugrīva could forget all ideas of self in the defence of Rāma's interests was clear from the single combat he had with Rāvaṇa before the commencement of the actual fight. "I am the friend as well as the slave of Rāma," he shouted hitting the crown of Rāvaṇa off his head with a blow, "and me, backed by the energy of that lord of the earth, thou shalt not escape to-day."[1] Rāma did not fail to administer a stern rebuke to Sugrīva for exposing himself to such serious risk; but the devoted Sugrīva had his ready reply. "Knowing my own strength," he pleaded, "how could I, O Rāghava, control myself on seeing the wicked one who carried away the spouse?"[2] Vāli's final reconciliation with Sugrīva and concern for the future of Tārā and Aṅgada, and Sugrīva's own genuine repentance for having sought the death of his brother who had generously let him off alive after many a combat, have enormous power of appeal and show the noble heights of *dharma* to which those heroic ones could soar.

SANCTITY AND POSSIBILITIES OF MARRIED LIFE

Sītā is the ideal wife. Women were in ancient days considered to be the equals of men in the sense that whatever the husband did for the acquisition of merit or spiritual evolution was to be fully shared in by the wife, who was usually to sit by his side during the ceremonies. If the husband fixed his attention upon the Supreme Being while going through his daily routine and meditations, and the wife looked upon the husband as the Lord Himself in flesh and blood, there was no reason why heroic children with a passion for *dharma* could not be born to bless their wedded life. That marriage was to be considered a sacred trust to

[1] *Yuddha* XL.10-11. [2] *Ibid.* XLI.9.

rear up a generation that would solve all unsolved problems of the family, country or even of the world, instead of adding to them, was recognized by, and taught to, all who chose to enter the householder's stage. Here and there Vālmīki himself mentions directly or through the medium of the *ṛishis* that Rāma was an incarnation of the Deity for the removal of the world's distress occasioned by those who made life an opportunity for aggression and gross sense enjoyment. Thus the fact that Daśaratha and his wives made themselves fit channels for the descent of the Lord to the earth in the interests of suffering humanity, shows the maximum heights to which married life, properly led, could lift such as were bent on following in the wake of *dharma*. A temporary defect in the mood of any one parent, as in the case of Nikashā, the mother of Rāvaṇa, was sufficient to cause a congenital defect in the outlook of the child which no course of studies or penances might succeed in totally eradicating. On the other hand, by the virtuous thoughts of the expectant mother, it was possible to give such a moulding to the temperament of the child that, as in the case of Lava and Kuśa, the training would progress by leaps and bounds and bring about the rounding of the personality with the minimum effort on the part of the teacher.

SĪTĀ

Accepting the principles of married life, Sītā remained true to her lord in spite of the numerous trials she had to undergo. She felt it would be wrong on her part to stay behind in the palace when Rāma was to go alone into the trackless forest. "I have been taught," urged she, "by my parents to follow my husband in all conditions of life; I shall carry out that lesson to-day and shall abide by no other counsel."[1] Indeed the happiness of Rāma and the maintenance of his reputation were her guiding principles from the moment her father led her up to the altar for marriage. "This Sītā, my daughter," Janaka said addressing Rāma, "do thou accept as thy partner in the observance of every *dharma*. May she be of exalted piety and devoted to thee, her husband, following thee like a shadow!"[2] Far from weakening her and effacing her capacity for independent thinking, this whole-hearted devotion to her husband only made her all the more conscious of her inner strength. She knew that the fire of her chastity was capable of reducing Rāvaṇa to ashes, but she deliberately refrained from such an exercise of her power.

[1] *Ayodhyā* XXVII.10. [2] *Bala* LXXIII.26-27.

For she did not wish to deprive Rāma's arrows of their legitimate privilege of rescuing her and humbling Rāvaṇa whose insolence had swollen with his boons. In spite of her intense longing for a sight of Rāma she was, therefore, unwilling to agree to the proposal of Hanumān to free her from Rāvaṇa's control by carrying her on his back on his return journey through the air. Confronted by Rāvaṇa who had all the advantages of physical force at his command, she rose equal to the occasion and asserted the royalty in her in a dignified manner. "May good betide thee, O Rāvaṇa," said she in a spirit of moderation, "and do thou take me unto Rāma, stricken with grief that I am. Enter into friendship with that best of men, if thou wishest to maintain thy life and empire. He is well known for his adherence to *dharma* and is kind to all who seek his shelter."[1] She appealed to his sense of honour too. "Born as Kubera's brother," said she, "thou art heroic and great in prowess. How then couldst thou stoop to take me away by stealth after luring my protector out of the hermitage?"[2] And on every occasion of their meeting she warned him that even if the thunderbolt might leave him unscathed and Death himself spare him, there was no safety for him when Rāma, the lord of men, was enraged.[3]

Devotion to her husband broadnened Sītā's sympathies instead of narrowing them. If Rāma was sorely afflicted by the illusion of her execution, she was equally tried by the sight of Rāma and Lakshmaṇa stretched, lifeless as she thought, on the field of battle. Although her heart was torn asunder by the irreparable loss she herself had sustained, her thoughts quickly went in the direction of the aged queen at Ayodhyā. "I do not grieve so much for Rāma or the mighty car-warrior Lakshmaṇa," said she, "as I do for the wretched mother-in-law of mine who constantly thinks of the promised return of all of us from the forest."[4] That same broadness of mind made her pardon the *rākshasīs* who had ill treated her in obedience to the mandates of Rāvaṇa. "It behoveth the pious," said she meditating a while and addressing Hanumān who offered to kill those cruel women, "to show compassion to those who perpetrate crimes and are worthy of being slain. My sufferings, I know, have been due only to my own ill luck."[5]

The worst trials for Sītā, however, commenced only after Rāma had slain Rāvaṇa and vindicated the honour of his family. In accordance

[1] *Sundara* XXI 18-20 [2] *Ibid* XXII.22. [3] *Ibid.* XXI 23
[4] *Yuddha* XLVIII 20-21. [5] *Ibid* CXV 37-38, 43-44.

with his order she bathed and went up to him expecting to be treated with overflowing love and tenderness. But a bolt from the blue awaited her. For in the presence of all Rāma announced: "I have nothing to do with thee, O Sītā. Thou wert carried by Rāvaṇa on his lap and beheld by him with sinful eyes. I cannot therefore take thee back and bring disgrace upon my great family. My object being accomplished with the chastisement of the *rākshasa,* thou mayst now stay with whomsoever thou likest."[1] Although humiliated thus before the great assembly, she replied in a fearless and dignified manner, lamenting only that she had not been understood aright yet by her husband. "O Fire! O witness of the people!" said she, circumambulating Rāma, "protect me as my heart hath never deviated from Rāghava, my lord!" With this simple prayer she then dauntlessly entered the rising flames, making the very gods hurry thither to proclaim her spotless purity and persuade Rāma to accept her again.[2]

It was with similar prayers invoking the strength generated by her observance of the chaste wife's *dharma,* that she faced the second ordeal of exile or fire. Abandoned in the forest while carrying Rāma's future heirs in her womb, or called upon to adduce proofs of her innocence a second time before the people, Sītā undoubtedly suffered agonies, but remained patient like the earth from whom she claimed her birth, convinced that her virtuous husband thus treated her harshly only for upholding the *dharma* of the ideal king. The perfect wife that she was, she performed her proper duty by praying continually for the welfare of Rāma and his subjects, and never expressed a word of reproach or complaint against him for the attitude he chose to adopt. "I have always with my mind, body and words prayed for Rāma's well-being and by virtue of that may the goddess Earth give me abiding place within her!" It was with these fervent words that she faced her second ordeal and disappeared for ever from mortal view. Her faith in Rāma's undivided love for her remained unshaken, though her physical eyes were not destined to see how it manifested itself in later years through his keeping of a golden image of her by his side during all his ceremonies. Rāma and Sītā showed that marriage could be an indissoluble bond resulting in mutual confidence and esteem, and in the rearing up of heroic sons in spite of enforced exiles, apparently inhuman treatment and all the shocks given by a hostile external world. Nor is this strange in a

[1] *Yuddha* CXVII 20-23. [2] *Ibid.* CXVIII 23 27; CXIX--CXX.

country where voluntary renunciation of one's nearest and dearest and a direct realization of the Lord as immanent not merely in one's own partner in life but also in all other objects of the outside world, *terrible no less than beautiful,* have been regarded as indispensable factors in any genuine spiritual life.

RĀMA

Rāma is presented in every context as the ideal man. There were occasions on which the great *rishis* or the celestials stood before him with joined palms and urged him to remember that he was the Supreme Being Himself. But he seldom moved from the position that he was a mere man, Rāma, son of Daśaratha.[1] No doubt he is described as the possessor of all the virtues a man can inherit or acquire, but there is not the least suggestion that he obtained them just because he was divine and not because he underwent the necessary discipline laid down for ordinary men. If he developed subtle intelligence or philosophic wisdom and could excel in military feats or in answering controversialists or even in singing, it was only because he diligently engaged himself in the study of the respective subjects and in serving his seniors and preceptors.[2] When fighting with Indrajit who concealed himself by resorting to illusion, Rāma and Lakshmaṇa behaved only as any other persons following the code of chivalry and honest warfare would have done. They were both, as a result, quickly overpowered, rendered senseless and bound with net-works of arrows. Vālmīki makes the tragic element here complete by describing Sītā as viewing them in such a plight from the Pushpaka and Vibhīshaṇa as bursting into lamentations until Garuḍa raises them up and sets them free. There is also a sad touch of dramatic irony in Garuḍa's parting words. "By nature," said he addressing Rāma, "the *rakshasas* have cunning shifts in fight whilst thou, who art heroic and of a pure spirit, reliest on thy simplicity alone for strength. Thou shouldst never more trust these *rākshasas* in the field of battle, for they are deceitful. And allow me to depart, O Rāghava, and do thou entertain no curiosity as to our friendship."[3] The implication was that owing to Rāma's conception of himself as a mere human being, and not as Vishṇu, he had reason enough to be curious as to why Garuḍa should leave the Lord and rush for his assistance on the earth below.

[1] *Yuddha* CXIX 6-11. [2] *Bala* XVIII.28, 36-37; XXII 23.
[3] *Yuddha* L. 53-57

Rāma's relations with his brothers form an interesting set-off to those of Rāvaṇa with Vibhīshaṇa or of Vāli with Sugrīva. It so happened that circumstances forced Lakshmaṇa and Bharata into widely different positions when Kaikeyī insisted on the granting of her boons and Rāma agreed to retire into the woods. But they both entertained and manifested the same devotion to him and the same spirit of submissiveness. Thus, if Lakshmaṇa remained sleepless at nights, acting faithfully as a servant and bodyguard, considering that as the best path for his spiritual advancement, Bharata too expressed identical feelings when he condemned his mother, lived like an ascetic or ruled the country in Rāma's name, using Rāma's sandals to symbolize his presence in the city. Śatrughna's attachment was equally strong. Obeying Rāma's instructions he had slain Lavaṇa and raised up a beautiful city after the strenuous work of a dozen years. Unable to bear separation from Rāma any more, he then ran up to Ayodhyā and prayed for permission to stay permanently in his company. The ideal brother and king that he was, Rāma gave a fitting reply considering duly the demands of love and of government. "Be not sorry, O hero," said he, "for the *dharma* of the Kshatriyas is to govern their subjects, and they should never be tired of living in foreign lands for that purpose. Do thou, however, come at intervals to see me, and return to thy own city. Forsooth thou art dearer to me than my life." Some of the most touching scenes in the *Rāmāyaṇa* are those relating to Lakshmaṇa. For example, there is the scene where Rāma is shown as regaining consciousness first and grieving for the fall of Lakshmaṇa whom he believes to have been slain by Indrajit's shafts.[1] There is also the scene in which Lakshmaṇa, who had long before known from Sumantra of Rāma's future abandonment of him, coolly asks Rāma to kill him for violating the privacy of his talk with Yama. How could he hesitate to lay down his life for saving the entire race? Arguing thus Lakshmaṇa had readily arranged the interview, and was not pained in the least to find that after all what Durvāsas wanted was only some food for satisfying his hunger!

Rāma's life was one of crosses. Situations of such a baffling nature always arose that anybody less heroic or less self-sacrificing would have either fled from them or left them further complicated. But Rāma faced them all and put forth his best efforts to bring them under control. Many were solved through the exercise of his military tactics and

[1] *Yuddha* XLIX.



RAMESVARA TEMPLE

prowess[1]; the rest he tackled through his supreme spirit of renunciation. Of renouncing people Vālmīki has shown different types. One is the ascetic who abandons kith and kin and the pleasures of life at a stroke, and when the initial shocks of the mind are got over, struggles gradually to approach a state of bliss and tranquillity. Many belonging to this class, like Visvāmitra in his earlier days, stumbled and fell occasionally in the course of their perilous onward march, whenever external forces proved too strong for the measure of self-control acquired by them. Others, like Agastya or Bharadvāja, attained mental poise and spiritual freedom and remained prepared to help actively in the affairs of men, if the need for it arose. It was Agastya, for instance, that gave Rāma the weapon and the *mantra* which gave him additional facilities for overcoming Rāvaṇa in the final encounter.[1] Rāma's renunciation was of a different type. He, too, gave up kith and kin and the pleasures and privileges of life, but not at a stroke. His struggles were spread out throughout a whole life, each succeeding step coming just when the mind had learnt to adjust itself to the tremendous changes in outlook and conduct caused by its predecessor. Thus by the time he got reconciled to the loss of the kingdom and of his father, he was confronted with the loss of his wife. When, after meeting enormous difficulties, he recovered his wife and became installed on the throne, there arose a whisper of scandal and he had to banish his wife to the woods and lose with her his future heirs as well. Long afterwards, his silent sorrows got mitigated a little when he recognized his children and took them to the palace; but the second ordeal which he imposed on Sītā resulted in her final disappearance from the earth. Lastly, to crown his human woes, there cropped up the need for killing or banishing Lakshmaṇa when only a few days more of life remained for them. In all these cases, the principle followed by Rāma was that of sacrificing a smaller circle of interests when wider ones had to be protected, and of maintaining tranquillity in spite of the pain consequent upon such a procedure. Thus it was that when domestic interests came into clash, he satisfied Kaikeyī and gave up his own right to be installed. Similarly, threatened with the danger of his being viewed by the citizens as a man of lust or impure ways, instead of as a model of virtue and purity, he chose to give up Sītā, knowing in his inmost heart that she would pray for his success in the observance of the sovereign's *dharma*. And lest his words should be

[1] *Yuddha* CVI, CX 3-4.

falsified, the man of truth that he was, he ordered the banishment of the faithful Lakshmaṇa. There was no situation from which he shrank or which he did not endeavour to solve or at least smooth, through the application of his prowess, his regard for truth and justice and his readiness to sacrifice his interests to achieve the welfare of others. If Vālmīki has not stressed the fact of Rāma's being an incarnation of Vishṇu, he has certainly brought out vividly that he was an embodiment of *dharma* in its manifold aspects.

CONCLUSION

Vālmīki's is not the only *Rāmāyaṇa* now available for us. In Sanskrit itself there is the *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa* which reminds the reader at every turn that Rāma was conscious of his divinity at all times although he continued to behave like an ordinary man, suffering patiently the sorrows that fell to his lot. Many a poet of later years has drawn inspiration from the glorious history of Rāma and has either translated these two ancient works into the vernaculars or produced original compositions giving elaborate treatment to particular episodes. Painters and sculptors have also been drawing their best materials from this sacred theme; and in different parts of the country one may see the mighty temples erected in honour of Rāma, containing his image in a heroic pose within the shrine or his story depicted in colours all over the walls. In the afternoons or at nights, when work is over and leisure is available, here and there might also be seen groups of devotees, including women and children, listening eagerly to the exposition of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and imbibing the principles of *dharma* as the ancients conceived of it. The story-tellers are specially trained in the art, though there may not be much in common between their modern performances and those given by the original chanters, Lava and Kuśa, the disciples of Vālmīki. In all these ways and many more, the ideals presented by the sage have spread to every corner of the country; and even if many may not accept Rāma as a deity to be worshipped or regard him as their chosen spiritual ideal, there is no doubt that his character as a hero and as a man of virtuous action and that of Sītā as a model heroine have been instrumental in shaping the lives of many who genuinely aspire after *dharma*.

Religion is now passing through a crisis. On the one hand we see the different creeds meeting together everywhere and trying to swell the

ranks of their respective followers through diverse methods of propaganda and conversion. On the other hand we see a hundred forces threatening to remove not merely any one creed, but religion itself, from all schemes of human activity on the ground that it has made men weak and inefficient, created splits instead of unity and failed miserably in combating the evils of a world distracted by political rivalries and economic depression. But even to such a world Vālmīki may have a welcome lesson to teach, if it were so minded as to learn. For he has carefully refrained from laying emphasis on what we now wrongly understand by the term religion, namely, rituals and external conformity to set prayers and churches and their rules. These, he knew, have necessarily to differ with the differences in the temperaments and attainments of the individuals who have to evolve. Instead he has wisely upheld the ideal of *dharma* which has a comprehensive sweep and which enables its votaries, irrespective of their vocation or status in society, to enjoy inner perfection and freedom while dedicating their virtues to the welfare of others. If this ideal, as the sage has exemplified in the motives and activities of his numerous characters, is grasped and put into practice, all the creeds may survive the present crisis, work side by side without feelings of hostility and make people intelligent, efficient and self-sacrificing enough for solving the problems of the family, country or even of the world as a whole.

THE MAHĀBHĀRATA AND SOME ASPECTS OF ITS CULTURE

The *Mahābhārata* is, next to the *Ṛig-Veda Saṁhitā,* perhaps the most remarkable work in Sanskrit literature. It is the biggest of the world's epics. Since the commencement of the sixth century A. C., it is known to have consisted of 100,000 *ślokas* or verses, that is, about eight times the size of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* put together. From the beginning it has enjoyed exceptional popularity. Heroes of the great poem find prominent mention in the works of grammarians, theologians, political thinkers, poets and dramatists almost uninterruptedly from about the fifth century B. C. Precepts culled from the epic are quoted by a Greek envoy as early as the second century B. C., while the prowess of its principal heroes is mentioned with admiration by royal personages in the Deccan already in the second century A. C. The whole poem is known to have been recited in temples in far-off Cambodia as early as the sixth century A. C. In the next century we find the Turks of Mongolia reading in their own idiom thrilling episodes like the Hiḍimbā-vadha. The work was translated into their own vernacular by the people of Java before the end of the tenth century.

As pointed out by a famous scholar who has given much study to this poem, the *Mahābhārata* represents a whole literature rather than a single homogeneous work; it constitutes a veritable treasure-house of Indian lore, both secular and religious, and gives, as does no other single work, an insight into the innermost depths of the soul of the people of Hindusthan. It is a " Song of Victory," commemorating the deeds of heroism in a war to avenge insults to womanhood, and maintain the just rights of a dynasty that had extended the heritage of Bharata and had knit together the North, East, West and South of India into one empire. It is a *Purāṇa-saṁhitā* or collection of old tales containing diverse stories of seers and sages, of beautiful maids and dutiful wives, of valiant warriors and of saintly kings. It is also a magnificent *kāvya* or poem describing in inimitable language the fury of the battlefield, the stillness of the forest hermitage, the majesty of the roaring sea dancing with billows and laughing with foams, the just indignation of the true daughter of a warrior line, and the lament of the aged mother of dead heroes. It is a

śāstra or manual of law and morality, and of social and political philosophy, laying down rules of conduct for the attainment of *trivarga* or the three great aims animating all human conduct, viz. *dharma, artha* and *kāma, i.e.* moral and religious duties, material wealth and pleasures of the flesh. Above all, it is a *moksha-śāstra* or sacred treatise showing the way to salvation, expounding the highest religious philosophy of India and inculcating reverence not only for Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Spirit, Sarasvatī, from whom flow all learning and the arts, and Nara, the superman, the ideal fighter and seer, the close associate of God, but also for mankind in general. " This is the holy mystery," declares the *Śānti Parva* of the great epic, " there is nothing nobler than humanity " (XII. 299. 20).

Regarding the origin and antiquity of the poem our information is surprisingly meagre. It professes to be a composition of the holy sage, Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa and is said to have been completed in three years. But there is evidence to show that it has been added to from time to time, that it has passed through several stages of development and that it has attained to its present bulk by a slow and gradual process. For the beginnings of epic poetry we must turn to the Vedic texts—the *ākhyānas* and *itihāsas* embedded in the Brāhmaṇas and connected treatises and often recited at great sacrifices like the *rājasūya* and the *aśvamedha*, as well as the hero-lauds sung in praise of mighty princes and warriors to the accompaniment of a musical instrument which in the *Mahābhārata* itself is called *sapta-tantrī vīṇā*, seven-stringed lyre (III.13.14). Of the stories, songs and lauds referred to above, not a few proclaimed the sanctity of Kurukshetra, the intrepidity of the 'inviolate Arjuna,' and the glory and fame of Bharata, of Pratīpa, of Śāntanu, of Dhṛitarāshṭra Vaichitravīrya, of Parīkshit, of Janamejaya and others of the Bharata or Kuru race, and spoke of the feuds between the Kurus and the Śrīñjayas and the calamity that overtook the former. It is such legends and lays that formed the nucleus of an epic that assumed coherent shape some time before Āśvalāyana and Pāṇini who probably flourished in the fifth century B. C. Originally a heroic poem or " Song of Victory " known by the names of *Bhārata* (XVIII.5.49) and *Bhāratī Kathā* (I.61.3), tale of the Bharata race or of the Bhārata war, singing the victory of the Pāṇḍus led by Arjuna and Kṛishṇa Devakīputra later identified with Nara and Nārāyaṇa, it was handled by successive generations of Sūtas devoted to the *Bhāgavata* and well

versed in Purāṇic lore, of Brāhmaṇas who recited charming tales and of ascetics living in woods at Taxila, Naimishāraṇya and other places, who transformed it into a vast store-house of old lays and ballads as well as of precepts on law, polity, morality and religion. On the one hand it grew into a Holy Writ of the Bhāgavatas—a *Kārshṇa Veda* as it is called in the *Ādi* and *Svargārohaṇa Parvas,* written by the sage Kṛishṇa, which taught *bhakti* for Vāsudeva Kṛishṇa and incorporated the "Song of the Lord"; on the other hand it summed up Brāhmaṇism and all that it stood for and became a veritable encyclopædia which "forgot nothing and absorbed everything," in which we find, side by side, martial songs giving highly coloured pictures of battlefields where the twang of the warrior's bow resembles the rumbling of rain-clouds and the shriek of troops sounds like the roar of the tempest-tossed ocean, lovely idyls depicting forest scenes and celebrating the victory of love and constancy over destiny and death, scholastic discourses on religion, philosophy and sociology intermingled with "mild ascetic poetry of edifying wisdom and overflowing love towards man and beast."

At some stage in its development the epic contained 24,000 verses, but gradually by absorption of numerous *upākhyānas* or secondary tales, and a considerable mass of floating literature it attained to its present bulk of 100,000 verses or prose equivalents. This process was practically completed in the fifth century A. C.

When the epic began, the centre of Aryan civilization was in the valleys of the Ganges and the Yamuna, where rose flourishing kingdoms of the Kurus, the Pañchālas, the Śālvas and the Matsyas as well as the powerful confederacy of the Yādavas of Mathurā. Large tracts even in this region were still covered with forests, some of which, notably the Khāṇḍavavana, the Kāmyakavana and the Dvaitavana, find prominent mention in the epic narrative. Through these and other wood-lands glided sacred streams like the Sarasvatī, the Dṛishadvatī and the Mālinī, the banks of which were dotted over with serene hermitages of seers and sages, "echoing with the sweet songs of birds and clad with flowery attire of many colours"; while the smiling plains in the neighbourhood were washed by the Yamuna and the Ganges, the waters of which reflected the splendours of stately capitals of the warrior clans, surrounded by massive walls and deep moats and abounding in pleasure parks and palaces. Before the epic was complete the Aryan civilization had spread over the whole of the vast sub-continent named after the

illustrious Bharata and stretching from Badarī, hallowed by the hermitage of Nara-Nārāyaṇa (III.156.10), in the North to Kumārī in the land of the Pāṇḍyas in the extreme South (III.88.14) and from Dvārāvatī nestling under the shelter of Mount Ujjyanta in the West (III.88.24) to Prāgjyotisha and Kāmākhyā beyond the Lauhitya or Brahmaputra in the East (III.82.105; 85.2). The centre of political gravity was in the western part of the Madhyadeśa or the Upper Ganges Valley, though Magadha (South Bihar) was clearly laying the foundation of its future greatness. But the name of Pāṭaliputra was not yet heard of and the sturdy warriors of South Bihar were still content with their old hill fortress of Girivraja. The people of the holy land watered by the Sarasvatī and the Yamuna looked askance at the new type of imperialism that had been evolved on the banks of the Sone and had resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of princes who were kept for slaughter in the fastness of Girivraja "as mighty elephants are kept in mountain caves by the lion." The statesmen of the Madhyadeśa devised a new scheme of conquest which secured the release of these princes and the unification of Bhārata-varsha under a just and virtuous emperor (*dharmarāja*) who performed Vedic sacrifices and demanded from his lieges "only agreeable services—homage or tribute" and had no desire to offer them as victims in a horrid rite (II.33.6).

The great king of the epic was usually a monarch who could boast of an illustrious pedigree and a claim to rule by hereditary right (III.78.9). But elective monarchies were not unknown, and in the *Puruvaṁśānukīrtana* section of the *Ādi Parva* we have a reference to a ruler whom "all the people elected to the kingship, saying that he was a virtuous man."

In several passages mention is also made of kingless people, of corporations (*gaṇa*) that are autonomous and of warrior clans having a titular *rājā* but actually governed by elders styled *saṅgha-mukhyas*.

The head of the State in the epic was no autocrat. He carried on the affairs of his realm with the assistance of a *sabhā*, which was either as assembly of all the warriors of the clan (I.220) or a council of elders consisting of the members of the royal family, generals, subordinate allies and other military chiefs (V.47.10). The circle of advisers and councillors was sometimes enlarged by the admission of priests and even representatives of the lower orders of the people as the following extracts from the *Śānti Parva* (XII.85.66) seem to indicate: "I shall tell you

(the king) what kinds of ministers should be appointed by you. Four Brāhmaṇas learned in the Vedas and ready-witted, who have completed the period of study and discipline and are of pure conduct, and eight Kshatriyas, all of whom should have physical strength and be capable of wielding weapons, and one and twenty Vaiśyas, all of whom should be rich, and three Śudras, every one of whom should be humble and of pure conduct and devoted to his daily duties, and one man of the Sūta caste, possessing the knowledge of the Purāṇas and the eight principal virtues, should be your ministers."

The royal advisers in the epic did not hesitate to upbraid or reprove the king when he went wrong. The *rājā* had also to defer to the wishes of the Brāhmaṇas, the *śreṇimukhyas*—elders of corporations (III.28.16), and the people, whose opinion could not always be ignored (III.170). The connection between the king and his people was based on a theory of mutual advantage. The king was to protect the people and do what was pleasing to them (XII.59.125) in return for the taxes that he received. For the efficient discharge of his duties he had to learn the Veda and the *śastras* (I.124) and practise self-control (V.129.34).

For purposes of self-defence and defeat of his enemies the king had to maintain a standing army with a *senāpati* at its head. The army was subdivided into regiments and battalions, styled *anīkinī, chamū, pṛitanā, vāhinī,* etc. The fighting forces consisted not only of chariots, elephants, horses and infantry but also, according to some passages of the twelfth book (59.411), of a navy, labourers, spies and local guides. Standards and flags bore an important part in battle. Among weapons the most interesting are the *yantra* or "machine" and the *śataghnī* or "hundred-killer" which were often used as projectiles (III.283-30 ff). The laws of war were humane, though they were not always observed in practice when feelings ran high. The army seems to have been recruited from all castes, though the Kshatriyas naturally formed the predominant element. We have references not only to Brāhmaṇa generals but also to Vaiśya and Śūdra warriors along with those belonging to the Kshatriya caste (VIII.47.18), for the great battle destructive of life, body and sins, brought on religious merit, heaven and fame for all the Kshatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra heroes that engaged in it.

Though the four primary castes and the mixed castes were known, social divisions had not yet become as rigid as in later times. We have, indeed, in a passage of the *Śānti Parva* (188.10) the bold statement that

there is no distinction of castes. The whole of this universe is divine, having emanated from Brahman. Created (equally) by the Supreme Spirit, men have, on account of their *karma* (deed or profession), been divided into various castes.

In the fourth *adhyāya* of the *Gītā* the Bhagavān says that he created the four *varṇas* or castes "having regard to the distribution of qualities and works." The qualities required in a member of the highest caste are thus described in the *Pativratopākhyāna* of the *Vana Parva* (ch. 205): "Wrath is the enemy of persons residing in their (own) body. One who forsakes this wrath and infatuation—him the gods know to be a Brāhmaṇa. One who speaks the truth and pleases his elders, who, though himself injured, never injures another—him the gods know to be a Brāhmaṇa. One who has his senses under his control, who is virtuous, devoted to studies and pure, who knows how to restrain lust and anger—him the gods know to be a Brāhmaṇa. The high-minded man who loves all people as his own self, knows what is right and applies himself to all righteous acts—him the gods know to be a Brāhmaṇa. One who studies himself and teaches others, who performs sacrifices and officiates at sacrifices performed by others and gives away (in charity) according to his means—him the gods know to be a Brāhmaṇa. The foremost of the twice-born who is a Vedic student, practising continence, who is generous and sober, who attends to his studies—him the gods know to be a Brāhmaṇa."

Women were accorded a place of honour in epic society and were allowed a considerable amount of freedom in the early period. The misogynists of the age no doubt spoke of girls as a torment (I.159.11) and women as the root of all evil (XIII.38.1 ff). But the better mind of the age had nothing but veneration for the fair sex. "Women shall always be honoured, for when they are honoured the deities rejoice" (XIII.46.5, 9). "Three things do not become impure women, gems and water" (XII.165.32). "Women should not be slain" (XII.135.14).

The noble sentiments about women are reflected in the tales of Sāvitrī, Śakuntalā, Tapatī, Damayantī and Sītā than whom "no more tender and delicate types of women are to be found." Epic heroines received a liberal education in their fathers' houses and developed into well-taught and clever disputants. Thus a princess tells her husband in the *Vana Parva* (ch. 32.60 ff) how, in days long gone by, her father and her brothers received lessons on the *nīti* of Bṛihaspati from an erudite


Brāhmaṇa and she herself listened to all those learned discourses while seated on her father's lap. In the *Udyoga Parva* (133.3) a Kshatriya matron is described as being widely known for her knowledge and learning. In several epic stories we find maids choosing their own husbands and in a famous episode of the *Vana Parva* a king asks his daughter to choose a husband and says that he will give her to the man of her choice (III.292.32 ff).

Privacy of women was practised in certain families, but many of the epic tales bear witness to a freer life when women laid aside their veils and came out of the seclusion of their houses. This was specially the case at the time of a *svayamvara* or on the occasion of a great national festival or sorrow. The characteristic traits of the women of the period and the place they occupied in society are clearly brought out in several *upākhyānas*. In the story of Sāvitrī we have the ideal wife wrestling with the god of death for the life of her husband. The episode of Vidulā bears testimony to the fierce unbending spirit of the true daughter of an aristocratic house who exhorts her indolent son to " flare up like a torch of ebony wood, though it be but for a moment, but not to smoulder, like a fire of chaff, just to prolong life " (V.133.14).

The place of the wife in domestic economy is best described in the following lines of the *Śakuntalopākhyāna:*


" A wife is half the man, transcends
In value far all other friends.
She every earthly blessing brings,
And even redemption from her springs."
" In lonely homes, companions bright,
These charming women give delight;
Like fathers wise, in duty tried,
To virtuous acts they prompt and guide.
Whene'er we suffer pain and grief,
Like mothers kind they bring relief."

As already stated, the *Mahābhārata* is not only an *itihāsa* and a manual on law and duty, it is also a *mokshaśāstra* which undertakes to show the way to deliverance from a world of change and pain. The religion (*dharma*) that it inculcates has a twofold basis—truth and the Vedas (III.205.41). The religious ideas of the epic are not, however, a mere replica of those prevailing in the Vedic period. Great changes have taken place in men's conception of divinity and the problems of



GANGAVATARANA: THE DESCENT OF THE GANGES

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DHARMARAJA'S RATHA



DRAUPADI'S RATHA

life. The old Vedic gods have lost much of their pristine splendour, and anthropomorphism has made the presiding deities of nature "quite human in dress, talk and action." New deities like Skanda and Viśākha, Vaiśravaṇa and Maṇibhadra take their place in the pantheon. Deification of heroes proceeds apace; but the whole world of gods and demi-gods, sentient beings and inanimate things is conceived as a "perpetual process of creation and destruction filling eternity with an everlasting rhythm," and the entire scheme is placed under the law of *karma* which provides that every individual shall reap the fruit of deeds performed in previous lives. "As a calf could recognize its mother among a thousand kine, so the deeds of the past would not fail to find out the doer" (XII.181.6).

The operation of the law might, however, be modified by the grace (*prasada*) of the Lord, the Ordainer (Īśvara), combined with the loving faith (*bhakti*) of the worshipper. The new doctrine is preached, among others, by the Bhāgavatas or Pāñcharātras. They teach *bhakti* for Kṛishṇa who is identified with Vishṇu and Nārāyaṇa, and their religious and philosophical views are expounded in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the *Nārāyaṇīya*, the *Viśvopākhyāna* and several other theistic treatises incorporated into the great epic. Rival sects also make their appearance—the most notable being the Pāśupatas and the Sauras who lay stress on devotion to Śiva-Paśupati and Sūrya (also called Mihira) respectively. The growth of these sects threatened to destroy the solidarity of the Aryan community. Separatist tendencies of extreme sectarianism are, however, sought to be checked by the doctrine that Vishṇu, the God of the Bhāgavatas, is identical with Śiva, the deity of the Pāśupatas (III.39.76 ff).

This dualism prepares the ground for the doctrine of the *Trimūrti* which seeks to unite the gods of the most important theistic sects and of the orthodox theologians into a trinity and teaches that the Father of the universe, though one, has three aspects. In the form of Brahmā he creates, in the form of Purusha (Vishṇu) he preserves and in the form of Rudra (Śiva) he lulls the universe to eternal sleep (III.271.47).

The next step is to identify the sun and other great gods such as Indra, Śanaiśchara, Skanda, Varuṇa and Yama with the *Trimūrti* (III.3.18), and regard them as but manifestations of the Primeval Spirit, the Lord (Īśāna) who is adored by all and to whom all make offering, the true, the one undecaying Brahman, both manifest and unmanifest,

the everlasting; who is both non-existent and existent-non-existent, transcending all existent-non-existent, the Creator of the lofty and the low, ancient, supreme, undecaying; who is Vishṇu, the good and goodness; who is worthy of all worship, pure and sinless; who is Hari, the Lord of the faculties, the Guide of all that moves and does not move.

How to win admittance to the realm of this Primeval Spirit and attain immortality? Not by hundreds of sacrifices but by self-restraint, renunciation, vigilance and goodwill towards all beings.

"Self-restraint, renunciation and vigilance—these are the three horses of Brahman. He who rides on the car of his soul, having yoked (these horses) with the help of reins of right behaviour, goes, O king, to the realm of Brahman, shaking off all fear of death. He who assures to all beings freedom from fear goes to the highest of regions, the blessed abode of Vishṇu. The fruit that a man reaps by granting protection from harm cannot be obtained by thousands of sacrifices or daily fasts" (XI.7.23 ff).

These sentiments are echoed by a Greek devotee of Vāsudeva, the God of gods, *i.e.* Kṛishṇa, in an epigraphic record of the second century B. C. The new school of saints and seers to whom we owe these and similar ideas, lays stress on *ātma-yajña* (sacrifice of self) in place of the older *paśu-yajña* (sacrifice of animals).

"Death comes from infatuation, and immortality is acquired by truth. Abstaining from injury, shaking off desire and anger, resorting to truth, with a happy and contented mind I shall scoff at death like an immortal. Engaged in the sacrifice of peace, possessed of self-control and employed also in the sacrifice of Brahman, the sacrifices I shall perform are those of speech, mind and deed, when the sun enters his northerly course. How can one like me celebrate an animal sacrifice which is full of cruelty? How can one endowed with wisdom perform, like a ghoul, a sacrifice of destruction after the manner of the Kshatriyas —a sacrifice which brings only transitory rewards? I am born of my own Self, O father, and without progeny I shall seek my own spiritual welfare. I shall offer the sacrifice of self, I require no children to be my saviours" (XII.276.30 ff).

It is interesting to note that it was Ghora Āṅgirasa, the preceptor of Kṛishṇa Devakīputra in the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* (III.17.6), who first taught a *purusha-yajña-vidyā* in place of the old *vidhi-yajña*. This indicates the source of inspiration of the famous poets and sages who

sang of the newer morality. Doubts, however, not only about the value of sacrificial rites but also about the efficacy of religion and morality and the justice and benevolence of God Himself are heard now and then. A long-suffering princess complains that a man does not attain prosperity by piety, gentleness, forgiveness, straightforwardness and other virtues, and expresses her conviction that " the blessed God, the self-created, the great Grand-sire, with secret action destroys creatures by creatures, playing with them as a boy with toys. Not like father or mother does the Creator behave to his creatures; like ordinary mortals he acts in anger " (III.30.36 ff).

To this the man of religion replies that true piety seeks no reward. " Do not," he adds, " speak ill of God, who is the Lord of all creatures; learn to know Him; bow to Him; let not your understanding be such. Never disregard that Supreme Being, O Kṛishṇā, through whose mercy the mortals, by pious observances, become immortals " (III.31.41 ff). The Lord Himself says in the *Gītā* (IX.29): " All beings I regard alike; not one is hateful to Me or beloved; but those who with loving faith worship Me abide in Me, and I also in them."

THE MAHĀBHĀRATA AGE

The *Mahābhārata*[1] is really great for its ethics and philosophy. Ethics means science of morals, *i.e.* the rules of good conduct. The *Mahābhārata* teaches all, children and grown-ups, men and women, Brāhmaṇas and Kshatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras, to do what is good and to avoid what is bad.

We shall review some of the leading characters of the great epic and learn what each character stands for.

Vyāsa, the author of the *Mahābhārata*, is himself the grandfather of the Kurus and the Pāṇḍavas. The son of the sage Parāśara, he has so highly excelled in severe austerities and penances that there is no one equal to him in greatness anywhere in the world. He is possessed of the highest wisdom and yet comes down, whenever necessary, amongst his descendants to comfort the righteous and pure-minded when they are subjected to untold miseries, and to inspire in them faith and confidence in the all-powerful hand of destiny. He is more an on-looker in the great epic than an active participator in the daily affairs of the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas. He has attained a high serenity of mind and calm composure so as not to bring himself down to the plane of worldly action and yet is not unwilling to do what he could to dis-entangle seemingly inexplicable situations. Though a Kshatriya, his is the status of the highest practical *yogin* whom caste cannot affect as he is beyond all such mundane environments. He represents the divine in embodied human form.

Dhṛitarāshṭra, the father of Duryodhana and his ninety-nine brothers and sister, represents the typical king. Highly learned and well-versed in all the arts and crafts, he is yet more human than the average human being. Himself being born blind and his step-brother, Vidura, being debarred on account of low birth, Dhṛitarāshṭra knows that he cannot succeed to the kingship, which, by customary law, can go only to Pāṇḍu. However, he could not refrain from being a party to all the machi-nations of Duryodhana and his accomplices who resorted to every questionable expedient to dispossess the Pāṇḍavas of their lawful heritage. Dhṛitarāshṭra knows the avariciousness of his sons. He

[1] Mrs. Besant's *The Story of the Great War* narrates the main incidents of the *Mahābhārata* in a telling style. We have freely adapted many passages from it.

knows that their claims as against the Pāṇḍavas are illegal and opposed to all canons of righteousness. Yet he would seem to justify his name Dhṛitarāshṭra—one who, having got the kingdom in his possession, would not lightly part with it. Dhṛitarāshṭra represents the average king who, though aware of what is right and wrong, yet does not possess the necessary spiritual greatness to avoid unrighteousness and walk in the narrow path of *dharma*. Again and again Sañjaya tells him that it is not yet too late to order the withdrawal of Duryodhana and others from this unrighteous conflict. Dhṛitarāshṭra is convinced of the guilt of his sons, but he could not summon up sufficient courage to prohibit them from such warfare, as even the remotest chance of their plausible success in the field of battle is still to his liking.

Vidura the wise realizes quite early in his career the utter demoralization of the Kauravas and argues in vain with his elder brother Dhṛitarāshṭra. Whenever he appears in the great epic he gives sound advice calculated to strengthen the faith in what is right. He is a typical statesman who propounds what is just and great, with characteristic detachment from all immediate considerations.

Pāṇḍu is an ideal king, who finds the luxuries of kingship to be ephemeral and whose anxiety is more for the hereafter than for what matters here below. In the very prime of life, he repairs to the forest to practise severe austerities to have children who will carry on the line after him. He is an example of the typical spirit of Hinduism which always emphasizes more the spiritual well-being in the life beyond in clear contrast to the transitory pleasures of the life in this world.

Bhīshma, the commander-in-chief of the Kuru hosts, is the ideal son and the ideal hero in peace and war. To satisfy the worldly desires of his father Śāntanu, he vowed himself to a life of eternal celibacy as an ideal son. As a far-seeing statesman, he advised his king Duryodhana to desist from open battle with the Pāṇḍavas on whose side was right. But when Duryodhana decided on war, though unrighteously, his duty was clear. Bhīshma, as the incarnation of duty, never shone more brightly than in the closing scenes of his life. For a Kshatriya, the duty of combat for his king, for the cause of his country, was the supreme law of life. His body owed allegiance to Dhṛitarāshṭra and his sons; he was their subject and councillor; he had lived, worked and fought in their service all his life through. Not for pain and suffering, not for broken heart and ruined life, could he leave duty. He must

pay with his body the debt his body owed. His love, hopes and reverence were with Śrī Kṛishṇa and his friends; but his bodily strength, his warrior arms, his skilled brain and his might as a leader were at the disposal of the king to whom he had sworn allegiance. It was not for him to judge of the right or wrong of the quarrel when war broke out. His was the duty to fight where his *karma* had placed him. So he got ready for the battle to fight outwardly against the Lord he loved, hoping, it may be, that in the struggle a bolt from Him might lay him low, that he might die of the wounds of love. Was there ever a greater sense of duty displayed?

The most fascinating portions of the *Mahābhārata* are the *Śānti* and the *Anuśāsana Parvas*. The highly ethical and moral teachings contained in these sections are put into the mouth of Bhīshma, the greatest Kshatriya of the day. In the *Mahābhārata* age, spiritual and philosophic knowledge was neither the birthright of the Brāhmins alone nor was it a taboo with the other castes. Bhīshma, the greatest warrior, is also the greatest exponent of all the highest *dharmas* and principles, Brāhminical and otherwise. Droṇa, the most orthodox Brāhmin and preceptor, was not only a teacher of the Vedic lore but he was also one of the foremost warriors in his day, next only to Bhīshma. It cannot be gainsaid that Bhīshma as the expounder of *dharma* and Droṇa as the generalissimo of the Kuru hosts are two outstanding personalities in the *Mahābhārata* who command unstinted homage from all. It is quite evident that the *Mahābhārata* age was an age of action *par excellence*, when the great castes stood really for what they signified as occupational guilds rather than as hide-bound skeletons narrowing people's vision and making them see only in their own narrow grooves and not as members of a composite whole.

Duryodhana and Yudhishṭhira are two great heroes who are poles apart in their outlook on life. To Duryodhana the end justifies the means and nothing can succeed like success. No expedient is too mean nor any one too low to be of use to him in his ambition. Yudhishṭhira is the typical warrior-statesman who cannot bring himself to adopt even the slightest objectionable tactics in claiming his right. Ever and anon he is oppressed more by the sense of reverence and duty to his elders, however evil-minded they may be towards him and his brothers. To his sense of justice, the end can never justify the means; whether success comes or not, the means employed should for all time remain irre-

proachable. Deep hidden in the nature of Yudhishṭhira there was a weakness—a disposition to rely too much on others, to shrink from taking responsibility and to stand alone. He was righteous, gentle, enduring and blameless in life; but this weakness in his inner nature remained, and it was brought to the surface to cause his fall. When he uttered the equivocal words "Aśvatthāman is dead" to confound the intellect of Droṇa and thereby cause his death, he was tested and found wanting. His steeds and chariot which were wont to remain four fingers' breadth above the ground, sank down and touched the earth—a mute but eloquent testimony to his fall. Yet by that fall and the life-long sorrow of having slain his *guru* Droṇa by telling a lie, Yudhishṭhira was purged of his last lingering weakness in his noble character. When, at the close of his life, he was again tested by a god who bade him desert his faithful dog, he rose above the trial and stood fast in righteousness, throwing away heaven that he might stand rooted in *dharma* till the end. Thus do the gods deal with us, trying us to the very uttermost, that any flaw may be found and got rid of, that in the end we may be able to stand blameless through any stress of pain or any strain on self-reliance.

In complete contrast to Yudhishṭhira, Duryodhana was obstinate, cruel and unscrupulous. Withal, he was strong and brave as became a true Kshatriya. Even when his end was quite near and when Śrī Kṛishṇa took him to task for all his misdeeds, he answered boldly thus: "I have studied, made presents according to the ordinance, governed the wide earth with her seas and stood on the heads of my foes. Who is there so fortunate as myself? That end again which is coveted by the Kshatriyas observant of the duties of their own order—death in battle—hath become mine. Human enjoyments such as were worthy of the very gods and such as could with difficulty be obtained by other kings have also been mine. Prosperity of the very highest kind has been attained by me. With all my well-wishers and my younger brothers I am going to heaven. As regards yourselves, with your purposes unachieved and torn by grief, live ye in this unhappy world." It was a hero-heart that, in the hour of defeat, in bodily agony and surrounded by triumphant foes, could thus rejoice exultantly.

In severe contrast to the Pāṇḍava brothers, Karṇa, their own step-brother, typifies the average human being whose conception of duty is neither too obscure nor too idealistic but, none the less, robust and full of common sense. When reminded by Śrī Kṛishṇa of his real lineage

and how he was in truth the eldest son of Kuntī and therefore entitled to the sovereignty of the kingdom even in preference to Yudhishṭhira, Karṇa is not blinded by ambition but replies, "This is the time when all those who have been supported by Dhṛitarāshṭra's sons should exert themselves for their masters. I shall certainly act for them even at the risk of my life. Those sinful men of unsteady heart, who, well fed and well furnished by their masters, undo the benefit received by them when the time comes for paying back those benefits—verily, those sinful men, those faithless servants of kings, those thieves of their master's cakes, have neither this nor the other world."

Karṇa, therefore, was an embodiment of gratitude. To his real parents who cast him off as unwanted, he was as indifferent as if he had nothing to thank them for. To Duryodhana who befriended him in his hour of need, he was devoted to such a degree that he was prepared to do anything for him, even risk his own life if need be.

It is when the hour of death approaches that even the stoutest heart wavers. When Karṇa's chariot-wheel stuck to the earth and was going deeper and deeper into the mire, he asked Arjuna to desist for a while from battle to enable him to raise up his chariot, appealing to Arjuna in the name of virtue, of which the latter was such an exemplar. This was too much even for Śrī Krishṇa. He said to Karṇa bitterly that he did well to remember virtue in the hour of his extremity, when he had forgotten it in all his dealings with the Pāṇḍavas, in the poisoning of Bhīma, in the house of lac and in the insults to Draupadī. Undaunted by Śrī Krishṇa's taunts, Karṇa fought valiantly and died in the field of battle at Arjuna's hands, crowning himself with glory as much by his heroic deeds as by his acts of charity and devotion to those who had helped him.

Arjuna, the third of the Pāṇḍava brothers, stands as one of the most heroic and fascinating figures in the great epic, and his place in the hierarchy of the warrior princes of the age is only next to that of Śrī Krishṇa, his Master. Needless to say the advent of Arjuna into the arena of Indian life is highly significant. He had quite a distinct spiritual mission to fulfil for which he had been specially chosen and also trained by Śrī Krishṇa. If we carefully study the trend of events in his life, we unmistakably find in them a logical sequence, all pointing to a certain divine purpose. Śrī Krishṇa, an incarnation of the Most High, had come down to awaken sleeping humanity to the greatness of

its spiritual life and to extinguish discord and irreligion that ran rampant in the country. He needed an instrument to fulfil his divine mission. And what better instrument could he find than Arjuna, the boldest, the purest and the most faithful of the warriors of the day?

An early manifestation of his sterling qualities of head and heart marked him out as the fittest person to be, in later age, Śrī Krishṇa's most trusted friend and most beloved disciple. His early life is a dazzling record of heroic exploits and there is evidently no clear indication of the spiritual fervour which seized him later on. But potentially a spiritual soul, Arjuna was always hankering after truth, and the many wanderings which he had to welcome in obedience to the inexorable call of destiny gave him occasions to practise very hard austerities lasting for years. He underwent many hardships and spent many years of his life in prayer and meditation which qualified him for the rare spiritual insight which Śrī Krishṇa meant to bestow on him. He was, no doubt, a soldier *par excellence;* but even his soldiership was meant for a religious cause—a cause for the establishment of a kingdom of heaven on earth. In fact Arjuna, the real man, was more a spiritual aspirant than a soldier. This may sound like a paradox, but it is a fact nevertheless. His complete self-surrender to Śrī Krishṇa does certainly testify to that. His was a surrender which only a disciple would make to his *guru* in whom he has implicit faith. In fact this spiritual ambition seems to have been the very key-note of his many-sided life.

His humility, obedience, devotion to duty and his spirit of heroic self-sacrifice find an eloquent expression in his behaviour towards his superiors. No doubt, all the glories that the Pāṇḍavas, as a whole, reaped, were mainly due to his mighty achievements. But this instead of turning his head made him all the more humble and respectful to his brothers. In short, Arjuna stands out through the dimness of the past as a radiant and magnetic personality transcending all age and clime and inspiring love and respect even in modern minds so much engrossed in sense enjoyments. He was a superman and may well be cherished as an idol in our hearts.

Śrī Krishṇa, the human-*cum*-divine actor on the *Mahābhārata* stage, is the pivot on which the whole epic revolves. The intervention of the divine in human affairs is an integral part of Hindu philosophy and religion. Only the elect know whether Śrī Krishṇa is only human or divine as well. Whatever Bhīshma may say to prove the divinity of

Śrī Kṛishṇa, Duryodhana and Jayadratha can never perceive a spark of divinity in him. Whatever may be the reverses sustained, Yudhishṭhira and Arjuna can never doubt the greatness and divinity in Śrī Kṛishṇa. Thus does the inexplicable law of the universe confound the intellect of the proud and chasten the mind of the devoted. Right can never be defeated of its end even as wrong will never go unpunished. To test our constancy in the Lord, right suffers apparently more reverses, but there can be no doubt of the final victory of right over wrong. It is to teach these age-long truths that the happy and perfect combination of Arjuna with Śrī Kṛishṇa, the ideal pupil and the perfect Master, has been worked out by the author of the *Mahābhārata*. The moral teachings preached in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* are true for all time and for all castes. Whatever may be one's duty, so long as it is performed without malice and without an eye to selfish gain, it will stand by the doer for his lasting good. Exertion is always superior to destiny, for destiny is the result of previous exertion. Inaction, born of the unreasonable belief that destiny is all-powerful, is condemned unequivocally. The *karma* that we reap now is the result of our past exertion, and present exertion can modify this *karma*. We are not straws in the current of *karma* but men, nay, gods in the making.[1]

Among the female characters of the *Mahābhārata* age, two, Gāndhārī and Draupadī, stand out pre-eminently.

Gāndhārī, the daughter of a king, became the wife of Dhṛitarāshṭra; and as soon as she knew that her husband was blind she resigned herself to her fate and decided that so long as her husband was not given the pleasures of life accruing through the eye, she too would voluntarily deny herself such pleasures by blinding herself artificially with a bandage over her eyes. This bandage she kept on throughout her life, never wavering even for a minute—so great was her real devotion to her lord. She never approved of the conduct of her sons towards their Pāṇḍava cousins and often appealed to her husband to check them. Even when all her sons had been slain in the field of battle and Śrī Kṛishṇa, after pacifying her, asked her permission to go away immediately to save the Pāṇḍava princes from an impending danger from Aśvatthāman, she quickly asked him to depart and save the Pāṇḍava princes at least from final disaster. Throughout, she is a typical Hindu

[1] *Śānti-parva*, ch. 56

wife, devoted to her lord and affectionate to her kinsmen—the very incarnation of chastity and asceticism.

Draupadī, the young wife of the five Pāṇḍava princes, represents the perfect flower of Hindu womanhood, great in her attainments, great in her sorrow and trials and great also in her devotion to her elders and superiors.

When Yudhishṭhira pawned her in a game of chess, she is naturally very angry with her lord and wonders if she cannot possess mastery even of her own self. All the taunts and insults that were heaped on her in the presence of her husbands, she bore patiently and appealed only to the Lord Govinda to protect her in her worst hour of trial. She was devoted to her husbands, whether they lived in palaces or roamed about as exiles in forests. Their joys and sorrows were equally hers. The insults she had borne, she could not forget unless they were duly avenged in the battlefield. When all her children were slain by Aśvatthāman by a dastardly plot during the night, she exhorts her husbands to kill the culprit the next day if they did not want her to slay herself. Of such proud and heroic stuff was this warrior woman made. Her faith in Śrī Kṛishṇa never wavered and till the end, she sought refuge in him whenever she was assailed too much by grief and distress. She represents the ideal wife and the ideal woman of the *Mahābhārata* age.

The *Mahābhārata* age was the golden age in the history of Hindu civilization. The caste system had not yet bound itself with unbreakable fetters. It stood more for one's vocation in life, suited to one's temperament and environment. The Brāhmaṇas were not only philosophers and preceptors but were warriors as well; and the Kshatriyas were not only warriors but great philosophers endowed with highest spiritual insight. The welfare of their subjects was the constant care of kings whether they were on the throne temporarily or permanently, in their own right or by right of possession. The subjects loved their king whether he was in prosperity or in exile. The land was overflowing with riches and honey; and even at the end of unparalleled wars, no one heard of famines, much less of punitive taxes or military occupations. In that age, arts and services flourished as never before; prosperity and contentment were writ large on every face and every square inch of land.

From the point of view philosophy, it was an age of consolidation rather than invention. The intellectual Sāṁkhya was developed

hand in hand with the practical Yoga. Śrī Kṛishṇa was the greatest *yogin*. The Darśanas were in their embryo and had not yet developed as distinctive schools. All were Mīmāṁsakas in that they obeyed implicitly the injunctions of the Vedas in regard to their daily practices and the performance of sacrifices. But the philosophical development of the Mīmāṁsā system was a matter of later development. Nyāya flourished as a necessary equipment for all studies and speculations. The general principles of the Vedānta as taught in the principal Upanishads, held the field. Vedānta was single and undivided in its scope and the Absolute was called Brahman, Vishṇu or Śiva, the three not being mutually exclusive or contradictory. Śiva and Vishṇu are praised equally in one and the same *parva*, each with a thousand names. Śrī Kṛishṇa is the highest Lord even as Śiva's *pāśupata-astra* is the mightiest weapon. The outlook is synthetical rather than the competing omnipotence of one or the other. It was an age of belief in God and faith in the scriptures, each one performing his allotted task not only for his own sake but for the sake of the glory and uplift of his community and nation as a whole.

The epics, the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, continue even to-day to be the bed-rocks on which the Hindu ethics and moral ideas and ideals are based and practised. To a Hindu, his daily life, from morning till evening, is one that cannot be divorced from the observances of religious acts and duties. Religion and daily life are so inextricably interwoven with each other that herein lies the special feature of Hinduism that marks it out from other world religions. The epics give the patterns that should form the standards according to which each Hindu should fashion his own conduct in daily life. And it is because of this peculiar feature of Hinduism that it is well-nigh impossible to give any scientific definition of Hinduism in cut and dry formulas. However, Sir P. S. Śivaswami Ayyar has, in his *Kamala Lectures*, brought out admirably the leading features of Hinduism in the following words:

"The doctrine of *karma* with the allied doctrine of rebirth is one of the essential tenets of Hinduism. It is deeply rooted in the minds of all Hindus and has permeated Hindu philosophy, literature and art. This doctrine which teaches that every one must win his salvation by his own work is a much stronger incentive to the spirit of manly self-reliance and self-improvement than the doctrines of vicarious atonement or redemption. Hinduism dwells persistently upon the importance of

self-discipline and self-control for the regulation and co-ordination of human impulses and instincts for the perfection of character. In no Occidental religion has the doctrine of *ahiṁsā* been proclaimed as one of universal scope or assigned such an important place in the ethical scheme. Hinduism has always been characterized by a spirit of toleration and has hardly ever indulged in the persecution of the followers of other religions. It has never put forward its claim to a monopoly of truth. It is the glory of Hinduism that it never interfered with or discouraged freedom of thought, speculation or opinion, so long as they conformed to the rules of society in matters of external conduct. In dealing with the mutual relations to members of society, Hinduism has always laid stress upon obligations rather than rights." These are the ideals preached in the *Mahābhārata* and these continue to be the governing factors in the life of every true Hindu even to-day.

THE TEACHINGS OF THE BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ

Sri Ramakrishna used to say that in order to know the essence of the *Gītā* one had only to utter the word 'Gītā' ten times. If the word is repeated in quick succession, it sounds like *tāgī-tāgī-tāgī*, which has the same meaning as *tyāgī*, *i.e.* a renouncer. Sri Ramakrishna meant that the essential teaching of the *Gītā* was the renunciation of worldly objects and desires and devotion of oneself to meditation on God and God alone.

Swami Vivekananda, speaking on the *Gītā* on a certain occasion when the writer happened to be present, said that advocacy of work without desire for its fruit and reconciliation of the different religions and philosophies of the time were its special features. Incidentally he also remarked that Sri Ramakrishna in the present age went much further as regards the harmony of religions and philosophies. Reading out some verses from the beginning of the second chapter where Śrī Kṛishṇa exhorts Arjuna to fight, he grew eloquent in explaining the one which begins with "Don't be a coward, O Arjuna," and so on (II.3). Swamiji's emphasis was unmistakably on *karma-yoga* (the philosophy of work).

We shall try to show in this article that both the apparently contradictory views regarding work and worklessness are true. The central teaching of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* is to attain worklessness (*naishkarṁya*) through work.

Many commentators have tried to explain the *Bhagavad-Gītā* from different points of view, some emphasizing knowledge, some devotion and others work. The general impression, however, that we get from reading the whole book is that its author, whoever he may be, tries to maintain a reconciliatory attitude towards all these different paths. Of course, by quoting isolated passages from it one can maintain the view that only one of the paths—be it knowledge, devotion or work—is superior to the others. But whoever studies the whole text with an unbiassed mind cannot but admit the harmonizing attitude of its author. There have always been religious sects in India, for example, the followers of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja or Chaitanya, who advocate either knowledge or devotion as a sole means to liberation. The *Gītā* states their different positions, but never condemns one in favour of another.

though it may recommend one of the paths as easier or more suitable for a particular temperament. The teaching about *karma* (work) in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* appears to be unique. Before the days of the *Gītā* people seem generally to have understood the word in its Pūrva Mīmāṁsā sense, that is, as work for some material object or *sakāma karma.* The author of the *Gītā* strongly condemns this type of work in many places as an impediment to higher attainments, though we cannot say that he advises everyone to discard it altogether. For instance, he says, "The Prajāpati, having in the beginning created mankind together with the sacrifice (*yajña*), said, 'By this shall ye multiply: this shall be the milch cow of your desires'" (III.10).

Many are so enamoured of the doctrine of selfless work (*nishkāma karma*) in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* that they consider renunciation or worklessness altogether outside the teachings of the *Gītā.* To them we recommend the relevant portions of the discussion in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Gītā*[1] regarding *sannyāsa* or the monastic life. They should consider the implications of such expressions as "retiring into solitude" and "alone" (VI. 10), as well as "firm in the vow of a *brahmachārin*" (*Ibid.* 14), and "renouncing every undertaking" (XII. 16). Still it cannot be gainsaid that the emphasis is generally on *karma;* for instance, when advising Arjuna to keep his mind always fixed on the Lord, Krishṇa does not forget to mention that he must also fight: "Therefore constantly remember Me, and fight" (VIII. 7). But even here it must not be forgotten that the disciple addressed is a Kshatriya (one belonging to the warrior caste) and a householder, and in directing him to fight, Krishṇa has only pointed out his *svadharma,* the duties attaching to his particular station. *Svadharma* has been explained by some as the duties of one's caste and order of life (*varṇāśrama-dharma*) and by others a little more liberally. In the *Gītā* we find specific mention of the respective duties of the four castes (*varṇa-dharma*). They are elaborately dealt with in verses 41-44 of the last chapter, where it is explained how one performing the specific duties of one's caste (*varṇa*) can ultimately attain the Lord. The duties of one's order of life (*āśrama-dharma*), however, are not dealt with so explicitly; but sufficient hints have been interspersed throughout the book from which we can conclude that the householder's life (*gārhasthya-āśrama*) alone was not working on the author's mind to the exclusion of the other three,

[1] II.71; IV.18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 32, 33, 37, 41; V 13; XII.16, 19

though these latter are not supported here exactly in the same form as we find in some other scriptures. The *Gītā* seems to be averse to extreme forms of austerity or bodily torture (see VI. 16; XVII. 5-6). But that an intense sort of meditation and devotion is necessary in order to attain the Highest is amply borne out by the whole book, and many physical disciplines such as the control of breath (*prāṇāyāma*) as well as living in a solitary place, leading a perfectly continent life and retiring from the hurry and worry of work, at least occasionally and under special circumstances, are also recommended.

There is hardly any room for doubt that there was a great personality named Kṛishṇa, who was a Kshatriya king and a householder, though the details of his life remain mostly legendary. He lived in the world but was not of the world.* Having attained a great spiritual height, he attempted to preach *Brahma-jñāna* to the then existing society. He realized in his life the ancient truth of the *Ṛig-Veda* (X. I. 164. 46) that " Existence is one which the sages call by various names " and tried to reconcile contradictory philosophical and religious views of people.

In reading the *Gīta* one may naturally ask whether on the eve of the battle such an abstruse dialogue could take place between the two great heroes of the age, and supposing it did, what its exact form was. As to these, even the ancient commentator Śrīdhar Svāmī has said in his introduction that Veda-Vyāsa, the great disciple of Kṛishṇa, recorded the dialogue as it took place, but that he added some compositions of his own in order to make it a connected narrative. One may even think that the conversation actually took place in prose, but was recorded in verse. These doubts have weighed so much with some people that they want to deny altogether the historical event of the battle and give it an allegorical or esoteric significance. The battle, according to them, is nothing more than the eternal struggle between man's good and evil tendencies. But if we read the whole *Mahābhārata*, of which the *Gīta* is only an episode, we shall come to a very different conclusion. Even if we still doubt whether the Kurukshetra war actually took place or not, and consider all the *dramatis personæ* as fictitious characters, yet we cannot but think that the problem which the author of the *Gītā* wanted to solve was whether action, or rather resistance of evil, was wrong under all circumstances, and how to reconcile it with the highest philosophy of life, viz. non-resistance of evil (*ahiṁsā*). And he



PARTHASARATHI

Krishna as the Charioteer of Arjuna

By Nandalal Bose

By courtesy of the [illegible]

has chosen this scene of battle in order to draw our attention pointedly to the evil inherent in work. There were schools of thought, such as the Sāṁkhya and the Buddhist schools, that believed in the giving up of all work or worldly pursuits as essential to perfection, and they advocated its acceptance by all persons indiscriminately. The author of the *Gītā* entirely disagrees with that view. He admits with all other philosophers that the highest goal of life is *mukti,* or blessedness, or absolute cessation of misery: "Know that to be the state called *yoga,* in which there is a severance of the contact of pain" (VI. 23). But he prescribes different methods of practice for persons differently situated. The Pāṇḍavas have been wrongfully deprived of their rights, and in the *Udyoga-parva* of the *Mahābhārata* we find the question discussed again and again from all angles—what should be the duty of a person in such circumstances—whether to fight or to flee. Finally, Kṛishṇa is sent as a messenger of peace to the court of Dhṛitarāshṭra with a proposal of very little demand on the part of the Pāṇḍavas, but he fails in his mission. The Pāṇḍavas are at last forced to a fight with their enemies, and just on the eve of the battle Arjuna, the commander-in-chief, says to Kṛishṇa that he will not fight, because fighting is a sin. It is better, he says, to live peacefully by begging one's food like a *sannyāsin* than to fight one's enemies, specially when they are relatives and friends; and when Kṛishṇa, the great Incarnation of the Lord, exhorts him to fight and condemns his attitude as unmanliness, Arjuna in a state of confusion wants to know what his exact duty at that moment is. He describes himself as bewildered. Should he fight or withdraw? And he asks repeatedly, if the highest goal of life is perfect peace, why is this heinous act (*ghora karma*) at the beginning? Why should he not at once begin the peaceful life? Throughout the discourse Kṛishṇa never fails to point out the highest goal of life to Arjuna: "With the mind concentrated by *yoga* and with an attitude of evenness towards all things, he beholds the self in all beings and all beings in the self" (VI.29); "Alike in pleasure and pain, established in the self, regarding a clod of earth, a stone or gold alike, the same to the loved and unloved, steady, the same to censure and praise, to honour and disgrace and to friend and foe, relinquishing all undertakings,—such a person is said to have transcended the *guṇas*"[1] (XIV.24-25). But at the same time, specially in the concluding discourse, he constantly reminds Arjuna that his present duty is to fight: "If

[1] The three constituents of the Prakṛiti or primal matter.

through self-conceit you think that you will not fight, vain is this resolve; your very nature will constrain you" (XVIII.59). He, however, advises Arjuna to neutralize the binding effects of action by undertaking it unselfishly—dedicating its fruits to the Lord. He calls it the "secret of work" (II.50).

This marvellous doctrine of *karma-yoga* is very difficult to understand. People generally hold two views regarding it. They are either for work with its fruits or for total abstention from work. They think that when you take up work, it is impossible for you to give up its fruits. So, if you are to attain the highest state, you must eschew work altogether and be a *sannyāsin*, for none can work without some motive behind. Kṛishṇa emphatically differs from this view. He says again and again that it is absolutely useless to give up external actions, until you have been able to give up desires also. So the proper course for a man to follow is, according to him, to take up the duties of life as they are, and try to do them with the highest motive, viz. the attainment of the Lord. And for this he is to pass through certain physical, mental and moral disciplines, which are elaborated in the different *yogas*. And when he will attain the highest stage, all action will drop of itself. "But the man who is devoted to the Self, and is satisfied with the Self, and content in the Self alone, has no duty" (III.17).

The Hindu life, as we have said before, is divided into four *āśramas*. The Hindus believe also in the doctrine of reincarnation. The human soul has passed through many different bodies, and it will pass through many more yet, until it reaches perfection. So there is no hurry. Reformers like the great Buddha, who were mainly guided by their heart, wanted people to realize that perfection as soon as possible. They could not brook delay. So they tried to revolutionize the society by their fervent appeal to take at once to the direct path of liberation, and thus created a large sect of monks and nuns, and we know the result. Kṛishṇa had a wonderful intellect and heart combined, and though we sometimes find his heart getting uppermost—as in that beautiful episode of his life, the Vṛindāvana-*līlā*, where he mixes freely with men and women of a humble caste and draws them to the highest state by his unspeakable charm and love in his maturer years we find his intellect predominant, when he tries to lead the whole society to the highest goal by allowing everyone to do his own duties (*svadharma*), only asking him to give up the worldly motive behind them. Very few

people can devote themselves to meditation alone, giving up work entirely. With those rare souls who can, Krishṇa has no quarrel. But he has in his mind's eye the mass of people who cannot think of life as free from work, and who, when they meet or hear about some rare souls that have devoted themselves exclusively to meditation, are tempted to follow them, but unfortunately do not succeed in their attempt, nay, run the risk of falling into abject torpidity (*tamas*). He considers Arjuna to be a typical example of these. At the same time he knows the dangers of a life of mere action, and so his exhortations include the teachings of highest meditation, knowledge and devotion.

Krishṇa, as we have already said, was a preacher of the harmony of faiths. Though attempts have been made by commentators to fit all his teachings into particular systems according to their view-points, an impartial student will find hints of all the different schools of Vedānta such as the monistic (*advaita*), quasi-monistic (*viśishṭādvaita*) and dualistic (*dvaita*) in them: for example, "Know Me, O descendant of Bharata, to be the *kshetrajña* (self) in all *kshetras* (bodies)" (XIII.2), on which the *advaitin* Śaṅkara has written an elaborate commentary. "He who sees Me in all things, and sees all things in Me, never becomes separated from Me, nor do I become separated from him" (VI.30), which may well fit in with the *viśishṭādvaita* philosophy of life. "Relinquishing all duties (*dharmas*), take refuge in Me alone, and I will liberate you from all sins, grieve not" (XVIII.66), which is a dualistic passage, pure and simple, and looks like the Christian doctrine of redemption through grace. As to philosophy, Krishṇa does not observe any rigid distinction between Vedānta and Sāṁkhya, and encourages men to come to the goal by whatever path they like: "Howsoever people may take refuge in Me, I accept them through that path," etc. (IV. 11). He has no quarrel even with the worship of the manes (*pitṛis*) or gods (*devas*) or with external ritualistic worship, but he emphasizes concentration and devotion as things that are essential in these. "If anybody offers Me with devotion a leaf, a flower, a fruit or water, that devout gift of the pure-minded I accept" (IX. 26).

The doctrine of Divine Incarnation in the *Gītā* need not be interpreted in a narrow sense. It merely points to the Vedāntic doctrine of the divinity of man and acknowledges the possibility of divine manifestation whenever virtue subsides and irreligion prevails (IV. 7). Every object which turns our mind towards the highest truth is admitted as a

special power (*vibhūti*) of the Lord, and the last verse of the chapter in which these *vibhūtis* are enumerated ends significantly with the words: " Or what is the use of knowing all this diversity, O Arjuna? (Know that) I exist, supporting the whole world with a portion of Myself " (X.42). This is elaborated in the next chapter in Arjuna's vision of the Lord's all-comprising universal form. Where, then, is the room for narrowness or exclusiveness, for in the state of spiritual ecstasy does not one actually see with divine eyes that the whole universe is nothing but the Lord?

Reference has already been made in passing to Sri Ramakrishna's remarkable achievement in the realm of harmony. In his life we actually find him practising the doctrines and methods of every form of religion with which he came into contact, including Mohammedanism and Christianity. He followed the external forms of those religions in their minutest detail, for he used to say that a grain of rice without its husk cannot develop into a plant. Yet in his interpretation of the *Gītā* he emphasized the aspect of renunciation. There is, however, no contradiction in this. Renunciation of the ego can well go hand in hand with intense activity for the sake of others. The example of Swami Vivekananda, the monk *par excellence* and at the same time preacher of the worship of *Nara-nārāyaṇa* (God in the form of man), helps us to understand the utterance of Sri Ramakrishna in its proper light.

Resignation to the divine will (*śaraṇāgati*) is another outstanding topic in the *Gītā*. Says Śrī Kṛishṇa: " Take refuge in Him with all your heart, O Bhārata; by His grace you will attain supreme peace and an eternal abode " (XVIII. 62). (See also XVIII. 66, already quoted). The *Gītā* tries to raise the aspirant (*sādhaka*) to such a height of spirituality that he ultimately finds himself only an instrument in the hands of the Lord. For the attainment of this state of resignation he is required to eliminate more and more of his egoism, till he feels just as the Lord says, " By Me alone have they already been slain; be merely an apparent cause, O Savyasāchin (Arjuna)" (XI. 13). The author of the Gītā seems to believe that it is possible to work without the feeling of egoism and attachment. Consider the verse, "He who is free from the notion of egoism, whose intellect is not affected (by good or evil), kills not, though (outwardly) he may kill these people, nor he is bound (by the action)" (XVIII. 17). This is a great doctrine liable to much misinterpretation; but the great teacher does not refrain from giving utterance to it only

for that reason. The standard of judgement of the actions of an ordinary man and those of a superman is not the same. A question may here be pertinently asked whether any sort of action is possible when a person attains perfection through resignation. Different opinions seem to be held by different commentators. Some say that in that state no activities are possible, while others hold the opposite view. The former group tries to explain away the scriptural assertion of the possibility of action by saying that such mention of activity is only by way of extolling the highest state. It is technically known as *arthavāda* (eulogy). The controversy can be set at rest only when one has actually risen to that state. The scriptures mention many distinguishing marks of a perfect man. But these are not always dependable, because sometimes even the worst persons seem to possess them. So it is said that the highest state is only known to one's own self (*svasaṁvedya*). But is there no chance of self-delusion? Yes, there is. Still in spite of the existence of such self-deluded individuals, one cannot help accepting the fact that there are actually such rare souls as have attained spiritual perfection. To be an instrument in the hands of the Lord, no doubt, implies some sort of dualism. Since the Lord is the only thing that exists, where is the occasion for one to be an instrument of another? This, however, can be reconciled if we take the expression in a figurative sense, or as indicating merely a stage on the road to ultimate fulfilment.

The *Gītā* epitomizes the teachings of the Upanishads. The Upanishads have been compared to a forest where, after passing through many thorny bushes, we come across a beautiful rose; but the *Gītā* is a bouquet of these roses. In the Upanishads we may trace the growth of religious ideas; from the lowest idea we find the conceptions of religion mount higher and higher, till at last we come to the highest. In the *Gītā*, on the other hand, we find the various results of religious researches combined, harmonized and presented in such a beautiful fashion that before it a person of whatever spiritual pursuit feels himself in divine presence, as it were, and beholds his aspirations and beliefs given expression to by a master-mind. This is the reason why the *Gītā* is so popular with all sections of the Hindus, as well as with those followers of other religions who have an acquaintance with Hindu religious literature.

THE GĪTĀ AND MODERN LIFE

I

In some ways the teaching of Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa may be said to be an embodiment of the spirit of the *Gītā*. A sublime simplicity, an all-embracing charity and a divine harmony characterize the teachings of both. No rigid doctrine, no hair-splitting arguments, no cut-and-dried schemes of life or salvation mar the simplicity of the *Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna* as well as of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. At the same time no form of worship of God, provided it is offered in the purest of motives, is ever excluded from their domain of religion. And above all, the aim of the modern as well as of the ancient seer has been to look around and gather all the threads of religious tradition lying scattered in the land and weave out of them a fabric, rich and lasting, for the good of humanity at large. Hence their universal appeal and their attraction, especially for the modern mind which loves what is informal, tolerant and comprehensive; hence also the fact that each was the nucleus of a great Hindu Renaissance.

II

The scope and purpose of the *Gītā* cannot be better explained than by the colophon that we find repeated at the end of every chapter. To begin with, the scripture is described as a series of songs. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* is a divine song; it is not a philosophical disquisition, nor a theological treatise, nor a manual of ethics. It states no dogmas, formulates no creed and, in spite of the commentators, it has no clear-cut sections. The way it reveals is a natural slope and not a staircase. A whole and integral spiritual experience arises out of its sympathy, with numerous overlappings, repetitions and even apparent inconsistencies. Its appeal is to the entire man and not to any isolated faculty, and it covers almost the whole ground of religious life. So it is misplaced ingenuity to read any sectarian theology into this poem or to seek for any logical exactitude in the use of its terms. Informality is of the very essence of the *Gītā*, in spite of the many technical words that it employs. To appreciate its profundity we have to keep open not only our minds but also our hearts. The deepest things in it belong to the kingdom of silence and no wonder that the commentators pass by them without a word of comment.

Secondly, the *Gītā* is described as an Upanishad. It is a layman's Upanishad, as the *Mahābhārata* is a layman's Veda. It is accessible to all classes and applicable to all sorts and conditions of men. It reiterates the gospel of ancient wisdom with special reference to secular life. It gives us instruction not only with regard to the goal of our spiritual journey but also with regard to the various stages of it. There is a well-known popular verse which compares the Upanishads to cows and the *Gītā* to their milk. A careful reader will find innumerable echoes of the Upanishadic *mantras* in the verses of the *Gītā*. Of all the Upanishads the *Kaṭhopanishad* seems to be the one that is most laid under contribution. Therefore it is wrong to argue, as some foreign critics have done, that there is a contradiction between the teaching of the Upanishads and the teaching of the *Gītā*—that the former exalts contemplative life, while the latter exalts active life. The fact is that there is only a change of front and not a change of ground. The active life of the householder and the citizen is presupposed in the Upanishads and the ideal of contemplative life is ever the background of the *Gītā*-teaching. The ideal *yogin* of the *Gītā* is no doubt a practical mystic, but a mystic all the same. He knows that the psalmist is on a higher level than the crusader. And scores of verses could be quoted from the *Gītā*, which do justice to the contemplative life recommended by the older scriptures.

Thirdly, the *Gītā* is described as *Brahma-vidyā* or the Science of the Absolute. The vision of God is the reward of religious life. A growing knowledge of the ultimate Reality and of its manifestations and workings in the universe is the result of our spiritual life. In fact, throughout the *Gītā* we find the two streams flowing concurrently—what man has to do and what God is. In some chapters one stream comes up to the surface and the other runs below the ground, and in others both the streams are visible and flow side by side. Speaking generally, we may say that the first six chapters deal with what the spiritual man has to do, the next five chapters with what God is, and in the last seven chapters we have both the topics treated together—the nature of God predominating in chapter XV and the endeavour of man in chapters XII, XVI, XVII and XVIII.

Fourthly, the *Gītā* is significantly termed a *Yoga-śāstra*. Here we have to be on our guard against interpreting the word *yoga* in any technical sense, as in Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtras*. Even a superficial acquaintance with the *Gītā* will convince one that *yoga* is the key-word

in this scripture. The word is used in various senses, but its primary meaning here is union or fellowship with God, being cognate with the English word 'yoke.' It is in this sense that the *Gītā* is described as a *Yoga-śāstra*. For it is a scripture that sets forth the ways and means of attaining that fellowship. Accordingly, all the compounds in which the word *yoga* occurs have to be interpreted in terms of divine fellowship. It is significant that the ideal character described in the *Gītā* is called a *yogin*, and Īśvara Himself, who imparts the teaching, is called a Yogeśvara, and the scripture itself is called a *Yoga-śāstra*. The main *yoga* or union with God involves a preliminary *yoga* or union within oneself and a consequential *yoga* or union with other beings in the world. The *yogin* has first to harmonize the various powers of his soul and acquire a singleness of aim. All his faculties have to subserve a single spiritual purpose. He should possess his soul in peace, having gained equanimity of mind. This setting of the spiritual house in order the *Gītā* sometimes calls *buddhi-yoga*. Then comes the main *yoga* or fellowship with God with its three well-known aspects of *karma, bhakti* and *jñāna*. It is important to notice that the *Gītā* makes no artificial division of these, and sometimes speaks of all of them together in the same verse. Nor does it confine itself to those three aspects. It deals with almost all aspects of spiritual life, but never isolates them so as to lose its sense of proportion. The *Gītā* is unique in this respect. It maintains a perfect balance among the components of spiritual life. It never loses sight of the wood for the trees. So it is not fair to describe it as a gospel of *karma-yoga*, or of *bhakti-yoga*, or of *jñāna-yoga*, as sectarian commentators, ancient and modern, have done. The *Gītā* is a gospel of *yoga* or union with God, whether the union is achieved through righteous action, or loving worship, or mystic knowledge, or rapt prayer. As a corollary of this union with God is our union with our fellow beings. For if we look around with undeluded eyes, we shall see that consciously or unconsciously all beings are on the path of *yoga*. All are seeking union with God, all returning to the source from which they came. The sparks are going back to the central fire. So it behoves the spiritual man to see the same Spirit in all beings, though in varying degrees, and extend to them the hand of comradeship. Then only does he become a true *yukta*—a harmonized one. In the beginning, when he started on his spiritual journey, he was only a *sakta* or a worldling. Now at the end of the spiritual journey, when he has subdued himself, sought the fellowship of God and learnt to

love all beings, he is transformed into a *yukta*—one who is harmonized in God whom he sees in all creatures. He thus attains his spiritual freedom. The Bhagavān of the *Gītā* says:

"The *yogin* who having attained to oneness worships Me abiding in all beings, lives in Me, however he leads his life."[1]

Lastly, the *Gītā* is described as a dialogue between Arjuna and Śrī Krishṇa. Apart from all historical considerations, it is obvious that the two characters here are meant to stand for Nara and Nārāyaṇa—man and God. It is really a dialogue between man and God. The dialogue is the traditional literary form through which religious teaching was conveyed in ancient times. The characters that figure in it stand in the relation of *guru* (teacher) and *śishya* (student). The *Gītā* effects an improvement on the traditional convention by making the *avatāra* himself the *guru* and a world-renowned warrior and epic hero the *śishya*, and by choosing the most dramatic moment in a great war as the starting point of its teaching. No reader, however, will get the full benefit of the teaching unless he sets aside all historical considerations and puts himself in the place of Arjuna and regards every word of the Bhagavān as directly addressed to himself. The *Gītā* is not simply a dialogue that took place in the remote past between two historical characters; much more than that, it is a timeless dialogue carried on in the recesses of every striving soul. God speaks to us as Krishṇa speaks to Arjuna, if only we tune our ears to His voice, and attempt to listen to Him. Many an obscure verse in the *Gītā* would leap into light and technical terms appear in a plenary sense, if we regard the dialogue as eternal, not merely historical. If every reader brings to bear upon the sacred verses his own inward life and spiritual experience, he will see at once that we have here a living dialogue between the human spirit and the divine and not simply a literary artifice. The *Gītā* does employ the language of the schools, but it is marvellous what a wealth of meaning it wrings out of it. Take for instance the three well-known terms of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Take them as part of the Sāṁkhya technique and many of the verses in the *Gītā* become dry and jejune, but take them as meaning the moral life, the mental life and the animal life of man respectively and the verses will glow with a meaning and a significance which will be of great moment to us in our everyday life.

[1] *Gītā* VI.31.

III

Even if we take the *Gītā* as a dialogue in a specific situation, we have much to learn from Arjuna's question and the Bhagavān's answer. The question and the answer reveal two fundamentally different view-points. Arjuna's conception of *dharma* is the conventional one, set forth with florid eloquence in the first chapter. He fears that the "eternal *dharma* of the tribe and clan" would be violated if he and his brothers took part in the war. It is to be noted in the specious arguments of Arjuna, based on the effects of war (which had never before swayed his action), that he speaks mostly of the consequence of his intended action and not of its inherent rightness or wrongness, and that his conception of *dharma* is narrow and mechanical, devoid of any spiritual background, being nothing more than the established usage. We know that his objections were overruled and that at last he was made to fight. What happens then to "the eternal *dharma* of the tribe and clan"? Has that *dharma* been violated? The fact is, Śrī Krishna's conception of *dharma* is quite different from Arjuna's. The whole *Gītā* may be considered to be a fitting comment on the plaintive statement of Arjuna that "by the misdeeds of those who destroy a tribe and create confusion of castes, the immemorial *dharmas* of the tribe and clan are rooted out."

The right conception of *dharma* is organically related to *yoga* or spiritual life. *Dharma*, according to the *Gītā*, is only a means to an end and not an end in itself. The end is *yoga* or participation in the divine life. So every step in *dharma* has to be judged in the light of *yoga*. If in the given circumstances any item of *dharma* stands in the way of the larger life and the progress of spirit, it ceases to be *dharma*. True *dharma* is a living tree expanding in the light and warmth of increasing knowledge, and not merely a dried fruit or a piece of varnished wood. It grows heavenward to the feet of God. If only we could make sure of the direction of its growth, we would not care for the dead leaves which automatically fall to the ground. The *Gītā* accordingly advises us to set aside all petty rules and take refuge in God. A sincere life of prayer in which we commune with God will prove a solvent of all rules and regulations, however rigid. This truth is indicated in various places, but most pointedly in the well-known *śloka*:

"Surrendering all duties come to Me alone for shelter. Do not grieve, for I will release thee from all sins."[1]

[1] *Gītā* XVIII.66.

IV

At the same time the *Gītā* insists that the growing tree of *dharma* should have its roots struck deep in its native soil. The conception of *svadharma* is the most central in its teaching. But to interpret *svadharma* as the traditional duties of the four castes is to take a most superficial view of the question. The *Gītā* no doubt refers to the Aryan caste system and the connected duties, but it refers to it in the same way as it does to the system of sacrifices, or the various modes of polytheistic worship, or the dualism of Sāṁkhya and Yoga, or the eschatology of *pitṛiyāna* and *devayāna*. Its method is obviously to take the religious, social and scientific conceptions of its time and give them a higher direction and meaning.

To understand the implications of the gospel of *svadharma* as taught in the *Gītā*, we have to go not to the traditional duties of the Aryan caste system, but to the depths of human nature. In a very suggestive passage it connects *svadharma* with *svabhāva* or the individual's own nature. I think no commentator has done justice to the *Gītā's* recognition of the strength of nature in man. On the other hand, several critics have rushed to the conclusion that it teaches asceticism. There could be no greater mistake. Almost everywhere it pleads for a wise direction of nature, and not for its suppression. Many passages could be quoted in support from the book:

"*Yoga* is not for him who eats too much, nor for him who eats too little. It is not for him, O Arjuna, who is given to too much sleep, nor for him who keeps too long vigils. But for the man who is temperate in his food and recreation, who is restrained in all his actions, who is regulated in his sleep and vigils, *yoga* puts an end to all sorrows."[1]

"Vain and conceited men, impelled by the force of their desires and passions, subject themselves to terrible mortifications not ordained by scriptures. And, being foolish, they torture their bodily organs and Me also who dwell within the body. Know that such men are fiendish in their resolve."[2]

And consider the beauty and significance of the figure in the following:

"Some offer as sacrifice their hearing and other senses in the fires of restraint; while others offer sound and other objects of sense in the fires of their senses."[3]

[1] *Gītā* VI.16-17. [2] *Ibid.* XVII.5-6. [3] *Ibid.* IV.26.

The same idea is expressed without figure in the following:

"A man of disciplined mind who moves among the objects of sense with his senses fully under his control and free from love and hate—he attains to a clear vision."[1]

The drift is clear. Nature should not be violently suppressed but properly controlled and utilized. And in passages where the *Gītā* enforces the example of Īśvara and calls upon man to work as He works in the world, it speaks of nature as the instrument of God and implies that it should be used as such by man also. Every man has certain natural endowments and propensities to be fully developed and wisely directed so that he may play his part efficiently in God's universe and co-operate whole-heartedly with the Producer of the world-drama. This is the meaning of *svadharma,* which they surely miss who confine it to the duties of one's caste. *Svadharma* may be, to start with, the law of the group to which the individual belongs; but it should soon become the law of spontaneous action. Obedience to the rule laid down by the wisdom of others leads one gradually to the discovery of the law of one's own being. Happy are those who find no conflict between their natural endowment and their environment, who find that their faculties have opportunities to develop and perform their functions. And happy is that country in which the arrangements of society are such that every individual has facilities to grow to his full stature according to the law of his own being. In any case, the duty of the individual is clear according to the *Gītā* which says:

"He who does the duty imposed on him by his own nature incurs no sin."[2]

As *svadharma* is based on natural gifts, it takes the line of least resistance and spells spontaneity, ease and happiness. The *Gītā,* while classifying actions, gives the highest place to actions done without desire or hate and with perfect detachment; the middle place to actions involving a strain; and the lowest place to actions beyond one's capacity. An action which is not performed with perfect ease and spontaneity is not the best, and an action which is beyond one's capacity is opposed to the very principle of *svadharma.* We should so train ourselves that our virtues proceed out of us as naturally as flowers out of a tree. For *svadharma* implies not only spontaneity but also beauty. For what is beauty but the perfection which creatures attain when they are true to

[1] *Gītā* II.64. [2] *Ibid.* XVIII.47.

themselves and when they act according to the law of their own being? The *Gītā's* emphatic assertion "that it is better to die in one's own *dharma*, for the *dharma* of another spells fear"—is quite natural and appropriate when we take *svadharma* to mean the law of one's own being. It would be a mere obscurantist statement if we confined *svadharma* to caste duties.

Thus, according to the *Gītā*, we should look upon our daily work as our vocation, that is, the sphere in which we are called by God to serve Him to the best of our capacities. Disinterested service is true worship. The *Gītā* says:

"He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is pervaded—by worshipping Him through the performance of his own duty does man attain perfection."[1]

It is not the work we do that matters, but the spirit in which we do it. The lowest kind of work done for the love of God ranks higher with Him than the highest kind of work done for personal gain. The former sets us free, the latter leads us to greater bondage. This is what is called *karma-yoga*, which provides a solvent to the inexorable law of *karma* and is only a complement of *svadharma*. Not only should we obey the law of our being, but also recognize it as the will of God. Then we become His true servants and realize that in His service lies our freedom.

V

It was a mere accident that the message of the *Gītā* was delivered to a soldier on a battlefield. That circumstance should not mislead us into thinking that the *Gītā* sanctions the violence of war. It is a mistake to think that Arjuna is a pacifist or has faith in non-violence. The main object of the *Gītā* is to teach that a man should do the duty imposed on him, fearless of consequences. The *Gītā* bids us do our duty impersonally as the servants of God. But our duties are not always clear. The difficulty that confronted Arjuna may confront all of us. It may not be on the same scale. But in our humble spheres, if we are anxious to do what is right, we are often puzzled. And in such circumstances what light does the *Gītā* throw? The answer which the book gives to our question is simple. The Bhagavān says:

"On those that are ever devoted to Me and worship Me in love I

[1] *Gītā* XVIII.46.

bestow the understanding by which they come to Me. Out of compassion for them do I dwell in their hearts and dispel the darkness of ignorance by the shining lamp of wisdom."[1]

"Fixing the thought on Me thou shalt surmount every difficulty by My grace; but if from self-conceit thou wilt not listen to Me, thou shalt utterly perish."[2]

In other words, we are bidden to lead a holy life, to make ourselves pure and perfect receptacles of God, and to pray to Him in all earnestness and humility to enlighten our conscience. But even supposing that we have made ourselves as pure as we could and prayed to God for light and guidance, can we be sure that we have eliminated error? Can there be a guarantee that we are in possession of Truth? No. On the other hand, it often happens that what appears as clear truth to us appears as falsehood to others. If we have the humility to think that others are as much entitled to Truth as we are, we must pause before we triumphantly act on our conscience, especially when our action involves injury to others. What havoc is caused in the world sometimes by men who sincerely think that what they do is right! Even the most religious man in the world cannot claim immunity from error for the simple reason that he is a man. Perfect ourselves as we may, error will cling to us as long as we are in the flesh. The *Gītā* simply says, "Lead a godly life, eliminate every trace of self, pray for light and act according to the dictates of God within." But when a number of people submit themselves, or imagine they submit themselves, to the same process and find themselves ranged on opposite sides, what are they to do? And where is Truth? Both sides may claim it as in the late European war. In such circumstances, is there any other alternative but to fight it out and kill one another? If it is admitted that error could only be due to the traces of self still left even in the most perfect man, the only thing to do is to find out a way of eliminating the self still further. When a man sincerely comes to the conclusion that he is in possession of Truth, he should try to establish it not by force but by self-suffering. It is only when he is prepared not to kill but to be killed for what he believes to be Truth, that he can be said to have left every vestige of self behind. His identification with Truth becomes then complete. If what he stood for is Truth, his martyrdom will melt the hearts of men and establish it firmly. If it is falsehood or error, no harm is done to the world. Only

[1] *Gītā* X.10-11. [2] *Ibid.* XVIII.58.

the misguided man harms himself and passes away. Hence 'Truth' becomes Truth only through self-suffering. Let him suffer for Truth and demonstrate to the world its power so that others may be convinced and accept it of their own free will. This gospel is of momentous consequence, for it effects a transvaluation of some of our moral values. It means that to be killed is more heroic than to kill; that it is nobler to stand up in spotless innocence against our misguided brother and be slain by him than march against him and slay him. It is more profitable to convert him through love than to put an end to him through violence. It is better to evoke the divinity in him by our suffering and effect a permanent cure of the evil than crush him, win a temporary triumph and perpetuate the evil. In a word, Truth is secure and duty unerring only when they sit on the throne of love. Eternal Truth postulates immeasurable Love.

COMMON SENSE RELIGION IN THE BHAGAVAD-GITĀ

A COMMON CHARGE AGAINST HINDUISM

It has been often urged that Hinduism is characterized by a tendency towards extremism both in its theoretical and practical aspects. It is said that its teachings either fly into ethereal abstractions or degenerate into low and degraded forms of demon worship and idolatrous rites of a questionable nature. As examples of this are pointed out the subtle philosophy of Vedānta culminating in the shadowy conception of Nirguṇa Brahman on the one hand, and the popular worship and propitiation of village gods and goblins attended with eating, drinking and merriment on the other. It is often asked whether there is not a middle course between these—a religion which while being within the capacity of the common man to practise is yet devoid of the crudities of popular faiths, which while satisfying the requirements of mature intelligence is simultaneously appealing to the rich emotional nature of man. In other words the question is whether Hinduism has got in it a strain of teaching applicable to busy and active men of culture and refinement demanding the satisfaction of their intellect, emotion and will, and not suited only to ascetics given to a life of quietness and living on a plane of extreme intellectual subtlety and abstraction. Our emphatic answer to this question is, 'yes,' and it shall be our attempt in the following paragraphs to state briefly the principles of what we may call the religion of common sense as developed in Hindu scriptures.

THE GITA FULFILS THE REQUIREMENTS OF A RELIGION OF COMMON SENSE

The two prime necessities of such a creed are in the first place the conception of a Deity who is both transcendent and immanent, who is not only an Absolute Existence unsoiled by the evils of the world but a Person responsive to the soul-anguished cries of His creatures, who is both the material and master of the universe, and in the second place a form of spiritual discipline that is within the reach or capacity of all, whatever may be their physical, intellectual and moral qualification. In examining the claims of Hinduism to be a religion of common sense we have to bear these two points in view and see how far it satisfies these tests.

Among the great scriptures of Hinduism that set forth such a conception of religion, the *Bhagavad-Gītā* is the most pre-eminent, both from the profundity of its thought and the practicability of its discipline. While catering to the needs of a philosophic mind, the *Gītā* conception of the Supreme is simultaneously appealing and agreeable to the deepest longings of the human heart. The spiritual discipline it propounds, while it is sufficiently difficult and exacting for the most advanced of souls, is at the same time capable of being practised even by the beginner in spiritual life. In fact in the *Gītā* we come across Hinduism in its most highly developed form--universal yet individual, absorbent yet intensive, abstruse yet appealing, philosophic yet practical. It is the greatest challenge that the Hindu mind has thrown at the kind of criticism that characterizes it as too metaphysical or too vulgar.

GOD OF THE BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ: HIS MULTIFARIOUS ASPECTS

What then is the conception of God in the *Gītā*? He is the mighty Spirit, the all-knowing Intelligence, a speck of whose glory is the manifested universe. From a spark of His splendour is derived all that is grand, beautiful and strong. The brilliance of the sun, the moon and the fire is His; He is the vital force that sustains all life, vegetable as well as animal. The great Nature (Prakṛiti) is His womb; in it He places the germ and from there is the birth of all beings.

At the end of a cycle all beings are dissolved in His Nature, and at the beginning of a cycle He generates them again. Controlling Nature which is His own, He sends forth again and again this multitude of beings helplessly bound by the powers of Nature. None of these actions, however, affect Him; for in the midst of these cosmic activities He remains unaffected like one sitting unconcerned. In His unmanifested form He pervades the whole universe. All beings rest in Him, but not He in them. As the mighty wind blowing everywhere ever abides in ethereal space, in the same manner do all beings abide in Him.

He is Time, the Destroyer, in whose form the world systems originate and get absorbed. Eclipsing everything by His brilliance, embracing everything in His being, encompassing the past, present and future in Himself, He exists in His infinite universal Form on all sides, with myriads of arms and trunks, with myriads of faces and eyes, striking wonder and terror into the hearts of all. He is the Imperishable, the Supreme to be realized, the Abode of the universe, the undying Guardian

of the eternal law, the Primal Being. Like the waters of the river rushing towards the sea, like moths swiftly hurrying into a blazing fire, the whole world is hastening towards Him to meet its sure and certain doom of death.

His hands and feet are everywhere; His eyes, heads and mouths are facing in all directions. His ears are turned to all sides; He exists enveloping all. He seems to possess the faculties of all the senses and yet He is devoid of all senses. He is unattached, and yet He sustains all things. He is free from the dispositions of Nature, and yet He enjoys them. He is without and within all beings. He has no movements, and yet He moves. He is too subtle to be known. He is far away and yet He is near. He is undivided, and yet He is, as it were, divided among beings. He is to be known as the sustainer of all creation. He devours and He generates. The Light of lights, He is above darkness. Knowledge, the object of Knowledge and the aim of Knowledge—He is set firm in the hearts of all.

These grand and powerful aspects of God do not, however, exhaust His nature. Besides being the creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe, He is also related to the human soul by the bonds of love and pity. He is not a Being situated in a far-off heaven, but is present in the heart of all beings—nay, He is, in one of His aspects, the innermost soul of all beings. He is the Father of the world—of all that move and all that do not move. The greatest of teachers and the supreme object of worship, there is none equal to Him. He bears with one who adores Him and seeks His grace, as a father does with his son, a friend with the friend, a lover with the beloved. He is the Father of the universe, the Mother, the Supporter and the Grandsire. He is the goal and the support; the Lord and the Witness; the abode, the refuge and the friend. He is the origin and the dissolution; the ground, the treasure-house and the imperishable seed. He is the enjoyer of all worship and sacrifices, even though they be offered unto other gods; for He is the one that manifests as the various gods, strengthens the faith of their respective votaries, and bestows on them the fruits of their worship. But because they do not know His real nature as the Supreme Being, they fall.

THE RELATION OF THE DIVINE WITH MAN

All beings are the same unto Him, none being hateful or dear in any special sense. But those who worship Him with devotion—they are in

Him and He in them. There are two types of beings in the universe, the divine and the diabolic. The former, endowed with knowledge, devotion, purity, self-control, humility, compassion and non-covetousness gravitate towards the Supreme Being, while the latter leading an impious and unrighteous life lose Him and come to grief. Believing neither in God nor in righteousness, holding lust to be the cause of all, steeped in pride, arrogance and hypocrisy, given up wholly to lust, anger and cruelty, caring only for money-making and wreaking vengeance on their enemies, and hating, in their violent conduct towards living beings, the Lord Himself who is in the hearts of all including themselves, these vilest of men are hurled into the wombs of devils in cycles of birth and death. Deluded from birth to birth, they never attain to Him but go to the lowest state. Even these souls are not beyond the pale of His grace, for the Divine Charioteer is ever seated in the chariot of human personality, guiding it through the dangerous fields of life, ever ready to give help and assurances of hope and safety to the drooping spirit of man. "Thou art well-beoved of Me," He cries, "therefore will I tell thee what is good for thee."[1] If man would but hearken to this voice, and worship Him and no other, he is quickly transformed from a sinner into a saint. Soon does he become righteous and obtain lasting peace. One may with boldness proclaim that His devotee never perishes; for whoever seeks refuge in Him, even though he be of sinful birth and uncultured understanding, is sure to attain to the highest state. One who knows in truth the grandeur and power of the Lord comes to possess unfailing devotion unto Him. Knowing Him to be the origin of all, the wise worship Him with all their heart. Their minds fixed in Him, their lives resting in Him, they ever converse about Him, enlightening one another. On such as these, who are devoted to Him and worship Him with love, He bestows the understanding by which they go unto Him. Out of compassion for them He dwells in their hearts dispelling the darkness of ignorance by the shining lamp of wisdom. Their minds being ever set on Him, He saves them quickly from death and the ocean of mortal life.

TRUE WORSHIP IT IS OPEN TO ALL

We have described in brief the *Gītā*-conception of God and His relation to the human personality. What constitutes His worship?—is

[1] *Gītā* XVIII.64.

the next question. Worship, according to the *Gītā,* is not a form of ritual apart from the general concerns of life. It is a function conterminous with every movement of life. Indeed, the *Gītā* sometimes speaks of a form of ritualistic worship whose essence does not, however, consist in the elaborateness of its paraphernalia or in the intricacies of its ceremonials. " Whoever devoutly offers to Me a leaf, a flower, a fruit or water—I accept the pious offering of that man who is pure of heart,"[1] says the Lord. It is noteworthy that even here the tendency is to reduce the ritualistic aspect to a vanishing point and insist on devotion and purity of heart. We get also references to various forms of sacrifices, both ritualistic and ethical. " Some *yogins* offer sacrifices to the gods; while others offer sacrifice in the fire of God, even in the manner of a sacrifice. Some offer as sacrifices their hearing and other senses in the fire of restraint; while others offer sound and other objects of sense in the fires of their senses. Some again offer the works of their senses and their life-breaths as sacrifice in the fire of self-control kindled by knowledge. Some likewise offer as sacrifice their riches or their austerities or their practices; while others of subdued minds and severe vows offer their learning and their knowledge. Some again who are bent on regulating their breath, sacrifice the outward breath in the inward, and the inward breath in the outward, or stop the passage of both the inward and the outward. While others, restraining their food, sacrifice their life-breaths in their life-breaths. All these know what sacrifice means, and by sacrifice are their sins destroyed. Thus many kinds of sacrifice are set forth as the means of reaching the Absolute. But knowledge as a sacrifice is superior to all material sacrifices, O Arjuna. For all works with no exception culminate in knowledge."[2]

The drift of all this is to shift the emphasis from rituals to knowledge and devotion, both of which bear a more or less identical significance in the *Gītā;* for in the *Gītā* to know God is to love Him, and to love Him is to know Him. A description of these various forms of sacrifices, ritualistic, ethical and psychological, may leave one with the impression that true worship is possible only to a master of an elaborate technique. But that is exactly what the *Gītā*-conception of worship is not. Neither any type of special skill nor any periodical observance of rituals and prayers constitutes worship. True worship is simple and

[1] *Gītā* IX.26. [2] *Ibid.* IV.25-33.

natural, as easy to a common man engaged in his daily toil, to a statesman in the council-chamber, to a merchant in his business house, as it is to a scholar at his books or the ascetic in his solitary abode. For, it is a pervasive influence over every activity of life, including what we consider the most important of our undertakings and not excluding even the trivial actions of our daily life. "Whatsoever thou doest, whatsoever thou eatest, whatsoever thou offerest, whatsoever thou givest away and whatsoever of austerities thou dost practise—do that as an offering unto Me. Thus shalt thou be free from the bonds of works which bear good or evil fruits. With thy mind firmly set on the way of renunciation thou shalt become free and come to Me."[1] Here is a form of spiritual discipline which no man who eats, drinks, and attends to his duties can complain as being inconvenient to practise owing to its remoteness from the concerns of practical life. Yet it is not too simple or elementary to merit no attention from advanced spiritual aspirants or to offer no scope for the strenuous exercise of their highly developed spiritual power.

THE SUPREME WORSHIP OR SELF-SURRENDERING

Whole-hearted dedication of one's activities is only the first stage of worship; for in the completed form of worship an offering still greater has to be made. Duties discharged in the true spirit of dedication train a person in the disciplines of renunciation and the constant remembrance of God. Ethical perfection endows him with the power of deep meditation on the Divine Being with an unwavering mind, which leads in turn to the complete annihilation of the animal in him, and the growth of supreme devotion. Casting aside conceit, violence, pride, desire, wrath and possession, selfless and tranquil in mind and regarding all beings alike, he gains supreme devotion by virtue of which he comes to know the Divine Personality, who and what He is in truth. He perceives in all vividness that the Lord dwells in the hearts of all beings, causing them to revolve by His mysterious power, as if they were mounted on a machine. The unenlightened man, entrenched in his ego-consciousness, is accustomed to look upon his own narrow self as the sole agent of all his actions, both small and great. But the knowledge of God's real nature reveals unto the enlightened soul that however useful this notion of free will has been as a psychological protection in the days of his ignorance, saving him from lethargy and

[1] *Gītā* IX.27-28.

hypocrisy, it is essentially an idea born of limited vision, and that in truth the only agent in the whole universe is the Lord Himself. When this supreme knowledge dawns in the heart of man, he becomes fit to perform the highest form of worship, namely, the offering unto the Lord of his ego, which constitutes the highest possession of man. He perceives thenceforth that he is nothing but a humble instrument in His hands and that even before he does an act it has already been accomplished in the being of the Lord, in whom the past, present and future meet as an eternal present. Endowed with this knowledge which supreme devotion alone can confer, he forthwith enters into the being of the Lord. Though constantly engaged in all kinds of work, yet, having found refuge in Him, he reaches by His grace the eternal and indestructible abode.

It is indeed possible only for the perfect man to perform this highest worship of the Supreme consisting in the unreserved resignation of one's ego, accompanied by the transference of agentship from oneself unto the Lord. But just as the discipline of dedicating one's activities unto Him can be gone through by any one according to one's capacity, so in the practice of this higher form of worship also there is possibly no difficulty accruing from one's occupation or station in life, or indeed from any demand it makes by way of mastering any elaborate technique. A firm faith in God and a sincere desire to love Him and to know Him are the only preliminary conditions required of one who wants to make a beginning in the practice of this rational worship. Hence the voice of the indwelling Divinity cries out unto one and all these words of saving grace, "Fix thy mind on Me, be devoted to Me, sacrifice to Me, prostrate thyself before Me; so shalt thou come to Me. I promise thee truly, for thou art dear to Me. Surrendering all duties come to Me alone for shelter. Do not grieve, for I will release thee from all sins."[1]

THE PERFECT MAN

One who arduously practises this discipline reaches the state of God-realization or what the *Gītā* describes as ***Brāhmī-sthiti***. A person established in this state is the perfect man of the *Gītā* described variously as the *yogin* (one united with the Divine), ***bhakta*** (one devoted to the Divine), *jñānin* (one knowing the Divine), ***sthitaprajña*** (man of steadfast wisdom), and *triguṇātīta* (one who has risen above the three

[1] *Gītā* XVIII 65-66.

dispositions of nature). Various descriptions enumerating the characteristics of the perfect man are to be found scattered through the chapters of the *Gītā*, but these can be generalized under the following heads:—God-consciousness, same-sightedness, sense control and action without attachment. God-consciousness in the *Gītā* does not consist in seeing visions or getting absorbed in mystic trances. These there may be, but they are recognized only as indications of a transformed outlook on life and its values. This transformation consists in the dawning of the unshakable conviction embodied in the cryptic saying, "All this is Vāsudeva." The nature of this conviction is described as "that in which the mind is at rest, restrained by the practice of concentration, that in which he beholds the Spirit through the mind and rejoices in the Spirit; that in which he knows the boundless joy beyond the reach of the senses and grasped only by the understanding, and that in which when he is established, he never departs from truth, that on gaining which he feels there is no greater gain, and that in which he abides and is not moved even by the heaviest of afflictions."[1] In other words God-consciousness in the *Gītā* consists in the realization, not simply intellectually but from the very depth of one's being, that the whole universe including one's own self and that of all beings is nothing but an expression of a fragment of Divine glory, and the consequent recognition of the fact that there is but One Will in the universe and that what one has been accustomed to see as one's independent will is nothing but a mere instrument in the hands of the Divine.

All other characteristics of the perfect man of the *Gītā* are the reflection in ethical life of this fundamental illumination of consciousness. They are the emotional, volitional and conative reactions of a personality established in this conviction. God becomes the only object of his love, and he abides and delights solely in Him. He sees the Divine everywhere and everything in the Divine, and as a consequence worships Him in everything. Recognizing the same Self in his own being and in that of all others, his mind is established in equality—a state in which he looks upon all alike, whether it be a learned and lowly Brāhmin or a cow or an elephant or even a dog or an outcaste. He is therefore the friend of all and is interested in the well-being of all.

His outlook is changed not only in regard to God and his fellow-beings but also in relation to his whole environment, both internal and

[1] *Gītā* VI.20-22.

external. Recognizing the separateness of his self from the body and the mind, he perceives the latter as the expressions of Prakṛiti working at the direction of the Divine Will. As a consequence the three *guṇas* or dispositions of Prakṛiti known as *sattva, rajas* and *tamas,* which cause in all beings light, activity and delusion, leave him quite untouched; for he has no aversion for them when they are present, nor longing for them when they are absent. Knowing that it is dispositions (*guṇas*) that act, he remains always firm and unwavering like one unconcerned with all the transformations that Prakṛiti brings about in his being. He dwells in the Spirit and is the same in pleasure and pain; he looks upon a clod, a stone and a piece of gold as of equal worth; he regards alike both pleasure and pain, honour and dishonour, friend and foe; and he renounces all kinds of egoistic enterprises undertaken with the notion that he is the doer.

The perfect man who has reached the final stage—*Brāhmī-sthiti*—is completely free from the slavery of the senses and the desires pertaining to them. He puts away all the desires of the mind, and his spirit finds comfort in itself. With no attachment on any side he is neither perturbed nor filled with joy at the alternation of adversity and prosperity. He withdraws all his senses from their objects on every side as a tortoise does its limbs. Consequently his senses are under perfect control, and his mind not only ceases to feed on sense objects, but succeeds in completely eradicating even the latent longing for them. As waters enter into the sea without raising its level in the least, so do all desires enter into him without in the least disturbing his equipoise. Bereft of the idea of 'I' and 'mine' and freed from desire, fear and anger, he remains ever steadfast in wisdom and firm in understanding.

The life of a perfected *yogin* resembles the activity of the Divine in the universe. For the Supreme Lord there is nothing in the three worlds to achieve, nor is there anything He has not gained. Yet is He engaged unwearied in the great work of creation, preservation and destruction, for if He ceases to work, these worlds would perish. But works do not defile Him, as He has no longing for their fruits. Under His guidance Prakṛiti performs this great cosmic action, and though He is the ultimate source of all this activity, yet does He remain unattached in their midst like one unconcerned. The perfected *yogin* is the very prototype of his Divine Master. His life is a constant blessing and a benediction to all living beings. United in spirit with the Divine he becomes a greater

centre of divine activity. In the midst of work, however, his mind remains quite unruffled and in constant communion with the Divine. Knowing full well that the only will in the universe is that of the Supreme Lord, he is never prompted by the slightest trace of egoism in all his activities, however great and significant these might be from the point of view of the world. Unrestricted by the barrier of egoism his personality becomes a great channel for the manifestation of Divine energy and a fitting instrument in the hands of the Supreme for working out His cosmic purposes.*

*The writer acknowledges his indebtedness to the excellent translation of the *Bhagavad-Gita* by Prof. D. S. Sarma for the English renderings of the *Gita*-passages incorporated in this essay.

III

THE SMṚITIS AND THE PURĀṆAS

THE SMṚITIS: THEIR OUTLOOK AND IDEALS

The Smṛitis embody the normative Hindu *dharma*. At one time, they covered the whole of India. The people are not now all 'Hindu' in religion or in their mode of life. Early Christianity affected beliefs but did not interfere with the Indian ideas of life very much. But it can no longer be said of Christianity that it does not touch social life. Islam has a religion and culture of its own. There is the Parsi separated by ancient misunderstanding from the Indian Aryan but reunited in brotherhood by a thousand years of common life in a common motherland. These non-Hindu groups are Indian and much that is ancient is woven in the very texture of their mind and modes of thought and life. Any composite culture that might ultimately be evolved must largely have in it what belongs to the soil of India.

There are other groups also which may claim to be outside Hinduism. But they are much nearer to the Hindus than any of these. The Buddhists, the Jains and the Brāhmos are already treated in some respects as belonging to the fold of Hinduism and cannot well disclaim interest in Hindu culture.

The remaining population with all its diversity is classified as 'Hindu.' Generally speaking, the Smṛitis govern them all. They, in the main, are of 'Aryan' origin and have pre-Indian roots. The later developments have occurred on the Indian soil and they naturally had to take, and did take, into account, the peculiar conditions which the meeting of two peoples, diverse in origin and outlook, has always involved in the history of the world. South Africa and the United States of America, which furnish modern parallels, have been much less successful in solving the conflict of races. In fact, the solution of differences has altered the religion of the Indo-Aryan settlers and there has been a "giving and taking" in some respects, though, as might be expected, the predominant factor has been the religion of the Aryans in the evolution of the composite religion.

When the first inevitable conflicts came to an end and the rival groups settled down, a process of amalgamation necessarily set in. Here, as elsewhere, the local and tribal gods became subordinate deities and the God or gods of the Aryans took a dominant place. When later the people

became consolidated and their conception rose to that of a Universal or All-pervading God, these were all treated as forms of the one God whom the worship reached, to whomsoever it was addressed and in whatever form or manner it was rendered. No one will or can maintain that the worship or social polity of the unmixed Aryans was the same as that evolved after their conflict with the pre-Aryans had been over on the soil of India.

'Hinduism' is not a religion in the sense in which we now understand the word. The word is not Indian in origin; nor was it ever used by the Hindus as the name of their religion. The word *dharma*, frequently used in the description of their religion, is not easily translated into the English language. In fact it is a conception and a way of life. It was conceived as the only mode of individual and social life at all times and in all places and that is at least one of the reasons why it is called *sanātana dharma*. But when religions with distinguishing names derived from their originators or inspirers arose, it was inevitable that a word should be found to designate the way of life of the ancient Indian as a form of religion by way of contrast. It used at one time to be called Brāhmiṇism and is even now occasionally so described. That word misrepresents its nature in so far as it implies that it has its origin from the Brāhmins. The name 'Hinduism' has the merit of avoiding that implication, and convenience requires that the word should be retained to describe the Indians' mode of life inclusive of religion in the strict sense of the term.

The name *sanātana dharma* was not intended to stand for each individual observance but only for the *dharma* viewed as a whole and in the abstract.[1] The lawgivers and the Mīmāṁsakas knew only too well that their laws had been changed or modified from time to time according to the needs of an expanding society, but the content of *dharma* was in all its parts *sanātana* or eternally the same. Just as a person may grow and shed particles of his body and yet may retain unchanged his individual identity, so does this body of Hindu *dharma* retain its unity and individuality across the ages from the time anterior to the *Ṛig-Veda*. Its *sanātana* character is not destroyed but maintained by its adaptability and adaptations. The institutions of to-day are founded on ideas which were alive and active in the Ṛig-Vedic and pre-Ṛig-Vedic times. And *dharma* has its roots in ancient ideas and ideals.

[1] The opposite view that "every thing in Hinduism is ancient and nothing is obsolete" is not unknown



BENARES

A Partial View from the Ganges

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As already implied, these Smṛitis are not mere law books. There is involved in the Smṛitis much more than the civil and criminal laws and the rules of inheritance and the laws of marriage and families. Every detail of the daily life of the individual is included. Social arrangements with all the social institutions are comprehended. The king's duties in relation to the internal and external affairs of the country are included therein. It is difficult to conceive of anything bearing on the conduct of any individual or group of individuals, or of society as a whole that does not fall within the regulation attempted by the Smṛitis. Worship of gods, ceremonies in commemoration of the dead, birth and death pollutions, expiatory acts, sacrifices, customs and manners of daily life and behaviour are all included, indicating thereby their all-embracing character.

The period of the Smṛitis strictly so-called may cover one thousand and five hundred years, but an understanding of the Smṛitis as well as of the lives lived under their influence requires that period to be extended both ways, farther back into the period preceding it, and farther forward almost up to the middle of the last century. In the pre-Smṛiti period, that is, before the days of the *Sūtras* and the metrical Smṛitis, we had mere manuals of different Vedic schools for the instruction of pupils and before that period we had only continuous oral tradition handed down from teacher to pupil. The matter of the recorded Smṛitis thus goes back to the Vedic and pre-Vedic period. If the *Ṛig-Veda* goes back to at least 1500 B. C., a far more ancient date must be assigned to the beginnings of the culture represented by the Veda.

Before the collection of the Veda into *Ṛich*, *Yajus* and *Sāman*, sacrifices were performed and hymns of praise, old and new, were in existence. Their use was regulated and chanting always formed a part of the sacrificial ceremony. Social organization had advanced to a feudal stage by the time of the *Ṛig-Veda*. The Aryan community had divided itself into clans or *gotras*, each comprising several families with different family names. The poetry of the *Ṛig-Veda* indicates a fairly long period of literary culture and development that had already passed. The origin of the Smṛitis is traceable to this ancient pre-Ṛig-Vedic period.

There is a very precise philosophy of life, individual and social, behind the scheme of the Smṛitis. That philosophy is at least as old as the Upanishads. The universe is one vast pulsating life. The manifestation of that life is not all alike or in one grade. It sleeps in the metal. It is awake in plants. It moves and knows in animals. It knows, and knows

that it knows, in man. Increasing complexity of biological organization runs through physical evolution. It culminates in man.

Further progress is not in the direction of a new and higher species. It is along a wholly new track, that of man in organized society. As in physical, so in social evolution, increasing complexity characterizes rise in the scale. In both spheres such complexity involves dangers. With the break-down of any part, the whole will collapse. Increasing vigilance is the price of individual and social security, and increasing capacity and intelligence and power are the result of man's life in society. Division of function and close-knit interdependent unity are the marks of growth which bring in their train increasing sensitiveness and mutual adjustment and co-ordination of parts acting in unison for the achievement of a recognizable purpose.

Man is essentially divine and immortal. He has, sure enough, roots in the earth. He is an animal among animals, though at the top of the ascending series. This is his physical heritage. But in mind and spirit, with his power to look back and think and philosophize and plan and create, he is akin to the Intelligence that is at the heart of the universe. He came from Brahman and unto Brahman he will return. He will be at one with Brahman at the end of the *saṁsāra* or the cycle of births. Not in one birth, but in several, does man learn his true nature, and grow into a perfect recognition of what, in fact, he is and has been all along. Man is but the result of his past and present actions in all the three spheres of his existence, physical, mental and spiritual. And each new life starts at the point where the previous life ended, with the accumulated heritage of aptitudes and capacities. This process of the continuous ascent of man is pursued through the ages and in countless lives.

The individual requires a certain social environment. And society must take note of this need and provide it. But this need cannot be satisfied unless the units take their proper places and make their true contribution to the co-operative concern of social life. Each unit truly appreciating its own share in the social process must contribute its quota of service to the collective life of the society.

The functions of the Brāhmin, the Kshatriya, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra are essential parts of a social organism. Having regard to the nature of these functions, they are likened to the mouth, the arms, the thighs and the legs of the cosmic Purusha respectively. By the perfect co-ordination of these functions does a society live as an efficient unit.

Any of these functions failing, society must be thrown out of gear and its unity must be destroyed.

Men are in different stages of evolution. They are of different types, and are fit for performing different duties. The Brāhmin learns and teaches; he ministers to the spiritual needs of the people as priest, preceptor and preacher; he advises the sovereign, expounds and administers laws, and helps in framing and carrying out legislative policy. He is the custodian of the intellectual and spiritual heritage of the race. The Kshatriya governs and performs the executive functions of the State, protects and preserves order against external aggression and internal forces making for disorder, and is the custodian of social power. The Vaiśya includes the agriculturist, the merchant, manufacturer and trader and all those who provide the sustenance of the race, and is the custodian of its economic functions. The Śūdra is that portion of the population which, being incapable of independent initiative on an adequate scale, merely assists in the discharge of essential functions by the contribution of manual labour. With opportunity for unimpeded growth, a man reaches to the full height of his stature. In pre-natal growth he re-enacts his biological evolutionary history. After birth the history of man becomes the history of the liberation of his faculties, and their unfolding in active life. Life never rises beyond what the potential capacity of the individual makes possible.

Now let us turn to the problems of life as they present themselves to one who entertains these general ideas. Social scheme must provide for the continuous prolongation of life for successive generations, progressively increasing where increase of population is required for security, or maintaining the population at the optimum level where increase is not needed. This renewal of life is secured by the recognition of a duty to the *pitṛis*, or the guardians of the physical body of the race. The germ plasm travels from the ancestor to the descendant. There is this physical continuity of the race. The father is born again in his wife as the son. It is himself that is named the son. The intellectual and cultural heritage and traditions of the race have to be handed on. This handing on with such augmentations as each generation is able to make, is secured by the recognition of a duty to the intellectual guardians of the race, the *ṛishis*. Worship and sacrifice are the duties that man owes to the *devas* or divine powers that preside over life. This is nothing more than the recognition of the normal needs of all societies at all times; only they are

founded on the conception of a threefold duty in three spheres of life, which in the mode of expression, looks archaic and quaint. Take two individuals in the most and the least advanced stratum of life and follow their typical career in society. At birth, they are both Śūdras and irresponsible and have little to distinguish one from the other except that the families of both, that is, the parents, are distinguishable. Both grow physically and mentally as their individual capacity permits. It is only in innate capacity that the one is once-born and the other is twice-born. The first cannot usefully be introduced to the abstruse and higher lore of the scriptures. He performs indispensable services in his own sphere. He is associated with the other classes in their work. His sphere is not one of independent responsibility. It is subordinate and subsidiary. Most of his work is carried on under the direction of others. His education and assimilation are effected by association with the Aryan in his family life. Service is his contribution to society and this serves to train and discipline him as a social unit. The other, being a twice-born with higher capacity, is initiated at the age of eight, or earlier if precocious, but never later than twice that age. His education, his scriptural study, begins. It generally continues for not less than twelve years. A keen student might care to study two Vedas or even three in twenty-four or thirty-six years. A few may not care to marry but may remain *brahmachārins* for life (*naishṭhika*). One who so decides does not procreate children and may thereby ignore one of the triple debts, viz. debt to the ancestors (*pitṛis*). This is not considered wrong in the case of those whose passion is to advance the higher intellectual and cultural interests of society. The mind-born sons of Brahmā refused to propagate in response to the higher impulses of their nature and thereby served the society and their own spiritual interests in a more eminent degree than by rearing a family, and these secured eternal recognition from every Aryan making offerings to the *ṛishis* as their spiritual ancestors. Normal life takes the temporary student (*upakurvāṇa*) on to marriage. He becomes a teacher or priest or an official, making his learning available to the public and to the State. He becomes a father and passes on the heritage of his life, in all the three spheres, to the next generation. The sacrifices he performs in the latter part of this stage of life in the family discharge the third debt to the gods. When the son takes to family life and has himself a son, the father is ready to withdraw from active family duties and turn his attention to the service of the public. He becomes a forest-dweller (*vānaprastha*). His

physical and mental disciplines reach a further stage. He may generally live alone. Though his wife may accompany him, his sex life has already ended. After a few years he withdraws from even this connection with the world and prepares himself for the other world, that is, he has no mind for anything but the spiritual concerns of life.

It may be noted that the first stage of this evolved life of the individual is that of a Śūdra, but his higher evolution takes him on. Fully educated he passes on to the next stage of life which is akin to the Vaiśya stage of evolution. He cannot rest there and passes on to public service, having discharged his three debts within the framework of family life. This stage is like that of a Kshatriya with his attention centred not in his own self or family but in society and social affairs. The final stage is that of liberation. Accumulation of higher knowledge and things of the spirit occupy his mind and life.

The advantage of a division of types and the assignment of different functions according to type is that it leads to the abolition of conflict and the production of increasing efficiency through the specialized function for which individuals are prepared by the concentration of their individual aspiration, their every "sense of perception" and "sense of action," that is, by the combination of eye and arm. Conflict is also abolished, as between different generations of people, by the retirement of each generation in due time when the next generation is ready to take the place of the outgoing. The above constituted the general theory of life for society and for the individual.

This may give a one-sided picture if we do not add the following as to the real position of women and the Śūdras in society. There is a view, believed to have the support of the Mīmāṁsakas, that women had equality with men in acts and sacrifices and property; but this conception is not likely to be accepted without contest. So changed are our present views of women and their rights and status. Nor is this change a recent one. Those, at any rate, who took the adverse view claimed to have the support of Baudhāyana: "Women lacked strength and had therefore no right to a share." Even such rights as they indubitably possessed have fallen into disuse in many places. The wife's share in a partition, and the mother's, are no longer enforced in the Brahmarshideśa or below the Vindhyas. The daughter's loss is not much. She has lost her one-fourth share only to gain all; in middle-class families her marriage often absorbs more than her due share. It beggars many a family. Where a woman does take property

at partition or by inheritance, her right has been reduced to one of enjoyment for life, notwithstanding Vijñāneśvara's more liberal interpretation of her rights. The caste system, which so largely dominates the regulations of the Smṛitis as to marriage and inheritance and also in the sphere of criminal law and social usages, is connected with external life and social organization. It does not affect the growth of the inner spirit of man in any sphere. If the exact texts of Vedic lore are denied to the Śūdra, nothing of substance has been denied unto him. His growth in every department is unimpeded. The *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and all other valuable books conceived as man-made, are open to the study of all. Even the unchanted Veda, verbally the same, may be listened to and understood by the uninitiated classes. The Veda is denied, but not its meaning. As the saying goes: "The Veda chanted is Veda, and the Veda without chant is the meaning of the Veda." The Purāṇas and the Itihāsas are not without stories of the non-Aryan being referred to and approached for a solution of problems relating to conflict of *dharma*. Nor was the position of these well-instructed non-Aryans always one of inferiority. In the purely spiritual sides of life, for example, among the *bhakti*-dominated communities—the spiritual equality of all the *bhaktas*, irrespective of caste, was recognized. Whether the equality allowed in these brotherhoods was only spiritual and did not touch the regulations of a settled social order, may always be a matter of controversy. The Smārtas on the one side and the Vīra Śaivas on the other will always differ on this point, the Smārtas being particular about social regulations. It is again to the *bhakti* schools that we must attribute the recognition and canonization of non-caste saints, and among these schools the Vaishṇavas have shown more liberal tendencies than the Śaivas—as the regulations in the Śiva and Vishṇu temples as to the different modes of recognition of caste indicate.

Neither women nor the Śūdras, in general, were treated as slaves in the Smṛiti period. One may find harsh words regarding both in some parts of the Smṛitis, indicating that expressions of ideas have not always been the expressions of our best or most discriminative moods; but life has always flowed along right lines. For alongside of these very harsh words we find other passages inculcating the duty of guidance and protection and the duty of leniency in judging of the conduct of the uninstructed. When the Aryan householder is exhorted to feed all including the Śvapacha before he feeds himself, one has an idea that these ancient lawgivers were

not without a sense of how much social stability depended on social justice.

In any system whether of the East or of the West one intent on finding fault can take hold of a rule or text as showing intolerable injustice. In so far as social injustice is involved in the rule, it will require correction and will be corrected. Life is stronger than any system, and life that breaks rocks will break the system where it invites the attack of advancing righteousness. But the judgement on a system must depend on the intention of the system as a whole, the intention being harmony and mutual adjustment—to each his due. "There will always be the better and the less good, the more and the less capable. To entrust to the inferior a responsibility beyond his powers is as unjust to him as to all others concerned. The happiness of the individual and the health of the social group are to be found neither in the exercise of force to enthrone injustice nor in an envious striving for a mythical equality. They are attained only when the members of each social group exercise the function they can perform adequately and are rewarded in proportion. In every organism, there must be a co-ordination of energy, a sifting of the better; and the success of any social group depends upon the power of the leaders to distinguish the superior from the inferior, to exercise a check upon the uncritical appetites of the group, a capacity which can only be gained by practising it on oneself with the consequent development of knowledge, experience, and character. In the absence of such leaders there will be but the chaos of contradictory impulses or the brutal domination of the stronger."

It is now possible to gather up certain general ideas that run through the scheme: Equality is spiritual. Inequality is the present fact. Equality is only potential. Social organization cannot be founded on what, in theory, shall one day be, but must be founded on what is here and now. There must be differentiation of functions, however equal all may be. There is no real or objectionable inequality between those who perform indispensable functions. Each should be fixed up according to his quality and made to specialize. No arrangement for replacement in each function is so easy and self-fulfilling as birth settling a person's place in the social organism. Rare are the cases where another rule may be called for; but unsettlement for a rare case is unwise and full of disadvantage in the long run. A general rule just in the main deserves to be recognized and enforced.

To woman is assigned the care of the home. Family being her creation, her association with man in every sphere is stressed. Her unassociated individuality is ignored and she is advised to turn her back on it, even to the total suppression of what may be her individual spiritual need. Within the home her influence has been much greater than alien observers imagine. When circumstances have drawn her outside the home, she has shown capacity, courage and strength. Classes are formed on capacity. Transmission of capacity and quality in the generality of cases is presumed. So function on the basis of birth is established as a means of preventing unhealthy competition. Living and due share of family life are secured in this way much more than by leaving the matter to unrestricted competition. On some important matters opinion looked like taking one line, but oscillated and finally passed into another line. The first line was in deference to theory. The second was accepted as the demand of experience. The theory covered exceptions and allowed exceptional treatment to exceptional cases. Ignoring the exceptions, and so avoiding the dangers of unsettlement and confusion arising from special provisions, became one of the cardinal policies of later thought. The abolition of initiation and *brahmacharya* for women falls in this changed line of thought. The few cases of Aryan progeny on non-Aryan women brought up as Aryan and the subsequent abandonment of it also fall in this category. Here again falls the abandonment of the attempt at incorporating the once-born in an Aryan household and raising him by intimate social association. It perhaps deserved to be abandoned. All attempt at uplift in unequal proximate association is bound to fail. Such attempts do not take account of the psychological difficulties. There is much of goodwill but little of sound knowledge in such attempts. The superior and the inferior alike, by their ever-present and unforgettable consciousness of differences in social life, tend to be demoralized and to fall from virtue. Examples of this truth are all around us. Therefore much association with the non-Aryan gets deprecated. He has no longer the same old freedom in the Aryan household. Marriage outside caste with the demoralizing inequality of position for the wife is abolished or discountenanced. A good deal of the injustice of unequal competition is removed by making each class keep within its own fold in marriage.

It is not out of place, however, to add one or two reflections which are intended as an exposition, and not as a criticism. No plan has a chance of success unless it has the general consensus of informed opinion

and, general goodwill behind it. When the consensus and goodwill fail, the conditions for its successful working disappear. It is a question whether the system of *varṇas* has worked within the limits set or has gone beyond the allotted sphere, producing what has been called 'confusion of functions.' Mathematical precision is not attainable in estimating the consequences of planning. Life breaks through and disturbs all calculations. A step may not produce the intended consequences or may produce, along with the desired consequences, others not foreseen or desired. When unforeseen consequences arise, corrections may be needed, and these corrections may be equally inexact as a plan and may also produce other unforeseen consequences. Planning is a continuous process and not, at any time, a finished and completed programme which may go on in the expected manner along expected lines without further interference. Facts have not one but two ends or poles. According to mood and circumstance we stress one or the other of them; we do not take account of both. Periodically, the weight of collective judgement shifts from one to the other. We do not all think alike. Some are at one pole and some at the other. The same mood does not overtake all of us at the same time. Life flows along the lines determined as the resultant of complicated forces set free by differing and contending humanity.

These are not, by any means, intended as a criticism of the conservative Indian view. Those who accept the Indian social philosophy adduce these very reasons to support their view that forces are incalculable and must be allowed to operate naturally without society being forced into a line chosen by a few men, however eminent they may be, and that individual one-sidedness can be corrected only by the sanity of collective judgements allowed to be expressed not by votes, but by the preferences expressed in actual life.

CASTE

It has been said that caste is a unique and a puzzling institution of Hindu India, not to be found anywhere else in the world. The uniqueness of caste is undeniable, but it is rooted in intelligible psychology and was almost inevitable in the circumstances in which it arose. It started in ideas which are world-wide and have their counterparts in the modern world. There has been much speculation as to its origin. Sir P. S. Śivasvāmī Iyer in his "Kamalā Lectures" on Hindu Ethics says that the system of castes was not the invention of the Brāhmin. No one who

knows the real nature of the caste system, as it is, and as it has been, could commit the mistake of supposing that it was brought into being by a single individual or group of individuals. There are in existence to-day some hundreds of groups that go by different caste names and show all the qualities of separate castes. When did these groups come into existence? Did the Brāhmins 'ordain' these divisions? The Śūdras show divisions into hundreds of castes. The untouchables show divisions —grades of untouchability and pollution. What possible advantage could the Brāhmin derive in dividing the Śūdras and the untouchable classes below them? The truth is that divisions have always existed and they are not the creation of any single individual at any point of time. The Brāhmin has not sought to disrupt human society, but has attempted to bring order into existing chaos by extending his own fourfold functional division to the grouping of the divided population. The process by which his own conception of a fourfold division came to be brought into the Hinduized India may now be examined.

There are two clues that may be usefully followed—one is the history of the fourfold division and the other the division of the Aryans into *gotras* or clans. The fourfold division is found among the Parsis also. The Parsi names for these groups are Athravas, Rathaesthas, Vastrya-fshuyans and Huiti. The Athravas were fire priests and their name is connected with the Indian *atharvan*. The priest that feeds the fire in an Indian sacrifice, *agnīdhra*, has his counterpart in the Indian *atarevaksha*, who has an eye on the sacrificial fire all the time. The Parsi language has the words *atash* meaning fire, which is not found in Sanskrit except in connection with *atharvan* and *atharvāṅgiras*, both representing in India names of fire-priests. And in Persia there is evidence that the Athravas grew not only into a separate class but also became a caste not mixing with any other group. The warrior class is represented by a word which means the highest of the four arms in the ancient military science, namely, a car-warrior.

The Brāhmin and the Kshatriya, at any rate, were functional names. The abstract terms, Brahma and Kshatra, indicate their functional character. The Viś was the residual name for the Aryan population after separating those that fell within the definition of Brahma and Kshatra. These three names exhaust the Aryan group. The fourth name is the name of those outside the original Aryan population. We

meet the statement in the Sanskrit books that the Aryans are those who have three *varṇas*.

This division of the Aryans into three functional groups was, therefore, a growing institution in Indo-Iranian times. We do not know when exactly the Persian Athravas developed caste exclusiveness. The *gotra* division in India is anterior to the collection of the *Ṛig-Veda* in a separate book. Sacrifices had by that time been reduced to a common system, but there was one group of hymns known as *Āprī-sūktas* that varied with the *gotra* of the performer. These again seem to go back to the Indo-Iranian times as the Parsis have their Afrigan *mantras* corresponding to Āprīgaṇas. The formation of class for ceremonial purposes is again pre-Ṛig-Vedic and Indo-Iranian.

The class formations were not by any means rigid at first. It is possible to suppose that even when the Parsi Athravas were forming into an exclusive caste, those who were subsequently grouped under the name of Indian Aryans were only having their divisions in an extremely fluid condition. When the Iranians had settled down as agriculturists, the Indians were still nomadic. The Iranians complain of the depredations of these nomads. The Indians in their turn spoke of the seasons first obeying and serving the *asuras*, and the *devas* securing control over the seasons only subsequently by appropriate sacrificial ceremonies. During this period, when the Aryans were still moving and had not formed themselves into definite settlements, they must have been performing all the functions of an invading population without any differentiation or exact division of functions. They performed their religious functions as heads of their households and leaders of their communities; they must have fought when necessary and performed the warriors' functions and they must have accumulated property which then and for a long time consisted of cattle (*paśu*). Even when these functions came to be performed by different hands and the differentiation came into special notice, the people did not thereby become divided. Sons followed the profession of their fathers, but marriages took place between the still undivided Aryans. It was not the mother that settled the place of the child but the father, and there was not yet any question of *anuloma* and *pratiloma* differentiation as to marriages. The system was simple and intelligible. The people were one and no restriction as to alliances by marriage had yet arisen or could arise. The sons followed the profession of the fathers as a matter of convenience and were not prohibited from changing it.

In this fluid social condition, the group settles down in the midst of the Indian population. The freedom of intercourse among the Aryans is at first exercised even in the midst of this new population different in race and quality. The Aryan mixes with the indigenous group and tries to bring up the children of mixed marriages as if they were Aryans. In a few cases such experiment apparently succeeds, but in the large majority of cases it does not. That some early cases of this type were actually accepted as part of the Aryan sacerdotal group is supported by the *Mahābhārata*. The Aryans discourage the experiment of bringing up the issue of mixed marriages as if they were pure Aryans. But the union is allowed to continue. The issue take a lower place in the family, but they may wield considerable influence. Vidura's place in the family of the Kauravas in the *Mahābhārata* or that of a Nair son in a Samanta household of to-day in the West Coast will indicate the position of the sons of these mixed marriages. Sir P. S. Śivasvāmī Iyer notices that this recognition of the sons of mixed marriages—no doubt with decreasing influence and status—went on till the time of Bāṇa, but had ceased by 1,100 A.D. But long before this stage was reached, the mother's class had come to be taken into consideration in fixing the position of the issue. Slowly the position of the father as the determining factor fell into the background and the mother's status became the sole determining factor. It is the presence and influence of the racial factor in the case of the fourth caste that affected the relations as between the first three also and the free intermarriage of the first three came to be replaced by the rule of inferior and superior and *anuloma* and *pratiloma*.

The ancient discussion about the dominance of the seed or the field came to be definitely settled in favour of the field when we come to Manu with his clearly enunciated *varṇa* division. Incidentally one may express a doubt as to the legitimacy of the comparison between the father's function fixing the son's function in older times and the mother's caste fixing the son's caste in later times. The conception of class was functional in the first period, but it became a caste in the second.

Gotra is clan with a specific name. Each *gotra* has what is called a *pravara*—names of *ṛishis* or seers who are stated to be their ancestors. A person who pays his respect to an elder announces himself in these terms: "I invoke your blessing, I am the descendant of Aṅgiras, Bṛihaspati and Bharadvāja, of the *gotra* of Bharadvāja, follower of the *Āpastamba-sūtra*, of the name of N. N., venerable Sir!" The use of *gotra* and

pravara in a sacrifice is twofold. It fixes the *Āprī* hymn. The other use is in the invocation of the gods. The gods do not know any except their own devoted hymn-makers of the *Ṛig-Veda.* They do not respond to the invocation of any who are not the descendants of those devotees. So every sacrificer announces himself as the descendant of A, B & C. Another priest mentions the same names in the reverse order "as in the case of C, B & A." The gods are invoked to attend the sacrifice as they did in the sacrifice of his ancestors. This necessity to specify the ancestry of the sacrificer in sacrifices was an established idea from before the time of the *Ṛig-Veda.*

Seven are the primal *ṛishis.* Four of them are ancestors of human beings. But eighteen separate groups arose out of these four. If the *pravara ṛishis* were common, marriage was not permissible between the families. But Bhṛigu and Aṅgiras, two out of the four, do not exclude such marriages. As our object here is not the study of these *gotras* and *pravaras,* it is not necessary to recount all the *pravaras* or the relations between them. It is enough to say that ten out of the eighteen families are of Kshatriya origin. Bhṛigu took into his family four Kshatriyas who were also makers of hymns—Mitrayu, Sunaka, Veṇa, Vītahavya. The first name in all the families is Bhṛigu in the *pravara* list. But Bhṛigu's own descendants and the descendants of these four Kshatriyas constitute five different groups and intermarry. Aṅgiras had similarly affiliated six Kshatriyas—Hārīta, Kaṇva, Mudgala, Rathītara, Sankṛiti, Vishṇuvṛiddha; and Aṅgiras's own family and these six families, all of which invoke Aṅgiras as their first *pravara ṛishi,* intermarry. Viśvāmitra became a *gotra*-originator without getting affiliated to anybody else and he is generally cited as one who, having been a Kshatriya, became a Brāhmin, his claim to Brāhminhood being a matter of contest for a long time until finally, according to the current tradition, Vasishṭha agreed to accept his status as a Brāhmin. The Kshatriyas who have not thus passed into Brāhmin groups have either Manu alone or Manu, Ila and Purūravas in the *pravara.* And Phalandana, Vatsaprī, Maṅkila are considered the progenitors of the Vaiśyas.

The above narrative gives the following conclusion: There was a time when it was possible to pass from one group to another. The groups were not yet castes but only represented functions. While the groups closed their gates against new entrants, there was struggle against such closure and for a time re-entry was allowed, however unwillingly. The

circumstances in which re-entry was allowed by affiliation are the subject of stories which sound natural. The Kshatriyas fight and chase each other. They enter hermitages for protection against attack, much as sanctuary in churches was resorted to for escape from punishment, and settle down as part of the priestly groups that gave them shelter. Well-known Kshatriya names occur in the Brāhmin *pravaras:* Veṇa, Pṛithu, Divodāsa, Pṛishadaśva, Ajamīḍha, Kaṇva, Purukutsa and Trasadasyu. There has thus been a period when the class to which one belongs is getting to be recognized and yet his moving into another class is permitted, but very naturally each gets slowly fixed up.

When the *Mahābhārata* states that there was a time when there was no caste and all were Brāhmins (being born of Brahmā) it refers to an early time when the Aryan group considered itself one and undivided either as castes or classes. Then the fighting class emerged in the *tretā* and lastly came the Vaiśya or the trading group. Some speculation there is in the account, but it does correspond, it would seem, to a real stage in the evolution of castes.

Not until the Aryan settled in the country of the non-Aryan, did the threefold division of the Aryan himself assume its final form. First came the recognition of the Śūdras as non-Aryans. Next came the division of the Aryans into three groups. Partly the idea of class as high and low according to function and partly the contact between the high and the low and a consciousness of degradation by such contact between the groups produced the successive rules that a Brāhmin produced Brāhmin issue on all Aryan mothers, that a Brāhmin produced Brāhmin issue on Brāhmin and Kshatriya women only, and lastly that a Brāhmin produced Brāhmin issue only on Brāhmin women. When this result was reached, new names were being given to the issue of mixed marriages. Marriages in *anuloma* forms produced intermediate issue—above the mother's caste and below the father's. Mixed marriages between Aryans produced issue of the regenerate caste, but the issue of a Śūdra woman by an Aryan of the three castes produced a child which had *saṁskāras* only as Śūdra. If the marriage was a mixed one in *pratiloma* form, the issue was considered degraded. Still if the parents were Aryan, they were not wholly excluded. Their *saṁskāras* were like those of Śūdras. Their touch did not pollute. The Śūdras' progeny on the women of the higher castes and more particularly on the Brāhmin women were execrated, the last being described as Chandālas or untouchables. The most elaborate calculation on what

may be called a eugenic scale will be found in chapter X of the *Manusaṁhitā.*

In enumerating the castes referred to in the *Manusaṁhitā,* we may take the major castes to be four, the Brāhmin, the Kshatriya, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra. The remaining are the mixed castes, that is, those arising from the union of these major castes or from that of the mixed castes with the major and mixed castes. We exhibit below the list to be found in the above book:

Father	*Mother*	*Child*
Brāhmin	Kshatriya	Anantara[1]
,,	Vaiśya	Ambashṭha
Kshatriya	,,	Anantara[2]
Brāhmin	Śūdra	Nishāda or (Pāraśava)
Kshatriya	,,	Ugra
Vaiśya	,,	Anantara[3]
Kshatriya	Brāhmin	Sūta
Vaiśya	,,	Vaideha
,,	Kshatriya	Māgadha
Śūdra	Brāhmin	Chandāla
,,	Kshatriya	Kshattṛi
,,	Vaiśya	Āyogava

The first three are the offspring of twice-born parents in regular order and are, therefore, themselves twice-born. The first six are named Apasadas by reason of the inferiority of the mothers. The rest are the offspring of irregular or *pratiloma* unions and are not twice-born even where the parents are both of the twice-born caste; but the offspring of the Aryans, whether *anuloma* or *pratiloma*, are alike touchable.

Manu's Anantara is reminiscent of the time when each caste produced its equal on the next lower. That equality is half accepted by Manu himself. It is unequivocally accepted by Uśanas. In the stricter notions of his time, Yājñavalkya gives these Anantaras, as mentioned in the above table, the distinctive names of Mūrdhāvasikta, Māhishya and Karaṇa. Yājñavalkya has only the *pratiloma* and *anuloma* offspring of the four major castes. One more given is that Rathakāra is the issue of a Māhishya by a Karaṇi.

[1] Mūrdhāvasikta. [2] Māhishya. [3] Karaṇa.

Uśanas curiously but appropriately contemplates even *pratiloma* unions as legal and gives separate names to the offspring of marriage and the offspring of illicit union. *Pratiloma* issue of Aryan parents are disapproved but are not treated as unassociable. Uśanas again appropriately makes *pratiloma* issue of a Kshatriya on a Brāhmin woman a twice-born. His daughter married King Yayāti according to the Purāṇic tradition.

The other mixed classes of Manu are the following:

Father	*Mother*	*Child*
Brāhmin	Ugra	Āvṛita
,,	Ambashṭha	Ābhira
,,	Āyogava	Dhigvaṇa
Nishāda	Śūdra	Pukkasa
Śūdra	Nishāda	Kukkuṭaka
Kshattṛi	Ugra	Śvapāka
Vaidehaka	Ambashṭha	Veṇa
Vrātya[1] Brāhmin produces		Bhūrjakanṭaka Āvantya Vāṭadhana Pushpadha Śaikha
Vrātya Kshatriya produces		Jhalla Malla Nichchhivi or (Lichchhavi) Nata Karaṇa Khasa Draviḍa
Vrātya Vaiśya produces		Sudhanvāchārya Kārūsha Vijanmā Maitra Sātvata
Dasyu	Āyogava	Sairindhra

[1] Those of the three higher *varṇas* that have not had *saṁskāras* according to the Smṛitis are Vrātyas.

Father	*Mother*	*Child*
Vaideha	Āyogava	Maitreya
Nishāda	,,	Mārgava or Dāsa (Kaivarta
,,	Vaideha	Kārāvara
Vaideha	Kārāvara	Andhra
,,	Nishāda	Meda
Chandāla	Vaideha	Pāṇḍusopāka
Nishāda	,,	Āhiṇḍika
Chandāla	Pukkasa	Sopāka
,,	Nishāda	Antyāvasāyin

Uśanas, whom Yājñavalkya recognizes as having laid down the law as to these mixed castes, has a chapter consisting of 51 *ślokas* bearing the name of *Auśanasa Dharmaśāstra*. It is noticed there that Uśanas furnishes names which are somewhat different from those given by Manu, sometimes with the addition that the name refers to the offspring of illicit union.

Some of these names are connected with the performance of essential functions in social economy. Some are the names of well-known tribes. These are explained as resting on the basis of a mixture of castes, known and unknown. These names are a fanciful attempt at explaining the origin of the many groups that actually existed. They are not less fanciful than the description of some of the tribes, viz. Puṇḍrakas, Cholas, Draviḍas, Kāmbojas, Pāradas, Pallavas, Chīnas, Kirātas, Daradas, Śakas and Yavanas, as degraded Kshatriya tribes. Perhaps this latter statement may have much more justification in that it indicates that these are Kshatriyas in function, that is to say, by instinct, character and profession, but that they were degraded because they did not conform to the Smṛiti requirements of a perfect Aryan life. The fixing of the names of mixed castes has not even that degree of justification. It can only embody the fancy or the speculative estimate of the writers that the tribe or group by its quality and function is a cross of the castes represented as the origin of the tribe.

The rules about the raising of the status of the issue of mixed castes by successive hypergamous unions are to be found both in Manu and Yājñavalkya. No case is recorded, not even a mythical one, in the Purāṇas. But its possibility on the Indian conception of castes is con-

ceded by what must be accepted as high authority. Uśanas goes so far as to put in different groups those born by marriage in irregular order and also in illicit unions. How are the places in society to be determined except by supposing that the parents furnish the information or some record is available to furnish the basis of classification. If successive marriages should raise the child to a higher status in five, six or seven generations, the caste of the parent has to be remembered or recorded and the result, accordingly, decided and maintained. By the way, it may be stated that communities that may be treated as Brāhmins under this rule are not anxious to claim that status in these times, because of the penalties which such a claim might involve them in. It requires also to be stated that the rule has been practically a dead letter, embodying nothing but a theory almost impossible of enforcement in practice.

Only one more curious rule has to be noticed in this connection with its implications. In the ancient sacrifices, the sacrificer was required to name ten ancestresses. As often as he reached the name of a non-Brāhmin ancestress, it is to be omitted and the next Brāhmin ancestress is to be named. This rule reminds one of the times when the caste distinction was hardening; but the marriage of a Brāhmin with a Kshatriya or a Vaiśya woman was still considered as producing the equal or nearly equal of a Brāhmin.

THE PURĀṆAS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN THOUGHT

The Purāṇas are a very important branch of the Hindu sacred literature. They enable us to know the true import of the ethos and philosophy and religion of the Vedas. They clothe with flesh and blood the bony framework of the *Dharma-sūtras* and the *Dharma-śāstras*. Without such a tabernacle of flesh and bone, the mere life-force of the Vedas cannot function with effect. It is, of course, equally clear that without such life-force the mere mass of flesh and bone will decay and crumble into dust. The *Sthalapurāṇas* are records relating to local shrines and describe local and limited manifestations of grace. The Purāṇas, on the other hand, relate to the whole of India so far as the historical portion therein is concerned and to the whole world so far as their ethical, philosophical and religious portion is concerned.

As regards the historical side of the Purāṇas, many scholars attach little importance to it. But that is because they do not have sufficient patience to go deeply into the matter and investigate the historical facts in all the Purāṇas and correlate and co-ordinate them and then give a correct and coherent picture of the past of India therefrom. It is easy to dismiss them as a mass of legends and to wax eloquent over the lack of the historical sense among the Hindus, whereas a patient and pains-taking analysis, followed by a synthetic presentation of the vast and even stupendous mass of historical material scattered throughout the Purāṇas is a very difficult task.

I do not propose to go in this essay in any considerable detail into the opinions of Western savants about the Purāṇas. My aim is to present the Purāṇas from the positive traditional point of view and show how they explain the Vedas and how they have built up the national culture and inspired the national literature. But it will be of much use to know about the critical attitude of the West and the tenability or value thereof. H. H. Wilson's view that the Purāṇas were "pious frauds written for temporary purposes in subservience to sectarian imposture" is as patently incorrect as it is patently unjust. Nor is it right to say that they are the expressions of a late and perverted Hinduism. These and other depreca-

tory opinions are based on insufficient knowledge and defective sympathy and are as much opposed to truth as to tradition.

The Purāṇas are attributed to Sūta as the reciter and to Vyāsa as the author. It is said by some persons that Sūta was a non-Brāhmin. But there is a tradition that he was born out of the sacrificial fire. Kauṭilya differentiates between the Paurāṇika Sūta and the *prati-loma* Sūta, *i.e.* the son of a Kshatriya father and a Brāhmin mother. Even if the reciter Sūta was a non-Brāhmin, what follows from it? The Purāṇas were written with the object of popularizing the truths taught in the Vedas by presenting them in relation to concrete personages and to the events of their lives. The lineage of their narrator is as much beside the point as that of the printer of the printed Purāṇas of to-day.

The term Purāṇa means that which 'lives from of old,'[1] or that which is always new though it is old.[2] The *Chhāndogya Upanishad* refers to 'Itihāsa' and 'Purāṇa.' But probably these two terms relate to the stories and parables contained in the Vedas themselves. The references in the *Dharma-sūtras* and the *Mahābhārata* and Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra* are, however, to the Purāṇas proper. The tradition is that the sage Vyāsa compiled the Purāṇas and taught them to Lomaharshaṇa who was a Sūta or professional bard and story-teller and that Lomaharshaṇa taught them to his disciples Agnivarchas, Maitreya, Vaiśampāyana and three others (these names differ in different accounts). Modern scholarship says that the Purāṇas must be the work of many minds of diverse times and that the name Vyāsa indicates a mere arranger and compiler. It is stated in the *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, that the text of the Purāṇas "has been perverted by generations of editors and transcribers." We have only dogmatic assertions either way and hence may well accept the traditional view until it is disproved by facts. The *Vishṇu Purāṇa* (Part II, ch. 3) says that a Veda-Vyāsa arises in each *dvāpara yuga* to arrange the Vedas and give the Purāṇas to the world.

Some scholars find something tangible and important in the statement made in some of the Purāṇas (e.g. *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*) that Purāṇa was heard by Brahmā even before the Vedas issued out of his four mouths. From this they infer that the Purāṇas were regarded as earlier productions than the Vedas. They forget that some affirmations are there only by way of praise. The statements were merely meant to extol the value of the Purāṇas and not to deride or decry the eternal and self-existent and

[1] *Vayu Purāṇa.* [2] Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Gītā* IV.7.



BRAHMA

Courtesy Mr. O. C. Gangoly



KṚISHṆA GOVARDHANADHARA

self-proved nature of the Vedas. The Vedas themselves refer to Manu and say that every utterance of his is a medicine to the soul. All this in no wise affects the widespread Hindu belief in the infallibility and eternity of the Vedas. This may not commend itself to the modern mind, but there can be no doubt that there is no warrant for the theory that there is any Hindu doctrine that the Purāṇas are anterior or superior to the Vedas. The real function of the Purāṇas is to explain, illustrate and amplify the Vedas.

In the *Amara-kośa* it is said that a Purāṇa should have five characteristics, viz. primary creation, secondary creation, genealogy of gods and Prajāpatis, periods of different Manus, and histories of royal dynasties. It seems to me that this description refers to the special and specific topics contained in the Purāṇas and does not in any way affect the truth that the main value of the Purāṇas consists in amplifying, enforcing and illustrating the spiritual truths stated in the Vedas in the form of injunctions and commands. The teaching of the Vedas has been likened to masterly commands (*prabhusammita*) and that of the Purāṇas to friendly counsel (*suhṛitsammita*), and this is amply confirmed by the contents and delivery of the two classes of literature. Amara Siṁha in a comparatively late age gave a description of the contents of the Purāṇas as having five *lakshaṇas* (characteristics). The five *lakshaṇas* are fully found in the *Vishṇu Purāṇa* and are found fully or partly in the other Purāṇas.

It may be mentioned here that these five *lakshaṇas* or characteristics are amplified in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* into ten as follows: 1. *sarga* (primary creation), 2. *visarga* (secondary creation), 3. *sthāna* (preservation of beings), 4. *poshaṇa* (divine protection), 5. *manvantara* (periods of Manus), 6. *ūti* (desires), 7. *īśanukathā* (the stories of *avatāras*), 8. *nirodha* (involution), 9. *mukti* (salvation) and 10. *āśraya* (ultimate abode). But the classification into five *lakshaṇas* is the most usual, widespread and important classification.

Taking *pañcha-lakshaṇas* in some detail, it may be mentioned that *sarga* refers to the emergence of the primary evolutes from Prakṛiti or primordial matter under the control of Īśvara. The *pratisarga* consists of the secondary evolutes. The Absolute (Para Brahman) is Īśvara when in a state of relation to cosmic evolution. From Māyā or Prakṛiti which is controlled by Īśvara come the five *tanmātras* (subtle elements). Īśvara in relation to these becomes the Hiraṇyagarbha. From the

sāttvika (pure) element of the *tanmātras* comes each of the five *jñānendriyas* (organs of knowledge) and from the *sāttvika* aspect of the totality of the *tanmātras* comes the *antaḥkaraṇa* (mind). From the *rājasika* (active) aspect of each of the *tanmātras* comes each of the *karmendriyas* (organs of action) while from the *rājasika* aspect of the totality of the *tanmātras* comes the *prāṇa*. From the *tāmasika* (inert) aspect of the *tanmātras* come the five *bhūtas* (elements). By the combination (*pañchīkaraṇa*) of these the universe is manifested. Hiraṇyagarbha in relation to the gross universe is called Virāj. The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* describes how the creator went on creating form after form till he created man and was pleased when man emerged, as he alone can behold and realize God.

The value of the above view is that it gives a rational description of evolution. Modern science is unable to explain how the senses or the mind could have emerged out of matter which alone is postulated by it. Nor is it able to state how matter could be self-active and purposeful. The Purāṇas then proceed to describe the historic evolution of the human destiny in the course of the unfoldment of time. The four *yugas* are *kṛita* (*satya*), *tretā*, *dvāpara* and *kali*. The last consists of 4,32,000 years. The durations of *kṛita*, *tretā* and *dvāpara* are four times, three times, and twice the duration of *kali yuga*. All the four *yugas* put together form a *mahāyuga*. Seventy-one *mahāyugas* form a *manvantara*. There are fourteen *manvantaras*, *i.e.* Svāyambhuva, Svārochisha, Uttama, Tāmasa, Raivata, Chākshusha, Vaivasvata, Sāvarṇi, Dakshasāvarṇi, Brahmasāvarṇi, Dharmasāvarṇi, Rudrasāvarṇi, Rauchya-daivasāvarṇi and Indrasāvarṇi. There are also *sandhis* or twilight periods amounting to six *mahāyugas*. Thus 14×71+6, *i.e.* 1,000 *mahāyugas* form one day of Brahmā. His night consists of 1,000 *mahāyugas*. In this way he lives for 100 years. It is said that at the end of each day of Brahmā the three worlds are destroyed whereas all the seven worlds are destroyed when his life-period ends. Then the involution follows the reverse order and all the manifestations are reabsorbed in Prakṛiti which itself is reabsorbed in the Īśvara who is one with the Absolute.

Much has been made in later times of imaginary contradictions between the Śaiva Purāṇas and the Vaishṇava Purāṇas. In addition to such an untenable notion, an imaginary and utterly baseless rivalry and even enmity have been adumbrated between Śiva and Vishṇu. In the Vedas no such rivalry is stated at all. As the Purāṇas merely illustrate and

amplify the Vedic truth, they could not have asserted any gradation among the *trimūrti.* The trinity is really and essentially one divinity with three divine forms associated with three cosmic functions. The Western scholars grow very facetious when they speak about the "sectarian and propagandist" character of the Purāṇas. But joking is one thing and fact is another thing. The sect-obsessed Indians may use the Purāṇas as a Vaishṇava mace or a Śaiva trident, but the author of the Purāṇas had no such pugnacity in his nature. He arranged the Vedas and wrote the *Brahma-sūtras.* The very same truths are expounded in the Purāṇas as well. Vyāsa is their author and surely he would not have spoken with many and self-contradictory voices.

The fact is that each Purāṇa has preferences but no exclusions in regard to the gods. Whether we call a Purāṇa a Śaiva Purāṇa or a Vaishṇava Purāṇa, we find references to the *līlās* (exploits) of various gods, in each of the Purāṇas. For the purpose of intensifying devotion to one god, he is described as the Supreme, but this does not mean a denial of godhood to the other gods. In the *Brahma Purāṇa* Vishṇu teaches Mārkaṇḍeya that he is identical with Śiva. The *Padma Purāṇa* says in express terms: "Brahmā, Vishṇu and Maheśvara, though three in form, are one entity. There is no difference among the three except that of attributes." The *Vāyu Purāṇa* says that he who affirms superiority and inferiority among the gods is a sinner and that he who realizes their oneness is a man of true knowledge. The story of Atri's penance as described in the *Bhāgavata* clearly proves the same truth. We find it stated in the *Vishṇu Purāṇa* (Part I, ch. 2): "The Bhagavān Janārdana, though one, assumes the three forms of Brahmā, Vishṇu and Śiva for creation, preservation and destruction of the world respectively." Again in the same Purāṇa (Part I, ch. 8) the identity of Vishṇu and Lakshmī with Śiva and Gaurī is affirmed. The fact is that each of the functions of creation, preservation and destruction implies the others and contains the others in a latent form. That is why Vishṇu is described as Śiva's arrow and Śiva is described as Kṛishṇa's flute (*vide Kṛishṇopanishad*).

Another vexed controversy is about the *sāttvika* and *rājasa* and *tāmasa* Purāṇas. The *sāttvika* Purāṇas are stated in the *Padma Purāṇa* to be *Vishṇu, Bhāgavata, Nāradīya, Garuḍa, Padma* and *Varāha.* The *rājasa* Purāṇas are *Brahma, Brahmāṇḍa, Brahma-vaivarta, Mārkaṇḍeya, Bhavishya* and *Vāmana.* The *tāmasa* Purāṇas are *Śiva, Liṅga, Skanda,*

Agni, Matsya and *Kūrma.* Sometimes *Vāyu Purāṇa* is substituted for *Agni Purāṇa* in this list. There are also eighteen Upapurāṇas, viz. *Sanatkumāra, Narasiṁha, Nāradīya, Śiva, Durvāsas, Kapila, Mānava, Auśanasa, Varuṇa, Kālikā, Sāmba, Nandi, Saura, Parāśara, Āditya, Māheśvara, Bhāgavata* and *Vāsishṭha.* Some subtle minds have asserted a graded superiority among the Purāṇas as *sattva guṇa* is superior to *rajo-guṇa* and *rajo-guṇa* is superior to *tamo-guṇa.* As a matter of fact the confusion of thought inherent in such a classification is due to confounding the terms *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* as applied to the human mind with the terms as applied to cosmic energies which were anterior to the emergence of the human mind itself. Who dares to assert that there is a gradation among the cosmic functions of universal creation, preservation and destruction? The Vedas and the Purāṇas affirm only one God, call Him by any name you like. Some Purāṇas affirm the origin of Vishṇu and Brahmā from Śiva. Others affirm the *causa causans* to be Vishṇu. We can easily see the significance of this apparent variation. The one God conceived in His pre-tripartite state is described as the parent of Himself in His tripartite capacity. Where is the radical contradiction in this view? Further, *sattva* has a core of *tamas* (*antastamas*) just as *tamas* has a core of *sattva* (*antassattva*). Let us not forget the statement in the *Mahābhārata*: "The purport of the Purāṇas is identical."

We may refer here to a minor controversy as to whether the *Bhāgavata* referred to above is the *Śrīmad-Bhāgavata* devoted to the praise of Krishṇa or the *Devī-Bhāgavata* devoted to the praise of Devī. A verse is quoted as to what should be the contents of a *Bhāgavata.* But it bears on its face abundant proof that it is a mere distillation from what is found to exist. It is a mere *ex post facto* and *ex cathedra* pronouncement. There is no basis for the cheap and cynical remark that *Śrīmad-Bhāgavata* is a late work by Vopadeva. We find a *Bhāgavata* enumerated among the Purāṇas and another *Bhāgavata* enumerated among the Upapurāṇas. It is to be hoped that the war of the *Bhāgavatas* will be followed by a lasting peace and that, as is apparent enough, each will find a place in the one list and the other beyond the reach of controversy.

The geography of the Purāṇas is their weakest point. They describe seven concentric continents separated by encircling seas. In the *Cambridge History of India* it is said: "These are the 'seas of treacle and seas of butter' at which Lord Macaulay, with his utter inability to under-

stand any form of early culture, scoffed in his celebrated minute on Indian education." The Western culture which for centuries before Galileo's great work was satisfied with geocentrism and heavenly bodies moving in cycles and epicycles round the earth, need not turn up its nose when trouncing Purāṇic geography, which, so far as it concerns India, is correct and acceptable. Inaccuracies in universal geography are after all of minor importance compared with the adequacy of the fulfilment of the main object of the Purāṇas. It may, however, be suggested in defence of Purāṇic geography that probably the extra-terrestrial world and seas relate to subtler forms of matter or philosophical concepts. It may also be noted that the Purāṇas describe accurately the source of the Nile (Nīla Krishṇa) in a lake in Kuśadvīpa (Africa). The source of the Nile was rediscovered recently by British explorers after encountering innumerable difficulties.

We shall now proceed to deal with the historical aspect of the Purāṇas. In twelve Purāṇas we find an account of royal dynasties in India. But there is not full agreement among them as to the names or events. This is not a serious fault as we find it even in the accounts of Christ's life in the four Gospels. Hence it is necessary to test the stories therein in the light of archaeology and epigraphy. There is no such means of testing the stories in regard to the period prior to the *Mahabhārata* war. The Purāṇas refer to three great dynasties after that war, viz. the line of the Purus, the line of the Ikshvākus, and the line of Magadha kings. The *Matsya, Vāyu, Brahmāṇda, Vishṇu, Bhāgavata, Garuda* and *Bhavishya Purāṇas* give accounts of the dynasties that reigned in India during the *kali* age.

A new school of interpretation of the Purāṇas is that of Mr. K. Narayana Iyer in his work called *The Permanent History of Bhāratavarsha.* His aim is to prove that they teach *yoga* and not history or geography. He says that the seven *dvīpas* or islands surrounded by the seven seas are the seven *prakritis*, viz. the five elements, *ahaṁkāra* (individuation) and *buddhi* (determinative faculty) and that such terminology corresponds to the yogic terminology of *chakras* or *padmas* (lotuses) in the human frame; that the *devas* (gods) are the senses in their pure *sāttvika* nature; the *Bharata Khaṇda* alludes to the devotional *karmas* as a whole; that "the saline ocean forming the southern boundary of Bhārata-varsha and lying round the whole of Jambu-dvīpa represents the ocean of worldly miseries"; that Kāśī or Benares is the

nervous centre known to the *yogins* as *ājñā-chakra* (the spot between the eye-brows); and that the Gangā, Yamunā and Sarasvatī are the *iḍā, piṅgalā* and *sushumnā nāḍīs*. He points out that the Purāṇas affirm that the succession of the four *yugas* applies only to Bhārata-varsha and asks how time could have a merely local application. He says that the *yugas* refer to the forms of *yoga* and that the duration of the *kali yuga* refers to the yogic account of a single day of man and that "the doubling, trebling and quadrupling of this period for *dvāpara, tretā* and *krita yugas* are consequent on the regulation of breaths by the processes prescribed in the *Yoga-śāstras*." According to him Brahmā creates devotion and Vishṇu preserves it and "Śiva is primarily the cause of Brahmā's creation by his destroying the worldly desires and lastly he is the cause of final liberation by annihilating the good effects of religious devotion and practice." In regard to such incidents as Devī's killing of Mahishāsura and Chitrāsura he says that they merely represent the conquest of ignorance and discordant variety by wisdom and unity. He refers to the *Bṛihad-āraṇyakopanishad* and says that by Indra is meant the knower of the Ātman, that when India knows the Ātman he overpowers the *asuras* (desires) and that when he does not know the Ātman the *asuras* overpower him. He says further: "The above explains purely the human psychology, the *devas, gandharvas*, etc., alluding to the senses, internal emotions, etc. The *lokanāthas* clearly represent their respective faculties, and the *lokas* denote the nervous centres or seats of these faculties. He says that the *pitṛis* represent the subtle elements and that "*Soma* represents the *chid-ākāśa*, a stage superior to the *tanmātras* or *pitṛis*, alluding to a perfectly pure, devotional and tranquil state of mind." He says further: "The worship of the sun at the *sandhyā* is plainly explained as referring to the adoration of the internal *ātman*." According to him the *ṛishis* represent the *prāṇas*. He then proceeds to say: "The *ṛishis* clearly represent certain definite conditions of intellectual development in man attained by Yoga and Sāṁkhya practices."

It seems to me that this theory misses by exaggeration the true import and purport of the Purāṇas, just as it is wrong to expect and rigorously demand from them history and geography correct to the minutest detail. The fact is that Yāska himself has pointed out in regard to the Vedic texts that there is not only an *ādhidaivika* and an *ādhibhautika* method of visioning truth but also an *ādhyātmika* method. The parallelism of the microcosm and the macrocosm is a fundamental truth. The

fact that the *devas* mean the senses does not mean that there are no macrocosmic *devas*. We may take an illustration. The Veda affirms diverse gods and yet says that there is only one God and that the sages call Him by various names. Yāska in his *Nirukta* points out that the different names of God relate to the diversities of divine function. There is no real clash between the unity and the multiplicity of the divine personality. It is not henotheism but a many-faceted monotheism. Ice, water and vapour have different forms and functions, but are really and fundamentally one and the same. In the same way the Purāṇas affirm that they state facts. In some places they give hints of the *ādhyātmika* significance. In our own body we are not able to say where the body ends and the soul begins. Such mutual pervasiveness is a deep fact of life. But such a method, unless its limitations and uses are recognized well, has got its dangers. A modern variant of it has been given to the world by Lassen. He considers the leading characters of the *Mahābhārata*, not as persons, but as symbolical representations of conditions and events. According to him the Pāṇḍava history is a symbolical representation of the Aryan conquests, and the individuals bearing the name Pāṇḍava symbolically represent the various periods which could be assigned to such conquests. Talboys Wheeler also seems to think that the Pāṇḍavas represent the Aryans and the *Vana Parva* represents the penetration of the lands of the aborgines by the Aryans. Thus this method, which may be called the historical *ādhyātmika* method, has added to existing confusion and has no real substance. Lassen goes so far as to say that Draupadī's marriage to the Pāṇḍavas merely represents a political alliance with the king of Pañchāla!

It is not possible to give here a résumé of the contents of all the Purāṇas. These contain about 4,00,000 verses on the whole and relate to a vast variety of topics. It may be mentioned for the benefit of those who wish to know briefly the contents of the Purāṇas, that the *Matsya Purāṇa* gives a short summary of them. A brief summary of two *rājasa* Purāṇas, two *sāttvika* Purāṇas and two *tāmasa* Purāṇas is given below to show how they really speak with one voice and help us to understand the true import of the Veda and how they show that they are the basis on which the fabric of modern Hinduism rests to-day.

In the *Brahma Purāṇa* we find at the beginning a description of creation. It is stated to be caused by Vishṇu, who is described as being one with Brahmā and Śiva. The successive evolutes from

Pradhāna or Prakṛiti are *mahat* and *ahaṁkāra* and subtle elements (*tanmātras*). The Purāṇa then describes the oldest Manu (Svāyambhuva Manu) and his wife Śatarūpā and the Prajāpatis or patriarchs. The succeeding *manvantaras* also are described. There is an elaborate description of the present Vaivasvata *manvantara*, and this Manu's lineage, viz. the solar race up to King Bṛihadbala. The Purāṇa then describes the various *dvīpas* (islands) of the earth and also the nether regions (*pātāla*) and the upper regions (*svarga*). It next deals with the sacred places of India, especially Utkala (Orissa) and the worship of the Sun there as well as the Ekāmra forest which is the favourite abode of Śiva. We have got also a detailed account of Daksha's sacrifice and the passing away of Satī and the birth and marriage of Umā. There is also a description of Purī or Jagannāth. The Purāṇa then proceeds to describe Vishṇu's teaching to Mārkaṇḍeya that he is one with Śiva and that he pervades all things. It then describes Śrī Kṛishṇa's life and doings. Next come the *srāddhas* (obsequial rites) and the importance of the *ekādaśī vrata*. Then follow the *yugas* and the *pralaya* (dissolution) of the world, the nature of Yoga and Sāṁkhya, and *mukti* by attaining oneness with Vāsudeva. The Purāṇa has also an *uttara-khaṇḍa* or supplementary portion, describing the stories connected with Brahmā including his propitiation of Śiva.

In the *Padma Purāṇa* the first portion, *i.e.* *srishṭi-khaṇḍa* describes how Brahmā was born in the *padma* (lotus). It then describes the creation according to the Sāṁkhya terminology. Its speciality is that Brahmā is given a prominence which is absent in the other Purāṇas. It also extols the supremacy of Vishṇu. After treating of the divisions of time from an instant to the lifetime of Brahmā, the book proceeds to describe the Prajāpatis, Rudras and Manus. It states the importance of *śrāddhas*, especially at Gaya. It describes the lunar dynasty more elaborately than the solar. This portion also describes various *vratas* or observances at length. The second or *bhūmi-khaṇḍa* describes the life of Prahlāda and the life of Vṛitrāsura as also the history of Veṇa and Pṛithu. It then proceeds to describe the human aspects of holiness (*jaṅgama tīrthas, i.e.* the parents and the *gurus*) and the sacred shrines (*sthāvara tīrthas*) at Mahākāla, Prabhāsa, Kurukshetra, etc. The third or *svarga-khaṇḍa* tells of the upper spheres inhabited by the gods, in the course of King Bharata's rise to *vaikuṇṭha* beyond the pole-star (*Dhruva-maṇḍala*). The Purāṇa then describes the four castes and the four *āśramas*



VISHNU TEMPLE AT GAYA

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VARAHA AVATARA

and their duties as well as *karma-yoga* and *jñāna-yoga*. The fourth or *pātāla-khaṇḍa* describes the nether regions. It also narrates in a detailed way the exploits of the kings of the solar race. There is a praise of the *Bhāgavata* as the last and the best of the Purāṇas. The last portion of the Purāṇa is the *uttara-khaṇḍa,* which deals with the story of Jālandhara. It speaks of the *mantra "Oṁ Lakshmī-nārāyaṇābhyāṁ namaḥ"* as the greatest of all *mantras,* and says that it can be taught to all classes including the Śūdras and women after *dīkshā*. It describes also the *para, vyūha* and *vibhava* aspects of Vishṇu, and emphasizes the special holiness of the *kārtika* month and of *ekādaśī*. The last portion describes *kriyā-yoga,* which deals with practical devotion as distinct from *dhyāna-yoga* or *yoga* of contemplation.

The *Vishṇu Purāṇa* was narrated by Parāśara to his pupil Maitreya. It is divided into six parts, each of which is subdivided into many chapters. The first book gives an account of creation, which is due to the power of Purusha and Prakṛiti. Vishṇu who is Paramātman desired to create the universe so that the souls might work out their *karma* and attain liberation by means of God-realization. Creation is due to his mercy (*kṛipā*) and is his sport (*līlā*). Then follows an account of the *avatāra* (incarnation) of the Lord as *varāha* (boar). We then get a description of the Svāyambhuva-*manvantara* and the Prajāpatis. Then follows a description of the churning of the ocean followed by the getting of nectar (*amṛita*), and of the life of Dhruva who by his devotion to Vishṇu was lifted to the supreme height of the *Dhruva-maṇḍala* (the pole-star). Dhruva's descendants are then described.

The second book describes the earth and the nether worlds and the courses of the planets. The third book describes the Manus, the Indras, the gods, the *ṛishis* and the Vyāsas. The fourth book deals with the genealogies of the kings of the solar and the lunar race and brings them up to the *kali yuga,* among whom are included the Magadha and Andhra kings and even later ones. The fifth book describes the life of Kṛishṇa. The last book is philosophical and teaches how devotion to Lord Vishṇu is the means to the attainment of beatitude.

In the *Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇa* we have a detailed description of Śrī Kṛishṇa and Rādhā whose supreme abode is the *goloka*. Śrī Kṛishṇa is stated to be the supreme divine Principle from whom have come Prakṛiti, Brahmā, Vishṇu and Śiva. In the first portion (*Brahma-khaṇḍa*) we get a description of Vishṇu and Nārāyaṇa emerging from

the right and left sides of Kṛishṇa and Brahmā emerging from his navel. Rādhā emerges from his heart. The *gopas* and *gopīs*[1] come from him and her respectively. Brahmā then proceeds to create the ordinary universe. The second portion or *Prakṛiti-khaṇḍa* describes the evolution of Prakṛiti according to the Sāṁkhya school of thought, but affirms that it is under the control of Īśvara and is his *śakti* (power). *Śakti* has five aspects, viz. Rādhā, Durgā, Lakshmī, Sarasvatī and Sāvitrī. She has innumerable minor aspects as well. The third portion of the Purāṇa deals with the birth and exploits of Gaṇeśa. The last portion deals with the life of Śrī Kṛishṇa. The meeting of Kṛishṇa and Rādhā and their union form the theme of a most remarkable and picturesque poetic description.

In the *Vāyu Purāṇa* the worship of Śiva is largely emphasized. In some of the lists of the main Purāṇas, its place is sometimes taken by the *Śiva Purāṇa.* The two works as now extant are separate. The *Vāyu Purāṇa* is divided into two *khaṇḍas* (parts) and four *pādas* (quarters), and gives us the story of creation and the history of the kings of the solar and the lunar race. It is worthy of note that the Purāṇa also contains accounts of the actions of Vishṇu for the good of the world. We find also expositions of the Advaita system of thought.

In the *Agni Purāṇa* there is emphasis on the glory of Śiva, but we also find descriptions of the glories of Vishṇu. It contains in addition a detailed description of political science, law, judicature, medicine and rhetoric.

I have referred to some of the important and typical Purāṇas to show their method of treatment and their aim and content. We see from it that their main object—their very life—is, as I have said, to amplify the Vedic injunctions about morality and spirituality. They form in a way the *kindergarten* of the uprising soul which grows into fulfilment by means of *Brahmavidyā.* They give us lessons in pure *pravṛitti* (enjoyment) and *nivṛitti* (renunciation) and fit us for the ascent towards and realization of the highest spiritual truths taught in the Veda and the Vedānta.

The subject of the Purāṇas demands a much fuller treatment than is possible here. We shall, therefore, proceed to sum up the discussion and formulate our conclusions. It has been shown above that the Purāṇas are viewed by Indian tradition from two standpoints: One is the *upabrāhmaṇa* theory of Manu, *i.e.* they illustrate and amplify the Vedic

[1] The cowherds and milkmaids of Vṛndāvana.

truths. The other is the *pañchalakshaṇa* theory of Amara Siṁha, *i.e.* they deal with the five topics stated above. Colonel Von Kennedy stresses the former aspect and says, "I cannot discover in them any other object than that of religious instruction." Prof. Wilson supports the latter view and says that the five topics specified in Amara Siṁha's definition are important and have little to do with religious instruction. But is there any vital incongruity between the two views? We think not. Manu's view stresses the real essence of the Purāṇas whereas Amara Siṁha's view relates to their external aspects. The description of creation and dissolution is only to affirm and declare the glory of God. The description of the lives of divine incarnations, *ṛishis* and kings is only to inculcate moral principles.

At the same time it seems to us that the attempt to regard the biographical and historical details, whether they be true or false, as mere illustrations, and to say that they are probably imaginary, is not proper or praiseworthy. Rāma and Kṛishṇa are regarded as actual human beings who walked the earth veiling their supreme glory. If they are just like the creations of a poet or dramatist, a mere insubstantial pageant, the faith that attaches value to meditation on them and love towards them would be a delusion and a snare. In modern India there is a new-born mood to empty the stories of their divine elements and to make them mere human chronicles. Such a view is neither true nor just. As C. C. J. Webb says in his *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*: "A religion which involves as part of its essence a sacred history is, in this way, at a higher level than one which, while setting forth certain universal principles, moral or metaphysical, is ready to symbolize them by anything that comes to hand as it were, and is comparatively indifferent to the particular symbol chosen. Thus a religion which, having developed a theology, regards the narratives which are associated with it as mere illustrative stories, ranks below one which regards them as the actual form which the universal principles have taken."

It is thus clear that the Purāṇas are a vital portion of the scriptures of the Hindus. They are primarily an extension, amplification and illustration of the spiritual truths declared in the Vedas. Outsiders may call them legends like the works of fiction current to-day. Some insiders too may regard them as mere illustrative fictions or allegories, or as relating to yogic realities unconnected with the external material world. But the bulk of the Hindus and the main body of traditional opinion

attribute to the Purāṇas a double character, viz. illustrative value and impressive actuality. They have largely moulded public life, belief and conduct in our land for thousands of years, and they must be fully utilized by us if we are to realize the truths of the Vedas. Herein lies their permanent and supreme value to us.

IV

JAINISM AND BUDDHISM

JAINISM

ITS AGE

For a long time scholars were of opinion that Jainism was an offshoot of Hinduism and Buddhism inasmuch as it had a similarity to both. This historical heresy had been accepted as truth till it was finally rejected by careful students of history. It is now a well-known fact that the last of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras, Lord Mahāvīra, was an elder contemporary of Gautama Śākya Muni, Lord Buddha. According to the *Cambridge History of India*, the twenty-third Tīrthaṅkara, Lord Pārśvanātha, was also a historical person. According to the Jaina tradition, he preceded Mahāvīra by 250 years. It is evident, therefore, from this fact that Pārśva preceded the founder of Buddhism by the same period. This is indirectly borne out by the Buddhist literature, according to which Gautama Śākya Muni, in the early part of his ascetic life, himself observed the ascetic practices prescribed for a Jaina *tapasvin*. It is no more necessary, therefore, to refute the false doctrine that Jainism is an offshoot of Buddhism, though the blunder still persists in the minds of very many ill-informed persons. We may make bold to say that Jainism, the religion of *ahiṁsā* (non-injury), is probably as old as the Vedic religion, if not older. In the Ṛig-Vedic *mantras*, we have clear references to Ṛishabha and Arishṭanemi, two of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras, the former being the founder of Jaina *dharma* of the present age. The story of Ṛishabha also occurs in the *Vishṇupurāṇa* and *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, where he figures as an *avatāra* (incarnation) of Nārāyaṇa in an age prior to that of the ten *avatāras* of Vishṇu. The story is exactly identical with the life history of Ṛishabha as given in Jaina sacred literature. In the two Purāṇas referred to above, he is mentioned as *yogeśvara*, as the founder of *yoga* or *tapas*. The description given there of the *mahā-yogin* Ṛishabha exactly corresponds to the yogic discipline prescribed for a Jaina *tapasvin* contained in Jaina literature. It is not necessary to emphasize the fact that throughout Vedic literature consisting of the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upanishads, we find two currents of thought opposed to each other running parallel, sometimes the one becoming dominant, sometimes the other, one enjoining animal sacrifice in the *yajñas* (sacrifices), and the other condemn-

ing it. Hence it is obvious that from the very earliest period of Hindu thought, *ahiṁsā dharma* and its opposite have been struggling for domination.

"*Mā hiṁsyāt sarvabhūtāni*,"[1] the Vedic passage which condemns shedding of blood, occurs side by side with "*Sarvamedhe sarvaṁ hanyāt*."[2] The mythic rivalry of Viśvāmitra and Vasishṭha, and the story of Śunaḥśepa occurring in the Ṛig-Vedic hymns, similarly indicate the existence of and rivalry between two schools of thought, one sanctioning the sacrifice and the other opposing it. It is curious to note that the party which opposed animal sacrifice was led by Kshatriya leaders, whereas the party which defended animal sacrifice was led by the priestly class. When we enter the Brāhmaṇa period, the rivalry between the two schools becomes much more marked probably owing to political dissensions. At this period, the orthodox view of upholding animal sacrifice is associated with the Aryans of the Kuru Pañchāla-country who are dominated by the priests, whereas the party opposed to animal sacrifice is associated with the eastern countries of the Gangetic valley where the society was dominated by the Kshatriyas. The eastern countries referred to in Brāhmaṇa literature comprised Kāśī, Kośala, Videha and Magadha. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* the priests of the Kuru Pañchāla country are advised not to travel in the eastern countries of Kāśī, Kośala, Videha and Magadha for the following reasons:

1. The Aryans in the eastern country have lost their purity. They have given up the Vedic *dharma* of performing *yajña;* not merely this, they have started preaching a new form of *dharma* according to which non-performance of *yajña* and animal sacrifice is the true *dharma*. Hence it is not advisable that the Brāhmaṇas of the Kuru Pañchāla country should risk their orthodoxy and get indirectly insulted by travelling in the eastern countries.

2. The social organizations in the eastern countries are said to be quite different from that prevalent in the Kuru Pañchāla Deśa. In the latter the highest place in the society is occupied by the Brāhmaṇas and the other three castes have acknowledged their inferiority and accepted the leadership of the Brāhmaṇas. But in the eastern countries of Kāśī, Kośala, Videha and Magadha the Kshatriyas occupy the domi-

[1] "Do not kill any creature."
[2] "Kill all kinds of animals in the *sarvamedha* sacrifice."

nating position and the other three classes (including the Brāhmaṇas) are given an inferior status. For this reason also it is said to be inconsistent with the dignity of the Kuru Pañchāla Brāhmaṇas to venture into the eastern countries.

3. There is also another fact mentioned in the *Vājasaneyī-Saṁhitā* where the difference between the two countries is emphasized. The Aryan society in eastern countries not only lost the *dharma* or Vedic sacrifice, not only challenged the social supremacy of the priests, but had also undergone a degeneration even in their language. The Aryans in the eastern countries could not speak pure Sanskrit. They were not able to pronounce the characteristic sounds of the Sanskrit language which was preserved in its pristine purity only by the Kuru Pañchāla Brāhmaṇas. The Aryans of the eastern countries could not pronounce the Sanskrit words correctly. They always spoke a corrupt form of Sanskrit; and the illustration given is that they were not able to pronounce 'R' and that they always substituted 'L' for 'R.' This gives a clue to the language that was prevalent in the eastern countries. It must have been some form of Prākṛit out of which have evolved Pāli and later Prākṛit, the former being the language in which the sacred literature of the Buddhists was composed and the latter being the sacred language of the Jainas.

When we enter the Upanishadic stage the cleavage between the two kinds of *dharma* becomes quite obvious. The characteristic doctrine of Upanishadic literature, *Ātma-vidyā* (Self-realization), with its associated doctrine of *tapas* (self-discipline) becomes openly recognized as the highest *dharma;* whereas the older sacrificial ritualism is assigned a lower status. In this period, the courts of kings figure as centres of culture, and priests from the Kuru Pañchāla country rushed to the courts of the eastern countries eagerly seeking the new doctrine of *Ātma-vidyā.* What was considered in the previous age as *ku-dharma* (or the erroneous *dharma*) is now eagerly sought after by the very accusers coming from the Kuru Pañchāla country. The dominating figure of this period is certainly a Brāhmaṇa of the eastern country, Yājñavalkya, who is heartily despised by the so-called pure Brāhmaṇas of the Kuru Pañchāla country. Yājñavalkya and his patron Janaka throw their weight of influence and scholarship on the side of *Ātma-vidyā,* and thus have indirectly disapproved of the older notion of *dharma* involving animal sacrifice.

Thus the school of *Ātma-vidyā* which had been supporting the doctrine of *ahiṁsā* and hence had been opposed to animal sacrifice must be considered to be the forefathers of the latter-day Jaina thinkers of ancient India. This suggestion is well borne out by facts found in Jaina and Buddhist literature. Gautama Buddha, after completely qualifying himself for Buddhahood by achieving the ten *pāramitās* (moral virtues),[1] was enjoying the pleasures of *svarga* (heaven) as a *deva* (god) before he was born in the world as Śākyamuni. When the *devas* go to him to remind him of his future mission in the world, he examines which would be the fitting country, the fitting society, and the fitting family for the future Buddha to be born. Then he decides that the future Buddha should be born only in the Kshatriya family, thereby placing the Kshatriya family as higher than the Brāhmaṇa family. The country in which he was born was of course Magadha, the very country which was condemned as the land of heretics by the orthodox priests of Kuru Pañchāla. Similar is the attitude found in the Jaina literature. All the Tīrthaṅkaras from Ṛishabha to Mahāvīra were ruling princes of different countries—not one of them was from the Brāhmaṇa class. According to the Śvetāmbara version of the life of Mahāvīra, we have a very interesting fact to note. Mahāvīra was first conceived in the womb of a Brāhmaṇa lady. But Indra, whose duty it was to take care of the future Lord, thought that it would be inconsistent with the dignity of the Lord of the religion to be born of a Brāhmaṇa lady; hence it is said he transferred the fœtus from the womb of the Brāhmaṇa lady to that of the queen mother of the royal household. The story is interesting, inasmuch as it emphasizes the fact that the great founder of the religion of *ahiṁsā* must be born of a Kshatriya family and nowhere else.

From these facts we may safely conclude that the religion of *ahiṁsā* was probably as old as the Vedas themselves. The recent excavations at Harappa and Mohenjo-daro brought to light still more surprising facts. On the seals and coins dug out from these places are found figures resembling the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras; perhaps a closer study of these facts may throw more light as to the religious and social organization of ancient India. According to Jaina tradition itself, the Vedas were at

[1] The *pāramitās*, viz. *dāna* (charity), *śīla* (observance of moral precepts), *kshānti* (forbearance), *vīrya* (energy), *dhyāna* (meditation), *prajñā* (knowledge), etc.—are moral virtues enjoined in the Jātaka and Avadāna literature for the attainment of Buddhahood.

one time based upon the doctrine of *ahiṁsā* and became perverted later on through the personal rivalry between the two teachers at the time of King Vasu. It holds that those people who wanted meat-eating misinterpreted Vedic texts and introduced animal sacrifice as a necessary part of religion; hence the followers of *ahiṁsā dharma* were constrained to reject the perverted Vedas and stick to their own Āgamas resting upon *ahiṁsā dharma*. Curiously this story occurs in the *Mahābhārata* also and the same King Vasu was responsible for the mischievous interpretation introducing animal sacrifice. Mention of this incident made by both the rival parties is a significant fact. It may not be far wrong to conclude that some portions of the Vedas which are not now available were probably based upon the doctrine of *ahiṁsā*, thus supporting the claim of the Jainas that the Vedas were originally religious literature based upon the *ahiṁsā* doctrine. Hence the attitude of the Jainas to religion is just the same as the attitude of the Hindus to the Vedas—that the *ahiṁsā dharma* itself is eternal and it has been periodically revealed to the world for the benefit of mankind by the omniscient being, Sarvajña, at different periods of the world's history.

THE PLACE OF JAINA DARŚANAS AMONG THE INDIAN DARŚANAS

It is the usual practice of Hindu philosophers to classify Darśanas (philosophies) into two groups—Vedic and non-Vedic: those that accept the authority of the Vedas and those that reject the authority of the Vedas. They are otherwise known as Āstika Darśanas and Nāstika Darśanas. Under the former heading it is usual to include Sāṁkhya and Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeshika, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. Under the latter come the Jaina Darśana, Bauddha Darśana and Chārvāka Darśana. It is not necessary to attach any importance to the distinction between Āstika Darśana and Nāstika Darśana. From the foregoing sketch it is obvious why the Jainas had to reject the Vedas and Vedic ritualism. Since there is that fundamental difference between *ahiṁsā dharma* and Vedic ritualism, the followers of the former cannot be expected to accept the ritualism involving animal sacrifice. Hence it is but a truism to say that the Jaina Darśana is outside the Vedic fold. But on this score it is extremely misleading to call it a Nāstika Darśana, which becomes still more misleading when translated into English as 'an atheistic school.' The term atheism in the English vocabulary has a definite and well recognized significance. It is associated with the Semitic conception of a Creator.

One who does not accept such a Creator and His created activity is generally signified by the term atheist. But in the case of Indian Darśanas there is no such implication anywhere. The Sāṁkhya School of philosophy openly rejects the creation theory and ridicules the doctrine of the Creator of the universe. In this respect they are at one with the Jainas.

The Yoga school, which has gained the name of "Seśvara-Sāṁkhya," *i.e.* Sāṁkhya with an Īśvara, as contrasted with the Nirīśvara Sāṁkhya of Kapila, is equally opposed to *srishṭivāda* or the creation theory. The Īśvara in Yoga philosophy serves merely as an ideal to be realized by man. Besides this function, Īśvara in the Yoga system has no resemblance to Jehovah the Creator in the Hebrew religion. In the case of Nyāya and Vaiśeshika systems, writers very often speak of an Īśvara, with the attributes of *srishṭi* and *saṁhāra* (dissolution), though the word *srishṭi* here does not mean the same thing as 'creation' in English. *Srishṭi* here refers only to the building up of the cosmos out of ultimate and eternal elements which are in themselves uncreated—the atoms of the physical world and the *jīvas* of the living world. These are assumed to be uncreated and indestructible, existing for ever, serving as the ultimate constituents out of which the cosmos is built and into which the cosmos dissolves during the time of destruction. Hence even when the terms *srishṭi* and *srishṭikartṛi* are used, they mean something fundamentally different from the English terms, creation and Creator. In the case of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā school we don't find any Creator at all. In this respect they are at one with Nirīśvara Sāṁkhya in rejecting the theory of creation. The ultimate factor in evolution is recognized to be *karma*. Nothing greater than this is recognized by Mīmāṁsā Darśana. Finally, in the Uttara Mīmāṁsa which is otherwise known as the Vedānta, there is no recognition of a creation theory at all. The concrete world is interpreted to be a manifestation of the ultimate Brahman. Hence the world is explained as the result of evolution and not of creation. When we compare these Darśanas with Jaina Darśana we cannot detect any fundamental difference among them. Jaina Darśana is opposed to *srishṭivāda* even as the Sāṁkhya Darśana of Kapila is. But it speaks of a Paramātman or Sarvajña, the Omniscient Being, who serves as an ideal to be aimed at by man. It resembles the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā in emphasizing the potency of *karma* as the basic principle of *saṁsāra* (relative world). It resembles Vedānta in maintaining that every individual *jīva* is potentially a Paramātman. As the commentator Gunaratna of Hari-

bhadra Sūri's *Shaḍdarśana-samuchchaya* maintains, the only significance we can attach to the word *āstika* is a belief in the reality of *ātman*, of *saṁsāra*, and of *moksha* or salvation and in the possibility of *moksha mārga* (a path to salvation). Any Darśana which insists on a belief in these must be called Āstika Darśana and a Darśana which does not emphasize these doctrines must be Nāstika Darśana. According to this interpretation the only Darśana that could be called Nāstika is the Chārvāka Darśana and probably also that school of Buddhism which emphasizes *anātmavāda* (the doctrine that there is no *ātman* or self). Jaina Darśana is no more atheistic than the so-called orthodox Darśanas which accept the authority of the Vedas. But on this score it is not claimed that Jaina Darśana also is a Vedic Darśana, since that would be a contradiction in terms, because Jaina Darśana is rooted in *ahiṁsā*, whereas Vedic ritualism is intrinsically opposed to *ahiṁsā dharma*.

ĀPTA—THE LORD

Thus according to Jainism there is no creation of the world, nor is there any Creator necessary to explain the nature of the world. This is identical with the attitude taken by Śaṅkara when he rejects the doctrine that Īśvara is only the operative cause of the world. He clearly points out that since the concrete world of reality is without a beginning, the question of its origin does not arise at all, and hence it is not necessary to postulate an Īśvara as the operative cause of the world, as *nimitta kāraṇa*. Further he elaborately points out the intrinsic defects of the theory that Īśvara is only the operative cause of the origin of the universe. Hence Jainism is quite at one with Advaitic Vedāntism as far as this doctrine is concerned. According to Jainism, therefore, Paramātman is the highest object of worship. After completely conquering all the *karmas* and destroying all the shackles of saṁsāric consequences, the Self exists in its supreme purity endowed with the qualities of infinite perception, infinite knowledge, infinite bliss, infinite power, and so on. This Paramātman with infinite qualities is the conqueror of *saṁsāra*, is the Jina, and he serves as the ideal to be aimed at by all persons who desire to escape from the cycle of births and deaths characteristic of *saṁsāra*. The attitude of the Jaina devotee is expressed in the following quotation: "Him who is the leader of the path to salvation, who is the dispeller of mountains of *karmas*, and who is the knower of all reality, Him I worship in order that I may realize those very qualities of His."


Such an omniscient being who has conquered *saṁsāra* and has realized the true nature, is called the Siddha Parameshṭhin. He represents the highest Being corresponding to the Paramātman or Parabrahman of the Vedānta school.

Besides this Siddha Parameshṭhin, Jainism recognizes the Arhat Parameshṭhin. This represents a lower stage than the Siddha Parameshṭhin, inasmuch as it is not the final stage in liberation. Nevertheless, in some respects, the stage of Arhat should be considered from the human point of view more important, because it is in this stage of Arhathood that the Tīrthaṅkara reveals for the benefit of the world the path to salvation, and all the various Āgamas or scriptures describing such a path. According to Jaina tradition, the scripture embodying the knowledge of ultimate reality is periodically revealed for the benefit of mankind by the Tīrthaṅkaras or the Arhats. The Tīrthaṅkara occupies a privileged position among mankind. His status exactly corresponds to that of the founders of various other religions or to the conception of the *avataras*. Born with the privilege of becoming the Lord of religion through the adoption of *yoga* practice or *tapas*, after destroying the most powerful of karmic bondages, the Tīrthaṅkara attains omniscience in this world. He becomes entirely free from the wants and desires characteristic of the flesh. Establishing his own self in its purity, uncontaminated by the defects of the body which still clings to him, filled with universal love and mercy for all living beings, worshipped by the Lords of the three worlds, the Tīrthaṅkara spends some time in the world with the object of propounding the *dharma* for the benefit of the *jīvas* that are still entangled in *saṁsāra*. After achieving his own object in life by the realization of his true self-hood and thus becoming endowed with knowledge, power and bliss of infinite magnitude, the Tīrthaṅkara Parameshṭhin tours the country propounding the *dharma* and defining the path of salvation, so that others may also have the benefit of liberation from *saṁsāra*—the cycle of births and deaths. For his benefit, it is said that Indra constructs an elaborate moving audience hall which serves both as a vehicle carrying the Tīrthaṅkara from place to place and an audience hall accommodating the devout *bhaktas* (followers) eager to listen to the truth propounded by him. This is known as the *samavasaraṇa maṇḍapa* in Jaina literature. Whenever this *maṇḍapa* appears in any particular locality carrying the Tīrthaṅkara Paramadeva who is the embodiment of universal love and mercy, there is a reign of universal



A JAINA SHRINE

Courtesy Mr O C Gangoly



RISHAVANATHA

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peace and harmony. Animals instinctively antagonistic to one another exhibit a tendency to peace and goodwill to one another. Such is the result of the very presence of the Lord promoting universal love and mercy to all. Thus the Tīrthaṅkara, since he conquers all the deleterious *karmas*, is able to realize his true nature and becomes a Sarvajña. He is immersed in infinite bliss and is worshipped as Sarveśvara, Sarvahita, Mahādeva, Mahā Vishṇu, Arhadeva and in similar other divine names, one thousand and eight in number.

Such Tīrthaṅkaras appear in the world in different cosmic periods which, according to Jaina philosophy, consist of an age of evolution and growth, followed by an age of dissolution and decay. The former is called *utsarpiṇī* and the latter *avasarpiṇī*, the two constituting the complete cosmic cycle of time. Each of these time-periods is further subdivided into six, and the present world-period represents the period of decay or *avasarpiṇī*, of which the current division is the fifth time-period called *pañchama-kāla*. In the period immediately prior to this, the fourth period of *avasarpiṇī*, appeared all the twenty-four Tīrthaṇkaras of the modern world-period. These are Ṛishabha, Ajita, Sambhava, Abhinandana, Sumati, Padmaprabha, Supārśva, Chandraprabha, Pushpadanta, Śītala, Śreyāṁśa, Vasupūjya, Vimala, Ananta, Dharma, Śānti, Kunthu, Ara, Malli, Munisuvṛita, Nami, Nemi, Pārśva and Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. With Mahāvīra ends the line of the Tīrthaṅkaras as also the fourth period of *avasarpiṇī*. The Tīrthaṅkara is associated with five kinds of festivals known as the *Pañcha-kalyāṇas*, in which worship the *devas* take part. The *Pañcha-kalyāṇas* are (1) *Svargāvataraṇa*, the descent of a *deva* to become a Tīrthaṅkara; (2) *Mandarābhishcka* (otherwise known as *janmābhisheka*), rejoicing at the birth of the Tīrthaṅkara, by performing an *abhisheka* at the summit of Mandara-giri; (3) *Dīkshā-kalyāṅa*, when the Tīrthaṅkara renounces the kingdom and worldly pleasures in order to become a *yogin*; (4) *Kevalotpatti* which represents the appearance of omniscient knowledge as the result of *tapas* and the destruction of *karmas*; and (5) lastly, *Parinirvāṇa-kalyāṇa* representing the complete destruction of all *karmas* and the attainment of salvation or the realization of Paramātma-svarūpa. The paraphernalia provided by Indra in order to celebrate the glory of the Arhat Parameshṭhin consist of such marvellous occurrences as the appearance of an *aśoka* tree to provide shade, the rain of divine flowers, the sounding of divine music, the fanning with *chāmara*, the provision of a *siṁhāsana* (throne), the

creation of a halo of light surrounding his divine body, and the creation of a triple umbrella, representing his suzerainty over all the three worlds. These are the privileges of a Tīrthaṅkara and the *devas* vie with one another to offer him worship.

Besides these two types of Āptas, the Lords of religion, Jainism recognizes three other kinds of Parameshṭhins who also deserve reverence and worship from the devotees. And these are the Āchārya Parameshṭhin, Upādhyāya Parameshṭhin and Sādhu Parameshṭhin. These three do not represent the stage of complete liberation from *saṁsāra* but nevertheless represent important stages towards that goal. The first of the three classes are Āchārya Parameshṭhins who are endowed with important qualities and have to discharge equally important duties. An Āchārya must be free from all attachment to external things, must show general sympathy and love to all living beings, must be actuated by "the three jewels," *i.e.* right belief, right knowledge and right conduct, must be entirely free from the baser emotions such as anger and ambition, must illustrate by his conduct the significance of the five great *vratas* (vows), must be able to exercise the authority of initiating into the Jina *dharma* all those that seek to be admitted, must possess undoubted knowledge as to the nature of reality, must not be actuated by the desire of self-aggrandizement or self-praise, and must whole-heartedly devote himself to the propagation of *dharma*. Such a great *ṛishi* who whole-heartedly devotes himself to instruct mankind as to the nature of the path to salvation is called Āchārya Parameshṭhin. Next in rank to this comes the Upādhyāya Parameshṭhin. His duties are much more modest. He has no authority to initiate people into the Jina *dharma* or to organize the Jaina *saṅgha* (organization). His whole function is to popularize the Jina *dharma*, in order to help the several souls entangled in *saṁsāra* to reach the safe haven beyond. He educates and instructs. The third class consists of Sādhu Parameshṭhins, *i.e.* all those great souls who do not have any definite function either of authority or of instruction but still illustrate through their conduct the great path to salvation, so that others, following their example, may accept the *dharma* and adopt the path of self-discipline and self-realization.

All these five constitute the Pañcha Parameshṭhins—the five kinds of beings worshipped by the Jainas as representing the ideal in life at different stages of realization.

MOKSHA MARGA

The most important message of Jainism is *moksha mārga*. It is otherwise known as *ratnatraya*, the three jewels of right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. These three must be present together to constitute the path to salvation. Since all the three are emphasized equally, and since the *moksha mārga* is impossible without the compresence of all the three, it is obvious that Jainism is not prepared to admit any one of these three in isolation as a means of salvation. There are religious schools which lay all the emphasis on *bhakti* or faith, on *jñāna* or knowledge, on *karma* or moral conduct. The Bhāgavatas mostly emphasize the *bhakti* aspect. Provided that is granted, one is sure of reaching salvation. The Vedāntins, especially Advaita Vedāntins, emphasize the *jñāna* aspect. Provided *avidyā* or ignorance is dispelled, *moksha* or salvation is within your reach. The Pūrva Mīmāṁsā school may be said to emphasize *karma* or conduct. But according to Jainism no such one-sided emphasis can be accepted as the correct path. All the three must co-exist in a person, if he is to walk the path of salvation. The Jaina commentators make the meaning quite clear, by bringing in the analogy of medicine as a curative of some malady. A patient before accepting the medicine prescribed for him by a doctor must have complete faith in the doctor, and must believe in the efficacy of the medicine. Mere belief of this type is not enough: he must be in a position to have accurate information as to the nature of the medicine, how it is to be used and how it will gradually work as a curative principle before he is rid of his sickness. Mere faith in its efficacy and knowledge of its use will not be enough to bring about a cure in him unless he carries them out in practice by taking the doses as prescribed by the doctor, and by observing the dietary rules consistent with the taking of the medicine. Faith in its efficacy, knowledge of its use and actual taking of the medicine—all these three must be present if a cure is to be effected. Any one of these, though valuable in itself, will not be enough to bring about a cure. In the same way the universal malady of saṁsāric (worldly) misery which every soul is suffering from can be cured by this triple panacea—the *ratnatraya*, when accepted as a mixture of the three principles of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. If any one element is missing, the other two would be useless. Hence the emphasis is laid by the Jaina thinkers on the *ratnatraya* which constitute the *moksha mārga*.

This *moksha mārga* is revealed by the Tīrthaṅkara or Arhat Parameshṭhin for the benefit of suffering mankind.

THE ĀGAMAS

The Āgamas or the scriptures are revealed by the Sarvajña or the omniscient being. The Jaina scripture should not be in conflict with the well-known *pramāṇas*, the criteria of correct knowledge. It must be capable of leading men towards higher goals, to *svarga* and *moksha*. It must give correct information as to the nature of reality. It must describe the *purushārthas* (ends of human life) of *dharma* (religious merit), *artha* (wealth), *kāma* (enjoyment) and *moksha*. The scripture with such characteristics and revealed by the Sarvajña has been handed down from generation to generation by a succession of teachers called Gaṇadharas, beginning with Sudharma, the chief disciple of the Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra Vardhamāna. It is known by the following appellations: the Siddhānta, Paramāgama, Kṛitānta, Veda, Śruti, Śāstra, etc. The scripture[1] of the Jainas is grouped under three classes of Aṅga, Pūrva and Prakīrṇa. Of these the first is of twelve different sub-classes: *Āchāra, Sūtrakṛita, Sthāna, Samavāya, Vyākhyāprajñapti, Jñātṛidharmakathā, Upāsaka-daśāka, Antakṛiddaśāka, Anuttaropādhika-daśāka, Praśna-vyākaraṇa, Vipāka-sūtra* and *Dṛishṭivāda*.[2]

The second group, *i.e.* Pūrvāgama, consists of fourteen sub-classes: *Utpāda, Agrāyaṇīya, Vīrya-pravāda, Asti-nāsti-pravāda, Jñāna-pravāda,*

[1] In the matter of the religious scripture there is some difference of opinion between the two sects of the Jainas—Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras. About the time of the Maurya Emperor Chandragupta, on account of a terrible famine in Northern India a large body of Jaina ascetics under the leadership of Bhadrabāhu with his royal disciple Chandragupta who renounced his kingdom, migrated to the South for the purpose of obtaining support and sustenance during the period of the famine But a large section of the Jaina ascetics stayed behind in Hindustan. When the body of the ascetics who migrated to the South returned home to the North after the famine conditions had been over, they found that their brethren who stayed at home had changed their habits very much. On account of this change of habits there arose a cleavage between the two sections, which is supposed to be the origin of a schism within the community resulting in the two sections, the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras—the former school associated with those that stayed at home and the latter championed by those who migrated towards the South. The books preserved by the Northern group were not accepted as authoritative by the Digambaras who maintained that the original texts revealed by the Tīrthaṅkara Parameshṭhin and preserved by the succession of teachers were lost completely and what the Śvetāmbaras claimed as the authoritative texts was a spurious substitute for the lost originals. This controversy still persists between these two groups. Of course this contention of the Digambaras is not accepted by the Śvetāmbaras who claim that their texts are quite valid inasmuch as they represent the originals.

[2] About the time of the Conference at Pāṭaliputra, after the twelve years' famine, *Dṛishṭivāda* was lost and the Śvetāmbaras therefore recognized only eleven. But the Digambara tradition which is followed in Southern India recognizes all the twelve.

Satya-pravāda, Ātma-pravāda, Karma-pravāda, Pratyākhyāna, Vidyānuvāda, Kalyāṇa, Prāṇavāya, Kriyā-viśāla and *Loka-bindu-sāra.*

The third group, *i.e.* Prakīrṇa, consists of sixteen divisions: *Sāmāyika; Chaturviṁśati-stava, Vandanā, Pratikramaṇa, Vainayika, Kṛiti-karma, . Daśa-vaikālika, Anuttarādhyayana, Kalpya-vyavahāra, Kalpyākalpya, Mahākalpya, Puṇḍarīka, Mahāpuṇḍarīka, Padma, Mahāpadma, Chinyaśītikā.* Besides the foregoing classification of Āgamas there is another classification which is much more popular and which is generally accepted as authoritative. According to this the Parāgamas are of four kinds: *Prathamānuyoga, Charaṇānuyoga, Kāraṇānuyoga* and *Dravyānuyoga.* Of these the first, *Prathamānuyoga,* contains the biographies of the Tīrthaṅkaras, the emperors and other great historical personages relating to India. Such a life-history of the great personages is represented by the *Mahāpurāṇa.* The second, *Charaṇānuyoga,* deals with the course of conduct prescribed for the householder as well as the homeless ascetic. The third, *Kāraṇānuyoga,* treats of the cosmos and the constituent elements which build up the cosmos. The fourth, *Dravyānuyoga,* is a metaphysical treatise describing the nature of life, matter and other primary categories of reality.

JAINA METAPHYSICS

Jaina metaphysics forms the really important portion of Jaina sacred literature. The Reality according to Jaina philosophy is uncreated and eternal. According to the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra,* "*Utpāda-vyaya-dravya-yuktam sat:*" Reality is that which is characterized by appearance and disappearance in the midst of permanence. This is the peculiar doctrine as to the nature of reality found in Jaina metaphysics and the only parallel to this in Western thought is the Hegelian doctrine of the dialectical nature of reality—thesis and antithesis reconciled and held together by synthesis. Every object of reality embodies in itself an affirmative and a negative aspect synthesized and held together by its own complex nature, quite analogous to the biological principle of metabolism comprehending and reconciling in itself the two opposite processes of katabolism and anabolism. Such is the complex nature of reality according to Jaina metaphysics. It maintains its identity and permanency only through the continued process of changes consisting of origin and decay—identity in the midst of variety, and permanency through change. Neither the permanency nor the process of change can

be separated from each other. Each is indispensable to the other and hence cannot be separated in reality, though one may be differentiated from the other in thought and speech. From this triple nature of reality arise various other philosophical doctrines associated with Jaina metaphysics.

Such ultimate reals are five in number according to Jaina metaphysics. These constitute the primary elements which go to build up the cosmos. They are *jīva, pudgala, dharma, adharma* and *ākāśa*. These primary constituent elements of the cosmos are technically called *pañchāstikāya*, the five *astikāyas*. The term *astikāya* is a technical term of Jaina metaphysics. The first part *asti* implies existence. The second part *kāya* implies volume. *Astikāya*, therefore, means a category which is capable of having spatial relations. Here spatial relation should be differentiated from volume associated with matter. Materiality or corporeality is a property which is peculiar to *pudgala* or matter. Of these five *astikāyas*, *pudgala* alone is *mūrta* (corporeal), the others are *amūrta* (non-corporeal), though they are *astikāyas* or existences having spatial relations. Of these the first, *jīva astikāya*, relates to souls or *ātmans*. It is the only *chetana* category, the other four being *achetanas*. This *chetana* (conscious) entity, *jīva*, is entirely different from *pudgala* or matter which represents the inorganic world. If Time is added to these five *astikāyas*, then we have the six *dravyas* (substances) of Jaina metaphysics. The Time category is different in nature from the five *astikāyas* since it is a unilateral series, whereas the *astikāyas* are capable of being associated with multiple spatial points or *pradeśas*. Anything that is capable of having simultaneous relations to multiple spatial points or *pradeśas* would come under *astikāya*, whereas time can have only unilateral relation of moments and hence cannot have simultaneous relations to a group of multiple points. It corresponds to unilateral series in mathematics and hence it is excluded from the class of *astikāyas*. In Jaina metaphysics, nevertheless, it is included under the six *dravyas*, each *dravya* having the dialectical nature referred to above.

The description of *jīva dravya* as a *chetana* entity is exactly similar to the description of *ātman* in Upanishadic literature. Since its nature is *chetana*, or *chitsvarūpa*, it has the essential characteristics of perception and knowledge. In itself it is incapable of being measured by material units or space units. In the concrete world it is always found associated with a body as an organized being. As an embodied *jīva* it has all the

characteristics of a living being associated with a body and other sense organs. In this concrete world so organized and associated with the body *jīvas* are of four main groups according to the four *gatis* (destinations): *Devas* or divine beings, *naras* or human beings, *nārakas* or beings relating to hell, and *tiryaks* or the lower animals and the plant world. These four beings constitute *saṁsāra* which is the result of karmic bondage according to which a particular *jīva* will be born in any one of the *gatis*. *Moksha* or salvation consists in escaping from the saṁsāric cycle of births and deaths in any one of these four *gatis* and reaching that safe haven beyond the ocean of *saṁsāra* where there is a complete conquest of birth and death. The *jīva* that reaches this stage beyond *saṁsāra* is the pure *jīva* or *ātman*, otherwise known as *siddha-jīva*, which attains its goal and realizes its true nature. As long as a *jīva* is in *saṁsāra*, he is bound by karmic shackles which lead to the building up of a body for himself; and in this stage, on account of his imprisonment in the tabernacle of the body, his purity of self and strength of knowledge have no chance of complete manifestation. Hence his knowledge is limited and his nature deformed according as it is bound by various *karmas*. Since there is no scope for his pure nature to manifest itself, he mainly depends upon the sense organs as to instruction and acquiring knowledge, and his life is mainly determined by his environment consisting of objects presented to the senses. Naturally he is attracted by the pleasures derived from the sense objects and repulsed by contrary feelings. Till the proper time comes when he is able to realize his heritage of nobility and purity, he gets immersed in these sense pleasures which only help the *jīva* move from one birth to another birth, from one *gati* to another *gati*, in an unending series of births and deaths.

The *jīva* as an active agent figures as the operative cause of his own *karmas* and in turn enjoys the fruits of such *karmas*. Hence according to Jaina metaphysics he is a knower, an actor and an enjoyer. He has knowledge of objects, he acts either to possess them or avoid them and as a result of his action is able to enjoy the fruits thereof. Thus he is endowed with the triple nature of consciousness—conation, cognition and emotion. In this respect the Jaina conception of *jīvātman* is wholly different from the other views. For example, the Sāṁkhya conception of Purusha makes him the knower and the enjoyer but not the actor. The Sāṁkhya Purusha is distinctly inactive. His activities are entirely secondary and derived, inasmuch as he is associated with Prakṛiti, of

which his own body is a modification. It is this relationship that is explained metaphorically by the Sāṁkhya school through the story of the lame man on the back of the blind—the Purusha guiding the path while being carried by the blind Prakṛiti. Jaina metaphysics rejects this view and makes the *ātman* active in himself and what he enjoys as *bhoktṛi* is merely the fruit of his own action which he performs as *kartṛi*. Hence the Sāṁkhya doctrine that Purusha is *akartṛi* is rejected by Jaina metaphysics.

Dravya is that which manifests itself through its own *guṇas* and *paryāyas*—qualities and modifications. *Dravya* is a dynamic category which implies a process as already explained. This process expresses itself in the form of qualities as well as modifications. The usual illustration given is gold with its qualities of yellowness, brilliance, malleability, etc. Its *paryāyas* or modifications are the various ornaments that can be made of it. One ornament may be destroyed and out of the gold another ornament may be made. The disappearance of one *paryāya* or mode and the appearance of another while the substance remains permanent and constant, are the characteristics of every *dravya*. *Utpāda* and *vyaya*, appearance and disappearance, always refer to the changing modifications while permanence always refers to the underlying substance. From the aspect of *paryāya* it is subject to birth and decay. From the aspect of *dravya* it is permanent. Therefore permanence and change in reality refer to two different aspects—change from the aspect of modifications and permanence from the aspect of the underlying substance. When one mode disappears and another mode appears there is certainly no change in the underlying substance.

In the illustrations given above gold remains the same. Similar is the relation between gold and its qualities. Jaina metaphysics does not recognize *guṇas* without *dravyas* nor *dravyas* without *guṇas*. Qualities without a substratum and a substratum without qualities are both empty abstractions and hence unreal. The qualities of gold are entirely distinct from the qualities of any other baser metal. Hence the qualities are identical with the underlying substance, because the qualities constitute the expression of the substance. Since gold is distinct in nature from iron or lead the properties are also distinct. The qualities of one cannot be transformed into the qualities of the other. Thus substance and qualities are identical inasmuch as the latter exhibit the nature of the former. In spite of this identity between *dravya* and *guṇa*, they are

distinct from each other. If there is no fundamental difference between substance and quality, *dravya* and *guṇa*, there will be no means of apprehending the nature of *dravya* except through its manifestation. Hence the two must be kept separate in thought, though they cannot be separated in reality. *Dravya* and *guṇa*, substance and quality, may be said to be different from each other from one point of view and yet identical from another point of view. It is both *bheda* and *abheda*, different and yet identical. This *bheda-abheda* point of view is again peculiar to Jaina metaphysics.

In this respect it is fundamentally distinct from the Vaiśeshika point of view. According to the Vaiśeshika school *dravya* is a distinct *padārtha* from *guṇa* and the two are brought together by a third principle called *samavāya*. *Jīva* is a distinct *dravya* and its properties or *guṇas* are considered to be quite distinct. Knowledge, feeling and conation, as properties of *jīva*, exist independently of the soul but are brought together by the intervention of a third *padārtha*, *samavāya*, whose function it is to cement together the substance and its qualities. As has already been pointed out, Jaina metaphysics completely rejects this view. *Jñāna* and other properties of the *jīva* or soul are inseparable from the nature of the soul and hence the presence of properties in the *ātman* is not the result of a combination effected by a third principle. The qualities of the *ātman* are there and the nature of the *ātman* expresses itself only through the properties. If knowledge, feeling and conation, the properties of the soul, were considered to be existing independently of the *ātman*, then the soul without these properties will cease to be a conscious principle, a *chetana dravya*, and hence will be indistinguishable from the *achetana dravya* (matter). The distinction between *chetana* and *achetana* among the reals will cease to have any meaning; similarly, properties such as *jñāna* and *sukha* or *duḥkha* (pleasure or pain), since they do not have any relation to a *chetana dravya*, will cease to be the properties of the *chetana* entity and their association with the *dravya* effected by a third principle, may be with matter, an *achetana dravya*, and not necessarily with a *jīva*. Thus the absolute independence of *guṇa* and *guṇin*, property and substratum, is rejected by Jaina metaphysics as an impossible doctrine. Hence *jīva* is essentially of the nature of *jñāna*, which should not be interpreted as a quality made peculiar to *jīva* by the operation of a third principle. Thus *jīva* which is by nature a conscious or *chetana*

principle is fundamentally different from material substance; and yet in concrete life it is intimately in association with a body.

Throughout the living kingdom in the botanical and zoological world life is found in association with matter. This association of *jīva* with body, its *śarīra*, is an important characteristic of the concrete living world. *Jīva* in association with its body is quite different from *jīva* in its pure state. The latter is called the pure Ātman and the former *saṁsāra jīva*. This *saṁsāra jīva* in association with its appropriate body is said to be of different grades of existence. Of course *jīvas* in the four different *gatis* are all considered to be *saṁsāra jīvas*. In addition to this distinction of *gatis*, *jīvas* in the biological kingdom are classified according to their development; Jaina philosophy divides the *jīvas* in the world according to the principle of the development of the sense organs. The lowest class of *jīvas* consists of *ekendriya jīvas*, or *jīvas* having only one sense organ. Next higher to this are *dvīndriya jīvas*, or *jīvas* having two sense organs. Then higher above we have *jīvas* with three *indriyas*. Then there are *jīvas* of four *indriyas*, then *pañchendriya jīvas* or *jīvas* of five sense organs, and lastly, *samanaska*, *i.e.* *pañchendriya jīvas* with *manas* (mind). The first class refers to the vegetable kingdom which is considered to be a part of the living world, according to Jaina philosophy. Trees and plants have all the properties of living organisms such as assimilation, growth and decay and reproduction. They are endowed with only one sense organ--the awareness of touch. In addition to the recognition of the botanical world as a part of the biological world the Jaina philosophy speaks of *sūkshma ekendriya jīvas*, minute and microscopic organisms endowed with only one sense—the sense of touch. These generally reside in other bodies. Some of them are found in solid objects like the earth, others are born in water, some others live in air, and some others in light. According to their place of residence these *jīvas* are called *prithvī-kāyika*, *ap-kāyika*, *vāyu-kāyika* and *tejas-kāyikas*—those that reside in earth, in water, in air and light respectively. This doctrine of *sūkshma ekendriya jīvas* with their respective places of residence is entirely misunderstood by Oriental scholars who go to the extent of attributing to Jaina philosophy a primitive doctrine of animism that earth, water, air, etc., have their own souls. This confusion is unfortunately the result of a lack of understanding of the fundamentals of Jaina metaphysics.

Worms represent the second class of organisms with two senses —touch and taste. Ants represent the third class with touch, taste and smell. Bees represent the fourth class with sight in addition to the three. Higher animals represent the fifth class having in addition the sense of hearing. Of course man represents the highest of these classes, having mind in addition to the five senses.

The *dravyas* which belong to the non-living class, the *ajīva dravyas*, are *pudgala, dharma, adharma, ākāśa* and *kāla*—matter, the principle of motion, the principle of rest, space and time. All these are *achetana* (insentient) *dravyas*. *Pudgala* or matter is *mūrta dravya*, the corporeal category which can be perceived by the senses. It is associated with sense properties such as colour, taste and smell. These consist of ultimate entities called atoms or *paramāṇus*. By the combination of these atoms aggregates are formed which are called *skandha*. Thus the term *skandha* in Jaina metaphysics means quite a different thing from the Buddhistic *skandha*. These aggregates may range from the smallest molecule of two atoms to the most important aggregate or *mahā-skandha* represented by the whole physical universe. Thus the constitution of the physical universe is entirely dependent upon the ultimate constituent elements or the *paramāṇus*. The *pañcha-bhūtas* (five elements) of other systems are but examples of these aggregates of atoms. The *paramāṇu* or the ultimate atom cannot be perceived by the ordinary senses. So also the minute aggregates or the *skandhas*. The peculiar doctrine of the Jaina metaphysics is the doctrine of karmic matter, *karma-prayoga pudgala* (*karma-śarīra*)—subtle material aggregates which form the basis for the building up of the subtle body which is associated with every *jīva* till the time of its liberation or *moksha*. The gross organic body which is born of the parents, nourished by food, and subject to disease, decay and death, is the ordinary body known as *aūdarika śarīra*—the body which is given birth to and is cast away by its associated *jīva* at the time of death. But the *karma-śarīra* the *jīva* cannot so cast away during its existence in *saṁsāra*. This subtle karmic body is inevitably associated with every *saṁsāra jīva* throughout its career in the cycle of births and deaths. In fact it is this karmic body that is responsible for the saṁsāric changes of *ātman* which is in itself a pure *chetana dravya*. Its intrinsic purity is thus lost or diminished, because of its association with this karmic body constituted by the subtle material aggregates or *karma pudgalas*. The building up of this karmic body around the soul

is conditioned by the psychic activities of the soul itself. The conscious activities such as desires and emotions, according as they are healthy or unhealthy, act as causal conditions for the building up of the karmic body which becomes the vehicle for good or evil according to the nature of the psychic conditions which determine them and in its turn affects the nature of the psychic experience. Thus the interdependence between *jīva* and the karmic body acting as cause and effect, each in its turn, continues to keep up the show of the saṁsāric drama. But this should not be interpreted as fatalism, because the *jīva* has in its unfathomable being a mighty potency transcending the limitations imposed upon it by its association with its karmic body. Thus each person has the power and possibility of becoming an architect of his own destiny.

Jīva and *pudgala* thus constitute the main *dravyas*. All activities in the world must be ultimately traceable to these two entities, *jīva* and *pudgala*, soul and mater. Hence they are called active principles, *sakriya-dravyas*—*dravyas* which are capable of acting. The other *dravyas*—*dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla* are therefore called *nishkriya-dravyas*—*dravyas* without intrinsic activities. Of these *ākāśa* refers to space. Its only function is to accommodate the other *dravyas*. Thus space, according to Jaina metaphysics, is infinite in extent. That portion of *ākāśa* which accommodates the concrete world with its *saṁsāra jīvas* and *pudgala* is called *loka-ākāśa* space accommodating the world. The space beyond, where there is neither matter nor soul, is called *aloka-ākāśa*—the space beyond the world. Thus according to Jaina conception the physical universe is supposed to have a definite structure within which are accommodated all the *jīvas* and all the *pudgala skandhas* and *paramāṇus*. *Dharma* and *adharma*, the principle of motion and the principle of rest, are two categories peculiar to Jaina metaphysics which are not found in any other Indian system. These are *achetana dravyas;* hence they differ from *jīva*. They are *amūrtas* and hence differ from *pudgala* or matter. They are *nishkriyas*, without intrinsic activity, and hence differ from both *jīva* and *pudgala*, the only two *dravyas* which have activities. They resemble the other *dravyas* except *kāla* inasmuch as these are called *astikāyas*—existences having the capacity to be related to several spatial points simultaneously, what is technically called *pradeśatva*. The two pervade the whole of *loka-ākāśa*. They do not extend beyond it. Subtle and imperceptible in themselves, they are endowed with important properties of serving as conditions for motion or rest. Move-

ment in the world is associated with either a *jīva* or a *pudgala*. Motion in a moving object, whether living or non-living, is the result of appropriate causal conditions residing in the thing itself—*jīva* or *pudgala;* these being *sakriya dravyas* are capable of moving by themselves or as the result of appropriate causal conditions, which must also be material or living. The movement in these things is necessarily conditioned by the presence of this *dharma dravya* which pervades the whole of the world. Remaining in itself non-operative, this *dharma dravya* serves as a condition for making movement possible; and the illustration generally given is the presence of water for the movement of fish. When a fish swims the movement is due to an operative cause present in itself. Nevertheless swimming would be impossible without the presence of water. Water in the ocean is not an operative cause of the movement. Nevertheless it is a necessary condition. Similarly, while life and matter are both capable of moving of their own accord determined by appropriate operative causal conditions, their movement is certainly dependent upon the presence of this non-operative principle called *dharma.*

Similarly, when a moving object comes to rest it is necessary to have the presence of an opposite principle. Such a principle determining rest, *i.e.* coming to a standstill in the case of a moving object (whether living or non-living) is *adharma dravya.* This also is a non-operative condition of rest. A moving object coming to rest is certainly the result of an operative condition present in itself. A bird must cease to beat its wings so that its flight may come to a stop. But the stopping of activity requires a further condition. A bird ceasing to fly must perch on the branch of a tree or on the ground. Just as the branch of a tree or the ground serves as a non-operative condition of rest, the presence of the *adharma* principle serves as a condition for moving objects to come to rest.

Why should we postulate these two principles of *dharma* and *adharma?* Is it not enough to have the rest of the categories? Jaina metaphysics answers this objection and postulates the necessity of these two principles by stating that without these two there would be no definite structure of the world. The cosmos will disintegrate into primordial atoms which may spread throughout the whole of infinite space. Hence there will be no distinction between *loka* and *aloka,* the world and the beyond. There will be no permanent constitution of the world. Without constancy in the structure of the world there will be nothing left

but chaos. Hence what sustains the world as world and what prevents the disintegration of the world into a chaos is the presence of these two principles, *dharma* and *adharma*. Hence we have to postulate these two categories in order to explain the nature and constitution of the cosmos.

The last *dravya* is *kāla* or time. Jaina metaphysics postulates time as a necessary category of existence. Without postulating time it is not possible to understand growth and evolution. The whole world consisting of matter as well as soul is in a process of change, either evolution or involution. Changes involving growth and decay constitute the very nature of the concrete world. The process of change without time would be unintelligible and must be dismissed as illusory. Since the concrete world cannot be dismissed as illusory according to Jaina metaphysics, time must be postulated as a necessary condition of change. This time serves as the condition of change in other things and is called *kāla dravya* or the category of time. This real time is contrasted with *vyāvahārika* time based upon conventions. *Kāla dravya* or real time consists of moments or *kāla paramāṇus* which constitute a time series having only the relation of before and after. There can be no simultaneous moments in the time series. The conventional time is the time which we use in our social life, the durations being measured by the movements of the sun and moon. This is of different durations according to different measures and ranges from the shortest *nimisha* to the longest *yuga*. These are the six *dravyas* according to Jaina metaphysics, which may be grouped under two heads, *jīva dravya* and *ajīva dravya*, the latter containing all the other five in it.

We have noticed already that the *jīva* throughout the saṁsāric life is associated with a karmic body which forms the nucleus around which the grosser bodies are built up. According to this conception the building up of the karmic body forms the foundation for life in *saṁsāra* and the disintegration of the karmic body constitutes the final liberation of *jīva*. The process of building up of the karmic body and the plan of breaking up of the same are considered to be important aspects of metaphysical truth. *Jīva* and *ajīva* being the primary entities, how are they brought together to build up the body appropriate to each *jīva*? In answering this question Jaina metaphysics describes the process in the following way: *Āsrava*, which term means "flowing in," represents the process by which karmic molecules are attracted by a *jīva* according to the characteristic psychic experience. This process of *āsrava* or the

flowing in of karmic molecules is the main basis of the building up of the karmic body which like the cocoon of a silkworm surrounds the *jīva* and acts as an impediment against the free manifestation of the intrinsic qualities of the *jīva*. When once there is the process of flowing in or *āsrava* of karmic matter, the next stage is *bandha*, when the karmic matter gets settled, or fixed up, in the karmic body. This *karma*-bondage is of various intensity and duration. So long as the *jīva* is not alive to his own intrinsic properties and so long as he identifies himself with objects alien to himself, the building up of the karmic cocoon goes on interminably. But when the *jīva* realizes his nature as distinct from the material world, he endeavours to extricate himself from the trammels of the saṁsāric world whose root cause is the karmic body. The first step in extricating oneself from the shackles is called *saṁvara*, putting a stop to the inflow of karmic matter, and thus obstructing the stream of karmic molecules which may get absorbed in the karmic body. This process of *saṁvara* or blocking up the inflow is conditioned by the appropriate mental attitude characterized by freedom from the attractions of sense objects and concentration upon one's own nature. In other words, yogic meditation or *tapas* is the inevitable condition for preventing the flowing in of karmic matter and for preventing fresh assimilation by the karmic body. When once this is achieved then the *yogin* turns his attention to the karmic deposits already present in his karmic body. By concentrated attention and by endeavour to realize one's own true nature by *tapas*, the already deposited karmic matter is loosened and finally shaken away. This process by which the karmic body gradually gets disintegrated by the attack on its intensity and duration is technically called the process of *nirjara*. When the karmic body has already lost the chance of being strengthened by new karmic matter by *saṁvara*, and when the old karmic matter already present thus crumbles and disintegrates, the karmic body which is like the cocoon of the silkworm gradually gets diminished in its intensity and duration till it finally disappears. Side by side with the decay of the karmic body the intrinsic qualities of the *ātman* get expressed more and more. And when the karmic body finally disintegrates and disappears, the *ātman* shines in full luminosity, in infinite greatness and infinite glory, which state represents final liberation or *moksha*. Then the saṁsāric *jīva* by the process of destroying all the *karmas* becomes Paramātman, the pure soul with infinite knowledge, power and bliss. These stages

represent critical periods in the life-history of the soul. Technically, according to Jaina metaphysics, these together with the primary entities, *jīvas* and *ajīvas*, constitute the seven *tattvas* (principles): *Jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, saṁvara, nirjara* and *moksha*. If we add the two mental attainments, *puṇya* and *pāpa*, virtue and vice, to these, we get the nine *padārthas* (categories). Thus we have in Jaina metaphysics the five *astikāyas*, the six *dravyas* when time is added on to *astikāyas*, the seven *tattvas* and the nine *padārthas*—according to the point of view adopted and the purpose for which the categories are enumerated. Forgetting this principle, very often non-Jaina critics get confused and attack Jaina metaphysics for the alleged inconsistency in enumerating the *tattvas*. The critics say that "the Jainas sometimes speak of two *tattvas* *jīva* and *ajīva*, sometimes of five *astikāyas* and six *dravyas*, and sometimes of seven *tattvas* and nine *padārthas*. Thus they are not sure about their own metaphysical doctrine." Such a criticism becomes pointless when we attend to the purpose of classification.

JAINA LOGIC AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

We have already seen that, according to Jaina metaphysics, *jñāna* is an intrinsic property of the *ātman*. And hence the process of knowing must be interpreted to be the process of the manifestation by the *jīva* of its intrinsic nature. We have already noticed that this intrinsic nature, so long as the *jīva* is in *saṁsāra*, gets shrouded by the karmic body which interferes with the free manifestation of the soul. The theory of knowledge is therefore based upon this metaphysical postulate that *jñāna* is an intrinsic property of the *ātman* and that it gets clouded in the state of *saṁsāra* through the impediment of the karmic body. *Jñāna* or the process of knowledge is therefore of different kinds according to the stages of the spiritual development of the soul.

According to the Jaina theory, there are five different types of knowledge, viz. *mati, śruti, avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya, kevala jñāna*—ordinary sense experience, knowledge from the scripture, a kind of clairvoyance, a kind of telepathy, and the infinite knowledge, respectively. The first or *mati jñāna* refers to the ordinary process of sense experience which is generally conditioned by perception through the activities of the sense organs and the inferential knowledge based upon these. The second type, *śruti jñāna*, is the knowledge revealed by the scripture, the scripture itself being revealed to the world by Sarvajña Vītarāga Para-

meshṭhin. The third type is called *avadhi jñāna*. From the description given of it, it corresponds to what is known as clairvoyance. It implies the perception of things and events at a great distance of time or space. It is a kind of extra-sensory perception, not ordinarily available to all persons though it is latent in everyone. Through the instrument of extra-sensory perception one may actually see events taking place in a distant land or a distant time. The fourth type is *manaḥ-paryāya jñāna*. This refers to the knowledge of the thoughts taking place in other individual minds. It is different from the former, inasmuch as it does not resemble ordinary visual perception. It has direct access to the mind of other persons and this capacity arises only as a result of *yoga* or *tapas*. The last, *kevala jñāna*, refers to the infinite knowledge which the soul attains as the result of complete liberation or *moksha*. These are the five kinds of *jñāna* which constitute the *pramāṇas* (instruments of knowledge), according to the Jaina theory of knowledge. Of these, the first two are described as *paroksha jñāna*—knowledge conditioned by alien instruments. The other three are called *pratyaksha jñāna* (direct knowledge), because they are due to the direct perception of the soul without any intervening medium. This use of the word *pratyaksha* is peculiar to the Jaina theory of knowledge. The term *aksha* means the *ātman* or soul, and *pratyaksha jñāna* is the direct knowledge by the *ātman*. Since *mati jñāna* and *śruti jñāna* do not form such direct perception by the soul, they are called *paroksha*, because they depend upon the intervening medium of the sense organs. This use corresponds to the yogic *pratyaksha* of other systems.

The acquisition of knowledge therefore depends upon these *pramāṇas* whose function it is to reveal the nature of objects in reality. The external world revealed through these *pramāṇas* consists of real objects and hence should not be dismissed as illusory. In this respect the Jaina theory of knowledge rejects the theory of *māyā* of Advaitism as well as the Buddhistic doctrine of illusoriness of the objective world. The function of *jñāna* is merely to reveal, on the one hand, the objective reality which is already existing, and also to reveal itself on the other hand. Knowledge, therefore, is like a lamp which on account of its luminosity reveals other objects as well as itself, the objects so revealed being real. The external objects so known are independent, inasmuch as they exist by themselves and yet are related to knowledge as they are revealed by knowledge. Similarly, in the case of the soul, it is both the subject and

the object of knowledge in one; this inner experience is able to reveal the nature of *chetana* entity—the soul.

The logical doctrine of Jaina philosophy forms the most important aspect of that school, but unfortunately it is the doctrine most misunderstood by the non-Jaina critics. The fundamental principle of this logical doctrine implies the possibility of a positive and negative predication about the same thing. How this is possible is the perplexing question which confronts the critic, who at once concludes from the apparent contradictoriness that it is absurd. The doctrine is generally referred to as *asti-nāsti,* the thing both is and is not. Stated so simply, it is *prima facie* contradictory. But when we carefully examine the doctrine as expounded by the Jaina philosophy, it appears to be a statement of an obvious truth which cannot be reasonably controverted. According to Jaina logic, affirmative predication about a thing depends upon four conditions—*svadravya, svakshetra, svakāla* and *svabhāva*—its own substance, its own locality, its own time or duration and its own nature or modification. Correspondingly, the negative predication about the same thing is conditioned by the four things of an opposite nature—*paradravya, parakshetra, parakāla* and *parabhāva*—alien substance, alien locality, alien time and alien nature or modification. Let us explain the point more clearly. When you want to describe a particular ornament made of gold, you say this ornament is made of gold. You can also say that it is not made of any other baser metal. It is made of gold and it is not made of any other metal—are two obvious predications about the same thing, the affirmation from the point of view of itself and the negation from the point of view of other substances. *Asti* from *svadravya* and *nāsti* from *para-dravya,* both *asti* and *nāsti* referring to the gold ornament. Similarly, when you are talking about a certain object with reference to its locality, you may say that it is in its own locality and it is not in any other place. When you find the cow in its shed, you say the cow is present in the shed. And about the same cow you can say that it is not out in the field. Thus you say that Socrates was born in Athens and Socrates was not born in Rome—affirmative predication from *svakshetra* and negative predication from *parakshetra,* both referring to the same individual. Similarly, you may affirm the historical period of an individual when you refer to his proper time in history, and deny his relationship to any other period of time. Tennyson lived in the Victorian age and he did not live in the Elizabethan period. The same

with the last condition, *bhāva* or mode. Charles I died on the gallows and did not die in his bed.

From these examples it is quite obvious that both affirmative and negative predications are possible about the same thing *from different points of view,* enumerated above. It is this that is most important in this theory of predication. From the same point of view certainly it would be absurd to talk of affirmation and negation. The affirmative predication is conditioned by one aspect and the negative predication is conditioned by another. It is this difference of aspect that makes the *asti-nāsti* doctrine quite possible and enables us to have an affirmative and negative predication about the same object of reality. Critics forget this obvious truth and contend that Jaina logic is an absurd and self-contradictory doctrine. When the difference of the point of view is noticed the doctrine becomes so obviously true that none can afford to challenge it. Another kind of criticism based upon misunderstanding is levelled against this doctrine. If both *asti* and *nāsti,* affirmation and negation, are applicable to the same thing, then you have to apply the doctrine even to non-existent things such as the sky-flower and rabbit's horns, and assert that they are existing, since what can accommodate the negative predication that it is not, must also accommodate the positive predication that it is. This criticism is based upon sheer ignorance of the point of view. No doubt the doctrine implies that both *asti* and *nāsti* are applicable to the same thing from different points of view. But from this you cannot infer that because you can say that X does not exist, you may also affirm that it does exist. The *asti-nāsti* doctrine is applicable only to existing reals. It is only in the case of an existing reality that you can talk of *svadravya* and *paradravya, svakshetra* and *parakshetra,* etc. But in the case of a non-existing thing, you cannot apply this difference of point of view and hence the doctrine is not applicable to absolute nonentities. Absolute nonentity must be nothing and you cannot talk of *svadravya, svakshetra,* etc., with reference to it. And for this reason it is equally impossible to talk of *paradravya* and *parakshetra.* Hence the Jaina doctrine of *asti-nāsti*—the possibility of two predications, affirmative and negative, about the same thing, refers only to the reals and not to the unreals.

Based upon this principle is the other logical doctrine of *saptabhaṅgī,* the seven modes of predication. If your object is to assert about a thing something in relation to its own substance or locality, time or mode, you

will be satisfied with mere affirmation or *asti*. If your object is to assert something in relation to an alien substance, locality, time and mode, you will be satisfied with negation or *nāsti*. If you are interested in both the aspects, then you will assert both, one after the other, *asti* and *nāsti*. But if you attempt to represent both these aspects, affirmative and negative, in the same predication, you find it impossible to do so. Language fails to express your meaning. You can only say that it is impossible so to assert both the points together. It is *avaktavya* (inexpressible). Thus you have the four initial modes of predication in the group of *saptabhaṅgī*. If you combine the fourth item, *avaktavya*, to each of the first three, then you have all the seven modes of predication: *Asti, nāsti, asti-nāsti, avaktavya, asti-avaktavya, nāsti-avaktavya* and *asti-nāsti-avaktavya*. These are the only seven possible modes of predication that you can have. Is it possible to make the predication in each case in an absolute sense? Jaina logic does not recognize any such absolute predication. The nature of reality does not admit of it. Any real substance, since it embodies in itself the qualities as well as its modifications, must be described as something permanent in the midst of change, an identity in the midst of difference. You cannot describe a thing as absolutely unchanging permanence, or absolute change without permanence. Similarly, you cannot assert that the qualities are absolutely distinct from the thing, nor that they are absolutely identical. Any such absolute association would be rejected by the nature of reality, which is by nature an identity in the midst of diversity, unity in the midst of multiplicity, permanence in the midst of change. Since the reality, while maintaining its identical nature, expresses itself through multiple forms, it is *anaikāntātmaka*, unity in multiplicity. A true apprehension of its nature must recognize this aspect of reality and hence should reject any type of absolute predication. It is because of this that Jaina Darśana is called *anaikāntavāda* as opposed to other Darśanas which are *ekāntavāda*. Since absolute predication is impossible, Jaina logic recognizes only relative predication. Thus the term *syāt* which literally means "perhaps" is prefixed to the predication, and it implies "from one point of view." It is added on to the seven modes of predication referred to in the doctrine of *saptabhaṅgī*, viz. *syādasti, syānnāsti* and so on. This doctrine of *anaikāntavāda* and the consequent logical corollary of predication with the *syāt* is equally confusing to non-Jaina critics. So long as you recognize the nature of reality as an identity in

the midst of difference, you cannot escape the principle of *anaikānta-vāda.* If you do not accept the *anaikānta* point of view, and if you insist on absolute predication without condition, then the only course open is to dismiss either the diversity or the identity as a mere metaphysical fiction.

JAINA ETHICS

There are two courses of moral discipline according to Jaina ethics, one prescribed for the householder and the other for the homeless *sannyāsin.* The former is called the conduct of the householder and the latter, the conduct of the ascetic. In both cases the code of morals is based upon the doctrine of *ahiṁsā.* Everything is interpreted in the light of that ideal. We have already seen that the path of righteousness consists of the three elements—right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. Hence the path prescribed either for the householder or for the ascetic must necessarily consist of these three jewels or the *ratnatraya.* Hence *dharma* or the path of duty, according to Jainism, consists of the *ratnatraya*—right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. *Dharma* would be incomplete if any one of these is wanting. Hence the path of duty is associated with these three elements. Of these three inevitably the first is the foundation of *dharma. Samyak darśana* or right faith is the basis of conduct. Hence it is emphasized as the important starting point in the religious life of a Jaina householder, not to say of the ascetic. In order to possess an unwavering faith the Jaina householder is expected to get rid of certain undesirable qualities—the three types of superstitious ignorance and the eight kinds of haughtiness or arrogance. The householder must rid himself of these evils before he can be sure of his faith. What are the three types of superstitious ignorance? These are said to be three *mūḍhas*—*loka-mūḍha, deva-mūḍha* and *pāshaṇḍī-mūḍha.* The first refers to the general superstition among people that by bathing in the so-called sacred rivers one can attain spiritual purity and not merely bodily cleanliness. Similarly, climbing up the hills or walking through fire may be associated with a certain sanctity. Such beliefs are considered to be entirely superstitious and one must realize that no spiritual sanctity can be derived from such practices. Similarly, people believe in the powers of village gods and goddesses who are endowed with ordinary human qualities and human emotions. Attempts to propitiate such gods and goddesses with the

object of securing certain selfish ends will come under the second type of superstition called *deva-mūḍha.* Devotion to certain false ascetics who are actuated by the sole motive of self-aggrandizement and acceptance of their teaching as gospel truth would come under the third type of superstition called *pāshaṇḍī-mūḍha.* One should be careful not to be misled by such false teachers. Freedom from these three types of superstition is the primary condition of right faith. Even this is not enough. One who has the right faith must be free from the eight types of arrogance. Humility is the *sine qua non* of religious worship. Jaina teachers evidently emphasize humility as a necessary condition for entering the kingdom of God and such humility could be secured only by ridding oneself of the eight types of haughtiness: "Don't be arrogant because you are very intelligent. Don't be arrogant that you are able to conduct a grand type of temple worship. Don't be haughty because of your noble family. Don't be conceited because of your caste. Don't be conceited because of your physical or mental strength. Don't be haughty because of your magical powers. Don't be conceited because of your *tapas* or *yoga.* Don't be conceited because of the beauty of your person." Unless you free yourself of these eight types of arrogance you cannot have right faith. Hence you will not be fit to walk the path of righteousness. It is interesting to note how the Jaina teachers emphasize these eight types of conceit as incompatible with spiritual humility. Even caste pride must be got rid of. For according to the teacher even a *mātaṅga* (Chaṇḍāla), if he has right faith, will be considered the God of gods. Eliminating superstition and haughtiness right faith must be made the foundation of religious life. On this foundation equipped with knowledge or *samyak jñāna, samyak charitra* or right conduct must thrive. The life of the householder in certain respects is better than the life of the ascetic. If it is possible for the householder to walk the path of righteousness without indulging in worldly pleasures and to secure his spiritual freedom, then his life is certainly much higher and much nobler than the life of the homeless ascetic who roams about in the forest and yet whose thoughts are turned towards things worldly.

The householder thus equipped with right faith and right knowledge must observe the five *vratas* or abstinences. He must be free from cruelty, untruth, theft, unchastity and unnecessary luxury. Every householder is enjoined not to have anything to do with these five things:

Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not utter untruth, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, thou shalt be free from avarice. These are the five restrictions prescribed for the householder. They are called *aṇuvratas,* the little code of morals, since they are of limited application. When they are applied without limitation, then they become *mahāvratas,* the great code of morals, which is prescribed for the *yatis* or homeless ascetics. It is worth noticing that *ahiṁsā* leads the five *vratas*: *Ahiṁsā*—non-cruelty, *satya*—truthfulness, *asteya*—non-theft, *brahmacharya*—chastity, and *aparigraha*—non-attachment to worldly goods. Every householder is expected to practise these five *vratas* according to his capacity. He has to pass through the eleven stages or grades of a householder's life according to the success of his discipline, before he can enter the life of an ascetic. The first *vrata, ahiṁsā,* means not injuring any living being, an animal or even an insect, either by thought, word or deed. It is not enough that you yourself do not directly injure; you should neither cause injury through an agent nor indirectly approve of the conduct of others when they indulge in such an act of cruelty. Neither inflict injury yourself directly nor cause it to be inflicted through some other agency nor approve of the conduct of others when they indulge in such cruelty. Such is the implication of the first and most important *vrata* for a Jaina householder; so entirely different is this doctrine of *ahiṁsā* from what is preached and practised by the Buddhist. According to the Buddhist ideal, *ahiṁsā* merely means not directly inflicting injury oneself. The other two types do not come under it. Hence they would purchase meat from the butcher, though they themselves would not kill the animal. But according to the Jains, such a conduct is not consistent with the spirit of *ahiṁsā.* Because the Jaina conception of *ahiṁsā* implies not merely abstaining from direct injury but also abstaining from the two types of indirect injury—instigating others to cruelty and approving of cruelty in others. *Hiṁsā* in any form should be avoided.

Thus nine types of cruelty should be avoided if this principle is to be rightly observed. This principle of *ahiṁsā* may very often be violated by circumventing it. There are five such violations: Cutting the ears or tail of animals, binding them cruelly with ropes, thus preventing free movement, beating them cruelly with sticks, compelling them to carry burdens beyond their capacity and not feeding them properly. The second *vrata,* not to utter falsehood, is quite obvious. But it is interesting

to note that even speaking truth which results in injury to others should be avoided. Thus it is clear that this principle is subordinated to the principle of *ahiṁsā* which is the primary principle. This second *vrata* of *satya* also has five types of violations: Teaching false doctrines with the object of misleading people, openly proclaiming from sheer wantonness certain secrets such as those pertaining to the private life of people, scandal-mongering out of envy, sending anonymous letters containing mischievous insinuations and suppressing the truth for the purpose of deceiving others. A thing may be left on account of forgetfulness; it may accidentally fall on the road. Such things belonging to others should not be taken possession of, for it may amount to stealing others' property. This principle is also liable to be evaded in five different ways: Instigating a person to go and steal in somebody's house, receiving stolen property, accompanying a victorious army in a military campaign with the object of looting the enemy's towns, using fraudulent weights and measures, and adulterating things in selling them. The fourth principle refers to chastity or sex purity known as *brahmacharya*. This also is liable to be evaded on account of extreme lust. The last refers to limiting one's attachment to wealth and other worldly goods—*parimita parigraha*. Inordinate longing for worldly goods will never result in contentment and happiness, and thus prevent the spiritual harmony and peace of life. Hence even a householder has to reduce his wants and limit his desires if he is to pursue his spiritual career so that he may not be altogether lost in the world. If he is to be in the world but not of the world, he must certainly practise his detachment from worldly possessions.

THE DUTY OF THE HOMELESS

The householder's *dharma* is but a preparation for the life of the ascetic. The *pañcha aṇuvratas* are but the probation for the *pañcha mahāvratas*. The discipline of the householder finds its culmination in the life of the *yogin*. Hence the *dharma* for the homeless is the limitless and complete application of the very principles which are prescribed for the householder. The discipline for the householder is specially intended to liberate him from the domestic ties which bind him to his wife and children, to his land and wealth. After completing this period of probation the householder evidently is expected to enter into a wider realm of activity. His love and sympathy liberated from the sphere of

domestic environment would thereafter become available for the whole animal creation. He quits the house surrounded by the four walls, merely to enter into another residence in which the whole realm of nature becomes his abode. The entire dumb creation now shares his love and sympathy which were available only to the few members of his family. Now he has no roof to live under except the star-bespangled canopy of the heavens. His new habitation is not walled round by obstacles. Now his heart throbs in sympathy with the whole of creation. Such a life *prima facie* appears to be the very contradiction of the householder's life. The *yogin,* when he quits the household to identify himself with the whole realm of nature, has to observe certain principles and adopt certain courses of conduct appropriate to his new surroundings. Since he quits the world once for all and since he does not associate himself with the ordinary social occupations, his behaviour in general becomes quite out of the ordinary and entirely unconventional. He limits his words and thoughts and refrains from indulging in useless and unnecessary activities. No idle word escapes his lips, no wanton movements are indulged in by his body, nay, not even idle thoughts are allowed to have their own way. His is a new mission and hence the method of his life is also novel. Not only does he control his thought, word and deed but he also develops a gentleness of behaviour characteristic of one who has mastered all his emotions. An ordinary person is generally a slave of emotions; harshness of speech, hastiness of movement and general excitement in behaviour are characteristic of one who is swayed by the grosser emotions. The psychic violence within, due to the emotional excitement, manifests itself in the general excitement of behaviour in the case of ordinary mortals. But in the case of the *yogin* who has conquered such emotions, who has put his heel of *dhyāna* on such disturbing experiences, gentleness of behaviour comes naturally. The words that escape his lips are soft and gentle, soothing and consoling. Even the movements of his limbs are so gentle that not even a worm is injured nor a bird disturbed from its perch. While speaking and walking, his behaviour is a source of comfort to the disturbed. In his presence even birds and animals otherwise frightened will muster courage. Even the ferocity of wild animals will be disarmed, for what is the might of the flesh before the peaceful spirit of this sage? Thus equipped with an internal peace and harmony, the *yogin* carries about him a spirit full of melody, by which all sores are soothed and all discords are dissolved.

With an ordinary man, his body is but a psycho-physical mechanism responding to the infinite stimuli that the environment is full of. Like clay on the potter's wheel, nature through her infinite stimuli touches and shapes the human personality which has at the best an efficient response apparatus. This very often makes man a creature of his environment, alternately exalted and depressed according as its stimuli sustain him or not. But the life of the *yogin* is quite different. His whole discipline aims at the conquest of the environment. His pride consists in being unshaken by its changes. Its thousand and one surging stimuli may break against him with accumulated violence, but he remains in himself unshaken like a pillar of rock, for he is not aware of them.

His thoughts are fixed on higher and nobler things. When he carries his body as a temporary tabernacle to achieve his spiritual goal, certainly he finds no time to attend to these little inconveniences which nature may create around him. The body which may be a source of inconvenience and trouble to the ordinary man ceases to be such in the case of a *yogin*. For, in his case, the body derives its strength and vitality from the inner strength and vitality of the spirit. Only where these are not available one has recourse to the inferior means of medicine and doctoring. But to one who carries in himself the universal panacea there can be neither disease nor decay. He may lie in a mountain cave or roam about in the forest land. He is always rooted in himself; his mind is completely self-possessed. This conquest of the environment even including his own body carries him through the threshold of a newer world, where he enjoys a happiness far surpassing the pleasures of the senses known to him, and he secures the peace that passeth understanding. Because of the heritage of this spiritual kingdom he considers the concrete world in which he lived before to be worthless trash. The laws and institutions which matter so much to ordinary mortals appear to him quite irrelevant and useless. For has he not now become a superman having the privilege of being a law unto himself? Hence, the ordinary conventions which are made so much of by the man of the world are completely discarded by the superman, the *yogin*. But he may sometimes appear quite strange and eccentric. The person who has secured mastery over himself and who is thus in possession of the great spiritual heritage may, because of his very unconventionality, appear to be a mad man in the eyes of the philistines of the world. Every act of his may appear to them as an act of violation of the sacred

law. But he himself may smile at their wounded ignorance, because they could not see as the scales have not fallen from their eyes. He is able to see far ahead of them. Hence his words and actions become unintelligible to them. He has secured the citizenship of the world of reality whereas they are still living in the realm of shadows. Such is the life of the ascetic whose one occupation is to perform *tapas* and to secure the inner freedom. That is the heritage of man which, according to Jaina philosophy, is far richer than even the heritage of Devendra. The pleasures of a *deva,* however great they be, must end some day. Even a Devendra, the King of the gods, with all his greatness can never enter the kingdom of God, if by the latter is meant that spiritual liberation which is implied by the term *moksha.* He must become a man before he can think of heaven. For man forms the " way in " for that paradise wherein is situated the temple of spiritual freedom. This embodies an important truth, viz. that man's heritage as man is far superior to any other riches in the world. It is this wonderful spiritual heritage of man that Nachiketas would have from the Lord of Death in preference to the overlordship of the three worlds offered to him. It is this heritage again that Maitreyī preferred to all the accumulated wealth which was offered by her husband, Yājñavalkya. Again, it is to inherit this kingdom that prince Siddārtha cast away his father's kingdom as worthless and put on the mendicant's robe in preference to the royal crown. This is the message of Jainism to mankind. " Be a man first and last, for the kingdom of God belongs to the son of man." It is this same truth that is proclaimed in unmistakable terms by the Upanishadic text *tat tvam asi* " Thou art That."

JAINISM: ITS HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

I. HISTORICAL SURVEY


The Jainas claim a great antiquity for their religion. Their earliest prophet was Ṛishabha-deva who is mentioned even in the Hindu Purāṇas as belonging to a very remote past. In the earliest Brāhmaṇic literature are found traces of the existence of a religious order which ranged itself strongly against the authority of the Vedas and the institution of animal sacrifices. At the time of the great Kuru war (*Mahābhārata*) this order was led by Neminātha who is said to have belonged to the same Yādava family as Kṛishṇa and who is recognized as the twenty-second Tīrthaṅkara. The order gathered particular strength during the eighth century B.C. under Pārśvanātha who was born at Benares, where he was preceded by the eleventh Tīrthaṅkara Śreyāṁśanātha from whom Sarnath near Benares derives its name. Pārśvanātha became the twenty-third Tīrthaṅkara. This order we may call the *śramaṇa saṅgha*, the opponent of the Vedic order, which later became divided into the Jaina and the Buddhist orders under Mahāvīra and Buddha respectively.

Mahāvīra, also known as Vardhamāna, the twenty-fourth and last of the Tīrthaṅkaras, was born 250 years after Pārśvanātha, which, according to Jaina tradition represented by an era still current, corresponds to 599 B.C. His father was the chief of Kauṇḍinyapura near Vaiśāli, which is now the village Basrah some twenty-seven miles to the north of Patna. His mother was Triśalā Devī, the daughter of the Lichchhavi king of Vaiśālī. From his early childhood he had a reflective mind. After undergoing all the education and training usual for princes of the time, he realized the transitory nature of the world and became an ascetic at the age of thirty. He parctised hard penance and meditation for twelve years in the course of which he had to bear many persecutions at the hands of the ignorant people, till, at last, he attained enlightenment. Then he began to preach his doctrines to people. His chief contribution was the popularization of the principle of *ahiṁsā* (non-injury) on the basis of which he elaborated the ethical code for householders as well as for monks, and as its background, he put forward the philosophy of the seven *tattvas* (realities). He organized the Jaina community to which he



MAHAVIRA'S RENUNCIATION

Courtesy Mr. O. C. Gangoly



GOMATESVARA

[illegible]

admitted all aspirants irrespective of caste or sex, and inaugurated a system of peaceful proselytization. This he did for thirty years and won a large number of followers, both monks and householders. He abandoned his mortal body at the age of seventy-two.

Mahāvīra left behind him a strongly organized religious order through whose incessant efforts the animal sacrifices fell into disuse and non-violence became firmly established as a rule of life even amongst those classes of people who did not join the order. His followers gradually expanded over the whole country. Jaina monks were to be found on the banks of the Indus already at the time of Alexander's invasion. A band of Jaina monks under Bhadrabāhu migrated to the South and spread the religion throughout the Deccan with Śravaṇa Belgola in Mysore as their central seat. Royal patronage was also bestowed upon the faith, and the great Maurya Emperor Chandragupta is claimed to have himself joined Bhadrabāhu's march to the South as his disciple. A very old rock inscription at Śravaṇa Belgola commemorates his visit to the South, a cave is dedicated to him and the hill on which it exists is known as Chandragiri after him. During the second century B. C. King Khārvel of Kaliṅga professed Jainism and promoted its cause by setting up Jaina images himself. During the early centuries of the Christian era, Mathurā in the North and Śravaṇa Belgola in the South formed great centres of Jaina activities as is proved by a large number of inscriptions, images and other monuments discovered at both the places. From the fifth to the twelfth century the various royal dynasties of the South such as the Gaṅgas, the Kadambas, the Chālukyas and the Rāshṭrakūṭas accorded their patronage to the faith. Some of the Rāshṭrakūṭas kings of Mānyakheṭa, from the eighth to the tenth century, showed a special leaning towards Jainism and gave a great impetus to the development of Jaina art and literature. Many Jaina poets of great repute flourished under them. Jinasena and Guṇabhadra composed their *Mahāpurāṇa* at the time of King Amoghavarsha when Mahāvīrāchārya also wrote his work on mathematics. Amoghavarsha himself was an author and his *Ratnamālikā*, though a Jaina work, became very popular with people of all sects, and it has frequently been imitated. He is said to have become a Jaina monk in the latter part of his life. There is epigraphical evidence for the fact that one of his successors, Indra IV, died by the Jaina form of renunciation. About 1100 A.D. Jainism gained a great ascendancy

in Gujrat where the Chālukya kings Siddharāja and his son Kumārapāla openly professed Jainism and encouraged the literary and temple-building activities of the Jainas. Hemachandra, the author of several works on different topics, religious as well as secular, lived at the court of the latter. During the Mohammedan period, Jainism continued to flourish without much molestation from the rulers owing to the very peaceful ways of its followers, though in ever decreasing numbers. They even received some patronage under the benign Mughal Emperor Akbar. But during this period the Jainas particularly increased in the native States of Rajputana, where they came to occupy many important offices of the State including generalships and ministerships. The period following was of steady decline. The monastic order which provided a large number of unselfish workers for preaching and proselytizing, fell in number and ceased to be enthusiastic in those activities. The days of royal patronage were gone. The lay community became split up by internal divisions, which made it impossible for them to combine for any solid work. Caste distinctions, which were once thoroughly brushed aside, were reimposed and they became active in a vigorous form. Thus the original vitality of the community was sapped, though it continued to exist. The present day population of the Jainas is about thirteen lakhs distributed all over the country, but predominantly in Rajputana and Gujrat. Mostly the Jainas are traders and a very large amount of the trade of the country passes through their hands. They have founded, and maintain many charitable institutions in the country such as dispensaries, *dharmaśālās* (rest houses) and houses for animal protection. They are now devoting more attention to the reform of their society, the spread of education and the publication of old literature which has for centuries remained locked up in various manuscript-stores at different places in their temples.

The Jainas have played a very important part in the linguistic development of the country. The medium of sacred writings and preachings of the Brāhmins has all along been Sanskrit and of the Bauddhas Pāli. But the Jainas utilized the prevailing languages of the different times at different places for their religious propaganda as well as for the preservation of knowledge. In this way they exercised a predominant influence on the development of the Prākṛit languages. They even gave a literary shape to some vernaculars for the first time. Mahāvīra preached in the mixed dialect called Ardha-Māgadhī in order

that he might be understood by people speaking Māgadhī or Śaurasenī, and his teachings were classified into twelve books called *Srutāṅgas*. These were preserved by oral tradition for some time, but were subsequently lost. An effort was later made to recover these and the result was the existing canonical books of the Śvetāmbara Jainas which still preserve for us the form of the Ardha-Māgadhī language. Of late, a very rich literature produced by the Jainas has come to light, which preserves the form of the language as it was current prior to the evolution of the present day vernaculars, specially Hindī, Gujrātī and Marāṭhī. This language has been called Apabhraṁśa. It forms the link between the classical languages, Sanskrit and Prākṛit, on the one hand, and the modern vernaculars on the other, and, as such, its study is very important from the philological point of view. The earliest literature in Kanarese is of Jaina authorship, and the early Tamil literature also owes much to Jaina writers. The Jainas have also produced a rich literature in Sanskrit, both narrative as well as philosophical, and works on technical subjects like grammar, prosody, lexicography and mathematics are also not wanting.

The Jainas have always taken their due share in the development of the arts in the country. They erected *stūpas*, as did the Buddhists also, in honour of their saints, with their accessories of stone railings, decorated gateways, stone umbrellas, elaborate carved pillars and abundant statues. Early examples of these have been discovered at Muttra. Bundelkhand is full of Jaina images of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The huge statues of Bāhubalin known as Gomateśvara at Śravaṇa Belgola and Karkal in Mysore are among the wonders of the world. The former was erected by Chāmuṇḍarāya, the minister of the Gaṅga king Rāchamalla, during the tenth century. The colossal reliefs carved in the rock-face near Gwalior belong to the fifteenth century. The Jainas also built cave-temples cut in rocks, the earliest examples of which, belonging to the second century B. C. and later, exist in Orissa, known as Hāthīgumphā caves. Other examples of varying periods exist at Junagadh, Junnar, Osmanabad and other places. The numerous Jaina places of pilgrimage such as the Pārśvanātha Hills, Pāvāpurī, and Rajgir in Bihar, and Girnar and Palitana in Kathiawar, possess temples and other architectural monuments of different ages. The Jaina marble temples at Mount Abu in Rajputana, belonging to the eleventh century and later, ' carry to its highest perfection the Indian genius for the inven-

tion of graceful patterns and their application to the decoration of masonry.'

Jainism is one and undivided so far as its philosophy is concerned. But about the beginning of the Christian era it became split up into two sects called the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras chiefly on the point of certain rules and regulations for the monks, the most important difference being that while the former held that monks could not bear any clothes, the latter asserted that they could. During the centuries that followed, further minor splits took place amongst both these sects, the most important of them being one that renounced idol-worship altogether and devoted itself to the worship of the scriptures. These are called Terāpanthīs amongst the Śvetāmbaras and Samaiyās amongst the Digambaras. This sect came into existence not earlier than the sixteenth century.

Early European scholars started a wrong theory about the origin of Jainism. Finding a good deal of similarity between the two religions, Jainism and Buddhism, they thought that two similar religions could not have arisen independently and simultaneously in one and the same country. They, therefore, regarded the less known Jainism to be a branch of the more extensive Buddhism. But later researches conclusively proved the falsity of the theory, and the priority of Jainism to Buddhism is now admitted as beyond dispute. Mahāvīra is now admitted to have been a senior contemporary of Buddha.

II PHILOSOPHY

The Jaina philosophy might be summed up in one sentence. The living and the non-living, by coming into contact with each other, forge certain energies which bring about birth, death and various experiences of life: this process could be stopped, and the energies already forged destroyed, by a course of discipline leading to salvation. A close analysis of this brief statement shows that it involves seven propositions: firstly, that there is something called the living; secondly, that there is something called the non-living; thirdly, that the two come into contact with each other; fourthly, that the contact leads to the production of some energies; fifthly, that the process of contact could be stopped; sixthly, that the existing energies could also be exhausted; and lastly, that salvation could be achieved. These seven propositions are called the seven *tattvas* or realities by the Jainas. The first two great truths

are that there is a *jīva* or soul and that there is an *ajīva* or non-soul. These two exhaust between them all that exists in the universe. A recognition of the two entities at once marks the Jaina system out as dualistic like the Sāṁkhya and distinguishable from the monistic Vedānta which accepts only one reality without a second. The soul, by itself, is imperceptible, but its presence can be found out by the presence of its characteristic qualities in a material body. Its chief characteristic is consciousness which is accompanied by sensual activity, respiration and a fixed period of existence in a particular body. There is an infinite number of such souls in the universe and they retain their individuality throughout, neither destroying it altogether nor merging it in the individuality of any other superior being. In their embodied state they are divisible into two classes, the immobile (*sthāvara*) and the mobile (*trasa*). The former are of five kinds according as their body is made up of earth, water, fire, air or vegetable substance. The first four are very subtle forms of life, while the fifth is gross. All these five classes of beings have only one sense developed in them, that is, the sense of touch, responding thereby only to a stimulus of physical contact brought to bear on them. There is a class of beings still lower than these, called the *nigoda* or group souls, in which an infinite number of beings have a body and respiration in common. They infest the whole world, not excluding the bodies of men and other animals. They are slowly evolving and serve as a regular supply for replacing beings that pass out of the cycle of birth and death by the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. The mobile class of beings is further divided into four kinds, according as they possess two, three, four or five senses, *i.e.* the sense of taste, smell, sight and sound, in addition to that of touch Oysters are examples of two-sensed beings, bugs and lice of three-sensed, mosquitoes, flies and bees of four-sensed, and birds, animals and men of the five-sensed beings. Amongst the last kind, again, there are beings, like men and most of the animals and birds, that possess *saṁjñā* or a faculty to discriminate between the beneficial and the injurious, between the favourable and the unfavourable, while there are some, like a particular kind of reptile in the ocean, that possess no such faculty. Consciousness being the characteristic of a soul, knowledge is inherent in every living being, but its stage of development differs. Knowledge derived from the observation of nature through the senses is the first to be acquired and is the most universal. Next come, in gradual order, knowledge of the

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scriptures or of others' experiences, of objects remote from one in time and place, of another's mind, and, lastly, perfect and supreme knowledge of everything. These are respectively called *mati-jñāna, śruti-jñāna, avadhi-jñāna, manaḥ-paryaya-jñāna* and *kevala-jñāna*. The first two kinds are possible to any man, the next two to sages, and the last, to a perfect sage only who has qualified himself for *nirvāṇa* (illumination).

The second reality or *tattva* is *ajīva*, the lifeless substance, whose essential characteristic is that it lacks consciousness. It is of five kinds: The first kind is matter (*pudgala*) which includes everything that is perceptible by the senses. It could be touched and found to be soft or hard, smooth or rough, heavy or light, cold or hot. It could be tasted and found to be bitter, sour, pungent, saline or sweet. It may smell good or bad, and, lastly, it may appear black, blue, yellow, red or white. Matter constitutes the physical basis of the universe, even as the reality *jīva* constitutes the psychical. The elements of nature—earth, water, fire and air, are all gross manifestations of matter, the finest and most subtle form of which is the atom (*paramāṇu*). Even heat, light, shade and darkness are forms of fine matter whose particles are constantly in motion (*parispanda*), leading to a perpetual succession of integration and disintegration, with a variety of forms and appearances as the result. In this respect the Jaina view of matter differs from the atomic theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika philosophy which assumes as many kinds of atoms as there are elements. This matter is as real and eternal as the soul, and its total quantity always remains the same in the universe. The second kind of *ajīva* is a little difficult to understand. It is named *dharma*. It is quite imperceptible, though it fills the entire universe which we inhabit (*lokākāśa*). It has none of the characteristic qualities of matter, but forms the medium of motion which is possible only through its existence. 'Just as water helps the fish to move about, even so *dharma* makes the movement of soul and matter possible.' The necessary counterpart of this subtle substance forms the third kind of *ajīva* called *adharma*, which also pervades the whole universe and serves as a medium of rest 'like the shade of a tree helping the wayfarer to stop for rest.' It will thus be seen that *dharma* and *adharma* are two non-physical, inactive conditions of movement and rest respectively, conceived as real substances. They should not be confused with righteousness and unrighteousness for which the terms used in Jainism are *puṇya* and *pāpa*. The fourth *ajīva* substance is space (*ākāśa*) which

like the preceding two, is matterless. Its nature is to provide locality or room for the existence of all other entities. Unlike the other substances it is infinite. Only a part of it is occupied by the other substances, and this part is called the *lokākāśa*. The other part which is void is called *alokākāśa*. *Dharma, adharma* and *ākāśa* are, thus, mediums or conditions of motion, rest and subsistence respectively, all the three being interpenetrating. Modern philosophy recognizes the three only as the functions of a single entity such as space or ether. The fifth and last *ajīva* substance is time (*kāla*) which also pervades the whole *lokākāśa* in the form of single, independent, minute points which never mix together to form a composite body. It brings about changes or modifications in all the other substances and it affords them extension in time which, by itself, is beginningless and endless. For practical purposes (*vyāvahāra*), however, it is divided into limited periods such as minutes, hours, days, months, years and ages. These five varieties of *ajīva* together with the *jīva* form the six substances (*dravya*) that exist in the universe.

Before passing on to the third *tattva*, something might be said about the nature of existence attributed to the six substances. Here, again, the Jaina system distinguishes itself from the Brāhmaṇical idea on the one hand and the Buddhist idea on the other. The teaching of the Upanishads and of all the philosophies directly based on them, is that there is one being upholding everything, physical as well as psychical, from within, and that this being is permanent, absolute and unchanging. In opposition to this the Buddhist doctrine is that all things, physical as well as psychical, are transitory, there being nothing that is absolute and unchanging. Jainism comes in between the two and defines existence in such a way as to equate all the different views. It holds that existence consists of three factors operating simultaneously, namely, production, decay and permanence. From the point of view of the essential nature of a thing, it is permanent and unchanging, but from the point of view of its accidental qualities it originates and perishes. The soul is permanent in itself, but its relationship with the body begins and ends. The atoms of which gold is made are everlasting, but its form as a chain or a ring originates and perishes. A particular point of space is the same, but its occupants are different at different times. Time is ever the same, but the appearances associated with it are frequently changing. This is the case with everything that exists. The Jainas have not been

satisfied with merely emphasizing these three aspects of existence, but they have formulated on this basis a system of thought called *anekānta* or *syādvāda* which comes to this that we may make seven assertions, seemingly contradictory but perfectly true, about a thing: It is (*syādasti*); it is not (*syānnāsti*); it is and is not (*syādasti nāsti*); it is indescribable (*syādavaktavyam*); it is and is indescribable (*syādasti cha avaktavyaṁ cha*); it is not and is indescribable (*syānnāsti cha avaktavyaṁ cha*); it is, is not and is indescribable (*syādasti nāsti cha avaktavyaṁ cha*). Not caring to understand the full meaning and significance of these propositions, some philosophers have denounced the Jaina philosophy as a bundle of contradictory and vague and indefinite assertions. But really it is not so. A man is the father, and is not the father, and is both—are perfectly intelligible if you understand the point of view from which the statement is made. In relation to a particular boy he is the father; in relation to another boy he is not the father; in relation to both the boys taken together he is the father and is not the father. Since both the ideas cannot be conveyed in words at the same time, he may be called indescribable, still he is the father and is indescribable; and so on. Thus, the philosophy of *anekānta* is neither self-contradictory nor vague or indefinite; on the contrary, it represents a very sensible view of things in a systematized form. By means of it the seemingly warring ideas and beliefs of different faiths can very well be accommodated and reconciled to each other, and thus so many clashes could be avoided.

We now come to the third *tattva*, the contact of the soul with matter (*āsrava*). There is no God or Supreme Being creating, destroying and recreating the world. Souls exist in the world from time eternal, in association with matter. The enjoyment of this association leads to further contact, and so the cycle goes on till the association is brought to an end in such a way as to avoid any fresh contact; salvation is then achieved. The contact takes place in the following way: The soul is always surrounded by a large volume of fine matter called *karma*. This invades the soul and settles down with it whenever the soul is found to be in a state of iniquity, *i.e.* affected by the activities of the body, mind or speech, due to the propelling force of wrong belief or moral failings or passions, namely, anger, pride, deceit or greed. This contact leads to the formation of what is called the *kārmaṇa śarīra*,[1] corresponding to the *liṅga* or the *sūkshma śarīra*[2] of the Sāṁkhyas, which

[1] Body pertaining to work. [2] Subtle body.

accompanies the soul throughout life as well as in its migrations from one body to another. That this *kārmaṇa śarīra* is formed of actual matter particles is evident from the fact that it has both weight and colour. Soul, by itself, is very light, the lightest of all substances, and hence, in a pure state, it would fly at once to the highest point of the *lokākāśa;* as far as the existence of *dharma* matter would make movement possible. But it is actually kept down by the weight of its *kārmaṇa śarīra.* The latter also imparts to it a complexion that may be dark, blue, grey, yellow, red or white. The first three of these are regarded as inauspicious and the last three auspicious.

Closely associated with *āsrava* is *bandha* (bondage), the fourth reality. The *kārmaṇa śarīra* spoken of above binds the soul in eight different ways according to the kinds of energies forged into it at the time the inflow of *karma* takes place. These are called the eight *karmas*: The first two kinds obstruct knowledge and faith (*jñānāvaraṇīya* and *darśanāvaraṇīya*), the third causes delusion in the form of affections and passions (*mohanīya*), the fourth brings about pleasure and pain (*vedanīya*) the fifth determines the length of life (*āyushka*), the sixth assigns everything that is associated with personality, *i.e.* the kind of body, senses, health, complexion and the like (*nāma*), the seventh determines the social status at birth (*gotra*) and the eighth produces hindrances in the way of realizing virtues and powers (*antarāya*). The time when a particular *karma* will bear fruit and thus come to an end is determined at that very time the karmic matter flows into the soul. The eight kinds of *karmas* have been further subdivided into 144 classes calculated to account for almost every experience that a man has in life. As will be seen from what has been said above, the four kinds of *karmas* from 4th to 7th may lead to good and enjoyable results or the reverse. Pious and holy activities of the mind and body give rise to good results and *vicé versā.* This appears like fatalism, but it is not so, because it is open for the individual not only to stop any further bondage but also to destroy or render ineffectual the existing bondages. This is the subject of the next two realities *saṁvara* and *nirjara.* By a systematic control of the mental and physical activities any fresh inflow of the *karmas* may be prevented, while certain austerities would destroy the existing *karmas.* When this is achieved in its fullness, the soul is set free, once for all, and the cycle of birth and death comes to an end. The soul realizes its inherent qualities of supreme knowledge and un-

limited happiness. It attains salvation, it becomes a perfect being—*Siddha*. The measures recommended for bringing about these results form the ethical codes of the householders and the monks which we shall now proceed to describe.

III ETHICAL CODE FOR A HOUSEHOLDER

Jainism holds that all living beings in the world have their inherent powers of the soul crippled by association with karmic matter, as a result of which they are undergoing births and deaths and various other troubles, and that the aim of every individual is or should be, firstly, to avoid evil *karmas*, and, then, gradually, to prevent all kinds of *karmas* and destroy the existing ones, so as to attain salvation. What can a householder who is faced with all the problems of existence, of maintaining himself and his dependants, do towards this goal, is now the question. The answer is that he can so conduct himself in his affairs as not to allow the evil channels of *karma* to come into operation, or, at least, to reduce their activity to a minimum degree. For this purpose he must observe certain rules. The most important vows of a householder are five, namely, he shall not do violence to other living beings, he shall speak the truth, he shall not commit theft, he shall not commit adultery, and, lastly, he shall set a limit to his greed for worldly possessions. These are respectively called the vows of *ahiṁsā, satya, asteya, brahmacharya*, and *aparigraha*.

The observance of even the first vow presents many difficulties. Firstly, what is violence, and secondly, how could one avoid it, even in the ordinary pursuit of his occupation? The answer to the first question is that any action calculated to do injury to other living beings is violence. Killing any being or inflicting a wound upon it or beating it is physical violence. Speaking harsh words so as to injure the feelings of others is violence of speech, while thinking ill of others or contemplation of injury is mental violence as it disturbs the equanimity of one's own soul even though no harm to others may actually follow. For a householder, it is not possible to avoid all these kinds of violence in their entirety, and therefore he is recommended to discharge his worldly responsibilities with the minimum injury to others. For giving more practical guidance in this matter injury to others has been analysed, according to the mental attitude of the individual, into four kinds, accidental, occupational, protective and intentional. The injury to small living beings un-

avoidable in building a house, cooking meals, grinding flour, walking, bathing and similar other performances of daily life, is violence of the first kind. When a soldier has to fight and strike his enemy, or when an agriculturist has to till the land and carry on other operations involving injury to living beings, the injury belongs to the second kind. If a tiger attacks you and you have to shoot it down, or if you are confronted with a dacoit and have to protect your life and property by striking him in self-defence, the injury is of the third kind; and when you kill men, animals or other lower creatures simply for the sake of killing, the injury belongs to the fourth kind. The householder is required to abstain fully from the fourth kind of injury and he should take as much care and caution against loss of life in the other forms as it is possible for him. This means the observance of the vow of *ahiṁsā* in a less rigorous form suitable for a householder, and hence it is called *anuvrata* (minor vow). Not that this will cause no karmic bondage, but it will be of a minor type, its intensity being proportionate to the intensity of the passion of the man committing it and to the grade of life injured. Piercing, binding, overloading or starving animals, are all forms of *hiṁsā* and should be avoided.

The same kind of concession as is allowed to a householder in the observance of the vow of *ahiṁsā*, is enjoyed by him in the observance of the other four vows also, and for this reason, they are all called *aṇuvratas*. He should neither speak falsehood himself, nor induce others to do so, nor approve of any such attempt on the part of others. Spreading false ideas, divulging the secrets of others, back-biting, forging documents, and breach of trust are all forms of untruth and one must guard oneself against them. It would be theft if one takes away secretly or perforce what does not belong to him. Appropriating to oneself what another man has forgotten or has dropped, or accepting what he knows to be stolen property, instructing another person in the methods of stealing, adulteration and use of false weights and measures, are all forms of theft and should be abstained from. A householder must keep himself satisfied with his own wife and should look upon all other women as his mothers, sisters or daughters. He would be violating the vow of *brahmacharya* if he indulges in unnatural gratification or even if he talks obscenity. The fifth vow is noteworthy as it indirectly aims at economic equalization by peacefully preventing undue accumulation of capital in individual hands. It recommends that a householder should fix, beforehand, the limit of his maximum belong-

ings, and should, in no case, exceed it. If he ever happens to earn more than that, he must spend it away in charities, the best and recognized forms of which are distribution of medicines, spread of knowledge by the distribution of religious books and support of teachers, provision for saving the lives of people in danger, and feeding the hungry and poor. Obviously, these vows are of a great social value as they accord a religious sanction to some of the most important public and private interests and rights which are, in modern times, safeguarded by the laws of the State. A due observance of them, for example, would save a man from the application to him of almost any of the sections of the Indian Penal Code.

From the aspirant's spiritual point of view the *aṇuvratas* are meant to give him practice in self-denial, self-control and renunciation. This purpose becomes more pronounced in the next three vows called the *guṇavratas*. He should lay down limits of distance in all the four directions beyond which he shall not travel in his life (*dig-vrata*), he should prescribe further limits of his movements for a specified period of time according to the requirements in view (*deśa-vrata*), and he should set limits on his belongings and occupations for a particular period of time (*anartha-daṇḍa-vrata*). The next four vows take him a step further. They are called *śikshāvrata* or instructive vows because they initiate him directly in the ascetic practices. The first of these is contemplation (*sāmāyika*). Retiring with as few encumbrances, such as clothes, as possible, to a quiet place, be it a temple or a private dwelling or forest, where he is not likely to be disturbed, he should stand erect, or squat on the ground, or even recline if that be more convenient to him. He should then mentally renounce, for the time being, every worldly possession, attachment and aversion and begin to meditate upon the nature of the self, the cycle of existence which is full of misery, and the way to salvation. This may be done once, twice or thrice a day, morning, noon and evening, according to convenience, the duration being gradually increased. This gives him mental strength and peace. Physical discipline is then secured by the next two vows. On four days in a month, that is, once a week, he should observe complete fast, abstaining from all kinds of food and drink, and should pass his day in a temple reading scriptures or contemplating upon the self. This is called *proshadhopavāsa*. For each day he should fix his programme of food and comforts in a restrictive manner both as regards quantity and

quality, and should strictly adhere to the same. This is known as *bhogopabhogaparimāṇa*. The last of the instructive vows is *atithi-saṁvibhāga* according to which he should, each day, feed, out of what is cooked for himself, such righteous and holy persons as may turn up at his house at the proper time. These five *aṇuvratas*, three *guṇavratas* and four *śikshāvratas*, in all twelve, constitute the chief vows of a householder, and a proper observance of them means right conduct. But right conduct has to be preceded by right faith and right knowledge. A deep devotion to those who have attained perfection, or, are on the way to it, as well as to their teachings, constitutes right faith. In order to keep this faith ever enkindled in his heart, a householder should perform the daily worship of the gods, scriptures and teachers. The sages who become perfect in knowledge and are on the verge of their salvation, teaching humanity its duties, are the real gods deserving worship. Twenty-four such Arhats or Tīrthaṅkaras, as they are called, are recognized with Ṛishabha-deva as the first and Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra or Vardhamāna as the last two. Books embodying their teachings and ascetics following the rules of conduct laid down therein, are the true worshipful scriptures and teachers. Right knowledge is the knowledge of the seven *tattvas* as propounded by the Tīrthaṅkaras and explained above. Right faith, right knowledge and right conduct together constitute the way to salvation. These correspond to the *bhakti*, *jñāna* and *karma-yogas*[1] of Hinduism, but the chief difference is that while Hinduism regards them as singly sufficient to lead the aspirant to the final goal, Jainism considers a combination of the three as essential for the desired end.

For the convenience of practice, the whole course of right conduct of a householder is divided into eleven stages. Right faith, without falling into pride or superstitious beliefs and unholy worship, is the first stage (*darśana*). Next comes the observance of the aforesaid twelve vows in a general way (*vrata*). At the third stage he devotes himself specially to self-contemplation thrice a day (*sāmāyika*). Carrying out the programme of the weekly fasts constitutes the fourth stage (*proshadhopavāsa*). At the fifth stage special attention is paid to avoid loss of life by renouncing green vegetables (*sachittatyāga*). Meals at night are completely given up at the sixth (*rātribhojana-tyāga*), strict celibacy is observed at the seventh (*brahmacharya*), household affairs and occupa-

[1] The philosophies of love, knowledge and work, respectively.

tions are given up at the eighth (*ārambha-tyāga*), claims to properties in his own name are renounced at the ninth (*parigraha-tyāga*), giving consent or advice in worldly affairs is abandoned at the tenth (*anumati-tyāga*), and at the eleventh stage he does not even take food specially cooked for himself (*uddishṭa-tyāga*). At this stage he is ripe for launching upon the much more arduous and abstemious career of a monk.

IV. ETHICAL CODE FOR A MONK

The line that distinguishes the monk from the layman (*śrāvaka*) is the complete abandonment of all worldly possessions and ceasing to dwell under a roof which may be called his own. Only a very limited number of articles is allowed to be possessed by a monk and these also not for his comfort and luxury but only as aids in the observance of his vows. He keeps with him a jug for holding pure water, a bunch of peacock feathers for driving away insects from wherever he may have an occasion to sit, and some religious books for study. In addition to these the Śvetāmbara section of the Jainas also allows some clothes to be worn by the monk, but the Digambara section prohibits this absolutely and regards the abandonment of all clothing as the *sine qua non* of the monastic order. The monk begins his disciplinary course by pulling out his hair with his own hands. He sleeps on bare ground and for a short period. He eats only once in a standing posture and from his own hands, at the house of any *śrāvaka* who may invite him when he passes through the town for the purpose. The five vows of non-injury to living beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy and poverty are observed by him in their strictest form, as *mahāvratas* and not as *aṇuvratas* like the householders. He must under no circumstances whatsoever injure any living being, in thought, word or deed, not even to save his life. The other four vows are observed with similar strictness without the least concession. For this purpose he observes certain forms of carefulness (*samiti*). He must walk only by day taking care that he kills no being (*īryā-samiti*). He must observe a great restraint in his speech strictly avoiding censure of others, self-praise and talk about women, kings, thieves or eatables; he should speak only beneficial words (*bhāshā-samiti*). He should not be fussy about his food; he should be satisfied with whatever is offered to him, but he should carefully see that what he eats is free from all impurity (*eshaṇā-samiti*). He must also be very careful in placing and taking up his things as well as in answering calls of nature, so as to

exclude the possibility of loss of life by these operations. Next comes the control of the senses. He must so train himself as not to be affected or moved by the objects of the senses. A beautiful or an ugly sight, a charming note or a jarring sound, a fragrant or foul smell, a flavoury or a tasteless dish, and a tender or a rough touch should arouse in him no feelings of joy or hatred, attraction or repulsion. Day in and day out, he should devote himself to deep meditation, eulogistic recitations of the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras and homage to them, confession of sins unwittingly committed and fresh determination to be more cautious and careful, and detachment of thought from the body. All these come under the twenty-eight fundamental qualities (*mūlaguṇa*) of an ascetic, by cultivating which he disciplines his body and mind in such a way that the passions are brought thoroughly under control and, in consequence, no fresh inflow of *karmas* takes place in his soul. The existing *karmas* may then be exhausted by allowing them no opportunity to bear fruit. This is done by means of various austerities, the chief of which is meditation. Withdrawing his senses from all objects, concentrating his mind on the self, he should reflect upon the nature of reality as propounded under the seven *tattvas*, the qualities of the Arhats and the *Siddhas*, and the way to perfection. He should think, in a systematic way, about the transitory nature of the body and its belongings, the sufferings of the self unaided by anybody else, the cycle of birth and death in which the soul revolves, how the soul is separate from the body which is full of impurities, how the soul gets entangled in the meshes of the *karmas* and how it can be freed from the same. He should so absorb himself in these thoughts that hunger or thirst, cold or heat, praise or censure, and worship or blows have no effect on him. Forgiveness to all creatures, complete absence of self-conceit, deceitfulness or greed, perfect honesty, complete self-control and chastity should characterize all his actions, utterances and thoughts. He should be friendly towards all, pleased with the learned, compassionate and helpful to the suffering and neutral towards those who might be uncharitably inclined towards him. The one aim before an ascetic should be to perfect himself in self-control and knowledge and be a light to himself and others. There are fourteen stages of spiritual advancement laid down. These are called *guṇa-sthānas*. Of these, the first five are covered by a householder. The ascetic begins at the sixth with some slackness in conduct and thought-activities. This is remedied at the seventh, the passions are con-

trolled at the eighth, perfect purity of mind is achieved at the ninth, very little of self-interest remains at the tenth, all delusion subsides at the eleventh and ceases altogether at the twelfth. At the thirteenth he shines forth as a Teacher perfect in knowledge, with all the karmic influences at rest; he is a Kevalin, an Arhat or a Tīrthaṅkara. At the fourteenth *guṇa-sthāna,* the mortal coil is thrown aside once for all, and he becomes a *Siddha.*

V CONCLUSION

Traces of Jainism go far back into history and it is certainly older than Buddhism. It has made substantial contributions to the development of art in the country. Its literature is very rich and linguistically varied, preserving forms of languages which are nowhere else preserved. Its philosophy is dualistic, believing in the separate existence of soul and matter. Its ethics is based upon the principle of *ahiṁsā* and it tries to produce men who have no tendency to do violence to any creature, much less to a brother human being. Its attitude towards other faiths is determined by its philosophy of *anekānta* which teaches that every single statement may have a partial truth in it and that in order to get at the whole truth one must get together all the different points of view. Peace and tolerance are, thus, inherent in the system.



EARLY BUDDHISM

Here by Early Buddhism is meant Buddhism as based upon the Pāli Canon, and by Buddhism is meant a distinct body of culture or a distinct movement of civilization with its historical background in the literature, religions and philosophies, as well as in the social, educational and other institutions, of India. This body of culture or movement of civilization has for its vital force an inspiration and guidance ever sought to be derived from contemplation of the personality, the message, the teaching, the example, and the tradition of a highly gifted individual called the Buddha. This particular culture or civilization has different aspects of development--palæographical, linguistic, literary, religious, philosophical, ethical, social, artistic, and the like, each of which calls for and deserves patient study, special investigation, careful consideration and prudent judgement. Thus to contemplate Early Buddhism is mainly to consider that vital energy or inherent force of Buddhism in the earlier phases of its articulation and development by which various aspects of human culture or civilization gradually developed or could develop at all.

The Pāli Canon, on the evidence of which this consideration is here based, is not a Book which took its shape or came into existence all at once. It is only a corpus of texts that grew up by stages and no less by different permutations and combinations, additions and alterations, expositions and deliberations. And yet the whole of it is allowed by tradition to pass as *Buddhavachana*, the Word of the Buddha. The same is honoured also as *Pavachana* (*Pravachana*), 'the best of words.' The same is called *Satthusāsana*, 'the Authority of the Master.' The same constitutes *Pariyatti*, 'the main subject of study,' to the disciples and followers of the Buddha. It is to the self-same corpus of original and authoritative texts, as distinguished from the *Aṭṭhakathās* or commentaries, that the name Pāli was originally applied. Pāli as a language is no other than that which came to be known from a certain date as *Tantibhāsā* or diction of that corpus of texts. It is claimed by Buddhaghosa, the greatest known Pāli commentator, that the language through the medium of which the Buddha promulgated his doctrine and discipline, was Māgadhī. To Buddhaghosa as well as to other Pāli commentators,

Māgadhī is indeed the *nirutti* or diction of what is now known as the Pāli Canon. Whether or no the language of the extant Pāli Canon developed on the habitual diction of the Buddha is still a disputed question. Some attempts have recently been made to ascertain what Buddha's habitual diction was, but these have ended, on the whole, in certain speculations without any solution of the main problem. Some light has been sought to be thrown on this subject from the language of the inscriptions of Aśoka, and it has been rightly suggested that the Girnār is the main set of Aśoka's edicts, the dialectical basis of which is in many respects similar to that of Pāli.

The history of the Pāli Canon itself covers some five centuries of literary development from the day of the first impetus given it by the Buddha to that of the first commitment of the texts to writing towards the middle or end of the first century before Christ, during the reign of King Vaṭṭagāmaṇi, a pious Buddhist king of Ceylon. The Pāli Canon became virtually closed, once it was committed to writing, there being hardly any new addition to it thereafter. Most of the texts of this Canon are mentioned by name in the *Milindapañha*, a notable Pāli work of the first or second century A. D. The possibility of any further additions to, or changes in, those texts was finally checked by the growth of the *Aṭṭhakathās* or commentaries in Singhalese on the basis of which Buddhaghosa, Buddhadatta and Dhammapāla wrote their commentaries. A broad distinction is sought to be made between the Canon and the Pāli literature that subsequently developed by the denial of individual authorship in respect of the former and the claim of individual authorship in respect of the latter. In other words, the growth of the Canon is accounted for as a total result of joint efforts of many rather than as literary productions of individual teachers or authors. According to traditional computation, the Canon is composed of 84,000 *dhammakkhandhas*, sections and paragraphs, chapters and verses, as one might say, out of which 82,000 are Buddha's own, and the remaining 2,000 only are to be ascribed to his disciples. Even the words of his disciples the Buddha is said to have made his own by virtue of the seal of approval attached to them. Even where the fact of approval is wanting, all that is added to the Canon is regarded as Buddha's own word on the ground that everything developed on the basis of the *mātikās* or schemes formulated by him. Though many things—legends and anecdotes, similes and metaphors, phrases and idioms, may be shown to have been taken almost verbatim from the

current Indian stock, all, as interwoven into a composite whole, are to breathe the same spirit, to suggest the same trend of thought, to serve one and the same end. From whichever part of a sea or ocean water is tasted, its taste is salt (*loṇarasa*), just so *vimutti* or emancipation of *chitta* (consciousness) is the underlying religious sentiment of every part as of the whole. *Vimutti* is indeed the *rasa* or central interest which is taken to have given a new character or tone to the whole and part of the corpus of texts composing the said Canon.[1] This fact cannot be done away with in spite of its various divisions and types of literature.[2] Thus this *vimutti* or emancipation of consciousness which is claimed to have been for the first time experienced by the Buddha in the present age—the free state of mind which followed upon omniscience and sense of peacefulness of the entire being, is the central point of interest, so far as the purely spiritual aspect of *Buddhavachana* is concerned. Emancipation or freedom being inwardly a feeling in its character, and a state of consciousness itself, there necessarily arises a psychological or psychical aspect without appreciating which the religious or spiritual aspect cannot be realized. When *vimutti* is considered as the ultimate concept or category of thought, there arises an aspect which is epistemological. When the same is viewed as a thing or element in itself, the aspect or interest is ontological. When *vimutti* in this aspect is considered from the point of view of the continuity of an individual, the aspect or interest is eschatological. When *vimutti* is made the basis of human conduct and action, the aspect or interest is ethical or moral. When the same is made the source of inspiration for creation and self-expression, the aspect or interest is literary or artistic. When it is treated as the subject of exposition, the aspect or interest is exegetical. When it is used as a means to the solution of problems, the aspect or interest is philosophical. When the same is viewed as the highest object of veneration, the aspect or interest is devotional. When it is sought to be realized as the ideal of self-perfection, the aspect or interest is disciplinary or educational. It is in this manner that the rise of manifold aspects or interests of Early Buddhism is to be envisaged. *Nibbāna* or *nirvāṇa* is the grand name for *vimutti* which constitutes the central interest in Early Buddhism.

Early Buddhism broadly speaks of two aspects of *vimutti*: *Cheto-vimutti* and *paññā-vimutti*, emancipation by way of attainment of the

[1] *Aṅguttara* IV, p. 203; *Udana*, p. 56.
[2] *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī* I, p. 20; *Atthasalinī*, p 17.

free state of consciousness, and emancipation by way of development of reason or knowledge. The stepping-stone to either is *Sīla*,[1] a term which comprehends the whole of man's moral sphere of existence and behaviour. *Sīla*, *chitta* and *paññā* are the three main terms of the entire system of which the ultimate aim is the attainment of emancipation. *Chitta* or *samādhi* comprehends the whole of man's psychical sphere of existence and experience. *Paññā* or *vipassanā* comprehends the whole of man's rational sphere of existence and intellection. He who follows the path of *chitta* or *samādhī* to the exclusion of the other path is called in later Pāli nomenclature *samathayānī*, a follower of the path to tranquillity. He who follows the path of *paññā* to the exclusion of the former is called *vipassanāyānī*, a follower of the path to knowledge. The highest ideal of the path is the fulfilment of both the *yānas*: *samatha* and *vipassanā*. The process of *samathayāna* is essentially physio-psychological, mystical, psychical or intuitional. The directness of perception or immediacy of experience is the characteristic feature of this process. He who follows it exclusively, aspires at the most to become a *kāyasakkhī* or eye-witness to all presentations to, or to all states of, consciousness. The process of *vipassanāyāna* is, on the other hand, essentially ratiocinative, reflective or philosophical, and he who fulfils it is called *paññā-vimutta*, emancipated by way of reason or knowledge. This latter process has for its presupposition the former, so that he who fulfils it really fulfils both. The consummation, therefore, of *paññā-vimutti* is aptly described as *ubhatobhāgavimutti*, emancipation by way of both.

Four subordinate ways of emancipation are mentioned, namely, (1) that of simple faith—the way of *saddhānusārī*; (2) that of moral action and piety—the way of *dhammānusārī*; (3) that of religious conviction the way of *saddhā-vimutta*; and (4) that of rational faith—the way of *diṭṭhipatta*.[2] The first three ways are but three aspects of *saddhā* or faith and the fourth way is just a step to *paññā-vimutti*. So in another formation, *saddhā*, *samādhi* and *paññā* are set forth as three principal terms of Early Buddhism, *saddhā* being the first step towards *samādhi* and *paññā*. In a formal discussion and estimate of the values of the three, *saddhā* the strong point of the *saddhā-vimutta*, *samādhi*—the strong point of *kāyasakkhī*, and *paññā*—the strong point of *diṭṭhipatta* or *paññā-vimutta*, none is allowed precedence over the other two, each and all of them being

[1] *Saṁyutta* I, p. 23; *Milinda*, p. 34; *Visuddhimagga* I, p. 1.
[2] *Majjhima* I, p. 439.

taken in their highest values as balanced, synthesized or co-ordinated in one and the same system.[1]

Of the three—*saddhā, samādhi* and *pañña*—the first is the means to developing highest reverence for the Triad, the second is the means to developing the three kinds of *vijjā* or faculty, and the third is the means to developing the three kinds of *paññā* or knowledge. The Triad consists of (1) Buddha—the man, the master or the personality; (2) *dhamma*—the message, the doctrine and discipline, the system; and (3) *saṁgha*—the order, the organization, the institution. The three kinds of *vijjā* or faculty are: (1) *pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*—the faculty to recall all past experiences of oneself acquired in successive births or existences; (2) *sattānaṁ chutūpapātañāṇa*—the faculty to visualize the rises and falls of all beings from one state or position to another according to their deeds; (3) *āsavānaṁ khayañāṇa*—the faculty to perceive the course of extenuation of all extraneous impediments to consciousness.[2] The three kinds of *paññā* or knowledge are: (1) *sutamayī*—the knowledge which develops from an acquaintance with the words and views of others; (2) *chintāmayī*—the knowledge which develops from self-induced reason, and (3) *bhāvanāmayī*—the knowledge which develops by way of formulation of one's own system in relation to the current thoughts and ideas.[3] The rise of the faculties leads to the attainment of *vimutti* or free state of consciousness, and the latter in its turn leads to the acquisition of *vasībhāva* or mastery. Thus *vijjā, vimutti* and *vasībhāva* are taken to constitute three successive steps in the process of individual perfection.

The literary product of the first kind of *vijjā*, called *pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*, is the *Jātaka*, representing, as it does, the progressive course of an evolving individual culminating in Buddhahood. The literary product of the second kind of *vijjā*, called *sattānaṁ chutūpapātañāṇa*, is the *Apadāna*, recounting, as it does, the progressive course of other evolving individuals, the Theras and the Therīs, culminating in Arhatship or saintship. The net outcome of the third kind of *vijjā*, called *āsavānaṁ khayañāṇa*, is the formulation of various *mātikās* or architectonics of thought. These *mātikās* are composed of 37 principal terms that came to be known accordingly as *Sattatiṁsabodhipakkhiya-dhammā*, the 37 terms appertaining to the system of Buddhist thought. These terms are so well devised as to be considered sufficient to comprehend the entire universe

[1] *Aṅguttara* I, pp. 118-120. [2] *Majjhima* I, *Bhayabherava-Sutta*.
[3] *Dīgha* III, p. 219; *Netti*, p. 8.

of knowledge and discourse. The system is so well-founded and well-propounded that it is claimed in one of the *Suttas* that whatever the path actually adopted and followed for the attainment of *vimutti*, that path cannot but come within the scope of that which is outlined by those terms. The simile by which the point is illustrated is as follows: Just as where a walled and vigilantly watched city exists allowing a passage out of it only through one gate, all persons who pass out of this city must be said to have passed through that one gate, in the same way all persons who proceed towards final emancipation must be taken to have followed a course that falls within the scope of the system so outlined.[1] Thus it is on the comprehensiveness and universalization of the central concepts of the system that the claims of Early Buddhism are based. The system is so well tested and so much perfected in its comprehensiveness that it is launched forth as sufficient in itself for the guidance of all persons striving for *vimutti* without having to wait for the personal authority of a Master. Hence its best description is *ehi-passika dhamma*, the system with its motto: 'Come and see.'[2] Hence the commanding word of advice: "So behave that you make yourselves your own island, your own refuge, and that you seek no other refuge. So behave that you rely upon the system as your own island, as your own refuge, and that you seek no other refuge."[3]

Hence the assurance given that the system in itself is capable of taking the place of the Master in his absence.[4] Hence the reason why no personal successor to the headship of the Order was nominated by the Buddha, or why he himself did not claim that headship,[5] though, as a matter of fact, he acted as the forerunner, the pioneer, the inspirer to all who left the world, passed into the homeless state of recluses, to walk on the path leading to *vimutti*.[6]

Thus there are different formulations or architectonics of the system called *mātikās*, each of them representing a particular setting of terms comprehending either a universe of life and experience, or of thought and knowledge or of discourse and action. The gradational arrangement of terms in each of these settings is devised to meet all actual or possible situations which arise in reality from the procession of natural events, mental phenomena or the steps of thought. The *mātikās* as abstract schemes are fixed once for all, while the processions are left to be envisaged

[1] *Dīgha* II, p. 83. [2] *Ibid.* II, p. 93. [3] *Ibid.* II, p. 100.
[4] *Ibid.* II, p. 154. [5] *Ibid.* II, p. 100. [6] *Majjhima* I, *Bhayabherava-Sutta*.

individually in experience. In other words, I am disposed to hold that all the words of the Buddha contained in the Pāli Canon can be reduced to certain *mātikās* or abstract schemes of thought, developed and applied differently to suit different occasions or purposes. It is accordingly on the soundness of those *mātikās* that the claim of the Buddha's omniscience (*sabbaññutā*) ultimately rests.

All these basic formulations with their different annotations, applications, exemplifications and discussions constitute the system of Early Buddhism. The teachers through whose instrumentality this system developed have suggested certain keys to unveiling its secret—certain directions as to how to appreciate its content. These keys or directions are therefore, mainly concerned with the method of its interpretation. The keys or directions given are as follows:

1. That from the point of view of *saddhā-vimutti* there are three different approaches: one from the Buddha, the teacher, the master, the personality; one from *dhamma*, the teaching, the principle, the system; and one from *saṁgha*, the order, the organization, the institution.

2. That from the point of view of *cheto-vimutti* there are three different approaches: one from *pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*, the faculty to recall one's past career and experiences; one from *sattānaṁ chutūpapātañāṇa*, the faculty to recount the career and experiences of others; and one from *āsavānaṁ khayañāṇa*, the faculty to get rid of all impediments to a free state of consciousness.

3. That from the point of view of *paññā-vimutti* there are three different approaches: one form *sutamayī paññā*, the book-knowledge; one from *chintāmayī pañña*, the knowledge based upon original thinking; and one from *bhāvanāmayī paññā*, the systematic knowledge.

Thus the Word of the Buddha admits of different interpretations from different points of view. Each and every interpretation is welcome if it suggests or can be taken to suggest *vimutti* as the underlying trend and ultimate goal of Buddhism. But an issue will be joined as soon as it is claimed and maintained that any one of these interpretations is the only valid and convincing interpretation, there being no other such interpretation possible. The textual interpretation, as pointed out in the *Nettipakaraṇa* and the *Peṭakopadesa*, is only a mechanical interpretation from the point of view of *sutamayī-paññā*, the book-knowledge. Accordingly there are two other higher interpretations possible, one from the standpoint of *chintāmayī-paññā*, and one from *bhāvanāmayī*, neither of

which is attempted in the *Netti*. The so-called Four Noble Truths (*chattāri ariyasachchāni*), the fourfold insight (*chattāro paṭisambhidā*), the four modes of mindfulness (*chattāro satipaṭṭhānā*), the five *indriyas*, the five *balas*, the seven constituents of knowledge, *i.e.* *bodhi* (*satta bojjh-aṅgā*), the noble eightfold path (*ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo*), and the rest are all reducible to so many *mātikās* or ready schemes of thought, some with four headings, some with five, some with seven, some with eight, each of them being so well-formulated as to be able to serve as a definite structure of thought for a systematic and comprehensive discussion of a subject concerned. The claim set forth is that whatever the statements on a subject for which a particular *mātikā* is meant, those statements will fall within the scope of that *mātikā*. To claim that no one can reasonably add a fifth heading to the underlying scheme of Four Truths is to maintain that the scheme, as it stands, is sufficiently comprehensive to contain or accommodate the whole universe of thought or of discourse bearing upon the subject for which it is intended. The four headings have been filled up, interpreted and illustrated by these four terms: *dukkha* (commonly rendered as suffering), *dukkhasamudaya* (the cause of suffering), *dukkha-nirodha* (the cessation of suffering), and *dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā* (the way leading to the cessation of suffering). This mode of presentation has well served the purpose of the *saṁgha* in its mission work. Even it has been sought to be shown that this Buddhist scheme of thought with regard to *dukkha* was made to run parallel to that which was adopted in the science of medicine with regard to disease (*roga*), or that which was adopted in the science of wealth with regard to waste (*apachaya*), or that in the Yoga system of Patañjali with regard to the world (*saṁsāra*). The scheme of thought, as it stands, is thoroughly logical or scientific, no doubt. But as explained from the *saṁgha* point of view, the whole doctrine appears to be a shibboleth of mission-work.[1] That the whole of existence suggests pain as an experience, or that pain is involved in the whole of existence, is a truth the validity of which rests upon a powerful appeal to the sentiment of a man in a psychological mood. A truth which is so conditioned, hardly deserves the name of truth. It is rather a mood or motive than truth. So to serve as a sound architectonic of thought, the underlying scheme of the so-called Four Noble Truths must be viewed and interpreted differently to make it universally applicable to all matters of truth. Happily it is suggested throughout the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* that

[1] *Dhammachakka-pavattana-sutta*

the four points in the scheme of Four Truths are but typical illustrations of four points in the underlying scheme of four *paṭisambhidās*. Even this latter interpretation is so mechanical and arbitrary that no one can seriously take it to be a sound scheme of thought. In going to establish a stereotyped textual interpretation suited to their own purpose, the *saṁgha* appears to have missed altogether the meaning of the *mātikā* from the point of view of original thought and systematic knowledge. The *mātikā* with four headings must be taken to imply that each and every original thought on a subject, whatever the subject, to be systematic, complete and comprehensive, must embrace these four aspects of investigation or discussion:

(1) What are the current or accepted ideas of the time?

(2) How do they arise, what is their common ground, and whether that ground stands?

(3) Is there any new ground of thought or investigation? If so, what is it, and what new aspect or character will the problems assume when enquiry proceeds from that new ground, and what new decisions will be arrived at?

(4) What new deductions will follow therefrom for general guidance of human life, thought and action?

Thus statements under the first two headings are concerned with *sammuti* or accepted truths or current beliefs, and those under the remaining two headings are concerned with the advanced views of the thinker himself. The statement of current views, their meaning, the thesis, and the deductions are the four headings of the particular *mātikā* within the scope of which all statements of a person on a subject are bound to fall, and there is no room for the addition of an extra heading.

If the *mātikās* of four *satipaṭṭhānas* taken together with those of four *jhānas* be shown to agree in many respects with the Yoga system of Patañjali, the agreement between the two systems is not to be used as a proof of borrowing from a Hindu source which is pre-Pātañjala and pre-Buddhistic. If Patañjali's treatise be chronologically later than the Pāli Canon, the agreement should better be taken to attest the soundness of the *mātikā* as it finally shaped itself in *Buddhavachana*. All systems that are sufficiently analytical are expected to fall in harmony with the *mātikās* set forth, and it would be rather disappointing if they do not so harmonize. If any system of thought accords with any of the *mātikās*, it does not mean that that system represents the whole content of Early

Buddhism, which inwardly aspires to be that and something more than that (*uttaritara*).[1]

Just as, on the one hand, an interpretation based upon one *mātikā* or one set of *mātikās* is bound to be one-sided and therefore incomplete and ultimately unsatisfactory, so, on the other, all interpretations, if they are detached and disconnected, are inconclusive. It is accordingly urged that a method of interpretation must be followed by which all the *mātikās* may be made to appear in their logical or organic interconnection and lead to a central point. The simile by which this matter is to be illustrated is that of a *kūṭāgāra* or one-peaked house. Just as in a *kūṭāgāra* the frame, the rafters, the thatch of the roof, all taper to a point, in the same way the whole setting of the *mātikās*, as adopted in an interpretation, must lead to a central point, which is no other than *vimutti*[2] or emancipation by way of faith, by way of vision of a free state of consciousness, by way of reason or knowledge, or by way of all.

If such be the attitude of Early Buddhism towards all interpretations within, the question arises—what is its attitude towards all prevalent types or currents of Indian thought in the midst of which it arose? The attitude of Early Buddhism towards those types of thought without is fundamentally the same as that towards the diverse interpretations within. The current thoughts of the age are broadly classified under these three heads: (1) *sakkāya-diṭṭhi*, (2) *vichikichchhā*, and (3) *sīlabbata-parāmāsa*. *Sakkāya-diṭṭhi* is not the *satkārya-vāda* of the Sāṁkhya system, but just another name for *attavāda*—all manner of thinking or speculation about the nature, existence and destiny of the self and the world as a whole. *Atthi* and *natthi*, or *sassata* and *uchchheda* are mentioned as two main subdivisions of *sakkāya-diṭṭhi*. *Vichikichchhā*, as employed in the context, is not a mere psychological term meaning doubt or perplexity but a philosophical term designating all manner of thinking or speculation savouring of scepticism and involving doubt as the mental factor. Similarly, *sīlabbata-parāmāsa* is no mere ritualistic term but a philosophical term designating all manner of thinking or speculation tending to hold that the whole sphere of conduct or behaviour may be governed by a code of ethics or a code of discipline. Corresponding to the three Pāli terms the Jaina Canon has *akiriya*, *aṇṇāṇa* and *vinaya*, regarding which one has the following fruitful observations from Professor Jacobi:

[1] *Dīgha* III, p. 28, cp. *Majjhima* I, *Mūlapariyāya-sutta*, in which the sense of *uttaritara* is implied in *abhijanati*. Cp. also, *Majjhima* I, *Rathavinita* and *Maha-Assapura suttas*.
[2] *Milindapañha*, p. 38. [3] *Ratana-sutta* (*Sutta-nipata* and *Khuddaka pāṭha*).

"The views of the *ajñānikas*, or agnostics, are not clearly stated in the texts, and the explanation of the commentators of all these philosophies . . . . is vague and misleading. But from Buddhist writings we may form a pretty correct idea of what agnosticism (better scepticism) was like. It is, according to the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, the doctrine of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta. . . . . It is evident that the agnostics examined all modes of existence or non-existence of a thing, and if it were anything transcendental or beyond human experience, they negatived all those modes of expression. The records of the Buddhists and Jainas about the philosophical ideas current at the time of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, meagre though they be, are of the greatest importance to the historian of that epoch. For they show us the ground on which, and the materials with which, a religious reformer had to build his system. The similarity between those 'heretical' doctrines on the one side, and Jaina or Buddhist ideas on the other, is very suggestive, and favours the assumption that the Buddha, as well as Mahāvira, owed some of his conceptions to these very heretics, and formulated others under the influence of the controversies which were continually going on with them. . . . . The subtle discussions of the agnostics had probably misled many of his contemporaries. Consequently the *syādvāda* must have appeared to them as a happy way leading out of the mare of the *ajñānavāda*."[1]

The doctrine of Pakudha Kachchāyana, as stated in the *Sāmaññaphala* and other *Suttas*, serves as a typical example of *sassatavāda* or *āstikya*, and that of Ajitakesakambalī that of *uchchhedavāda* or *nāstikya*. The ascetic code of expiatory discipline and the legal code of the Brāhmin lawgivers serve as the typical example of *sīlabbata-parāmāsa* or *vinaya-vāda*—Formalism. The earlier form of Vedānta or *Brahmavāda*[2]—the Vedānta of the Upanishads, was well known, and so, perhaps, was known a type of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, which was then shaping itself through some of the earlier Upanishads, notably the *Kaṭha*. Like Sāṁkhya-Yoga, there were three other pairs of terms current—(1) *vibhajjavāda* and *kammavāda*, to characterize the system of the Buddha, (2) *syādvāda* and *kriyāvāda*, to characterize the system of Mahāvīra, and (3) *saṁsāra-suddhi* and *āhāra-suddhi*, to characterize the doctrine of Makkhali Gosāla, the system of the Ājīvikas.

Now, with regard to each and every one of those prevalent types of

[1] *Jaina-sūtras, S. B. E.*, Part II, pages xxvi-xxviii.
[2] *Vinaya-Mahāvagga*: *Vedantagū Udana*, p 3.

thought or speculation, the criticism offered is one offered from the standpoint of *sammā* or *samyak*, as contrasted with or distinguished from which the rest of the standpoints, whether dogmatist, sceptic or formalist, represent only varying degrees of *michchhā* or *mithyā*. None of the types is discarded *in toto* as false or erroneous. Each and every type is taken to hold good as far as it goes or as far as the way it traverses. Each has been viewed as a limited procession of thought, not leading to anything beyond it. The dogmatic mode of expression of each, hardly without any exception, is clearly expressive of an exclusive mental attitude. This exclusive mental attitude, this obstinate adherence to one's own standpoint, or this latent prejudice against all other views that are not claimed as one's own is at the root of the great conflict of ideas (*kalaha-vivāda*) which produced a mighty convulsion in the life of Indian philosophy just at the time of the rise of Buddhism. All that may be regarded as the oldest portions of the Pāli Canon vividly portray a picture of this conflict or turmoil, and no less that of preoccupation of the Buddha's thought with it.[1] There was also the eternal internal conflict in the mind of each individual arising from the sense of discordance between man's natural yearning for an immortal, immutable and sinless state, on the one hand, and the contingency of birth, decay, death and sin daily experienced, on the other. A vivid description of this latter conflict which lies at the back of all religious quest (*ariyā pariyesanā*) is given in the *Ariyā-pariyesanā-sutta*.[2]

The key to the solution of the internal problem of an individual is to be found in the internal vision of *chitta* or consciousness when it is in itself, in the highest state of its freedom and purity. *Suññatā* or unrelatedness is the highest conceivable condition of consciousness. According to later Buddhist terminology, *śūnyatā* is nothing but *grāhya-grāhakabhāva-rahitatā*, the absence of subject-object relation. This vision dawns on the consciousness when there are no impediments to obstruct it. The means by which the vision may be obtained is the practice of *jhāna* or meditation. Four *jhāna* stages are to be gone through on the four levels of consciousness or the four planes of experience, called *avacharas*: *kāma*, *rūpa*, *arūpa* and *lokuttara*. Eight *samāpattis* or states of trance are said to have been attained by the Indian *yogis* already before

[1] *Sutta-nipāta*, *Aṭṭhakavaggya*, *Kalaha-vivāda-sutta*, *Chūlavyūha-sutta*, *Mahāvyuha-sutta*; *Dīgha*, *Brahmajāla-sutta*, *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, etc.

[2] *Majjhima*, I, pp. 161 ff.

the advent of the Buddha.[1] These *samāpattis* or *samādhis* make up a range of the mind from the lowest of the *kāma* levels to the highest of the *arūpa*. The ninth state, called *saññāvedayita-nirodha*, is claimed to have been reached by the Buddha for the first time in history, achieving the highest record on the highest of the *lokuttara* levels and planes. When this state of trance is reached, the person attaining it appears to be in all sense dead but for the *ushmā* or bodily warmth as the only palpable sign of life.[2] It is in this state that the attainment of *cheto-vimutti* or *chetaso vimokho* is really possible. This unprecedented achievement in the psychical sphere enabled the Buddha to stratify the mental levels, planes of experience and the states of trance, and to lay the foundation of a complete system of physio-psychology with the superaddition of altogether a new section called *lokuttara* or supra-normal,[3] not to say, abnormal, which would rather be misleading. The passage of the mind from level to level, from plane to plane, or from trance to trance is inwardly a feeling process of isolation or self-alienation from object to object, the highest condition being reached when all sense of the object, and so of the subject, vanishes altogether. Each recurring experience suggests the idea of a *dhātu* or element in itself. On the occurrence of each experience, the conscious feeling is—' It is ' (*atthi*), and nothing beyond it.[4] It is only in this psychical process that the experience becomes possible, the personality develops and an open declaration to that effect follows. But as no experience recurs precisely in one and the same form, no stable ground of identity is found in actuality. There is an element or feature of novelty which ultimately goes to render each experience unique, with the result that the concepts or generalized ideas based upon the common features noticed are only intellectual approximations never restoring the actual facts of experience that only occurred once and for all. From the point of view of volition, the net result of the success in enabling the mind to pass from level to level, from plane to plane, and from trance to trance is that thereby all stages of consciousness, both supraliminal and subliminal, are brought to view in the same stretch of *ekaggatā* or one-pointedness of mind. The whole mechanism of mind being gone through and its working seen, the key is at last found to purify the entire nature, both within and without

[1] *Majjhima* I, p. 1165. [2] *Ibid.* I, p. 296.
[3] See *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Chittakaṇḍa* and *Rūpakaṇḍa*.
[4] *Dīgha*, *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-suttanta*; *Majjhima*, *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*.

(*anusaya* and *pariyuṭṭhāna*)—destroying the sin, root and branch. *Saṁsāra* is the process of the rise and intensification of complexity of mind. *Nibbāna* or *nirvāṇa* is the process of the lessening of complexity and the realization of the serenity of mind. Both being the possibilities in one and the same reality, it is for each individual to choose the one or the other.[1]

Now, wherein lies, according to *Buddhavachana,* the key to the solution of the other problem arising from the conflict of views and opinions which, as they are advocated, appear to be mutually contrary or contradictory? The characteristic language of advocacy of each dogma or creed, as pointed out in the *Udāna*[2] and other Pāli texts, is: *Idam eva sachchaṁ, mogham aññaṁ*—(What I affirm or assert is the only thing which is correct and tenable, and everything else is incorrect and untenable). Each of such assertions betrays an exclusive spirit of thought. A dogmatic assertion touches only one side of truth and implies only a partial view of reality (*ekaṅga-dassana*).[3] The action of this class of people is to be compared to that of a number of persons born blind who go severally to have an idea of the bodily form of an elephant, each describing the animal in terms of the likeness of a particular limb or part felt by the hand, instead of having a view of the animal's body as a whole.[4] The imperfection of each dogmatic view lies in its incompleteness or one-sidedness—the limited character of the procession of thought of which it is the outcome. Being in the midst of conflict of these views, one has got to choose between these four logical alternatives: (1) Position, (2) Counterposition, (3) Juxtaposition, and (4) Total negation. To put them in another form, the alternatives are: (1) Affirmation, (2) Contradiction, (3) Half-hearted compromise, and (4) Evasion of all issues.[5] To emphatically assert is not to establish the truth. To meet an adversary or to answer him is not to decry his position. To evaluate all views eclectically is not to advance the cause of thought, and to cast doubt on the certainty of all assertions is only to make confusion worse confounded, which can never be the way of enlightenment. To make all of them significant without undervaluing any is to take up one's stand in a transcendental position, viewing from which each dogma will appear as a limited procession of thought, traversing a certain ground of knowl-

[1] *Majjhima* I, pp. 167-168. [2] *Udana*, pp. 66-69. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 69. [4] *Ibid.*, pp. 67-69.
[5] *Majjhima-nikāya, Aggiva Chchhagotta* and other *Suttas*. Particularly for the evasion of all issues, note the doctrine of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta in the *Digha-nikāya* I, p. 58.

edge and experience. Examining and ascertaining the genesis of each, understanding how they represent different gradations or approaches of thought, the data on which it is based, and the purpose which it fulfils, the way of *sammā* or completing process of thought is discovered. This process can be worked up by balancing up all statements of truth and centralizing all thoughts that appear at first sight so widely divergent. Thus *sammā* is essentially the way of bringing all thoughts to a focus, and the point at which all of them are focussed or centralized is *majjha* or *madhya*. Thus the real solution of the problem arising from the conflict of thoughts as well as of actions lies in the capacity to centralize them—to fulfil the *majjha*.[1] In the *saṁgha* formulation of the doctrine, both *sammā* and *majjha* are employed as adjectives,[2] while in Buddha's terminology they are substantives.[3] Historically viewed, the rise of Early Buddhism means the final evolution of the way of *sammā* and the fulfilment of the ideal of *majjha*. *Majjha* is indeed the key-word of the entire system of Early Buddhism. It is indeed by *majjha* or determination of the central point, the farthest logical reach, that the centuries of thought-evolution, religious evolution, moral evolution, and cultural evolution in India were sought to be directed.[4]

[1] Aśoka's S. R. E : *Majjhampaṭipadayema*

[2] *Dhammachakkapavattana-sutta*, in which *samma* is used as an adjective in such terms as *sammā-diṭṭhi, sammā-saṁkappa* and the rest, and *majjhima* as an adjective to *paṭipadā*

[3] *Saṁyutta-nikāya* II 17, 20, 23, 61, 76, III 135 Cp Barua, *A History of pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p 406

[4] Following the lead given by Mrs Rhys Davids, some of the English and Continental scholars have started talking about pre-canonical Buddhism without any reference to the Buddha, which is just speaking of a Play of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark in it One may freely concede that all that is attributed to the Buddha in the extant Pali Canon is not precisely the word of the Buddha, But it becomes intolerable when, rejecting the whole of the tradition, Mrs. Rhys Davids ventures to say a number of things that the Buddha would simply blush to claim as his own

BUDDHISM

There were various religious and philosophical speculations in the country before the Buddha was born, which undoubtedly exercised a great influence upon his mind. We notice in the first place a class of people performing various Vedic rites and sacrifices in the belief that they helped one to gain not only the pleasures and enjoyments of this world and the next, but also liberation. Alongside of these advocates of Vedic sacrifices were others who had lost their faith in them and held that they could hardly bring about the highest bliss in life. Some of these thinkers attempted to interpret Vedic sacrifices allegorically, saying for instance, with reference to the 'horse-sacrifice' (*aśvamedha*), that the sacrificial horse was not an ordinary horse, but one having the dawn for the head, the sun for the eyes, the wind for the breath, the heaven for the back, the intermediate space between heaven and earth for the belly, the earth for the legs, and so on. They also interpreted the self of the sacrifice as the worshipper himself, his faith as his wife, his body as the firewood, his breast as the shrine, and so forth, concluding that one who knew this sacrifice attained success. For these thinkers, whose influence became stronger and stronger as time went on, the external Vedic sacrifices had no value whatsoever. They regarded them merely as frail rafts on which one could in no way cross the ocean of *saṁsāra* (relative existence). Thus they developed the new idea of internal sacrifice which came to be rightly known as *jñāna-yajña* (sacrifice of knowledge) in contrast with the older *dravya-yajña* (sacrifice with material things). Among the followers of this system of internal sacrifice are Vedāntins as well as the Buddha. Though this view may sound strange, it is amply substantiated in the following paragraphs.

As time went on, the authority of the scriptures, the source of Vedic sacrifices, began to lose its hold on the people. As a consequence there arose many free and independent thinkers who propounded new systems of religious and philosophical speculation.

Vedic rites often included animal sacrifices of a very cruel, horrible and revolting nature. The sacrificers themselves seem to have felt it, as is evident from the following short, yet very interesting, story in a Vedic text:

First the sacrificial essence was in man. So when the man was sacrificed, it entered into the horse. When the horse was sacrificed, it entered into the cow. When the cow was sacrificed, it entered into the sheep. When the sheep was sacrificed, it entered into the goat. When the goat was also sacrificed, it entered into the earth and was found there in the form of rice and barley of which is made the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*). Thus even the advocates of Vedic sacrifices used to say that the offering of animal sacrifice and that of the sacrificial cake were of the same efficacy. Gradually in later ages we find the offering of ghee and cake as substitute for animals (*ghṛitapaśu* and *pishṭapaśu*). And it is to be noted that at the present day a stem of sugarcane or a pumpkin gourd (*ikshudaṇḍa* or *kushmāṇḍa*) is sacrified as an animal by those worshippers who do not like animal sacrifice.

Be that as it may, a strong voice was raised by a certain section of the people against the Vedic sacrifices attended with animal-killing, which were openly declared to be impure (*aviśuddha*). It was also held that it was impossible to reach the final goal through them.

Now, as regards the earlier conception of the Vedic religion, some would say it was naturalism followed by anthropomorphism, while others would tell us that everything was believed to have been permeated by a soul. And with reference to the Vedic belief in God, scholars differ—some holding it to be polytheism, others to be monotheism or henotheism. There are some who view it as monism too. We are not going to enter into the details of this question here, but shall content ourselves with mentioning a bare fact on the point. It cannot be gainsaid that theism, in whatever form it might be, got a strong hold on the mind of some people at the time we are speaking of. Yet, by a large section of thinkers it was utterly ignored. This seems to have been due to two factors: firstly, the belief in the extraordinary power of Vedic rites grew so strong among the followers of the *karma-mārga* (path of ritual) that no necessity whatsoever was felt for the intervention of a God in bestowing the highest reward of the actions (*karmas*), *i.e.* heaven (*svarga*) or that bliss which never disappears; secondly, the Vedāntic monism declaring the existence of only One Self naturally removed the belief in God also. For, if there remains only One, it is the man himself or his Self, as it is impossible to think of one's own annihilation. Besides, the conception of God is possible only when there is the notion of both the worshipper and the worshipped, and not otherwise.

It is said that the solution of the problem of the creation and destruction of the world requires the conception of God. But there were some in that age according to whom there was neither the creation nor the destruction of the universe. It has ever been in the form in which it is now visible, the changes in it being due to different circumstances. Even accepting the theory of evolution and dissolution of the world, there were also some others who explained them in a different way, allowing thereby no room for the intervention of God. They advocated dualism believing in two eternal principles, the Self and the Primeval Cause (Purusha and Prakṛiti), from which both the evolution and dissolution of the world are quite deducible. No help is required of God for one's salvation too, for a man himself can realize it by following the path suggested.

When the *jñāna-mārga* (path of knowledge) of the Upanishad prevailed over the *karma-mārga*, external means for achieving the highest object of life naturally gave place to internal ones and thus meditation took the place of performance of rites and ceremonies: this gave rise to *yoga* which developed to a great extent and was being much practised in the country long before the advent of the Buddha. With regard to metaphysical or philosophical thoughts, there were various other sections of thinkers holding different views such as the efficacy of offering sacrifices and oblations, absence of results according to the good or bad nature of one's actions, the existence, non-existence and partial existence of this world and the next, the importance of discipline as the only means of attaining salvation, the origination of the world from Time or Nature and several others too numerous to be mentioned.

Now, man is naturally attached to worldly enjoyments and wants to satisfy thereby the organs of sense. But gradually when it was fully realized that their satisfaction could in no way bring about real happiness, those who were desirous of peace turned back and tried their best to control their senses, resorting to austerity or self-mortification in its different forms. In some cases these were carried to the severest possible extent. There was also a section who held that neither excessive indulgence in sensuous enjoyments nor extreme self-mortification was the right path, and practised a mild form of asceticism, as indicated by such words as *brahmacharya* (continence), *tapas* (austerity), *śama* (control of the mind), *dama* (control of the senses), etc., without which it is impossible to march along the path of salvation. With reference to ethical laws no special mention is needed. Long before the Buddha the religious life of

the country had attained a very high degree of moral standard, the key-note of which was *brahmacharya*, the root of all spiritual advancement.

Besides, we should bear in mind that the Upanishadic thoughts, especially the doctrine or theory of Ātman or Brahman, were then exercising a tremendous influence upon the people of religious disposition.

It was in this atmosphere of religious and philosophical speculations that the Buddha was born. Let us see how he felt towards these theories and what it was that led him to find out a different or new course for the salvation of the world.

The freedom of thought prevailing in his days helped to liberate him completely from every bondage of authority, Vedic or non-Vedic. He was independent in thought and followed reason and truth, in place of any person or group of persons, however great or experienced. He did not, however, altogether ignore public opinion in regard to some outward and trifling matters. He would ask his disciples not to accept his words simply out of regard for him, but to do so only after a thorough examination of them, just as a man accepts gold after cutting, burning, and rubbing it on a piece of touchstone. He was very practical, never indulging in mere speculation. He would never discuss any question which in his opinion was of no use to the enquirer. There are things that cannot be expressed by words, but are only to be realized by oneself. There are also truths that are too profound and difficult to be understood by ordinary people. With regard to such questions, even when pressed very hard, he would keep silent. This attitude of the Buddha was only natural; for the highest truth is in fact silence. It was declared by the sages of the Upanishads long before the Buddha: "We do not know, we do not understand how one can teach it. It is different from the known, it is also above the unknown--thus have we heard from those of old who taught us this."[1] In short, he was a *sthitaprajña*, one firm in judgement and wisdom, of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. His heart was very compassionate and full of genuine and unparalleled love for all living beings, and he used to feel very strongly their sufferings. Moved by the suffering that he saw around him he set out to discover a way of salvation, not first for himself, but for others; for he had such great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) that he did not care for his own salvation until everyone was set free from suffering.

Born in an atmosphere full of Upanishadic fragrance, he was, as the

[1] *Kena Up.* I.3.4.

canonical works will show, a real knower not only of the Veda (*vedajña*) but also of the Vedānta (*vedāntajña*) having fully practised *brahmacharya* (*Saṁyutta Nikāya* I. 168; *Suttanipāta,* 463). And, like the Vedāntists, after he had attained 'Supreme Knowledge' he used to perform not external but internal sacrifices. Once when (*Saṁyutta Nikāya* I.168) a Brāhmin came to him taking in his hands the remainder of his oblation, the Buddha is reported to have addressed him to the following effect: "Do not deem, O Brāhmin, that purity comes by mere laying wood in fire, for it is external. Having, therefore, left that course, I kindle my fire only within, which burns for ever, and on that I have my mind rightly fixed for ever." "Here in this sacrifice the tongue is the sacrificial spoon, and the heart is the altar of the fire."

Referring to such Vedic sacrifices as *aśvamedha, purushamedha,* etc., which are attended with the slaughter of animals, he holds that they do not make for the achievement of the desired result. Hence great sages do not perform them. On the other hand, the sacrifices in which no animal such as goat or sheep or cow is killed are of great reward and should be performed by the wise (*Saṁyutta Nikāya* I. 76). This view is expressed by the Blessed One more than once in the canonical works.

The words *Brahmaprāpti* (Pāli *'patti'*—attainment of Brahman) and *Brahmabhūta* (identified with Brahman) very well known in Vedāntism are sometimes found in connection with Buddhism in Buddhist works themselves, and there is no reason against accepting them in their Upanishadic senses though with some modification of what is known by the word *'Brahma'* in the compounds. The Buddha or an Arhat is often spoken of as *Brahmabhūta*, and if, for instance, one reads *Itivuttaka*, p. 57, with a considerable amount of knowledge of Vedānta, one will naturally be inclined to take it in its Vedāntic significance. The explanation of the word *'Brahma(n)'* in such cases by Buddhist authors seems to be from the sectarian point of view.. *'Brahma(n)'* being interpreted as 'highest or most excellent' (*seṭhtha or śreshṭha*), *Brahmaprāpti* is taken to mean 'attainment of the highest state,' while *Brahmabhūta* means 'most excellent being.' That in such cases the use of this word in the Vedāntic sense is quite possible is supported by the theory of *vijñāna* or *vijñānamātratā* of Vijñānavādins (idealists).[1]

[1] One may be referred here to the present writer's paper 'Evolution of Vijñānavāda' in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, March, 1934, pages 1 ff., in which an attempt has been made to show that the *vijñāna* of the Vijñānavādins is in fact identical with the Brahman of the Brahmavādins or Vedāntists.

Just as the Buddha, like some of his predecessors, including the strict followers of the Upanishads, had no faith in Vedic sacrifices, especially in animal-killing therein, so like some of his other predecessors he found no place for God too in his system of religion, nor did he discuss the creation and destruction of the universe. Similarly, he had no faith in any external means by which the highest success of life could be attained and consequently, again like the same predecessors of his, he accepted *yoga* and *bhāvanā* (meditation) for achieving that purpose, laying special stress on *brahmacharya*, as in the Upanishads. He repeatedly asked his disciples to practise it for putting an end to suffering (*Mahāvagga*, pp. 12ff.). Again, when he commissioned his disciples to preach his *dharma* (religion), he advised them to reveal nothing but the consummate, perfect, and completely pure *brahmacharya* (*Mahāvagga* I.ii.1).

Like the Vedāntists or the Indian philosophers in general, he held that the root cause of the *saṁsāra*, from which one seeks escape, is *avidyā* (ignorance), though its interpretation or the process of its action may be different with different thinkers. Again, like the same Vedāntists, he maintained very strongly that suffering is due to desire, *kāma*, which brings about one's bondage. This idea has found its fullest possible expression in the Hindu scriptures from the Vedas downwards. It is *kāma* that binds the world; there is no other bond. It is never satisfied, nor is it ever extinguished by enjoyment of desired objects. On the contrary, it grows stronger and stronger. So a sage says in a Vedic text (*Atharva-Veda* IX.ii.20): "How great in width are heaven and earth, how far the waters flow, how far fire—to them art thou superior, always great: to thee as such, O *Kāma*, do I pay homage." In a number of Vedic passages, *kāma* is identified with fire. And it is not far to seek why this identification is made. Fire is never satisfied with any amount of fuel, so *kāma* can in no way be satisfied with any amount of its object. The sages of the Upanishads realized it fully and the following few words give expression to what they felt: "When the *kāmas* that are in his heart cease, then at once the mortal becomes immortal and obtains here (*i.e.* in this world) Brahman."[1] The same or similar thoughts abound in other texts of the Upanishads, and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* is full of them.

Exactly the same view seems to have been held by the Buddha as

[1] *Kaṭha Up.* IV.10.

is seen from his declaration that the root cause of sufferings is *kāma*. And it is so well-known a fact that it needs no elucidation. The most significant incident of his life is that he conquered Māra, the Evil One. It is only after this that he became a Buddha. Remove all the legendary characters of the story and the bare truth will reveal itself that it was only after freeing himself from desire that he attained to Buddhahood, Māra being in the story the personification of desire. This may be compared with the well-known dialogue between Yama and Nachiketas in the *Kaṭhopanishad*. If one considers the tremendous evil consequence of pursuing *kāma*, it will be evident that there is no better word for its expression. *Māra* literally signifies what is meant by the word *mṛityu* (death), both of them being derived from the same root *mṛi* (to die). Who is it that does not know that *kāma* brings about death? The literature of the country tells the same story in one way or another.

We are told that whatever misfortunes there are, here or hereafter, they are rooted in ignorance (*avidyā*), and desire. Ignorance means non-perception or wrong perception of truth. One who does not perceive or wrongly perceives the truth imagines things which have no existence at all, and thinks evil to be good; and naturally there arises desire and it leads man astray, bringing about his ruin. Now the cessation of desire is possible only after the removal of ignorance, which requires for its own disappearance knowledge, or perfect wisdom, or perfection of wisdom.

The sages of the Upanishads solved the problem, realizing and advising that there is only the Self or Ātman without a second. "I am below, I am above, I am behind, before, right and left—I am all this."[1] And they declared: "If a man understands himself to be the Ātman, what could he wish or desire for the sake of which he should pursue the body?"[2] For "He who sees, perceives and understands this, loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self, becomes a *svarat* (self-resplendent)." That being the case, there is nothing that could be an object of desire. Nor is there anything to be frightened of, for the possibility of fear is only there where there are two. For instance, where there are both a tiger and a man, the latter may be frightened by the former. Thus by the realization of the Self one becomes completely free not only from desire but also from anxiety, trouble and sorrow. So it is said: "When a man understands that all beings have become only the Self, what sorrow, what trouble can

[1] *Chh* VII 25 1. [2] *Bṛih* IV 4 12 [3] *Chh* VII 25.2.

there be to him who once beholds that Unity?"[1] Thus, on these or similar grounds, the sages of the Upanishads urged: "Verily, the self is to be perceived, to be heard of, to be thought of, and to be meditated upon."[2]

It is not that the Buddha did not listen to the above declarations. He did; but his perception of the Self was quite different; for he thought that instead of being the cause of liberation as held by the followers of the Upanishads, the knowledge of the Self was, in fact, the real cause of bondage. The notion of 'I' and 'mine' is the cause of bondage, and, as such, it must be shaken off. On the point of the necessity of release from bondage, both the Vedāntin and the Buddha are at one, but, while the former maintains that it can only be effected by the knowledge of the Self, the latter differs saying that the notion of 'I' and 'mine' can in no way disappear if there really is the existence of the Self. This led him to take quite an opposite and a very bold view that there is no Self or Ātman, as it is understood. Here it is said by his followers that if one knows that, in fact, there is Ātman, one's notions of 'I' and 'mine' or *ahankāra* and *mamakāra* do not disappear and consequently there is no cessation of one's suffering. For, when a man sees that there is Ātman, he identifies his body with it, and there arises his lasting love for it. This love rouses thirst for comforts and this thirst prevents him from realizing the transitoriness of the objects he wants to enjoy, and he loves to think that they are his and adopts means for their attainment. Where there is the notion of the Self, there arises also the notion of the other-than-the-Self, and owing to this division of the Self and the other-than-the-Self, there spring up feelings of attachment and aversion from which all evils arise. Thus, once a devotee is said to have extolled the Buddha: "If there is the notion of 'I' (*ahankāra*) in the mind, the continuity of birth does not cease, nor goes away the notion of 'I' from the mind, if there is the notion of Ātman. And there is no other teacher than you in the world advocating the absence of Ātman. Therefore there is no other way to deliverance than your doctrine." And it is said by a prominent teacher of Buddhism that as all the passions and evils arise from the notion of Ātman (*satkāyadrishṭi*) and the object of the notion is Ātman itself, its very existence is denied.

In order to root out desire (*kāma*) attempts are made in the doctrine

[1] *Īśa.* 7. [2] *Brih.* II 4 5, IV 5 6

of the Buddha to show that there is neither the subject nor the object of desire, and if that be so, naturally desires can in no way arise. Thus there is the cessation of desire, whereupon liberation or *nirvāṇa* follows as a natural sequence.

The question is, how it can be held that there is no existence of the subject and the object of desire in the face of their clear perception by everyone of us. The solution is supplied by what is known as the doctrine of *anātman* (absence of Self) or *nairātmya*.

The denial of Ātman is called *nairātmya*, literally 'the state of being devoid of Ātman.' Radically the word *ātman* means 'nature' (*svabhāva*: 'own being'), which never undergoes any change, nor depends on anything for its being. The Self is called Ātman, because, according to those who believe in it, it has the nature described above. Therefore it is held to be eternal.

This *nairātmya* is twofold: *pudgala-nairātmya* and *dharma-nairātmya*. *Pudgala* is nothing but what is known to us by such terms as *sattva, jīva, purusha,* and so on, that is, the Self. By *pudgala-nairātmya* we understand that what is believed to be a Self or Ātman has no independent nature of its own, and consequently no existence in fact, and therefore it is not a thing in reality (*vastusat*), but exists merely in imagination as a name, a term, a designation, a convention for serving the purpose of ordinary life. Similarly, the *dharmas* or things around us, internal or external, have not their Ātman or independent nature, because they depend for their being on causes and conditions (*pratītya-samutpāda*). And how can that which is not in its own nature, be in the nature of others? Therefore the things visible also have no existence in fact and are merely imaginary. This is *dharma-nairātmya*. Argument after argument has been offered in support or in refutation of this view, but to avoid prolixity, we need not discuss them here.

There being neither the subject nor the object, there is no room for desire in the case of a wise man.

This idea lies at the root of the two well-known schools of Buddhism, Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda. Taking its stand on such statements of the Buddha as 'All this is nothing but *chitta*,' a statement undoubtedly based on the Upanishads, as we shall see later on, the Vijñānavāda postulates the existence of *chitta* or 'mind' only, as the Vedānta of Brahman only, and utterly denies all external things which are, according to it, just like the phantoms created in a dream. Impuri-

ties or passions (*kleśas*), such as desire, obstruct the attainment of liberation, and, as such, are regarded as a 'cover' (*kleśāvaraṇa*). They are due to the conception or notion of Ātman or Self (*ātmadṛishṭi*), and so they must disappear only when one really understands that in fact there is nothing that can be called Self (*pudgala-nairātmya*). Then follows liberation.

Man is steeped in ignorance about the things he sees around him, for the things he sees are not in fact what they appear to him, they being only the vibrations (*spanda*) or transformations (*pariṇāma*) of *chitta*. Such ignorance is also an obstruction and, like darkness, covers the knowable (*jñeya*), the real truth, and is known to be a 'cover of the knowledge' (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).[1] When this cover is completely removed by means of the right view of things, one becomes omniscient (*sarvajña*).

The advocates of the Śūnyavāda who also hold the doctrine of *pudgala* and *dharma-nairātmya* or *śūnyatā*, as explained above, teach us that there is nothing real, as everything is devoid of its innate or independent nature; that being the case, anything that appears before us depends for its being on causes and conditions. It cannot, therefore, be said that there is anything in its own or innate form (*sva-rūpa*). We see a thing, no doubt, but it appears to us in its imposed (*āropita*) form, and not in its own form (*sva-rūpa*).

Now, if a thing visible to us is only in its imposed form, of what kind is it then in reality? What is its own form? The answer is that it is *dharmatā* (the state of being a *dharma*, thing). But what is *dharmatā*? Own being (*sva-bhāva*). What is own being? Nature (*prakṛiti*). And nature? That which is called voidness (*śūnyatā*). What does voidness mean? The state of being devoid of own being (*naiḥsvābhāvya*). And what are we to understand by it? That which is 'suchness' (*tathātā*). What is 'suchness'? Being of such nature (*tathābhāva*), that is, the state of being not liable to change (*avikāritva*), the state of permanent existence (*sadāvasthāyitā*).[2]

To be more clear, the *svabhāva* of a thing means only that which is independent of another (*paranirapeksha*), and thus, having not been before, it does not come into being (not *abhūtvā bhāvaḥ*). Therefore the *svabhāva* of fire is nothing but its non-origination (*anutpāda*), and not its heat, because it depends on its causes and conditions, and comes into

[1] Some would explain that as *kleśas* themselves are regarded as a 'cover,' so are also the things which are knowable (*jñeya*).

[2] *Mādhyamkavṛitti*, pp. 264-265.

being after having not been at first. Thus there appears nothing, nor does anything disappear; nothing has an end, nor is anything eternal; nothing is identical nor is anything differentiated; nothing comes hither, nor does anything go thither; there is only dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), where ceases all expression (*prapañchopaśama*).

Viewing things in this light, these teachers, the propounders of the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, which in this system implies simply the rejection of all sorts of imposition (*sarvāropa-nirākriyā*), declare that anything, external or internal, that appears to us as existing is, in fact, unreal, like the imaginary town in the sky (*gandharva-nagara*). Thus, there being nothing internally or externally, the notion of 'I' and 'mine,' technically *satkāyadrishti*, disappears completely, as there is neither the subject nor the object of the notion. The disappearance of this notion is followed by the disappearance of *saṁsāra* which has its roots struck deep in it. The sole object of the followers of the Śūnyavāda is to root out the notion of 'I' and 'mine,' or the Self and that which belongs to the Self.

It is appropriate to give here the following English translation of a passage from a very old work, *Āryadharma-saṅgītisūtra* as quoted in the *Sikshā-samuchchaya*, p. 264:

" One who believes in the void (*śūnyatā*) is not attracted by worldly things, because they are baseless. He is not delighted by gain, nor is he cast down by not gaining. He does not feel proud of his glory, nor does he hold back from lack of glory. Scorn does not make him shrink nor does praise win him. Neither does he feel attached to pleasures, nor does he feel aversion to pain. He who is not so attracted by worldly things knows what the void means. Therefore one who believes in the void has neither likes nor dislikes. He knows that which he might like, to be only void, and regards it as void only. He who likes and dislikes anything does not know the void, and he who indulges in quarrel or dispute or debate with any one does not know this to be only void nor does he so regard it."

When by the meditation on *śūnyatā* vanishes the idea of 'I' and 'mine' both internally and externally, all the *upādānas* 'holdings-up,' viz. desire (*kāma*), wrong views (*drishti*), belief in rites (*śīlavrata-parāmarśa*), and soul-theories (*Ātma-vada*), also vanish. This extinction of *upādānas* is followed by that of birth. Thus *karmas* and passions being extinct, *moksha* (liberation) is obtained.

The Vijñānavāda referred to above is said to be based on the Upanishads. This will be perfectly clear if one reads the Vedānta in the light thrown by such older teachers as Gauḍapāda. In the Upanishads Brahman which is identical with Ātman is only *vijñāna* (consciousness) or *jñāna*. Therefore Brahmavāda or Ātmavāda is in fact Vijñānavāda. Somehow or other, when all these three, Brahman, Ātman and *vijñāna*, are regarded as identical, the following and similar Upanishadic texts can very well be quoted as referring to *vijñāna*: "Verily, all this is Ātman,"[1] "Brahman alone is all this,"[2] "All this is Brahman,"[3] "There is no diversity here. He who perceives diversity here goes from death to death."[4] Thus, to say all this is Brahman or Ātman amounts to saying that all this is *vijñāna*, or in other words, all this is a *vivarta*, 'illusory manifestation' or *pariṇāma* 'transformation' of Brahman or *vijñāna*. Compare this with the following words which are said to have been uttered by the Buddha himself: "O the sons of Jina, the three planes are only *chitta*." The words *chitta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* are synonymous. It is evident from the above that in both the Vedāntic and Buddhistic schools of thought, the external world has in fact no reality; and though it appears to us, this appearance itself is due to *avidyā* according to the Vedāntins, or to *vasanā* (mental impression), as the Buddhists would maintain. In other words, it is *avidyā* or *vāsanā* that changes *vijñāna* into external phenomena as in illusion, mirage, dream, etc.

The idealistic interpretation of the Vedānta is fully supported by Gauḍapāda in his *Āgamaśāstra* or *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* as is generally known. Readers are referred to that work from which, for reasons of space, only a few passages are quoted below:

"This duality, having the subject and the object, is only the vibration of *chitta*. *Chitta* has in fact no object; therefore it is said to be always free from attachment (*asaṅga*: having no attachment or relation to an object)" (IV.72). Here vibration of *chitta* implies the activity of the mind, owing to which objects are represented. "As the movements of a fire-brand appear to be straight or crooked, etc., so the vibrations of *vijñāna* appear as the subject and the object" (IV.47). "As a fire brand when it does not move has no appearance (of its being straight etc.) and (thus) is not born, so when the *vijñāna* does not vibrate, it has no appearance (of the subject and the objects), and thus it is not born"

[1] *Chh.* VII.25.2. [2] *Muṇḍ* II 2.11 [3] *Chh* III 14 1 [4] *Bṛih* IV 4 19

(IV.48). " When a fire-brand moves, the appearances are not produced from anything other than that, and when it is at rest, they are not in a place other than that, nor do they enter then into that" (IV.49). "As the appearances are produced only when there is the vibration of *vijñāna,* so they have no other cause apart from this *vijñāna;* nor do they rest in anything other than this, or enter into it, when the vibration of *vijñāna* ceases " (IV.51). " As in dream, owing to illusion, the mind moves having the appearance of duality (of the subject and the objects), so does it in the waking state, owing to illusion, having the appearance of the duality" (III.29). "There is no doubt that as in dream the mind, though without a second, appears in the form of duality, so does undoubtedly the mind in the waking state appear in the form of the duality, though it is without a second" (III.30).

Let one read here the following few lines from the *Laṅkāvatāra* (Ed. B. Nanjio), the well-known work on the Buddhist Vijñānavāda: " All this is *chitta.* It comes forth in two ways—in the forms of the subject and the object. There is neither Ātman, nor anything belonging to it" (III.121, p. 209). "There is only *chitta,* and not the visible. The *chitta* comes forth in two ways—in the form of the subject as well as of the objects. It is neither eternal, nor has it annihilation " (III.65, p. 181).

" The *chitta* of man inclines (to its objects) in the form of the subject as well as of the objects. There is no characteristic of the visible as imagined by fools " (X.58, p. 272). That the visible universe is the creation of *vijñāna,* or *manas,* or *chitta* is found also in the *Maṇḍala-brāhmaṇopanishad* (Mysore, 1900, p. 12) where we read: " The mind which is the author of the creation, continued existence, and dissolution of three worlds, disappears, and that is the highest state of Vishṇu." In the Vijñānavāda the theory of *vijñaptimātratā* or *vijñānamātratā* is well known. Literally, *vijñānamātra* means ' simply *vijñāna,*' and its state is *vijñānamātratā.* When the *vijñāna* does not perceive any object whatsoever, it rests only in itself. This state of resting of the *vijñāna* only in itself is called *vijñānamātratā.* And this is, as the Vijñānavādins say, *mukti,* ' deliverance.'

In the Vedānta this *vijñānamātratā* is expressed in the words, *ātmasaṁstha-jñāna* (*jñāna* that rests in itself) of Gauḍapāda in his *Āgamaśāstra* (III.38). This statement of Gauḍapāda is undoubtedly based on such words of the Upanishads as the following (*Chhāndogyopanishad* VII.24.1-2: " Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing

else, understands nothing else, ... that is the Infinite (*bhūman*) . . . . The Infinite is immortal. The finite is mortal." "Sir, in what does the Infinite rest?" "In its own greatness or not even in greatness."

The exposition of Gauḍapāda (III.46) is here very clear. Says he, "When the *chitta* does not fall into a state of oblivion, nor is distracted again, nor is unsteady, nor has it any sense-image, then it becomes Brahman."[1]

Thus the *vijñānamātratā* of the Vijñānavādins is in fact the *Brahmabhāva* of the Brahmavādins or Vedāntins. *Brahmabhāva* means the 'state of Brahman' or 'becoming Brahman.' And this is the *mukti* of the Brahmavādins. Therefore, on this point, which is a vitally important one, there is entire agreement between the two Vijñānavādins —the Vedāntists and the Buddhists. Or to put it in other words, the original author of the Buddhist Vijñānavāda, *i.e.* the Buddha himself, understood the Vijñānavāda or Brahmavāda of the Upanishads in the same light as adopted by such teachers as Gauḍapāda and the author of the *Yogavāsishṭha Rāmāyaṇa*. It is, therefore, not too much to say, at least so far as the present point is concerned, that the Buddha was really a knower of the Vedānta, as observed above. It can further be observed, I think, that the *prapañchopaśama* of the Mādhyamikas, and the later Upanishads such as the *Māṇḍūkya*, *vijñāna* or *vijñaptimātratā* of the Vijñānavādins, *nirvāṇa* of the Buddhists in general, *Brahmaprāpti* or *Brahmabhāva* of the Vedāntins, *kevala jñāna* of the Sāṅkhyas, *yoga* or *chittavṛitti-nirodha* of the Yogins, *parama pada* of Vishṇu in the Upanishads and the devotional literature of the country, are, in fact, different expressions of one and the same thing.

It is evident from the dialogue between Assaji and Sāriputta, as described in the *Vinaya* (*Mahāvagga* I.23), that the spirit of the truth that dawned upon the Buddha lies in his explanation of the origination and cessation of the objects that proceed from a cause. This refers to his law of twelve-membered cause of existence (*dvādaśāṅga nidāna*) and dependent origination (*pratītya samutpāda*). They show the gradual origination of the whole mass of sufferings, the starting point of which is ignorance (*avidyā*), and also its cessation through the cessation of its fundamental cause, ignorance.

Now, the cessation of ignorance depends only on *bodhi*, 'Supreme

[1] See my paper 'Evolution of Vijñanavada' in *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. X, March, 1934, pp. 1 ff.; and the *Gaudapada karika* and the *Mandukya Upanishad* in the *Proceedings and Transactions* of the Second Oriental Conference, Calcutta, 1922, pp. 459 ff.

Knowledge,' which is in no way easy to acquire. An aspirant to it, who is known in the system by the name of Bodhisattva, is to strive for it throughout his life doing various duties. The ideal of this practice (*charyā*) of a Bodhisattva is very great; indeed, there is nothing more ennobling in Buddhism than this. It is not the subtle truth nor the profound philosophy of Buddhism that attracted people of so many lands, for we cannot think that the average person understood them thoroughly and then accepted the religion, for, in the words of the Buddha himself, they are very difficult to perceive and to understand, unattainable by reasoning, intelligible only to the wise. What is it then in Buddhism that won the heart of the people? It is the noble aim to be achieved, the discipline to be observed, and the practice to be made through the whole life by a Bodhisattva for *nirvāṇa*.

Before becoming a Buddha, anyone who strives for Buddhahood is a Bodhisattva, and everyone can become a Buddha. Therefore the Bodhisattva stage is the stage of discipline preparatory to the attainment of *bodhi*.

The first and the most important thing in the life of a Bodhisattva is *mahāmaitrī*, 'great love' and *mahākaruṇā*, 'great compassion.' *Maitrī* is that love for all beings (*sarva sattva*) which a mother feels towards her only and very dear son. And the *maitrī* that prompts a Bodhisattva to offer his body and life and all sources of good (*kuśalamūla*) to all living beings without any expectation of return is *mahāmaitrī*. And the thought or intention to work for the deliverance of all sentient beings, fallen into the unfathomable and unbounded ocean of *saṁsāra*, is called *karuṇā* (compassion). And that *karuṇā* with which a Bodhisattva desires *bodhi* or enlightenment not first for himself but for others is *mahākaruṇā*. We are told that the prince of Kapilavāstu, Siddhārtha, when he was in the stage of a Bodhisattva, was moved not by his own sufferings but those of the world, such was his love and kindness towards it.

Therefore a Bodhisattva, with a heart full of *mahāmaitrī* and *mahākaruṇā*, knowing thoroughly the miseries, sorrows, and sufferings of the world, identifies his own happiness with the removal of the sufferings of all creatures, and meditates as follows:

"When pain and fear are not pleasant to me as they are not to others, then how am I different from others that I should preserve myself and not others?"

Thinking thus, a Bodhisattva, in order to put an end to pain and attain the height of joy, both for himself and all other living beings of the world, makes his faith (*śraddhā*) firm and fixes his mind on *bodhi*, praying: "May I become a Buddha to effect the good and happiness of all sentient beings of the world and to put an end to all their sufferings." "By this good action of mine may I become ere long a Buddha, so that for the good of the universe I may preach the truth, delivering thereby all living beings, now subjected to various sufferings."

Undoubtedly he wants the cessation of suffering, *nirvāṇa*, but first not for himself, but for others. Until every living being is delivered he does not desire his own deliverance. He does not want to cross the ocean of existence only for himself, but wants to make others also cross it. Extremely difficult is the path of a Bodhisattva, yet he dares to tread it out of his love for his fellow beings. He takes the vow and resolves that so long as there is no end of birth he would observe the practices of a Bodhisattva for the well-being of all. And when he once takes the vow he would on no account give it up. He does not want to gain enlightenment hurriedly, but would wait till the last individual of the universe is emancipated from the bondage of *saṁsāra*.

Multifarious are the duties of a Bodhisattva which can hardly be performed by any one. Hence he attempts to understand their vital points (*marmasthāna*). What are these vital points? Sacrifice of all that is in one's possession—one's person, enjoyments, and the merits throughout all time. And with what object? The good of all living beings.

Indeed, for a Bodhisattva there is no sphere of success (*siddhikshetra*) other than that of sentient beings, all success in his life being dependent only on his service to them. So they are regarded by him as *chintāmaṇis* (thought gems), or *bhadraghaṭas* (vases of fortune), or *kāmadhenus* (wish-yielding cows); and they are served by him as teachers and gods. He is to worship the Tathāgatas (Buddhas) and he thinks that this can be done only by serving the world. Hence he says: "In order to worship the Tathāgatas I undertake the duties of a servant of the world. Let the multitude of people put their feet on my head, or let them kill me, let the Lord of the world (Buddha) be pleased. The kind-hearted Tathāgatas have identified themselves with the world, indeed they are seen in the form of beings; these are the only Lords. Why then show them disrespect? This is the worship of the Tathāgatas, this is the

accomplishment of one's own good, this is the removal of the world's trouble. Let this, therefore, be my holy practice (*vrata*)."

How a Bodhisattva serves humanity comes out in his own words:

"*Nirvāṇa* lies in the surrender of all things and my mind is inclined to do so; therefore, if I must surrender all, it is better to give it to all beings. I yield myself to them, let them do with me whatever they like. They may smile at me or revile me, bestrew me with dust. Or they may play with my body, or laugh and play wanton; when my body is dedicated to all, I need not think about it. They may get any work they like done by me to their own satisfaction. May there never be any evil to any one from me. May all who attribute some offence to me, or all who do any harm to me, or all who laugh at me, attain enlightenment (*bodhi*). May I be a help to the helpless, a guide to the travellers, a boat, or a dike, or a bridge for those who want to go to the other side.

"May I be a lamp to those who want it, a bed for those who require it, a servant of all. May I have the power to dispose myself in various ways, so that all living beings in space may live upon me until they are liberated."[1]

Let me quote here one stanza more from the same work, embodying the essence of the ideal of a Bodhisattva, which will speak for itself: "Let whatever suffering the world has, come to me and may the merits of the Bodhisattva make it happy."

The same idea has struck its root deep in Brāhmaṇism, specially in Vaishṇavism. Rantideva supplicates fervently in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (IX.21.12): "I do not want the highest state from God, nor do I want the attainment of the eight powers (*siddhis*), nor the absence of rebirth, but I want to undergo the sufferings of all beings, being in them, so that they may become free from miseries."

The following is from the prayer of Dhruva who was asked by his beloved Lord, when He appeared before him, to choose a boon:

"I pray for the well-being of the universe. I want no boon.".

The following is quoted from the *Mahānirvāṇatantra* (II.33). Mahādeva says to Pārvatī:

"O Parameśvarī, if good is done to the universe, the Lord of it is pleased, since He is its soul, and it depends on Him."

And the following is quoted in Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary on the

[1] *Bodhicharyāvatāra* III, pp 11-14, 16-21.

Brahmasūtra I.2.1: "The worship of Śiva consists in being of service to all, conferring benefits on all, and giving assurance of safety to all." This idea has found its fullest expression also in the following short *mantra* (formula) in a daily rite called *tarpaṇa* incumbent on every householder: "May the three worlds be satisfied! May the world including all from Brahmā (the Creator) to a stump of grass be satisfied." The sages of the Vedas make devout prayers: "May all directions (*diś*) be my friend!"[1] "May all beings see me with the eyes of a friend! May I see all beings with the eyes of a friend! May we all see all beings with the eyes of a friend!"[2]

Thus it cannot be denied that the development of the idea we are discussing owes much to Buddhism.

[1] *Atharva-Veda* XIX.16.6. [2] *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* 36.18

ESCHATOLOGICAL ASPECT OF NIRVĀṆA

The belief already gained ground among the people of India at the time of the rise of Buddhism that true salvation of man consists in evolving into an eternal personality exhausting all possibilities of rebirth —of reappearing in the mother's womb as they would put it. The whole chain of reasoning is: To be subject to birth is to be subject to decay and death. The world of life is so ordained that there is no escape from decay and death for one who has been brought into existence by the natural process of creation—by the parental union in the case of all higher forms of earthly beings.[1]

The very possibility of such an escape is denied by the daily experience of things or events happening around and at all times.[2] Even a Buddha or Tathāgata cannot escape it in spite of his universally admitted and unrivalled greatness and perfection.[3] And *saṁsāra* for an individual is nothing in common parlance but the painful necessity of undergoing the repeated process of birth and death—running in the course of transmigration of soul,[4] or finding somehow the concatenation of individual existence through the repeated natural process of birth and death.[5]

It is the consciousness of the 'contingent character' of *saṁsāra*, the world of life and existence, and the bitter experience of its 'unpleasantness' or 'unsatisfactory sequel' that is at the back of the religious quest of a permanent ground of existence and experience—a permanent feature or element of reality, some sort of an Absolute. So Buddha is represented as saying: "Having been myself subject to the contingency of birth and experienced its unpleasantness, I sought for *nirvāṇa* which is without such contingency—which is unsurpassed and secure from all worldly yoke, and obtained it. Subject to the contingency of decay, the contingency of disease, death, sorrow and sin, I sought for *nirvāṇa* which is without such contingency—which is unsurpassed and secure from all worldly yoke, and obtained it. The knowledge with the vision arose: 'Sure is my final emancipation, this is the last birth, there is no longer the possibility of rebirth.' Then this thought occurred

[1] *Majjhima* I, p. 266.
[2] *Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta, Dīgha* II, p. 158.
[3] *Dīgha* II, p. 157; *Majjhima* I, p. 82.
[4] The idea is Brāhmaṇical as well as Jaina.
[5] The Buddhistic way of expressing it.

to me: "I have reached this element of things which is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, tranquil, excellent, not within the access of mere logic, subtle and to be experienced only by the wise, each for himself.' The multitudes find delight in the home, they are attached to the home and rejoice over it. It is difficult indeed for them to apprehend this position (of *saṁsāra*), namely, the causal determination of all occurrences in fact—to apprehend also this position (of *nirvāṇa*), namely, that it is the subsidence of all predisposition towards the form of creation, the relinquishment of all ideas of belongings, the extinction of desire, the dispassion, the cessation, the ultimate."[1]

The authoritative utterance or verbal testimony (*aññā, ājñā*) of all the early Buddhist brethren and sisters is to this effect: "I have lived the holy life, done all that I was to do, and am now free from all attachment. Completely destroyed is the cause of birth through cycles of existence; there is no longer the possibility of any rebirth."[2]

But is this a genuine feeling felt in the innermost depth of one's being or self-consciousness, or an actuality? The question was raised by many an interested inquirer in Buddha's time, and it still remains: What happens to a Tathāgata (perfect man) after death? Does he continue to exist or does he cease to exist? Does he both exist and not exist, or does he neither exist nor not exist?[3]

Buddha felt constrained to remain silent whenever such an inquiry was pressed. He was always reluctant to commit himself to any statement in reply to any of the above four queries. The real reason is that he was not prepared to admit any of the questions—to entertain the inquiry in that form. With the inquirers, however, those were the questions that vitally concerned them.

In the *Chūḷa-Māluṅkya-Sutta* (*Majjhima* I, p. 432), Māluṅkyāputta is advised by Buddha to treat his *abyākata* (point in regard to which he did not commit himself to any one-sided statement whatsoever) as *abyākata*, and his *byākata* as *byākata*. The inquiry referred to above is to be counted among Buddha's *abyākatas*. Seeing that another inquirer, Aggi-Vachchhagotta, got rather puzzled than enlightened when he was told in all stages of inquiry, 'Vachchha, the inquiry in this form does not suit me, is not fitting,' Buddha felt it necessary to explain his own position thus: "Just as it is not possible to know whither the fire is gone which was so long burning before a man after it is extinguished

[1] *Majjhima* I, p. 167. [2] *Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā*. [3] *Majjhima* I, pp. 426 f.

once for all on the exhaustion of all materials of burning—the fuel, in the same way it is not possible to represent a Tathāgata after he has passed away on the complete exhaustion of all materials of bodily existence and of all pre-requisites of representation of an individual as commonly known."[1]

To say that Buddha attained *parinirvāṇa* is the same as to say in ordinary language that he died.[2] In his own words, to attain *parinirvāṇa* is to see 'the fire of life extinguished in that elemental condition of extinction which allows no residuum of possibility for reignition.'[3] The manner in which Buddha attained *parinirvāṇa* is said to have been described by Thera Anuruddha in the following terms: "There was then no process of respiration to be noticed in the organism of the great saint whose mind was then unshaken, steadily concentrated, and was on its peacefulness, when he expired. With an unperturbed mind he did bear the pangs of death. Just as fire extinguishes on the exhaustion of all materials of burning, in the same way his consciousness became completely emancipated."[4]

In the *Ratana-Sutta*, the disciples of Buddha who experience or realize the bliss of *nirvāṇa* are praised as personages who 'expire like a burning lamp (on the exhaustion of oil and wick).'[5] Whilst they live, they live enjoying the bliss of peace obtained without having to pay any price for it.[6]

Such is, in short, the Buddhist description of *parinirvāṇa* which is the natural end of life of those gifted men who realize *nirvāṇa* in their present conscious existence.

With the Jaina, too, *parinirvāṇa* is the last fruit or final consummation of the highest perfection attained by a man or attainable in human life.[7] But with him *parinirvāṇa* is the same term as *nirvāṇa* or *moksha* meaning final liberation that comes to pass on the complete waning out or exhaustion of the accumulated strength or force of *karma*.

With the Jaina, however, *nirvāṇa* or *moksha* is not a dreadful or terrible term like the Buddhist *parinirvana* which suggests at once an idea of the complete annihilation of individuality of a saint after death by the simile of the total extinction of a burning lamp on the exhaustion of the oil and the wick. So the point is discussed in the Jaina *Moksha-siddhi*: Would you really think (with the Buddhist) that *nirvāṇa* is a

[1] *Majjhima* I, pp. 487-488. [2] *Dīgha* II, p. 140. [3] *Ibid* II, p. 157.
[4] *Ibid.* II, p 157. [5] *Khuddakapatha*, p 5. [6] *Ibid*, p 4.
[7] *Kalpasūtra* (Jacobi's edition), p. 120. [8] *Ibid*, p 189.



BUDDHA'S MAHAPARINIRVANA

Courtesy Mr. B. C. Law



DIVISION OF THE RELIC

process of extinction of human soul which is comparable to the process of extinction of a burning lamp (on the exhaustion of the oil and the wick)? The hearer is advised not to think like that. For with the Jaina *nirvāṇa* is nothing but a highly special or transcendental condition of human soul, in which it remains eternally and absolutely free from passion, hatred, birth, decay, disease, and the like, because of the complete waning out of all causes of *duḥkha*.

The *Milindapañha* definitely says that after the attainment of *parinirvāṇa* the Buddha is no longer in that condition in which he is able to receive any offering made in his honour, though the offering itself as an act of worship is not fruitless on that account, so far as the worshipper is concerned. Thus the Buddhist description of Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* leaves no room for the popular belief in the possibility of resurrection of the bodily form, or even the spiritual form, of a saint.[1] Is it, nevertheless, a complete cessation of personality, even if that personality is made up of pure consciousness? According to the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, there is then *lakshaṇa-nirodha* (cessation of all signs of manifestation), but no *prabandha-nirodha* (cessation of the process of *vijñāna* in its own pure or transcendental mode).[2]

In all stages of the evolution of religious thought in India the description of the ultimate goal of the higher path of religious effort carried with it the dread of extinction of the individual after death. In the opinion of such ancient lawgivers as Baudhāyana and Āpastamba, the *devayāna* leading the traveller by an onward journey to the pure realm of infinity beyond the solar region leads really but to the funeral ground, *śmaśāna*, and those who travel by that path 'alone,' in disregard of the *pitṛiyāna*, become ultimately 'dust and perish.'[3]

Ṛishi Yājñavalkya's statement of the fate of the soul after man's realization caused puzzlement to the simple-minded Maitreyī: "Verily I say unto thee the soul is complete in itself, within and without. As a mass of intelligence (or consciousness), it emerges out of these (five) elements and loses its form of manifestation with their disintegration. There is no cognizance of it after man attains that state."[4] He offered an explanation, the tenor of which went to establish that as the soul

[1] Note the description of emergence of an effulgent miniature form of the sage Śarabhaṅga out of burning fire to which he offered himself as an oblation (*Vide Rāmāyaṇa, Araṇyakāṇḍa*).
[2] *Vide Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (Nanjio's edition).
[3] Barua, *History of pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, pp 247-249.
[4] *Bṛih. Up.* II.iv.12, 13.

After man's illumination passes beyond all duality, it does not admit of any representation in the current terms of thought. It then becomes the whole or infinity, and the whole or infinity is its own description.[1]

Similarly, Buddha's persistent reluctance to answer any of the four questions put to him regarding the fate of the Tathāgata after death caused puzzlement to his interlocutor, Aggi-Vachchhagotta.[2] Buddha, too, offered an explanation, the purport of which was to indicate that the condition of Tathāgata after *parinirvāṇa* was incapable of description in all convenient terms of description: *rūpa, vedanā, saññā* (*saṁjñā*), *saṅkhārā* (*saṁskāra*) and *viññāna* (*vijñāna*).

An illuminating description of the state or condition of existence reached by a person on the attainment of *parinirvāṇa* is met with in the *Udāna,* and it has been put into the mouth of Buddha himself. It is as follows: "Where water, earth, heat and air do not find footing, there no light burns and the sun does not shine, the moon does not shed her radiant beams and darkness does not exist. When a sage who is a Brāhmaṇa has realized the truth by silent concentration, then he becomes free from form and formlessness, happiness and suffering."

[1] *Bṛih. Up.* II.iv.14. [2] *Majjhima* I, p. 487.

EMERGENCE OF MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM AND BUDDHIST INSTITUTIONS

PART I

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN BUDDHISM

Buddhism is broadly divided into two sections, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, the former being prevalent in Chittagong (Bengal), Burma, Ceylon and Siam and the latter in Nepal, Tibet, China, Japan and Mongolia. On account of such geographical distribution of the adherents of the two forms of Buddhism, the Buddhist scholars of the nineteenth century spoke of Hīnayāna as Southern Buddhism and Mahāyāna as Northern. Strictly speaking, we should call Mahāyāna as Southern Buddhism and Hīnayāna as Northern, for the history of Mahāyāna shows that it originated in the South and became popular in the North at a later time, spreading thence to China, Tibet and Nepal and from these places again to Mongolia and Japan, while the history of Hīnayāna shows that it had its origin in the North where it enjoyed popularity for a long time, and then through the efforts of Aśoka it acquired recognition in Ceylon whence it spread to Burma, Siam and other countries.

THE TERMS HINAYANA AND MAHAYANA

To the early Buddhists the term "Hīnayāna" was unknown. It is not to be found in the Pāli *Piṭakas*. It came into use in the early Buddhist Sanskrit works, but not by way of disparagement as we notice in the later Mahāyāna works. The original and more common terms used for the two branches of Buddhism were (i) Buddhayāna or Tathāgatayāna or Mahāyāna or sometimes Bodhisattvayāna[1] and (ii) Śrāvakayāna as also Pratyeka-buddhayāna[2] or Hīnayāna. The simple reason adduced for prefixing *mahā* (superior) to *yāna* (vehicle) is that it carries an adept to the highest goal, the Buddhahood or Tathāgatahood, as was attained by Siddhārtha Gautama, while the other *yāna* with the prefix

[1] Tathāgata may be taken as a synonym for Buddha. The term "Bodhisattva" is applicable only to those who are on the way to Buddhahood and have not yet attained it, Bodhisattvayāna is not identical with Buddhayāna.

[2] Pratyekabuddhas are those Buddhist ascetics who live a solitary life and attain the knowledge possessed by a Buddha but never care to preach it to help other beings.

hīna (inferior) carried the adept only to the stage of an Arhat, a state lower in many respects to that of Buddha.

Hīnayāna is meant for the *śrāvakas* only, *i.e.* persons of average intellect who are capable of attaining perfection only by listening to, and practising, the *dharma* (religion) that has once been promulgated by beings of extraordinary intellect like a Buddha. Mahāyāna is meant for those superior beings who achieve their own salvation without anybody's help and who help others to attain the same by giving them the necessary aid and guidance. In short, Mahāyāna can make a Buddha while Hīnayāna can produce only a perfect *śrāvaka*, an Arhat.

Another explanation has been offered by Asaṅga in his *Sūtrālaṅkāra* in support of the use of the prefixes *mahā* and *hīna*. He says that the followers of Mahāyāna never seek their own salvation before others have attained it. They have to take the vow that they will attain *bodhi* only after they have done all that is necessary, even by sacrificing their own lives, for making all other beings attain the goal. It is after such dedication that they succeed in reaching the goal. It is for such self-sacrifice that they are distinguished as Mahāyānists. The Śrāvakayānists or Pratyeka-buddhayānists, Asaṅga says, seek their own salvation first. They start practising the Buddhist code of physical and mental discipline from the day of their initiation and it is only after they have attained the state of sanctity of an Arhat that they come out to the world to explain the teachings which had benefited them. Asaṅga considers such a course as selfish and justifies thereby the use of the prefix *hīna* for the Śrāvakayānists.

The philosophical explanation of the two *yānas* as offered by the Mahāyāna works is as follows: There are two *āvaraṇas* (covers) to the realization of the truth: one is the cover of impurities (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the other is the cover that shields away the truth (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). The *kleśāvaraṇa* is removable by the observance of the ethical laws, and the practice of the various forms of meditation. The Hīnayānists, according to the Mahāyāna works, are taught only the means of the removal of *kleśāvaraṇa* and as such they get free from impurities (*kleśas*) and become Arhats. But they are not taught the truth, the exposition of which is given only in Mahāyāna works and into which their intellect is unable to penetrate, and as such they are incapable of removing the *jñeyāvaraṇa*. By the removal of *kleśāvaraṇa*, one can realize merely *pudgalaśūnyatā* (absence of individuality), while by removing *jñeyā-*

varaṇa one realizes both *pudgalaśūnyatā* and *dharmaśūnyatā* (non-existence of all things of the world). The Mahāyānists remove both *kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa,* visualize the truth and become Buddhas. It is for this superior attainment that they deserve the distinctive appellation as "Mahāyānists."

POPULARIZATION OF BUDDHISM

Buddhism, though ushered into existence in the fifth century B. C., did not attain so much prominence as to be counted as an important religion till the time of Aśoka (3rd century B. C.). During the two centuries it existed before Aśoka, the followers of Buddhism were looked upon by the people more or less as ascetics or *parivrājakas* (wanderers) exerting themselves for *moksha* (liberation from worldly bondage). It may be that these devotees of Buddha met with some rebuff from the priestly class who believed in the infallibility of the Vedas and the sanctity of their profession, but they were, in fact, held in high esteem by the generality of the people, who, in spite of their allegiance to Brāhmiṇism, did not find anything wrong in supplying food and lodging to a class of men who had voluntarily eschewed worldly possessions and embraced poverty and hardship, and practised strenuous meditational exercises. The relation that existed between these Buddhist ascetics (rather monks) and the people who supplied them with the necessaries of life, usually called in the Pāli texts as *upāsakas* (lay devotees), was that of the donee and the donor. Time came when the donors did not like remaining aloof from the religion as mere suppliers of the necessaries of life, but wanted to share in the benefits of the religion by actually becoming its adherents. The Buddhist monks also realized that to ensure the constant support of householders, they must create a lay society, professing allegiance to Buddha, his *dharma* and his *saṅgha* (order). There was, from the very beginning of Buddhism, the system of becoming *upāsakas* by thrice uttering the formulæ: "I take refuge in Buddha; I take refuge in *dharma;* I take refuge in *saṅgha;*" but this utterance did not create a living interest in the minds of the *upāsakas* nor did it make them feel as adherents of the religion. To interest the laity in the new religion a section of the Buddhist monks produced the *Jātaka* and *Avadāna* literatures which gave currency to the doctrine of *pāramitās* (transcendent virtues), and advised the Buddhist *upāsakas* to have recourse to it. These could be practised not only by a householder, but by any being in any

form of life. The *pāramitās* are *dāna* (charity), *śīla* (observance of moral precepts), *kshānti* (forbearance), *vīrya* (energy), *dhyāna* (meditation exercises), and *prajñā* (knowledge). When a being reaches the acme of perfection in all these six qualities he becomes a Buddha. All Buddhas had fulfilled these *pāramitās* in their previous lives and as a result became Buddhas in the last existence. The *Jātakas* and *Avadānas* taught that every being in any form of existence was entitled to practise the *pāramitās* and thus pave his way for Buddhahood.

THE MAHĀSAṄGHIKAS AS PRECURSORS OF MAHĀYĀNA

The expression of this new movement to popularize the religion through *Jātakas* and *Avadānas* was found in the split that occurred in the Buddhist *saṅgha* about a century after Buddha's death. The progressive section who advocated less stringent disciplinary rules was known as the Mahāsaṅghikas while the conservative section who clung to the original idea of strict monastic life and rigid disciplinary laws came to be designated as the Thera- or Sthavira-vādins.

The traditional accounts, as found in the *Vinaya* texts of different schools, state, as an explanation for the schism, that a group of Vajjian monks wanted some leniency in regard to ten of the *Vinaya* rules[1] which the Sthaviras were unwilling to allow; while Vasumitra and other writers on the history of the schools tell us that the schism was due to the fact that the Vajjian monks did not agree with the Sthaviras in recognizing Arhathood as the highest spiritual state and treated it only as an intermediate state leading to the highest which in their opinion was only Buddhahood.

Thus we see that the new movement to popularize Buddhism gave currency to the belief that Buddhahood was attainable, and as such every being should aspire for it, and that Arhathood, though a desirable state, was not the highest. This belief brought in its train the cult of Bodhisattva.

THE BODHISATTVA CULT

To become a Bodhisattva a being has to develop and maintain the *bodhichitta, i.e.* he is to take the vow that he will ultimately attain *bodhi* (enlightenment) and for that he will dedicate himself in all his

[1] See my *Early History of the Spread of Buddhism*, pp. 226-27.

existences to the service of beings in order to rescue them from misery and lead them to *nirvāṇa* (release from worldly existence).

After developing the *bodhichitta*, he is to commence practising the *pāramitās* life after life, until he reaches perfection in all the six. During the many existences through which these virtues are acquired he is called a Bodhisattva, and a Bodhisattva may be a householder, a monk or an ascetic.

BUDDHISM DURING AŚOKA'S REIGN

The beginning of the new movement which brought in the *Jātaka* and *Avadāna* literatures, the goal of Buddhahood and the Bodhisattva cult, may be put in the fourth century B.C., *i.e.* about a century before Aśoka. They were introduced by the Mahāsaṅghikas. The Sthaviravādins, as also one of their branches which attained great popularity in Northern India, viz. the Sarvāstivādins, had to acknowledge the force of the new phase of the religion and even adopt the new doctrines and literatures, though these were not compatible with their cardinal principles. The various branches of the Mahāsaṅghikas gave more and more currency to the Bodhisattva cult and the goal of Buddhahood, resulting in the deification of Buddha and the introduction of *śūnyatā* (nothingness) philosophy.

The *pāramitās* are the only Mahāyānic traces noticeable in the religion of the pre-Aśokan period. In the edicts of Aśoka, there is no reference to the Bodhisattva cult, nor to the *pāramitās*, nor to Buddha as a god. But they reveal that Aśoka did not recommend severe austerities to his subjects. They were to choose the middle path avoiding the two extremes, viz. of retirement from the world on the one hand and indulgence in envy, anger, laziness and so forth on the other. Aśoka preferred the life of an ideal *upāsaka* to that of a monk,[1] though in the early Buddhist texts it is enjoined that none but a recluse can derive the benefits of the religion.[2] Hence, to find Aśoka discouraging retirement shows that by his time the angle of vision of a large section of the followers of Buddha had undergone a change, and that a movement was set on foot against the austere form of monk-life envisaged in the Pāli *Piṭakas*.

This movement brought out Buddhism from the secluded cloisters to the towns and villages, and converted it from a religion of the recluses

[1] See *Aspects*, p. 20. [2] *Majjhima Nikāya* I, p. 179.

to that of the masses. The disciplinary rigours were superseded by self-sacrifice, faith and devotion and an average man aspired to derive the benefit of the religion by erecting a *chaitya* or an image of Buddha and by worshipping it with flowers and other offerings. While the monks carried on their austere practices within the cloisters, the people became busy worshipping the Buddha, and giving expression to their devotion for the god (for to them Buddha was no longer a saint) by erecting huge monuments and carving on them scenes from the life of their idol. This ornate and emotional aspect, deeply engraved on stones from the second century B. C. onwards, we may call popular Buddhism, which retained the old Hīnayānic principles but laid emphasis on *śraddhā* (faith) and *pūjā* (worship). We may call it also semi-Mahāyāna, for it had the externals of Mahāyāna but the spirit of Hīnayāna. To this class belong the Mahāsaṅghika school and its branches,[1] and to a certain extent also the Sarvāstivāda.

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF THE MAHĀSAṄGHIKAS

About the geographical location of the various branches of the Mahāsaṅghikas, some clue is supplied by their very names, viz. Pūrvaśaila, Aparaśaila, Rājagirika, Siddhatthika and Haimavata.

The first four of these names as also the names of two other branches of the school, viz. the Chaityikas and the Bahuśrutīyas, are found in the inscriptions of Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunkoṇḍa. The name of the site of Amarāvatī and its neighbourhood was Dhanakaṭaka, which with Śrīparvata is mentioned in the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* as one of the places suitable for meditation purposes. Hiuen Tsang also visited this place where he saw the monks of the Mahāsaṅghika school in twenty monasteries of the place.

The above testimony proves conclusively that the Mahāsaṅghikas had their main centre of activity in the Andhaka country, for which reason four of their branches were designated by the Ceylonese chroniclers as the Andhakas.

Among the branches of the Mahāsaṅghikas there are two names,

[1] Viz. Chaityaśaila, Pūrvaśaila, Aparaśaila, Haimavata, Ekavyavahārika, Lokottaravāda, Bahuśrutīya and Prajñaptivāda (Masuda, p. 16).

According to Vinītadeva: Pūrvaśaila, Aparaśaila, Haimavata and Prajñaptivāda (Obermiller, Buston, II, p. 99).

According to the Pāli tradition: Gokulika, Chaityika, Ekavyavahārika, Bahuśrutīya and Prajñaptivāda, and the branches that came into existence after the Christian era are: Rājagirika, Siddhatthika, Pubbaseliya, Aparaseliya.

viz. Uttarāpathakas and Haimavatas, who, as these names indicate, had centres somewhere in the far North, and this is also corroborated by some of the inscriptions found in the North. It is, therefore, clear that the Mahāsaṅghikas made their principal centre in the South, particularly at Dhanakataka (Amraoti) and its neighbourhood and had some branches in the North.

DOCTRINAL CHANGES EFFECTED BY THE MAHĀSAṄGHIKAS

Many changes in the doctrines tending towards Mahāyānism were made by the Mahāsaṅghikas and their branches. Our sources of information for the doctrinal changes are mainly two works, the first and the earliest being the *Kathāvatthu*,[1] a Pāli text belonging to the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* of the Theravādins, and the second a later work written by Vasumitra on the history of the schools.[2] Among the many deviations made by the Mahāsaṅghikas from the original doctrines, the following may be regarded as Mahāyānic:

***Buddha*:** The Mahāsaṅghikas hold that Buddhas are *lokottara* (supra-mundane), free from *sāsrava-dharmas* (defiling elements), possessed of limitless *rūpakāya* (body), *prabhāva* (power) and *āyus* (longevity). They can remain without any sleep or dream and are always in *samādhi* (trance).[3] A Buddha can appear at the same time in all the *lokadhātus* (worlds).

***Bodhisattvas*:** The Mahāsaṅghikas believe that the Bodhisattvas in their last existence do not take birth or grow in the womb in the same way as an ordinary being. They enter the womb in full consciousness. They cannot harbour any feeling of *kāma* (lust) or *vyāpāda* (hatred). They take birth in *hīnagatis* (lower forms of existence) for the benefit of the various classes of lower beings. They practise austerities under the guidance of non-Buddhistic teachers and perform many hard tasks. They perform miracles even against nature.

***Arhathood*:** The Arhats do not acquire all the detailed knowledge[4] which Buddhas possess; so they are not absolutely free from all *saṁyojanas* (fetters of ignorance). They may fall from Arhathood to the

[1] Published by the Pāli Text Society with its commentary, and rendered into English by Mr. S. Z. Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids under the title *Points of Controversy*.

[2] Rendered from Tibetan into German by Prof. M. Walleser under the title *Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus*, and into English by Dr. Masuda in *Asia Major*, Vol II

[3] See my *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p 31.

[4] The Pubbaseliyas refer by this to the knowledge, e.g "of the name of lineage (*gotta*) of a woman or a man, of a right or wrong road, or of how grasses, twigs and forest plants are called." See *Points of Controversy*, p. 117.

anāgāmi (non-returning), *sakadāgāmi* (once-returning) or *sotāpanna* (set in the stream) state but not lower. By offering gifts or worshipping *chaityas* at the time of death, they bear a good state of mind (*kuśala-chitta*). There are instances of householders attaining Arhathood without taking ordination,[1] and also a rare instance of a body in embryo attaining Arhatship.

Śūnyatā and Tathātā (*reality*): These two topics have also been included among the subjects of controversy between the Theravādins on one side, and the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas on the other, but nothing very definite can be made out of the discussion to show that the Mahāyānic conceptions of *śūnyatā* and *tathātā* were already anticipated by these schools.[2]

THE VAITULYAKAS

The Mahāsaṅghikas and their branches, as we have seen above, had incorporated some of the Mahāyānic beliefs in their doctrines, but they were overstepped by the Vaitulyakas, a sect whose doctrines have also been included in the subjects of discussions in the *Kathāvatthu*. The following are the opinions attributed to the Vaitulyakas in the *Kathāvatthu*. The Vaitulyakas hold that Buddha never lived in the world of mankind. It was his image that delivered the teachings. They further hold that any gift made to Buddha or *saṅgha* does not confer any benefit on the giver; for, according to them Buddha does not enjoy anything, and only makes a show of partaking of food, etc.; so also there is no body of persons as *saṅgha* apart from *maggas* and *phalas*.[3] Hence any gift made to the *saṅgha* is also equally unproductive of merit.[4] This abstract way of looking at Buddha and *saṅgha*, *i.e.* asserting Buddha or *saṅgha* as not really existing, is distinctly Mahāyānic. But when we come to their doctrine that "a man and a woman may have sexual relation with one object in view, viz. *Buddhapūjā*," we may unhesitatingly state that they anticipated even the later Mahāyānists.[5]

As the doctrines of the Vaitulyakas have found place in an early work like the *Kathāvatthu*, it is worth while to trace their origin. In

[1] This is the opinion of the Uttarāpathakas. It is based upon the fact that Yasa Uttiya and Setu obtained Arhathood before they gave up their householder's dress. The Theravādins are strongly opposed to this view. [2] See *Points of Controversy*, pp. 360-361

[3] *Maggas* and *phalas* mean the eight stages of sanctification.

[4] See commentary on the *Kathāvatthu*, p. 169.

[5] This opinion is attributed not only to the Vaitulyakas but also to the Andhakas. *Kathāvatthu* commentary, p. 197.

the *Kathāvatthu* commentary, the Vaitulyakas are designated as *Mahā-śūnyatāvādins*, which is an appellation of the Mahāyānists. It is in the last but one chapter of the *Mahāvaṁśa* (XXXVI.41) during the reign of Vohārikatissa[1] (215-237 A. D.) that we read of the suppression of the Vaitulyavāda heresy which made its appearance in the Abhayagiri monastery.[2] In the *Nikāyasaṁgraha*[3] of Devarakshita Dharmakīrti Saṅgharāja (14th century A. D.) it is stated that the Vetullas had a *Piṭaka* of their own and that they tried to get hold of the Abhayagiri monastery during the reigns of Vohārikatissa, Goṭhābhaya and Mahāsena. The evidences suggest that a faction of the Mahāyānists known as the Vaitulyakas made their way to Ceylon some time before the third century A. D., and tried to obtain a footing there.

THE TERMS VAITULYA AND VAIPULYA

Profs. Kern, La Vallée Poussin and Charpentier have made some discussions about the reading 'Vaitulya' found in the Kashgar MSS. of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* instead of 'Vaipulya'[4] and the probability of the early Mahāyānic texts forming a part of the *Piṭaka* of the Vaitulya-vādins. The *Nikāyasaṁgraha* furnishes us with the information that the orthodox sects of Ceylon, specially the Mahāvihāravāsins, were very strong in their condemnation of the *Piṭaka* of the Vaitulyas. The recent archæological discoveries have conclusively proved the prevalence, in Ceylon, not only of Mahāyānic gods but also of Mahāyānic texts like the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*.[5] It is therefore not very unlikely that the *Prajñāpāramitā* and other such *Sūtras* originally formed a part of the *Vetulla-piṭaka* and were called *Vaitulya-sūtras*, which later on became *Vaipulya* or *Mahāvaipulya-sūtras* in the hands of the copyists of Nepal.

VAITULYAS AND VEDALYA OF DAKSHIṆĀPATHA

To the above evidences we feel tempted to add the statement, found in the *Laṅkāvatāra* (p. 268) and reproduced in Buston's *History of Buddhism* (II, p. 110), that a renowned monk Nāga by name would appear in Vedalya of Dakshiṇāpatha and preach Mahāyāna, the cardinal principle of which was the denial of the existence of both Ens and non-

[1] See Parker, *Ancient Ceylon* (1909), p. 280.
[2] *Mahāvaṁsa* (XXXVI.111).
[3] Colombo, 1907.
[4] Most of the early Mahāyānic texts are called *Mahā-vaipulya-sūtras*.
[5] See *Ceylon Arch. Reports*.

Eps. According to the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, this monk Nāga[1] belonged to the fourth century after Buddha's death, *i.e.* roughly first century B. C. Taking all these evidences together with the statement found in the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*[2] that Mahāyānism would originate in the South, we may draw the conclusion that Mahāyānism first made its appearance in a Southern country called Vedalya or Vetalya, and was named Vaitulyavāda after the country of its origin. It was under this name that the new school was taken to Ceylon, but in India the Vaitulyavāda underwent further changes and became Mahāyāna.

THE TIME OF EMERGENCE OF MAHAYANA

In the previous pages it has been shown that Mahāyānic ideas were for the first time introduced by the Mahāsaṅghikas and their offshoots about the fourth century B.C., but they adhered to Hīnayānic principles. Strictly speaking, Mahāyānic ideas of *śūnyatā*, *tathātā*, and *nirmānakāya* (created body) can be traced even in the early Pāli texts, but that does not warrant us to say that Mahāyānism was prevalent in the fifth century B.C. We shall have to ascertain the time of emergence of the cardinal principles of Mahāyāna, which are, in short, the following:

(1) Conception of *trikāya* (three bodies of a Buddha).

(2) *Daśabhūmi* or ten stages of sanctification.

(3) *Anutpattikadharma-kshānti* (belief in the non-origination of all things); in other words, *dharmaśūnyatā* as distinguished from *pudgalaśūnyatā*, *dharmasamatā* or *tathātā*.

(1) Conception of *trikāya*: The Mahāsaṅghikas, as we have already seen, started the theory that Buddha never appears in this world but sends out his image (*rūpakāya* or *nirmāṇakāya*) while he remains in *nirvāṇa* (*dharmakāya*, body consisting of the law or *svabhāvakāya*, natural body). The conception of two such *kāyas* (bodies) is to be found also in the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, which are avowedly Mahāyānic. The addition of the conception of a third *kāya* (*sambhogakāya*, body of enjoyment) was made by the Yogāchāra teachers like Asaṅga, Aśvaghosha and Maitreya, about the third or fourth century A. D.

(2) *Daśabhūmi*: The various stages of spiritual progress were originally known as *sotāpanna*, *sakadāgāmi*, *anāgāmi* and *arahatta*. These were subdivided into eight and by further subdivision the number

[1] Regarding the identification of Nāga see *IH.*, 1931, p. 636.
[2] *Ashṭasahasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* (p. 225).

was increased to twenty-three. In the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, we come across two forms of enumeration, one corresponding to the ancient Hīnayānic system and the other to the Mahāyānic. The *Mahāvastu* offers a list which may be regarded as Mahāyānic, but the names are different from those obtained in the late Mahāyānic texts. The full exposition of the *daśabhūmi* is to be found only in the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, the date of composition of which is assigned generally to the third century A. D.

(3) The best means to fix the time of emergence of Mahāyānism is to ascertain the time of appearance of the doctrine of non-origination of all things, which came later on to be replaced by the more philosophical expressions *dharma-śūnyatā*, *tathātā*, or simply *śūnyatā*. All these terms carry the same sense, viz. things of this world have no real origination, they do not exist in reality. What we consider as existence is, in fact, mere appearance, a delusion of the imperfect mind, clouded, as it is, by ignorance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). Tāranātha tells us that soon after Kanishka's Council, some Hīnayānic monks attained *anutpattikadharma-kshānti* and began to deliver Mahāyānic discourses.[1] These monks hailed from Aṅga and Oḍivisa, and were sought for by the devotees residing in other parts of India. About this time, Tāranātha adds, there suddenly appeared in different directions persons seeking Mahāyānic teachings, and these began to be delivered by Āryāvalokiteśvara, Guhyapati, Mañjuśrī, Maitreya and others. These teachings were embodied in the *Ārya-ratnakūṭa-dharma-paryāya-śatasāhasrikā* in 1000 sections, the *Ārya-avataṁsaka* of 100,000 discourses in 1000 chapters, the *Ārya-laṅkāvatāra* of 25,000 *ślokas* (stanzas), *Ārya-ghanavyūha* of 12,000 *ślokas* and *Ārya-dharmasaṅgīti* of 12,000 *ślokas*, and many other such works.[2] Later on these works were brought to Nālanda, where lived many monks with Mahāyānic faith and who wrote numberless works.[3] From the above account of Tāranātha, it is evident that Mahāyānism with its new doctrines appeared soon after Kanishka's Council, *i.e.* first century A. D. This is corroborated, also by Buston, who writes that in the hierarchy of teachers, Pārśva, the contemporary of Kanishka, was succeeded by his disciple. After him came Sunasata and then Aśvaghosha, Amṛita, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, etc. It will be observed that two generations, *i.e.* about sixty years after Pārśva, one Aśvaghosha became the head of the Church. If

[1] See my *Aspects* etc., pp. 40-41.
[2] Tāranātha (Schiefner's transl.), p 63. [3] *Ibid*, p 64.

he be the author of the *Śraddhotpāda-sūtra,* we may say that Mahāyānism began with him. If the existence of this Aśvaghosha be questioned, we have to place the beginning of Mahāyānism with Nāgārjuna who became the head of the *saṅgha* after Aśvaghosha's disciple Amṛita (ma-si-ba),[1] *i.e.* in the second century A. D.

PART II

CAUSES OF EXPANSION OF BUDDHISM

The causes of the phenomenal expansion of Buddhism in and outside India form a very interesting subject for investigation and have been taken up for study by a number of scholars. The conclusions reached by these scholars are summed up below along with the criticisms that may be levelled against them:

(i) The rational point of view taken by Buddha in regard to the ultimate problems of life and the universe is pointed out as an important factor for the success of Buddhism as against those preached by the pre-Buddhistic Brāhmaṇas, involving a very large measure of belief in the efficacy of the rituals and sacrifices prescribed in the Vedas, and in the infallibility of the solutions of philosophical problems as offered in the Upanishads.

As against this it may be argued that though Buddhism discarded rituals, it did not do away with faith altogether. *Śraddhā* or firm belief (Pāli: *saddhā*) in (a) Buddha as the only real discoverer of the way leading to truth, (b) *dharma* (teachings) as the most excellent and (c) *saṅgha* (the body of monks formed in accordance with the laws prescribed by him) as the ideal congregation—constitutes the most important prerequisite for making a person a true Buddhist. It is an antidote to *vichikitsā* (doubt) which is to be destroyed to make a devotee a *srotāpanna* (*i.e.* set in the stream flowing to *nirvāṇa*). Apart from *śraddhā* (or *prasāda*), Buddhism accepted the theory of *karma* and rebirth which are as much matters of belief as the existence of the Creator or the omniscient Soul.

(ii) The comprehensive moral code of Buddhism for which the religion is sometimes looked upon as purely ethical is by some counted as a cause for its success.

This opinion is evidently one-sided, because in the Buddhist litera-

[1] Buston's *History of Buddhism* (Obermiller's transl.), pp. 108-9.

ture there is as much of philosophy as of ethics. Moreover, we should not forget that in all Indian religions, ethical principles have found as important a place as in Buddhism, though it may be said that they do not appear in a codified form as in the *Vinaya* literature of the Buddhists.

(iii) The appeal which Buddhism made to the masses is very often pointed out as the main cause of its popularity. It is believed that this appeal became effective because Buddha rejected Sanskrit as the medium of his teachings and opened the portals of his religion to all men without any distinction of caste and creed.

A superficial study of Buddhism leaves an impression like this on the mind, but it is not correct as neither pure philosophy nor pure ethics appeals to the mind of the masses. A religion attains popularity not through its sublime teachings but through its rituals and sacrifices which readily work upon the faith of the people. Moreover, Buddhism made such strong demands upon the faith of its followers that it should be regarded as more exclusive than Brāhmaṇism with its *varṇāśrama-dharma.*[1] Buddhism demanded from its regular adherents a complete renunciation of the worldly life and the fulfilment of a discipline to which a very few among the intelligentsia, not to speak of the masses, could conform. In other words, Buddhism was suited more to the aristocracy of intelligence while Brāhmaṇism to the aristocracy of birth.

(iv) The patronage extended to Buddhism by kings, clans and noblemen accounted, according to some scholars, for the success of the religion.

It is no doubt a fact that Buddhism owes much of its success to the support given by kings like Bimbisāra and Aśoka, Kanishka and Harshavardhana, by clans like the Śākyans, the Vajjians and the Lichchhavis, and by personages like Anāthapiṇḍika, Viśākhā and Jīvaka. But it may also be pointed out that India is never the land of religious intolerance. Religious donations poured forth not for uplifting one religion against another but generally out of reverence for the religious man who could create a deep impression upon the mind of the donor regarding the greatness of the religion. Not only in the past but throughout the career of Buddhism, and even to some extent to the present day, donations are made to Buddhism by a large number of non-Buddhists. Aśoka's inscriptions prove very clearly that his patronage was not confined to the Buddhists; such an attitude was discernible in the case

[1] Classification of duties according to caste and order of life.

of many other kings. The Vajjians and Lichchhavis were as much supporters of Buddhism as of Jainism. So it should not be assumed that Buddhism monopolized all support and patronage to the exclusion of other religions.

(v) The cult of service and self-sacrifice is also mentioned as a cause of the success of Buddhism. The ideal of a Bodhisattva as dilated upon in the Mahāyānic texts is inspiring, and it was the Bodhisattva ideal that effected the propagation of Buddhism to a great extent.

This argument has also a certain amount of force, for a study of the Mahāyānic texts reveals that a large number of men were fired with the zeal for the alleviation of human sufferings and did, as a matter of fact, dedicate their lives to the cause of humanity. But the credit should go more to the institutions which gave impetus to these men to carry out the ideal than to the cult of service and self-sacrifice, as that was inculcated as much by Brāhmaṇism and other religions as by Buddhism.

Though the findings of scholars about the causes of the spread of Buddhism, as summarized above, are open to criticism, yet it must be admitted that each of them was in some way responsible for the spread of the religion. Buddhism owes its greatness not so much to its abstract principles as to the institutions that trained up the votaries who carried out the principles. These votaries gave an excellent account of themselves in the outside world both morally and intellectually and created the impression all over Asia that Buddhism produced ideal men. The religion prospered in spite of its defects so long as the institutions produced the right type of men, and its decline was marked by the diminution in number and the ultimate disappearance of such men.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTIONS

We shall now turn to these Buddhist institutions or *saṅghārāmas* which trained up the Buddhist monks and sent them out to the world to preach the religion and alleviate human sufferings. A glance at the ancient map of India shows what a large number of such institutions grew up in the different parts of India and how big were some of them, as even their ruins strike us to-day with awe and wonder. They were the centres of the great amount of influence exercised by the religion over the people of India. Some of these institutions were built up at an immense expense and were large enough to accommodate thousands of monks. They were mostly located at a distance from the din and bustle,



FACADE OF A CHAITYA HALL



MAHABODHI TEMPLE

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but not beyond the easy reach, of the city to which the inmates looked for their daily necessaries of life. The sites chosen by them were in many cases valleys separated from the inhabited localities by hills, mountains or forests. •In cases where such sites were not available, they were shut out from the world by huge walls with gates guarded by competent gate-keepers. Great discretion was used to keep the site aloof from the distractions of the town or village life, giving at the same time an opportunity to the townsfolk and villagers to frequent the *āvāsas* for listening to religious discourses and making their offerings. An individual monk or a donor was not allowed to select the site for a monastery. It is enjoined in the *Pātimokkha-sutta* that it must be done by a group of monks (see *saṅghādisesa* rule 6).

The *saṅghārāmas* offered shelter to all who submitted to the discipline enforced in them and dedicated their lives to the cause of Buddhism. There appeared from among them brilliant intellects who would shed lustre on the sphere of activities that might be allotted to them. The training imparted by these scholars produced a number of expositors of Buddhist philosophy and religion who carried far the torch of Buddhism. In short, these institutions radiated the force which made Buddhism an all-Asiatic faith.

To these institutions flocked from different parts of India and sometimes countries outside India men with different aims and inclinations. They remained there under the strict disciplinary rules for years, receiving instructions from distinguished monks; and it was only when they were found thoroughly chastened in body and spirit that they were sent out to the outside world for carrying on the work of the great teacher. The fame of the institutions at Takshaśilā, Nālanda, Sārnāth or Amarāvatī reached far-off places such as China, Central Asia and Ceylon, and attracted numerous students.

THE SAṄGHĀRĀMAS

The members of the Buddhist order at the very beginning of its formation led an eremitic life, and lived mostly in caves and forests, staying for only a short time at a particular place. It was probably the gift of Veluvana to Buddha that constrained him to permit his followers to dwell in hermitages; but he gave his formal consent (*Vinaya* II, p. 147) when he was requested by a merchant of Rājagṛiha to accept the sixty *vihāras* (monasteries) that had been built by him for acquiring merit to go

to one of the higher worlds. Once the sanction was given, the monks as well as the devotees showed so much zeal in the building of monasteries that it necessitated Buddha to frame a number of rules (see *saṅghādisesa* rules of the *Pātimokkha*) restraining the monks from drifting into luxury. These monasteries were originally used for residential purposes only, but grew up later on into academic centres even during the lifetime of Buddha.

ĀCHĀRYA AND UPAJJHĀYA

It was after the acceptance of Veluvana from Bimbisāra and the sanction of *ārāmas* (rest-houses) for the residence of monks (*Vinaya* I, p. 39) that Buddha turned his attention to the framing of rules for the conduct of the inmates of the *ārāmas*. He first prescribed the mutual duties of *upajjhāyas* and *saddhivihārikas*, *āchāryas* and *antevāsikas*. The general direction given by him was that the teachers must treat their students as sons, and students must look upon their teachers as fathers (*Vinaya* I, pp. 45, 60). Every new member joining the order as a *śramaṇa* (monk) must formally choose his *upajjhāya* and *āchārya* who should be qualified monks and whose duty will be to impart instruction to the student by reciting and explaining the texts and making him comprehend them through questions and answers (*Vinaya* I, pp. 50, 61).

HEADSHIP NOT BY SUCCESSION OR NOMINATION

Probably as a member of the clans which favoured democratic constitutions, Buddha became imbued with democratic ideas. He wanted to see his *saṅgha* grow on democratic lines and framed the rules accordingly. He himself, however, acted more as a dictator than as a constitutional head, prescribing rules and giving orders as he thought fit. He consulted the wishes of the people and kings more than those of his followers, and this was probably due to his eagerness to popularize the religion. In spite of the supreme authority wielded by him within the *saṅgha*, he did not like to admit that he was its leader, or that the *saṅgha* relied on him as the leader (*Dīgha* II, p. 100; *Milinda-pañha*, p. 159). From the words of Devadatta and Buddha's reply to the same (*Vinaya* II, p. 188), it is apparent that the question of the headship of the *saṅgha* after Buddha's demise was raised, but Buddha would not nominate any, not even his best disciples like Sāriputta and Moggallāna. In the history of Indian religious orders, the absence of the system of nominating a successor to the headship of an order was

probably unknown before Buddha and so it was a riddle to men like Gopaka-Moggallāna who enquired of Ānanda how the *saṅgha* could maintain its concord when neither Buddha had named his successor nor had the *saṅgha* elected one to the supreme headship of the whole congregation (*Majjhima Nikāya* III, p. 9). Ānanda's answer was that the *saṅgha* was not without a guide and that guide was the book of *Pātimokkha* containing the rules (*sikkhāpada*) prescribed by Buddha himself for the monks. The *Pātimokkha* retained the concord of the *saṅgha*, for it required all the monks residing in or about a parish (*gāmakhetta*) to assemble on the *uposatha* days (*i.e.* 8th, 14th or 15th day of a fortnight), listen to the rules recited by one of them selected for the purpose, confess their derelictions, if any, and undergo the penance deemed necessary (*Majjhima Nikāya* III, p. 10). Ānanda added that the monk who was asked to recite the rules was regarded for the time being as the chief of the *saṅgha* and was called *saṅghatthera*, *saṅghapitara* or *saṅghaparināyaka*. The qualities that an ideal *saṅghapitara* or *saṅghaparināyaka* was expected to possess were as follows (*Ibid.*, pp. 11-12): (a) He must be a true *brahmachārin*, observing all the restrictions prescribed in the *Pātimokkha;* (b) he should be vastly learned in the details of the *dhamma;* (c) he must be always satisfied at the food, bed and clothing that he may obtain; and (d) he must be proficient in the four forms of meditations and be in possession of the supernatural powers and *abhijñās*.

The *saṅghatthera* was generally selected from among the older monks. In the account of the Second Council (*Vinaya* II, p. 303) Sabbakāmi is described as a *saṅghatthera* as he was the oldest ordained monk at the time. Generally the *saṅghatthera* presided over the functions of *Pātimokkha*-assemblies, but in the deliberations of the Second Council Revatathera took the lead, perhaps because he was more learned (*Vinaya* II, p. 299) than Sabbakāmi, though spiritually he did not rise as high as the latter (*Ibid.* II, p. 304). The *saṅghatthera* was given the highest position in an assembly of monks and it is enjoined in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sūtta* (*Dīgha* II, p. 77) that he must be respected by all the monks.

NATURE OF DEMOCRACY

To the constitution of a *saṅgha*, the term *democracy* or *republic* cannot be justifiably applied, for it does not exactly follow the principles

on which a democratic or a republican constitution is based. Though there are the system of election of the President, the moving of a resolution, use of ballot voting by *salākās*, strict adherence to the rules of a meeting and so forth, the constitution of a Buddhist *saṅgha* differed in many respects from that of a political institution.

CHĀTUDDISA-SAṄGHA

One of the main differences is that any ordained monk, to whatever locality he may belong, is counted as a member of an assembly if he happens to be present on the day of the sitting of the assembly (which is usually the *uposatha* day) within the limits of the parish. An assembly would not be regarded as complete for an ecclesiastical action if a single monk, not excepting an *āgantuka-bhikkhu* (incoming monk), failed to join it either personally or by proxy (*i.e.* by sending *chhanda*, consent) (*Majjhima* III, p. 10). The only condition for the membership of a *saṅgha* was ordination and residence on the day of the assembly.

QUORUM

In a Buddhist *saṅgha* there is no question of quorum. No sitting is valid unless all the monks living within the *sīmā* (jurisdiction) of a *saṅghārāma* (*āvāsa*) are present personally or by proxy. Some scholars have confused "quorum" with "committees" of the *saṅgha*, the minimum strength of which is fixed according to the nature of the ecclesiastical business (*saṅghakamma*) to be transacted. In short, there was no question of quorum of a meeting.

SUB-COMMITTEE OR A BODY OF REFERENCES

The resolutions were formally moved generally from the chair. Every resolution had to be announced thrice and no resolution was carried unless it had the unanimous consent of all present. Hence ordinarily there was no question of majority or voting. The question of majority has been raised on rare occasions, e.g. in the holding of a *Pātimokkha*-assembly by the existing members of an *āvāsa* without *āgantuka-bhikkhus*. If the *āvāsikas* (existing members) were larger in number than the *āgantukas*, the actions of the assembly were regarded as valid provided the *āgantuka-bhikkhus* who joined the assembly after the fixed time were apprised of the proceedings of the assembly (*Vinaya* I, p. 129). If in the determination of the *uposatha* day (*i.e.* the 14th

or 15th of a fortnight) any difference of opinion took place between the inmates of an *āvāsa* (*āvāsikas*) and the incoming monks (*āgantukas*), it was settled as follows: the opinion of the former prevailed if their number was greater than or equal to that of the latter, but the opinion of the latter prevailed only if their number was greater than that of the former (*Ibid.* I, pp. 132-3).

There was a system of *ubbāhika* which is usually translated by the term 'voting,' but it bears quite a different sense. It corresponds to something like the formation of a sub-committee or a body of references. The method of *ubbāhika* was resorted to when there was a dispute relating to a particular question of discipline (*vivādādhikaraṇa*) and when there was no possibility of settling it in an assembly without unnecessary discussions. In a case like this, two or more monks possessing the requisite qualifications (as detailed in *Vinaya* II, pp. 95-96) were selected from among the members of the assembly and their names were placed before the assembly for approval, which to be effective must be unanimous. The selected monks were then entrusted with the duty of settling the dispute. This method of *ubbāhika* was adopted in the Second Council to settle the disputes between the Vajjian monks and Yasatthera. It was by *ubbāhika* that four monks of the eastern countries and four of Pāṭheyya were chosen, and the decision of this sub-committee of eight was placed before the whole *saṅgha* (*Vinaya* II, p 305) for confirmation.

VOTING

When the selected monks failed to settle a dispute, the matter was referred back to the *saṅgha*, which then proceeded to appoint one of the members possessing requisite qualifications (as detailed in *Vinaya* II, p. 84) as *salākāgāhāpaka*. The votes were then taken by means of *salākā* and the will of the majority was accepted as the just. As great responsibility rested on the *salākāgāhāpaka*, many rules had to be framed to guard the misuse of power by him. Such occasions were rare in the *saṅgha*; hence the question of majority or voting is not a subject that has been discussed at length in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*.

Thus we see that the constitution of the *saṅgha* was clearly democratic in principle but differed in many vital points from a democratic institution of the present day.

A study of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* further reveals that the *bhikkhus*, apart from religious practices, were required to act through the corporate

body, the *saṅgha*, and never individually, and it is for this reason that it is said in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* (*Dīgha* II, pp. 76-77) that so long as the monks will assemble frequently, transact business in concord, adhere to the rules already prescribed and avoid laying down new rules, the progress of the *bhikkhu-saṅgha* is assured and not its decline.

As the members of the order had no individual rights, it became incumbent on the organizers of the *saṅgha* to frame rules for the receipt and proper distribution of properties, food, clothing and other requisites of a monk. It will now be our object to take a bird's-eye view of the ways in which these affairs were managed by the *saṅgha*.

OWNERSHIP OF MONASTERIES

Monks, as a rule, take the vow of poverty; hence individually they cannot own any property. The *vihāras* cannot be given to a monk; they can be given only to a *saṅgha* of monks and that again should preferably be to the *āgatānāgata-chātuddisa-saṅgha*, *i.e.* a *saṅgha* the members of which are not only the *bhikkhus* of the four quarters but also those who will be *bhikkhus* in future. In some of the donative inscriptions of a later period (3rd century B. C. to 5th century A. D.) there are specific directions, dedicating the monasteries to a particular sect. This tendency developed when the Buddhist *saṅgha* split up into many rival sects, and the devotees of one sect wanted to give their support to their own sect only.[1] When for the first time Buddha permitted his followers to accept *āvāsas*, *ārāmas*, *vihāras* or *pariveṇas*, he enjoined that they should be given to *āgatānāgata-chātuddisa-saṅgha* (*Vinaya* II, p. 147). Even while accepting the Jetavana *vihāra* from Anāthapiṇḍika, he directed the donor to give it to *āgatānāgata-chātuddisa-saṅgha* (*Ibid.*, p. 164).

The *saṅgha*, therefore, becomes the owner of the properties given away by the devotees, but the ownership is not absolute, for it cannot alienate the properties nor even divide them among the members of the order (*Vinaya* II, pp. 170-171). This restriction was applied not only to the landed properties including the grass, shrubs, etc., but also to the articles of furniture, utensils made of earth or iron, spades and other such things of common use in an *ārāma* (*Ibid.*). To what extent individual ownership was denied, becomes apparent from the fact that on the death of a monk, his robes and other articles of use became the prop-

[1] Compare my *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 314.

erty of the *saṅgha* (*Vinaya* I, p. 303), and the *saṅgha* is advised to distribute the robes and other small articles by proper announcement in an assembly among the monks or novices who served the deceased *bhikkhu* during his illness. This power of the *saṅgha* is denied in the case of heavy articles, for they are inalienable and indivisible (*Vinaya* I, p. 305; II, p. 171).

FOOD AND DAILY NECESSARIES OF LIFE

In regard to food and the daily necessaries of life also, an attempt has been made to keep the sense of individuality in the background as far as possible. If a devotee wished to offer food to the monks, he had to invite the whole *saṅgha* and not any particular individual or individuals. In days of scarcity, provision was made for invitations by batches, and so *saṅghabhatta* (food for the whole *saṅgha*) was allowed to be replaced by *uddesabhatta, nimantana, salākābhatta,* etc. (*Vinaya* II, p. 175), *i.e.* the devotees might provide food not for all the monks of the *saṅgha* but for some, who, however, were not to be selected by the hosts. This naturally gave rise to troubles. To avoid these, it became necessary to fix the responsibility of selection upon a particular monk possessing the requisite qualities (*Vinaya* II, p. 176). He was called a (i) *Chatuddesaka* or the distributor of food. His appointment had also to be made formally by the *saṅgha* with the unanimous consent of all the members. Besides him there were other office-bearers whose duty was to distribute rice-gruel (*yāgu*), fruits (*phala*) and hard food (*khajjaka*) and they were called (ii) *yāgubhājaka,* (iii) *phalabhājaka* and (iv) *khajjakabhājaka* according to their respective charges.

With the increase in the number of monks and devotees bestowing gifts on the *saṅgha,* it became indispensable to appoint further office-bearers for maintaining concord in the *saṅgha*. They were (*Vinaya* II, p. 176): (v) *senāsanagāhāpaka, i.e.* the monk who is entrusted with the duty of accepting *vihāras, pariveṇas,* etc., on behalf of the *saṅgha* (*Ibid.,* p. 167); (vi) *senāsanapaññāpaka* or the distributor of beds and seats within a monastery, cave-dwelling, etc.; (vii) *bhaṇḍāgārika* or the store-keeper; (viii) *chīvarapaṭiggāhāpaka* or the receiver of upper robes; (ix) *chīvarabhājaka* or the distributor of upper robes; (x) *sāṭiyagāhāpaka* or the receiver of under-garment; (xi) *appamattaka-vissajjaka* or the distributor of trifling things, like needles, girdles and stores; (xii) *pattagāhāpaka* or the receiver of bowls.

Besides the above there were other office-bearers for different kinds of work. Some of these were (xiii) *navakammika* (*Vinaya* II, p. 160) or the monk entrusted with the supervision of the new construction or repair of monasteries; (xiv) *ārāmikapesaka* (*Ibid.*, p. 177) or the overseer of labourers engaged for construction or repair work; (xv) *sāmaṇerapesaka* or the overseer of the novices; (xvi) *āsanapaññāpaka* (*Ibid.*, p. 305) or the arranger of seats at the meetings of monks, and (xvii) *sāṭakagāhāpaka* (*Ibid*, p. 11).

In the appointment of every office-bearer, the usual formality must be observed, *i.e.* a monk possessing the requisite qualifications is selected first, then his name is announced thrice before an assembly, and if there be none making objections, he is formally appointed to the office for which he was selected.

Every act of the *sangha* was performed in this way. Without the formal announcement and sanction of the assembly, no ecclesiastical act could be performed or was regarded as valid. This discipline in working was strictly enforced and this was the secret of the great power which the *saṅgha* developed and by which it spread itself all over Asia. It was in and through an organization like this that scholars like Nāgārjuna and Asanga, Vasubandhu and Āryadeva, missionaries like Bodhidharma and Atisa, disputants like Dharmakīrti and Dinnāga, writers like Vimuktasena and Kamalaśīla, expositors like Subhūti and Kachchāyana, translators like Kumārajīva and Jinamitra radiated rays of light that dazed the whole world.

BUDDHISM IN TIBET UNDER IMPERIAL PATRONAGE

It was in the third century B. C., when the Emperor Aśoka became its great devotee, that Buddhism began to spread outside India. The Buddhist missionaries were not satisfied with the conversion of Ceylon and Burma alone. They reached Mesopotamia and Syria in Asia Minor, Egypt in Africa and Macedonia in Europe. In the same period Buddhism spread in Central Asia and, according to tradition, a son of Aśoka was successful in establishing his own kingdom in Kutcha and its neighbourhood. There is a doubtful tradition that Buddhism reached China at a very early period. We have got several translations of Buddhist works still preserved in Chinese language; these translations were made by Kāśyapa Mātaṅga who went to China in 56 A. D. Buddhism was introduced into Korea in 372 A. D. whence it reached Japan, the land of the rising sun, in 538 A. D. In Indo-China, too, Buddhism was already there before the third century A.D.

The question now arises why Buddhism was propagated into Tibet so late as 640 A.D. when it had already reached so many lands situated so far away from its place of birth.

From a close examination of the situation it appears that the delay was caused by the geographical position of Tibet and the consequent slow social evolution there. Generally, the human habitation in Tibet is at a height of ten thousand to twelve thousand feet above the sea level. If at some places it is met with at lower levels, at others it is found at levels as high as fourteen thousand feet. By reason of such enormous height Tibet experiences severe cold, and her hills and valleys are devoid of forests and of almost every kind of vegetation. Thus in Tibet the people found the struggle for existence to be very keen. And in search of a remedy they found an easy solution in restricting the growth of population by having one wife for all the brothers in a family. Since they adopted polyandry, the difficulties were partly obviated and for generations it sufficed to have the same house, the same number of sheep and goats, and the same plot of land without any need for expansion or extension. If we accept the tradition, agriculture was introduced there in the beginning of the Christian era when Bya-khri was her sovereign. In fact, if the outsiders had not made dangerous passages across the

Himalayas and compelled the Tibetans to come in contact with them, it is doubtful if any change would have been effected in their archaic ways of life till to-day.

Before the birth of Srong-btsan-sgam-po (617 A.D.), Tibet was divided into numerous principalities. Kong-po, the birth-place of Srong-btsan-sgam-po, is the warmest province in Tibet. Naturally enough, agricultural civilization was first to develop here. Tradition has it that Srong-btsan-sgam-po was a descendant of Prasenajit, the king of Kośala, who was a contemporary of Buddha. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the family and the homeland of Srong-btsan-sgam-po were more advanced in culture than their neighbours. The locality was more densely populated. And its people had heard the stories of the grandeur and magnificence of the courts of the emperors of India and China.

SRONG-BTSAN-SGAM-PO (630-698 A.D.)

At the early age of thirteen Srong-btsan-sgam-po succeeded his father, but he was not the man to be satisfied with such a small kingdom to rule. Like his contemporary, Emperor Harshavardhana, he wanted to conquer all his neighbouring States and to build a great and enduring empire for his dynasty. He organized the fearless and hardy Tibetan mountaineers and made out of them a strong army, with the help of which he was able to subjugate the neighbouring provinces of Dbus and Gtsang without much difficulty, and in a few years he became the master of the whole of Tibet. But even this was not enough for his great ambition, and so the Tibetan arms conquered all countries from Gilgit in the west to the Chinese Turkistan in the north. He defeated Aṁśuvarman, king of Nepal, who was forced to give his daughter in marriage to the Tibetan sovereign. The emperor of China was also defeated and he offered his daughter together with some of his provinces to the conqueror. Thus Tibet made its debut in the civilized world as a conqueror of no small consequence. Srong-btsan-sgam-po was now the emperor of all Tibet and the neighbouring countries.

To be able to control such a vast empire effectively, he introduced many new laws, regulations and innovations. One of his first measures was to change his capital from the bank of the Brahmaputra to the bank of the Dbus-chu river and then he founded the city of Lhasa. What was formerly called Ra-sa (the land of goats), now became known as Lha-sa (the land of gods). Before his time the art of writing was quite

unknown in Tibet; so he sent his minister Thon-mi, the son of Ann, with sixteen others to India for the study of the alphabet. After his return Thon-mi invented the Tibetan character on the model of the contemporary Kashmerian alphabets. He was the first grammarian of the Tibetan language. His grammatical treatise is still the standard work on the subject. The emperor retired to a cave near the vicinity of Lhasa for four years in order to study the new alphabet and grammar.

It was Thon-mi with whom the Nepalese princess reached Lhasa. The Chinese princess brought with her a very old sandal-wood image of Buddha, which had gone from India to China via Central Asia. In the northern quarter of Lhasa she built the temple of Ra-mo-che where the sandal-wood image was enshrined. Khricun, the Nepalese princess, a daughter of King Aṁśuvarman (645 A. D.), took with her the images of Maitreya, Akshobhya and Tārā; but she had not sufficient money and the emperor coming to know of her financial difficulties built the famous temple of Rjo-khang in the centre of the capital after filling up a lake which existed there. It was through the influence of his two queens and their countries of birth, China and Nepal, which were strongholds of Buddhism, that Srong-btsan-sgam-po was converted to Buddhism.

Tradition has it that it was this emperor who introduced the earthen pot, water-mill and the hand-looms into Tibet. It cannot, however, be gainsaid that Emperor Srong-btsan-sgam-po was a great and good ruler and was the creator of the literature, religion and polity of Tibet. The conversion of the emperor into Buddhism opened before him a new vision for developing primitive Tibet into a progressive country, which he successfully achieved during his own lifetime. Buddhist scholars and teachers were brought to Tibet to teach the people civilized ways and means, manners and customs, arts and sciences. They did not fall into the common error of the reformists of all times, inasmuch as they did not try to Indianize the Tibetans or make them a replica of the Chinese. On the contrary, they Tibetanized Buddhism and clothed the new religion and culture that they had brought with them in the familiar Tibetan garb to make them at once easily acceptable to the Tibetans. They conferred on Tibet their well-matured art, literature, religion and philosophy—but none in a foreign garb. With this end in view from the very outset they set themselves to translating their own sacred literature into the Tibetan language. The great Pandit Kumāra (from India), Śila-mañju (from Nepal), Tuna (from Kashmere) and Mahādeva (from

China) with the help of Thon-mi and his disciple Dharmakośa and Lhā-lung-rdo-rje-dpal translated many works into Tibetan. Very few of Thon-mi's translations survive in Tibet. All the other works were superseded by later translations and hence the former are scarcely found there. *Kāraṇḍa-vyūha-sūtra, Ratna-megha-sūtra* and *Karma-śataka* were translated by Thon-mi. The Chinese teachers mostly devoted their time to translating works on mathematics and medical science. India, China and Li (Chinese Turkistan), all these three countries co-operated with the Tibetan scholars for the translation of these works. Two monks from Li composed the life of the emperor which is now lost. After a long reign of sixty-nine years Emperor Srong-btsan at the age of eighty-two died in the province of Phan-yul, to the north of Lhasa in 699 A. D. After his death, Empress Kong-jo (of China) ordered the sandal-wood image of Buddha, originally taken from China, to be placed in Ḥphrul-snang (Rjo-khang) where it is still to be seen.

MANG-SRONG-MANG-BTSAN (699-712 A.D.)

Emperor Srong-btsan had by his Nepalese queen a son named Khri-tsun who died during the lifetime of his father. So Mang-srong-mang-btsan, another son by the Chinese queen, succeeded his father. Though before the grand personality of his father the valour of the new king paled, yet there is no doubt that he was the worthy son of a worthy father, and his fitness as a ruler was shown by his defeating the Chinese forces when the latter tried to wrest back some of the territories which his father had conquered from the Chinese. He and his son Dung-srong (712-730 A.D.) followed in the footsteps of their great predecessor in their devotion to Buddhism. Dung-srong was married to Vun-sing-kong, a daughter of the Chinese emperor.

KHRI-LDE-GTSUNG-BRTAN (730-802 A.D.)

Khri-lde-gtsung-brtan was born in the year his father Dung-srong died and was placed on the throne as an infant. Finding an infant on the throne of Tibet, once again China essayed to recover her lost territories. It was for the possession of Gilgit, through which lay the important highway to India from China, that there was a fierce tussle between China and Tibet, in which the former was beaten. The Chinese emperor gave his daughter Chin-cheng in marriage to the Tibetan crown prince Ḥjad-tsha-lha-dpon, but when the prince was going to receive his future bride, he

died as the result of an accident; so the Chinese princess was married by the Tibetan emperor himself. She got a dowry of two of the provinces of China, Chin-chu and Ku-e-i on the Hwang-Ho or the Yellow River. Mūlakosha of the village Blan-ka and Jñānakumāra of Ngag, two Tibetan translators, translated some works from Sanskrit in the reign of Emperor Khri-lde. The translation of the *Suvarṇa-prabhāsottama-sūtra* belongs to this period.

KHRI-SRONG-LDE-BTSAN (802-845 A.D.)

This emperor is considered to be Aśoka the Great of Tibet. He was born near Bsam-yas in the Iron-Horse year (790 A.D.). Like the great Emperor Srong-btsan he was only thirteen when his father died, with the difference, however, that he inherited an empire which was far greater in magnitude than that of Srong-btsan. At this period the Tibetan empire was not confined to Tibet alone. It was a far-flung empire and encompassed within its limits all the tracts to the north of the Himalayas from Gilgit to Assam and besides comprised several Burmese and Chinese provinces as well. To the north it stretched up to the Yellow River, while the Indian possession of Tibet reached at times almost to the banks of the Ganges. Since the time of Srong-btsan in the course of three quarters of a century the primitive and pastoral Tibet was transformed into a progressive country and a mighty empire which rivalled the great kingdoms of India and China. At the same time a great tide of art and culture of religious fervour and progress surged over the length and breadth of the land. Though the Tibetan emperors almost invariably married Chinese princesses and were thus half Chinese themselves, yet they never compromised one iota of their Tibetan culture and spirit and were always ready to fight their maternal relations for maintaining their own cultural tradition. Chinese men of letters, however, had a great influence in the Tibetan court and most of the *dharmāchāryas* (religious teachers) there were Chinese.

Before the introduction of Buddhism in 640 A.D. Tibet had a religion of demon and nature worship which is known as Bon. Though Buddhism showed great catholicism by accepting certain modes of worship from that indigenous religion of Tibet, there was, however, a considerable struggle between these two religions for supremacy in Tibet. During the minority of the emperor the Bon party got the better of the Buddhist party. The protagonists of Bon wanted the famous sandal-

wood image of Buddha to be packed off to China for good, in which, however, they did not succeed. But they removed the image from the temple and buried it at some unknown place. The temple itself was changed into a slaughter-house and a butcher's shop. But some calamity having soon after befallen the two Bon party ministers, they were demoralized by superstition, and lost no time to unearth the image and send it away to Skyed-rong in the province of Mang-yul near the border of Nepal.

While reading the lives of his forefathers the young emperor learned how his predecessors had bestowed all their faith and devotion on Buddhism. It created a profound impression on his youthful mind. He started studying secretly the sacred books of Buddhism, stowed away and concealed by the people, and in the end he turned out to be as zealous a Buddhist as any of his forefathers. He ordered two Chinese monks Me and Po and a Kashmerian Pandit Ananta to translate Buddhist works, but the active hostility of his Bon ministers prevented them from prosecuting the task and they were forced to go to Mang-yul whose governor was a Buddhist. The two Chinese monks and Pandit Ananta remained there, but Gsal-snang who afterwards became known as Ye-śes-dvang-po (Jñānendra) went to India. After paying his homage to Mahābodhi (Bodh-Gaya) he went to Nālanda where he heard of the fame of Āchārya Śāntarakshita. But the *āchārya* was not there at the time. Luckily, however, he met him in Nepal. At the request of Jñānendra the *āchārya* consented to pay a visit to Mang-yul. He remained there for some time and Jñānendra was greatly benefited by his company. It may be noted here that in those days the main route from India to Tibet lay through Nepal via Bhikhnathori in the district of Champaran and through Skyed-rong (Mang-yul).

In the reign of this emperor too, China measured swords with Tibet Once again Tibet emerged victorious and this victory is inscribed on a stone column which still stands at Lhasa below the famous Potala Palace.

Now, Jñānendra went to Lhasa and had many religious discussions with the emperor. The emperor and some of his ministers were anxious to restore Buddhism to its pristine glory in Tibet, but the minister Ma-śang-khron-pa-skyed of the Bon party was so powerful that they dared not translate their desire into action. A conspiracy was, however, hatched, as a result of which Ma-śang was buried alive and with his bones

the Bon religion was also buried in Tibet. According to the desire of the emperor, Jñānendra went to fetch Āchārya Śāntarakshita. On his arrival, the difficulty of the language was overcome by the Kashmerian Pandit Ananta who was versed both in Sanskrit and Tibetan languages, and served as an interpreter; and the king thus conversed with the great *āchārya* of India to whom he extended a right royal reception.

For four months the *āchārya* held religious discourses in the palace on the ten forms of good (*kuśala*), the eighteen spheres and the twelve-limbed causality. The emperor responded by becoming a devoted disciple of Āchārya Śāntarakshita. But three great calamities followed on the heels of this memorable event. There came a great flood in Phang-thang, one of the most populous districts in Tibet, as a result of which it was totally devastated. Next the Red Hill, on which the present Potala Palace came to be constructed in 1645 A. D., was struck by lightning and a cattle epidemic raged in the land. Superstition once again came into play, but this time it swung in favour of the protagonists of the Bon religion. They raised the convenient slogan that the gods of Tibet were mightily enraged at the re-introduction of heresy by Āchārya Śāntarakshita and they were punishing the people with these fearful visitations. The people echoed the cry and the emperor had to submit unwillingly to the popular clamour for the expulsion of the *āchārya* and he was accordingly sent back.

After some time, Jñānendra, at the instance of the emperor, proceeded to China for making a collection of Buddhist works there. There the emperor now commissioned Bhikshu Sang-śi (from the province of the same name, modern Shansi) with three other companions to fetch Āchārya Śāntarakshita, in which they were not successful. On their return Jñānendra was sent for the same purpose once again. An old man of seventy-five as he was, the *āchārya* was not inclined to lose this opportunity of propagating the noble *dharma*. Bsam-Yas in the valley of the Brahmaputra which was at a distance of two days' journey from Lhasa was selected for the residence of the *āchārya*.

Though Buddhism had been introduced into Tibet two centuries back, neither any monastery was constructed there so far nor was any Tibetan ordained for the Buddhist monkhood. The emperor had a great desire to achieve these and according to his direction a place was selected where the foundation of the first Buddhist monastery in Tibet was laid in the year 823 A. D., which was completed in 835. Tibetan chronicles say that this *vihāra* of Bsam-Yas was built on the model of Udantapurī

(Bihar Shareef), a *vihāra* built by King Dharmapāla in 769-809. The plan of the monastery reproduced the geographical notion in vogue at the time. The centre was occupied by the main temple representing the Sumeru, with twelve abodes for the monks surrounding it and symbolizing the four *dvīpas* (islands) and eight *upadvīpas* (semi-islands), which were all enclosed by a rectangular wall standing for the *chakravāla* or horizon which was pierced by four gates facing the four cardinal directions. At a little distance from the main shrine four magnificent *stūpas* were built, each with bricks of different colours. It took full twelve years to complete this monastery despite the vast resources of this powerful empire and when completed, the monastery must have presented a magnificent spectacle. After the completion of the monastery, learned Buddhist monks from India and elsewhere were lodged in the twelve *dvīpas* or abodes of the monks and they laboured hard for the translation of the sacred works. The library that gradually grew up in the monastery excelled both in number and in the variety of its collections many older and famous libraries in the Buddhistic world, so much so, that when in 1047 A.D. Dīpaṅkara Śrījñāna, the celebrated Buddhist *āchārya* of India, visited Tibet, he was struck by the vastness of the Tibetan collection and what is more, he found many texts there which were not available even in the greatest of the Buddhist monasteries in India. But as ill luck would have it, this library with its invaluable collection of works was totally destroyed by fire in the twelfth century, after which the ill-fated monastery, which was built of wood according to the prevailing practice of the time, was rebuilt on the old site by Rva-lo-tsa-ba Vajrakīrti on a rather humbler scale. The Indian practice of building monasteries on the plains, which was originally followed in Tibet, was subsequently abandoned since the thirteenth or fourteenth century and the practice of perching them on the slopes of hills was adopted instead. The monasteries of Shalu (1040 A.D.) and Snar-thang (1153 A.D.) and others including the monastery of Ñe-thang where Dīpaṅkara died in 1054, were all built on the plains according to the Indian system.

When the construction of the original *vihāra* was proceeding, Śāntarakshita sent for twelve Sarvāstivādin Bhikshus from Nālanda for the ordination of the Tibetan monks, probably as a special precaution, though the rules laid down a quorum of five monks being sufficient for the purpose outside Middle India (U.P. and Bihar). Thus in the Sheep

year (827 A.D.) the first seven Tibetans--Jñānendra, Śrīghosha, Śīlendrarakshita of Gtsang, Rin-chen-mchog of Rma, Nāgendra of Ḥkhon, Devendrarakshita of Gtsang and Vairochanarakshita of Pa-gor—were ordained. Thus by founding the first Buddhist monastery and the first Buddhist monastic order there, Āchārya Śāntarakshita laid a strong and deep foundation for Buddhism in Tibet.

Āchārya Śāntarakshita and his Tibetan disciples also translated several Sanskrit works into Tibetan, but the technique of translation having been yet imperfect, they were superseded by later translations and are not available now; the only extant work translated by Śāntarakshita with the help of his Tibetan interpreter Dharmakośa is that of *Hetuchakra*—a work on logic by Diṅnāga.

At the age of hundred (in or about 840 A.D.) Śāntarakshita died having met with an accident caused by a horse. His body was embalmed and preserved in a *stūpa* built on a hill in the eastern vicinity of the monastery. Only about forty years back when the *stūpa* had tumbled down, his skull and several other bones were collected which are now kept in a glass case inside the main shrine.

Śāntarakshita was a great philosopher of his time which is evidenced by his monumental work, *Tattva-saṁgraha,* in five thousand stanzas, wherein he surveyed the whole range of the Indian philosophical systems. Many scholars consider him to have been one of the great trio of Buddhist philosophers, the other two being Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. There can be no doubt that for such a great scholar there was no dearth of respect and honour in his own motherland in those distant days. But the fact that the spirit of noble adventure and missionary zeal were not yet lost to the scholars and sages of India, finds eloquent testimony in the case of Āchārya Śāntarakshita who even at the age of seventy-five undertook tasks which daunt people in the prime of their youth to-day. It is for this that he is better known in Tibet as Āchārya Bodhisattva than by his own real name. This deification is no doubt a worthy tribute to him from those for whom he devoted the mature wisdom and the fulness of the learning of his latter days. After his death there was some trouble in Tibet due to the preaching of the Chinese monks contrary to the teachings of the great *āchārya*. Thereupon his disciple Kamalasīla was invited from Nālanda and it was through his intervention that the threatened schism was averted.

EMPEROR MUNI-BTSAN-PO (845-846 A.D.)

Emperor Khri-srong was a brave man, but he was more religious-minded than worldly-wise. His personality influenced his entire household and also his people to no small extent. After his death in 845 A.D. his son Muni-btsan-po succeeded him. The new king was brought up in an atmosphere charged with the extreme form of the Bodhisattva ideal which viewed with great approval even the renunciation of one's own salvation in rendering services to others and removing their sufferings. So when Muni came to the throne he was already dreaming great dreams quite in consonance with the great ideal that inspired him. He saw poverty and misery on all sides which bred deep discontent among those who found others richer and happier than themselves and were treated with scorn by them for their poverty. In his quest for a remedy he hit upon a solution by an equal distribution of wealth—a strange anticipation of the remedy proposed by the economists of to-day to obviate the widespread misery the modern world is suffering from. So in the course of the years 845-846 he appropriated the wealth of the nation and redistributed it equally among all. But as the well-intentioned monarch did not realize in those distant days that an equal distribution of wealth was meaningless without a proper distribution of work, his bold experiments achieved only contrary results by encouraging idleness on the one hand and resentment on the other, and thus they came to nothing. These repeated experiments so frightened the people including his own mother, that the latter poisoned him and he died before he had been more than nineteen months on the throne of Tibet. Some people may look upon him as a mad man. If mad at all, he was only so after a noble ideal which many sane men of our own time have so devotedly served and so successfully fulfilled.

KRI-LDE-BTSAN-PO OR SAD-NA-LEGS (846-877 A.D.)

After his death, his brother Kri-lde-btsan-po succeeded him. He also was a pious Buddhist monarch like his father and brother. Far from his capital in the west at Skar-rdo in Baltistan, he built a Buddhist temple. Prior to his time Tibetan translation from other languages was carried on in a haphazard way. It was he who introduced the new technique of translation which still remains unsurpassed even by the modern progressive translations of the world in that it preserves at least eighty

per cent. of the perfect equivalents of original vocabularies in an ingenious way. In the edict which he promulgated in this connection in the Horse year (850 or 862) of his reign, he regretted the former haphazard translations in which due regard was not paid to the selection of proper Tibetan words. He, therefore, ordered the compilation of a lexicon of synonymous Tibetan words. These works which were subsequently compiled are known as the *Vyutpattis* and are included in the Tan-jur collection. The system of having definite words for all prefixes, suffixes and roots, which was thus evolved, is now found to be invaluable for the purpose of the restoration of the original texts. The emperor further ordered the Buddhist monks and scholars engaged in the translation work to undertake translations only from Sanskrit texts for the sake of precision. From 850 to 900 A.D. the period was one of intense activity in this direction and the volumes of works translated during these fifty years surpassed those of any other period. Of the numerous scholars engaged in this work, mention may be made of Jinamitra, Surendra-bodhi, Śīlendra-bodhi, Dānaśīla and Bodhimitra from India and of Ratnarakshita, Dharmaśīla, Jñānasena and Jayarakshita among the Tibetan interpreters.

EMPEROR RAL-PA-CAN (877-901 A.D.)

By superseding his elder brother Glang-dar-ma, Ral-pa-can became the emperor. In his devotion to Buddhism he was not only following his forefathers, but he tried to outstrip them all. He had an unbounded veneration for monkhood. He allotted seven householders for the service of each monk. Many State functions were appropriated by the monks during his rule. Even the chief administratorship of the capital city Lhasa was given to a monk. By the consent of his father Prince Gtsang-mo entered the monastic order. Thus this blind devotion surpassed all bounds with the result that many worthless people were tempted to enter the order. Glang-dar-ma, the superseded prince took this opportunity to spread all manner of rumours against the reigning king and his Buddhist priests. A rumour was spread that the monk Bande-de-guṇa-śrī, who was a favourite of the king, had immoral relations with the queen Nañ-tshul-ma. In the end the Bhikshu was murdered by the conspirators whereupon the queen also committed suicide. The emperor was also assassinated by two favourites of Glang-dar-ma in the year 901 A.D.

Thus for 162 years (from 640-802 A. D.) Buddhism was favoured and respected in Tibet, while for a hundred years (from 802-901) it enjoyed extraordinary prestige and veneration. Now it was its turn to fall on evil days.

GLANG-DAR-MA (901-902 A.D.)

After the assassination of his brother, Glang-dar-ma ascended the throne. Chinese historians note that the new emperor was addicted to drink, gambling, etc., and was a libertine, a cruel man, an oppressor and an ungrateful one. Whatever he might have been, he could not have done any harm to Buddhism if the Buddhist monks had not taken undue advantage of the power and position they held and if the emperor Ral-pa-can had evinced real statesmanship together with an intelligent devotion to and sympathy for Buddhism. Glang-dar-ma rewarded Dpas-rgyal, the assassin of his brother, by raising him to the status of a minister, and many other notable anti-Buddhists were appointed to the high posts of the State. He ordered all Bhikshus to renounce monkhood and return to lay life. Those who did not comply with his orders were given bows and arrows and were forced to lead the life of hunters. Many were beheaded for their refusal to obey the order of the emperor. The famous sandal-wood image of Buddha was removed from the Rjo-khang and buried in the sand. The gates of the temple were blocked and plastered and on them were depicted the pictures of the Bhikshus in the act of drinking wine. Many sacred books were destroyed and only those survived which were concealed by devout Buddhists in the catacombs of the Lhasa hills. Samādhibhadra of Ang and Ratnottara of Rma were murdered and other Pandits and Lo-tsa-vas fled for their lives.

No doubt the Buddhists committed great mistakes and thus drew these well-merited chastisements on themselves. But in these two centuries and a half Buddhism did a great service to Tibet and the Tibetan nation. So it was scarcely in the fitness of things to award it the extreme penalty of extinction. After some time when the wrongs done by the former priests and the monarch were forgotten, a serious reaction set in against the tyranny of the new ruler. Śrī Vajra of Lha-lung, a monk, was practising *yoga* a few miles to the east of Lhasa. When he heard of the persecution of the Buddhists he could no longer restrain himself. Clad in a skin-coat painted black outside with a fleeting colour

and having seated himself upon a pony similarly painted black, Śrī Vajra rode to Lhasa with an iron bow and arrows in hand. When he entered the city he found the king before the old Rao-ring pillar in front of Rjo-khang reading the edict inscribed thereon. Śrī Vajra pretended to salute him. " If a tyrannous king is to be disposed of, this is the way to do it "—with these words he shot an arrow right through his heart. The arrow went home and the king died on the spot. The last words that escaped his lips were: " Why was I not killed three years back in which case I could not possibly have committed such enormities, or if I were to meet this fate, why did I not do so three years hence by which time no vestige of Buddhism would have been left by me in this land?" Śrī Vajra, however, took no chances and galloped off, and on emerging out of the city he washed clean his horse of the paint, turned his coat inside out exposing the white interior and calmly rode away. This romantic episode has been made the subject of the famous drama—" The Black Hat," which is frequently staged in Tibet.

The dynasty of Srong-btsan ruled for 272 years with undiminished power, prestige and vigour for seven generations, though surrounded by the powerful Chinese, Islamic and Indian empires—a distinction which scarcely fell to the lot of any known dynasty in the civilized world. Its end, however, came with the miserable end of Glang-dar-ma who alone broke away from the great tradition of the dynasty and broke the empire as well on the rock of misrule.

The dynasty nominally continued for two more generations. Ḥod-srung (902-966), son of Glang-dar-ma, and his son Ḥkhor-ba-can (966-983) who followed Glang-dar-ma, restored Buddhism to favour—but it was beyond their power to restore the tottering dynasty to its former position; with the latter the mighty empire crumbled to pieces.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE BUDDHIST MYSTICISM OF BENGAL

I

Towards the close of the first millennium after Christ Eastern India witnessed the rise and growth of a new form of mysticism which has left its mark throughout the old literature of Bengal. This is the Sahajayāna or the Vehicle of Sahaja which represents a later phase of Mahāyāna Buddhism and particularly of the Mādhyamika school. The great teachers of this new form of mysticism were all known as Siddhas and their number has been recorded by various traditions as eighty-four. So far as it can be ascertained now, these Siddhas flourished between the tenth and the twelfth century A. D. A large number of their works, now lost in their original, are preserved in Tibetan translations executed during the thirteenth century A. D. by Tibetan Buddhist scholars in collaboration with Indian Buddhist scholars who had gone to Tibet mostly from the monasteries of Eastern India.

The Siddhas deviated from the orthodox Mahāyāna tradition by adopting as the vehicle of expression two popular literary forms, namely, the *apabhraṁśa* and the vernacular. The *apabhraṁśa* which was a more artificial form does not seem to have had a long popularity and was soon given up in favour of the vernacular. About fifty mystic songs composed by various Siddhas have been discovered in a collection called the *Charyācharya-viniśchaya*. They are all written in the vernacular—a vernacular which has been definitely proved to have been current in Bengal between the tenth and the twelfth century A. D. These mystic songs preach the doctrine of the Sahajayāna.

The number of the Siddhas who flourished in this age is given in Indian, Nepalese and Tibetan texts as eighty-four. It is not known if all of them wrote. From the available fragments of their compositions and the Tibetan translations of their works it can be ascertained that at least the most important of them composed mystic songs. The Siddhas who composed the songs of the *Charyācharya-viniśchaya* were the following: Lui, Saraha, Kānhu, Kukkurī, Bhusuku, Ḍombī, Śānti, Mahīdhara, Vīṇā, Śabara, Āryadeva, Ḍhenḍhaṇa, Dārika, Ṭāḍaka,



BUDDHA, SULTANGUNGE (BENGAL)

Courtesy Mr O. C. Gangoly

Koṅkaṇa, Jayanandī, Guṇḍarī, Chāṭilla, Virūpā, Kambala, Bhāḍe, Tantrīpāda and Dhāmapāda. Amongst these Kānhu, Saraha and Bhusuku seem to have been the most prolific writers of the age, because not only the authorship of the largest number of songs in the *Charyā-charya-viniśchaya* is attributed to them, but there were also other works either in *apabhraṁśa* or in Sanskrit composed by them.

From the Tibetan collection of Tanjur (Bstan-hgyur) we get the names of fifty-three works composed by them either in *apabhraṁśa* or in the vernacular of Bengal, works which are now mostly lost in original but preserved in Tibetan translation.

Amongst these fifty-three works the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasad Shastri discovered and published two, the *Dohā-koshas* of Saraha and Krishṇa. As the MSS. were very corrupt, the texts remained unintelligible for a long time till Dr. Shahidullah came forward to settle their reading with the help of Tibetan translations in his *Les Chants Mystiques de Kānhu et Saraha.*

Better MSS. of these two texts, a MS. of the *Dohā-kosha* of Tillopāda, fragments of two other *Dohā-koshas* of Saraha and fragments of other similar compositions were lately discovered by me and published in the Calcutta University *Journal of Letters*, Vol. XXVIII, 1935.

We have thus at present some texts to represent the vast collection of the mystic literature of the Sahajayāna and it is not quite impossible to make an attempt to deal with the doctrines of this school which has left its marks on various schools of later times.

II

Though it is at present difficult to explain all the details of this mysticism, it is possible to determine its characteristic features with the help of the texts now available. Its general trend was esoteric as nobody except a qualified *guru* or preceptor was allowed to initiate the disciple into its mysteries. This is why even in modern times the few followers of this school in Nepal call themselves *gubhāju* or *gurubhāju, i.e.* the followers or worshippers of the *guru*, and thus distinguish themselves from the followers of the Brāhmiṇical faith who are called *devabhāju* or the worshippers of *devas*. The literature of the Sahajayāna is full of such statements as "the truth that is free from duality is taught by the *guru*," "there is nothing unattainable for the man whom the *guru*

favours," "the truth is clearly revealed through the instruction of the *guru*," etc.

These clearly testify to the exalted position which the preceptor enjoyed in this mystic school. But there is a warning to him too when the Siddha Sarahapada says, "You should not initiate disciples as long as you do not know yourself. If you do that, you will act like the blind man who while leading another blind man both fell into the well."

Though the *guru* was given that exalted position, it was no easy task for him to lead the disciple to this goal. He had to find out the special spiritual aptitude of the disciple, and suggest to him the path most suitable for him. In his analysis of the spiritual aptitudes of various disciples he seems to have arrived at a novel classification called *kula*. *Kula* was the special spiritual aptitude of the disciple. There are five such *kulas* technically called Ḍombī, Naṭī, Rajakī, Chaṇḍālī and Brāhmaṇī. The nature of these *kulas* is determined by the five *skandhas* or the essence of the five basic elements (*mahābhūtas*) constituting the material existence of the being. The five *kulas* are conceived as the five aspects of the *prajñā* which is the same as the psychic energy (*śakti*) in these texts. The *śakti* assumes five different forms according to the predominance of each of the five *skandhas* or constituents and the best course for the *sādhaka* is to follow up his special *śakti* during his spiritual march. In the technical language of the school it is said that the five classes of *sādhakas* should practise their *sādhanā* in the company of the five *prajñās* or *śaktis* called Ḍombī, Naṭī, Rajakī, Chaṇḍālī and Brāhmaṇī. The first task of the *guru* was to find out to which of these five classes a particular disciple belonged and which of the five energies was dominant in him. That particular energy was to be evoked in the disciple and he was to be initiated to perform his *sādhanā* by cultivating that energy.

Now the question arises what was that *sādhanā* to which the *guru* had to initiate his disciple. This *sādhanā* involved the practice of a new system of *yoga* which seems to have evolved in the hands of the Siddhas. It believed in the existence of thirty-two *nāḍīs* or nerve-channels within the body and supposed that the *śakti* flowed up into the topmost station within the head called "the place of great bliss" or *mahāsukhasthāna*. Various names were given to these nerve-channels such as *lalanā*, *rasanā*, *avadhūtī*, *pravaṇā*, *kṛishṇarūpiṇī*, *sāmānyā*, *pāvakī*, *sumanā* and *kāminī*. Of these the first three, *lalanā*, *rasanā* and *avadhūtī*, were the most important and combined in themselves at particular stations the currents

supplied by the rest. The *avadhūtī* is the middlemost channel and corresponds to the *sushumnā* of the Brāhminical Tantras. According to this system there were also a number of stations compared either to lotuses or to wheels within the body, and the *śakti* in its upward march had to pass through them.

The topmost station was imagined to be a lotus having either sixty-four or thousand petals. These stations were sometimes compared to places of pilgrimage like *uḍḍiyāna, jālandhara, pūrṇagiri* and *kāma-rūpa.*

The state of *sahaja* which is the goal is a state of great blissfulness. It is a state which is without beginning and without end, and which is free from duality. When this state is attained, the objective world disappears from view, and the aggregates, elements, sense organs and senses all merge into it. The *sādhaka* then finds himself to be the sole reality, one with the universe and one with the Buddha—the being who is ever free. Everything else dwindles into nonentity (*śūnya*).

These are some of the main characteristics of the later Buddhist mysticism and they can be traced in the old literature of Bengal, not only in the *charyāpādas*, but also in the early Vaishṇava literature, the Sahajiyā literature and the literature of the Nāthas and Bāuls of Bengal.

V

SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY (A)

THE SĀṀKHYA SYSTEM

The origin of this system and the logical consistency of its teaching have, for a long time, been matters of controversy; but its importance in the history of Indian thought has never been questioned. Its characteristic ideas and the terminology in which it gives expression to them are met with in the religious and philosophical literature of India almost as commonly as those of the Upanishads. They especially pervade the Purāṇas, including a large part of the great epic of the *Mahābhārata*. We shall not concern ourselves here with the logical or chronological controversies touching the doctrine, but shall merely give a brief sketch of it, selecting in particular such features as will help us in understanding its significance to practical life.

The Sāṁkhya is frankly dualistic. It recognizes two ultimate entities—nature and spirit—neither of which can be derived from the other. The former is termed Prakṛiti, and the latter Purusha. Since these two conceptions are of fundamental importance to the doctrine, we shall begin our sketch with an explanation of them:

(1) **Prakṛiti**: There are two commonly known ways of explaining the origin of the physical world. It may be traced to a manifold of ultimate reals which are supposed to be simple and atomic; or it may be derived from a single substance which is assumed to be complex and all-pervasive. The former is described as the theory of creation (*ārambha-vāda*), for in it the things of the world are explained as generated by the putting together of two or more atoms; and the latter, as the theory of evolution (*pariṇāma-vāda*), for in it the same are looked upon as the result of transformations within the primal substance. The Sāṁkhya adopts the second mode of explanation, and Prakṛiti is the name which it gives to the principle or entity out of which is evolved the objective universe in its infinite diversity. This primal entity is not directly perceived and its existence, like that of the atoms in the other view, has only to be inferred. Here, as elsewhere generally, the Sāmkhya prefers a rationalistic explanation and does not, like some other systems, invoke the aid of revelation in support of its conclusions. The very name of the doctrine, derived from *saṁkhyā* which means *buddhi*, indicates that it is based on reflection rather than authority. Prakṛiti, or Mūla-prakṛiti

as it is sometimes designated to indicate that it is the First Cause of the universe, is thus one and complex; and its complexity is the result of its being constituted of three factors, each of which is described as a *guṇa*. By the word *guṇa* here we should not understand what it is commonly taken to mean, viz. 'a quality,' for the Sāṁkhya refuses to recognize the distinction between substance and attribute. There is indeed no harm in speaking, for the sake of convenience, of either, apart from the other; but to think of the two as really separate from, or external to, each other is, according to the present doctrine, to indulge in an illegitimate abstraction. The so-called quality and substance together form a single whole; and it is the concrete unity of both that any material thing represents. The term *guṇa* means here rather 'a component factor' or 'a constituent' of Prakṛiti. These three constituents, though essentially distinct in their nature, are conceived as interdependent so that they can never be separated from one another. It means that they are not mechanically placed together, but reciprocally involve one another and form a unity in trinity. That is, they not only co-exist but also cohere. The three *guṇas* are named *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. Each of them stands for a distinct aspect of physical reality: roughly, *sattva* signifies whatever is pure and fine; *rajas*, whatever is active; and *tamas*, what is stolid and offers resistance. From the standpoint of the experiencing mind, they are also described as being of the nature respectively of pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and bewilderment (*moha*), for they give rise to those feelings. The above description shows that the *guṇas* are not merely distinct but are also, in some measure, antagonistic in their nature. The antagonism, however, is not such as to preclude their acting together; and their harmonius action is illustrated by the example of a lamp-flame—the result of co-operation between the wick, oil and fire which, in their separate nature, appear to be hardly fitted to so co-operate. In other words, the physical universe is an orderly whole which has its own laws to obey and there is no ultimate contradiction in it, though it may consist of opposing elements.

It is not only Prakṛiti that consists of these *guṇas*. Everything that emerges from it is also similarly constituted, for the doctrine maintains that effects are essentially identical with their material cause. In fact, it is by a proper synthesis of the common and enduring features of the things of experience that the conception of Prakṛiti has been reached, as the idea of gold, for instance, is reached by a comparison of golden things

like bracelets and rings. These cosmic constituents are in a state of equilibrium in Prakṛiti until it begins to differentiate itself; and the diversity of the things that then spring into being from it is due to the diversity in the proportion in which the *guṇas* enter into their make-up in the complex process of Prakṛiti's evolution. 'It is just as in a game of dice: they are ever the same dice, but as they fall in various ways, they mean to us different things.' Though only three in number, the *guṇas* thus really stand for a manifold of distinctions. In later Sāṁkhya, it is expressly stated that their number is infinite and that they are only arranged in three groups on the basis of their likenesses and differences. Prakṛiti is not only complex and all-pervasive, it is also undergoing change perpetually. Naturally, the things that develop out of it are also conceived as sharing in its fluid character. Thus the paper on which these lines are printed may appear to be static; but it is really changing every instant, though at the same time it maintains its identity as long as it lasts. An important difference between the two is that while Prakṛiti, which is by hypothesis omnipresent, can have no change of place but only change of form, the things derived from it on account of their finiteness can have both. A plant, for example, may grow or wither where it is; and it may also be shifted from one place to another. It is change of form that is meant by *pariṇāma* or evolution. The evolutionary process, in the case of Prakṛiti, is supposed to be periodical. That is to say, every period of evolution or *srishṭi* is followed by a period of dissolution or *pralaya* when the whole diversity of the universe becomes latent or 'goes to sleep,' as it is stated, in Prakṛiti. But even in *pralaya*, we must remember, Prakṛiti does not cease to be dynamic; only its component parts, the *guṇas*, constantly reproduce themselves then instead of acting on one another and giving rise to a heterogeneous transformation.

As regards the things that emerge from Prakṛiti, it would suffice to call attention to only one point which it is necessary to know for understanding the Sāṁkhya explanation of experience. It is the distinction between the things in which *sattva* predominates and those in which *tamas* does so. Most of the things of the material world as well as our physical frame belong to the latter class. They are objective. The former in which *sattva* preponderates indeed are not subjective, because they also are derived from Prakṛiti and are therefore physical; but on account of their finer structure, they are well adapted to assist in

the revelation of external objects to spirit which, as we shall presently see, is unable by itself to apprehend anything. To state the same in another way, the activity of these *sāttvika* developments is a necessary condition of mental life, although they do not by themselves explain it. Of this group, the most important member is what is described as the *antaḥ-karaṇa* or the 'internal organ.' It is really threefold, consisting of *manas*, *ahaṁkāra* and *buddhi*, but it is not necessary to give a detailed description of them here. Its chief function is to receive impressions from outside and to suitably respond to them; and it is assisted in the proper discharge of this function by the various senses that belong to the same group. This whole apparatus, consisting of the internal organ and its several accessaries, may be taken as roughly corresponding to the brain and the nervous mechanism associated with its functioning, according to modern psychology. It is specific to each individual and together with certain other factors, accompanies him throughout his worldly existence or *saṁsāra*. This relatively permanent 'accompaniment' is known as the *liṅga-śarīra* or 'subtle body.' It does not part from one even at death, and is cast off only when freedom is fully achieved.

To sum up the conception of Prakṛiti: The whole of the physical universe emanates from it; and, since Prakṛiti is conceived as ultimate and independent, the explanation so far may be characterized as naturalistic.

(2) Purusha: What prevents the doctrine from being a philosophy of nature, pure and simple, is its recognition of Purusha by the side of Prakṛiti. Prakṛiti does not exhaust the content of the universe; it leaves out the very element by virtue of which we become aware of the existence of the physical world. And it is that element of awareness or sentience which Purusha represents. While the doctrine thus differs from naturalism, it does not identify itself with absolutistic systems like the Vedānta, because it preserves to the end the dualism of Prakṛiti and Purusha. No satisfactory explanation of experience is possible, according to the Sāṁkhya, if we do not admit the equal and independent reality of both the material and the spiritual elements. The existence of Purusha, like that of Prakṛiti, may therefore be said to have been reached through reason. If the latter is postulated on the principle that effects presuppose a cause that is immanent in them, the former is postulated on the principle that objects point to the subject, or more strictly, that the non-sentient implies the sentient. Another argument in support of the same

conclusion is based upon the design found in the physical world. The bodily organism, for example, with its many well-adapted parts suggests that it is meant to serve a definite end; and there are numerous other instances in nature with a similar teleology implicit in them. The entity, whose ends such adaptations and contrivances serve, is Purusha. In other words, spirit is the principle *for the sake of which* nature evolves. Both Prakṛiti and Purusha alike are thus deduced from an investigation of the nature of common things; the only difference is that while the one is the result of arguing from those things to their source or *first* cause, the other is the result of arguing from them to their aim or *final* cause. The world is derived from a principle which is like it in its nature, but subserves the ends of another which is quite unlike. Purusha is manifold, in contrast to Prakṛiti; and the doctrine may for that reason be described as pluralism. The conception is, in other respects also, the very opposite of Prakṛiti. Purusha is not complex but simple; it is not dynamic but static, knowing neither change of place nor change of form. It is passive while Prakṛiti is ever active, which means that it is to be identified more with feeling or the affective side of the mind than with any other. It cannot consequently either *know* or *will* anything in the ordinary sense, unless it is assisted by the internal organ and its various adjuncts. In itself, it is a mere witness or looker-on (*sākshin*), as it is described. Like Prakṛiti, however, it is supposed to be omnipresent, though its manifestation during the transmigrating state or *saṁsāra* is confined to the physical accessaries like the body and the internal organ with which it happens to be associated.

The exact manner in which these two disparate entities are brought together or seem to be brought together is a difficult point and remains one of the perplexities in the system. But our present purpose does not require any discussion of it. Whatever the ultimate explanation may be, Prakṛiti and Purusha virtually act as one; and we shall therefore take it for granted that they co-operate. It is, indeed, a matter of experience that there is no spirit without a body or a body which functions as a living organism without spirit. This complex of nature and spirit is only the empirical self and is to be distinguished, according to the Sāṁkhya, from the true or transcendental self, viz. Purusha; but, from the practical standpoint, the distinction is of no importance. The Prakṛiti element that most intimately enters into this union is the internal organ. There are other elements also, like the sensory organs, but they are all in

one sense or another entirely subordinate to it. The coming together of these is the necessary presupposition of all experience, for spirit without nature is inactive and nature without spirit is blind. In the resulting union, each finds its complement and the defects of both are made good. And we may point out by the way that experience is not explained here, as in naturalism, to be a product of unconscious matter; it is, on the other hand, taken to emerge from a certain association of spirit with it—an association through which the two behave as if they were a single organism. Matter is merely the medium for spirit to manifest itself, not its source. This association of the two is found not only ordinarily but also in what is known as *jīvanmukti* or 'freedom while still alive,' when a person has become fully enlightened and has transcended all the weaknesses of human flesh. Such a man, when he departs this life, must no doubt continue to *be*, Purusha being considered immortal. Spirit then remains in itself, wholly emancipated from nature. That condition is described as *kaivalya*—'isolation' or 'aloofness'—to distinguish it from *jīvanmukti* in which the Purusha continues to be associated with the body, senses and so forth, though no longer in bondage to them.

The self in this sense is not a detached entity like the Purusha, but exhibits the result of innumerable forces that have acted upon it in the course of its beginningless history. It is consequently not passive and does not remain a mere spectator of whatever happens to be before it, but is active and meddles with the external object as it apprehends it. It does not, however, through such meddling import any new features into the object presented; it only selects certain aspects of it and omits the rest. According to this theory of selective apprehension, all the characteristics that can ever be known of an object actually belong to it; and if any of them are not apprehended by a particular person or at a particular time, it is entirely due to subjective limitations. Hence the sensory organs and the *antaḥ-karaṇa*, though they help perception in one sense, may be said to hinder it in another. The nature of the selection made in the case of any object depends upon the past life or character of the person in question; and this is the reason why a thing that attracts one may completely repel another. The aspect under which an individual perceives the world is thus intimately personal to him; yet the doctrine does not maintain, as one school of Buddhism does, that there is no external reality at all. The different world-views are, no doubt, relative to the subject; but they, at the same time, point to an objective world which is

common to all and is real in its own right. The chief argument in support of this realistic position is that, although there are differences among men in their views of things, there are as certainly points of agreement also among them. If there are occasions when each can speak only for himself, there are others when one can speak for all. Here is an important feature of the system, for it neither sides with the view that things are precisely as they are apprehended, nor with the other which holds that the mind makes its own things. It avoids either extreme and allots equal importance to the subjective and objective factors in explaining the phenomenon of experience. It is we who know the *world* just as truly as it is. Men obtrude their personalities into their judgements, and subjective prejudices undoubtedly affect their knowledge of things; yet they never create the things they perceive. But our knowledge, though pointing to an external universe, is one-sided. This is a fundamental defect of human experience; and to it we should add another, arising from the fact that the *whole* of the world is presented to no man at one and the same time. All knowledge, as commonly known to us, is therefore personal and fragmentary. It may not indeed amount to an error of commission (*viparīta-khyāti*); but it is partial and, so far as it is not recognized to be partial, it becomes an error, though only an error of omission (*akhyāti*). This incomplete knowledge, with the resulting over-emphasis on a part of what is given, explains the conflicts and inconsistencies of life whether they be found in the same person at different times or between different persons at the same time.

Such a view of knowledge is not without its lesson for us. The lesson is twofold: It behoves us to feel less positive than we ordinarily do about the correctness of our own views, and be more regardful of the views of others. In other words, it teaches us the need for humility and charity in our intercourse with fellow-men, and impresses upon us the need for doing our utmost to see things not only as they appear to us but also as they may appear to others. The differences between one man and another may at first sight appear unbridgeable; but it may be that they can be easily adjusted, if only each tries to learn and appreciate the others' point of view. In one word, it bespeaks toleration which, as a matter of fact, is a striking feature of all Indian thought.

If all knowledge be thus imperfect in its very nature, what is truth? The Sāṁkhya holds that it is comprehensive knowledge in which one part supplements and corrects another. It is knowledge which knows no

exclusions or preferences and lays appropriate emphasis on all aspects of the object known. It may be asked whether such knowledge is at all possible so long as its means continues to be the internal organ which, as a product of Prakṛiti, is of a triple nature and consists not merely of *sattva* but also of *rajas* and *tamas*. In answering this question, it is necessary to remember that it is not the internal organ *as such* that limits our view of the world in the manner described above; for in its intrinsic nature, it is essentially *sāttvika* and is therefore well fitted to be the means of revealing all that is. In point of fact, however, *rajas* or *tamas* predominates in it as a result of the past history of the person to whom it belongs; and it is the relative predominance of either that accounts for whatever limitations it may possess as an organ of knowledge. By subduing these elements through proper self-discipline and restoring the internal organ to its original purity, man may completely transform his outlook upon life and the world. *Rajas* and *tamas* cannot, of course, be entirely eliminated; but when the internal organ is purified or 'the heart is cleansed' as it is said, their presence will be harmless for all practical purposes. But it should not be imagined that this complete knowledge is merely an aggregate of all possible views of the physical world. It is rather an experience in which they have all been integrated and, according to the account given of it (*Yoga-sūtra* I.49), is best described as intuitive. It overcomes the idiosyncrasies of individual attitudes; but it does so by synthesizing, not by summing them. In this synthetic view, which represents the climax of philosophic thought, all things are seen as they actually are. So soon as this whole and disinterested truth about the world dawns upon one's mind, one sees through Prakṛiti and realizes its absolute distinctness from Purusha. And it is a knowledge of this distinctness (*viveka-jñāna*) rather than that of the world as it is, that is stated to be the means of release. Such knowledge is attainable in the present life; and it is the attainment of it that is the final aim of life, according to the Sāṁkhya. The whole realm of nature is conceived in the system as leading up to this consummation. It is designed for this end and exists solely for it. Only the approach to the ideal is through worldly life, the character and duration of which depend upon the moral and intellectual equipment of particular individuals. But all alike have to pass through the trials and troubles of common life (*bhoga*) before their mind is turned towards the final goal (*apavarga*). It means that the true ideal does not suggest itself to any one that has not seen for him-

self the imperfections of *saṁsāra*. The Sāṁkhya ideal of life may appear to be one that can never be actually reached; but what is important to note is the possibility of a progressive approximation to it. In the case of all ideals, we may say, it is a continual advance in the right direction that matters more than even their actual realization.

Such a view of the goal of life means a long course of discipline to reach it, and we have now briefly to consider the nature of this discipline. But before proceeding to it, we may draw attention to what is a common feature of all the Indian systems. They are not motived by the purpose merely of discovering truth, but also by that of realizing it in life. It is such realization that marks the attainment of truth, in the proper sense of the term, and not merely arriving at a speculative notion of it. In other words, Indian philosophy regards truth as not merely a fact but also as a value. To give our intellectual assent to a doctrine, however vital that too may be, is therefore not all; we must see that it inaugurates a new life. This is the significance of the personal discipline prescribed in all the systems as the necessary accompaniment of philosophic study. The discipline in the present case is only briefly referred to in Sāṁkhya works, but it is fully described in the sister system of Yoga. If Kapila has enlarged upon the theory, Patañjali has done the same in regard to the practical side of the teaching. The discipline comprises what are described as the eight *aṅgas* of *yoga*. They are *yama* or 'self-restraint,' *niyama* or 'observance,' *āsana* or 'posture,' *prāṇāyāma* or 'regulation of breath,' *pratyāhāra* or 'withdrawal of the senses,' *dhāraṇā* or 'steadying the mind,' *dhyāna* or 'contemplation' and *samādhi* or 'meditative trance.' The aim of this discipline is to assist man in the ascent from the narrow view congenital to him to the larger vision which brings freedom with it. A characteristic feature of it is the gradation in the training which it prescribes. It recognizes different levels of fitness in the disciples and regulates the training accordingly. It does not aim at extirpating evil propensities all at once. Another noteworthy feature of the same is that it is based upon the psychologically sound principle that vice is not overcome by attempting to repress it directly, but by sedulously practising the contrary virtue which will eventually supplant it. This eightfold discipline may be divided into two stages:

(i) The first is concerned with the right direction of the will, and represents the attainment of the good as distinguished from the true. We have already mentioned the need for charity and humility in our

dealings with others. The discipline in the present stage is devised to develop this unselfish side in men's character. More particularly, it relates to the acquirement of virtues comprised in the first two *aṅgas* of yogic discipline, namely, *yama* and *niyama*. The former is negative and consists of non-injury (*ahiṁsā*), truth-speaking (*satya*), abstention from stealing or misappropriation of others' property (*asteya*), celibacy (*brahmacharya*) and disowning of possessions (*aparigraha*). The latter is positive and includes purity (*śaucha*), contentment (*santosha*), right aspiration (*tapas*), study (*svādhyāya*) and devotion to God (*Īśvara-praṇidhāna*). These together may be described as the ten commandments of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga. It is on this pre-eminently moral foundation that any spiritual training should rest, if it is to be fruitful and not on the mere cultivation of the intellect. Without such a foundation, there is no possibility of salvation; and he who lays that foundation firmly, even though he may stop short at that, may be taken to have achieved much. The key-word to this discipline is impersonality. Man must overcome the egoistic impulses in him which are the source of so much evil in the world. The discipline is consequently ascetic, but it is not so in the negative sense of the term, as is shown by the nature of the virtues enjoined under the second head of *niyama*. The impersonal attitude thereby attained is known as *vairāgya*, and its cultivation is recommended in order to awaken the spiritual will. It is described as *apara* or 'lower' *vairāgya*, to distinguish it from the *para* or the 'higher' which does not appear till full enlightenment has come. Any dabbling in *yoga*, without this preliminary purification of natural impulses, is fraught with danger; and it is such hasty recourse to yogic practice that is responsible for much of the odium that has come to be attached in the popular mind to that discipline.

(ii) The next stage of the discipline, consisting of the remaining six *aṅgas*, is for the specific cultivation of the power of mental concentration. Its details being somewhat technical, we shall refer here only to its general features. Of the six *aṅgas*, the first three are devised to secure control of the physical frame with a view to facilitate the control of the mind. They refer, as already noted, to right bodily posture, regulation of breath and the withdrawal of the senses from their respective objects. Of the succeeding three, two assist in getting a direct but gradual mastery over the ever-fitful mind. The objects chosen for meditating upon may be any in this stage. The last consists essentially in

direct meditation on the Sāṁkhya truth. When success in this final stage is achieved, all operations of the internal organ are suspended and spirit returns to itself, so to speak. The disciple then becomes a *jīvanmukta*. He may thereafter continue to live upon the earth, but he is virtually divorced from Prakṛiti and therefore remains 'far from passion, pain and guilt.'

There is one point in the above account which requires a word of explanation. We have mentioned God in describing *niyama;* but we have not, so far, referred to his place in the doctrine at all. Of the two systems to which we have alluded, the Sāṁkhya, in its classical form, is definitely atheistic. It believes in the permanence and supremacy of spirit, but knows nothing of God. Here it shows its rationalistic bias, for no syllogistic proof, as is well known, can be given of his existence. The Sāṁkhya, no doubt, like the other Indian systems, is essentially a philosophy of values. But according to its teachers, all that is presupposed by the reality of higher values is the reality of the human spirit. This is clearly indicated by the manner in which the 'design argument,' already referred to, is utilized here. It is regarded not as pointing to a designer, but to one that constitutes the end or final aim of the design. The Sāṁkhya concludes from the presence in nature of means adapted to the accomplishment of particular ends, not God as their author, but the self for whom it supposes them to exist. Patañjali holds a different view and postulates the existence of God or Īśvara over and above that of Purushas. The allusion to God appears in our account of *niyama* because the course of discipline, as we remarked before, is entirely taken over from his system. Devotion to God would consequently have no place in the discipline which is strictly in conformity with the Sāṁkhya teaching. Here is an important difference between the two doctrines which agree in so many respects. But the Yoga conception of Īśvara is vastly different from the familiar one of the Vedānta. To begin with, Īśvara here is one of the Purushas so that, though omnipresent, he is not all-comprehensive. There are other Purushas as well as Prakṛiti to limit his being. Secondly, he is not responsible, in the ordinary sense of the term, for the creation of the world which, as we know, is the spontaneous work of Prakṛiti. But he is a perfect Purusha and has always been so. He is therefore unique, and even the liberated Purushas do not stand on the same footing. Still, on account of his perfection, he serves as a pattern to man as to what he

might become. In this respect, he resembles a *guru* who should likewise be an embodiment of the ideal. Apart from serving as an ideal, he, out of his abundant mercy, sympathizes with suffering men and helps them in attaining spiritual freedom if they only trust in him and meditate upon him. Accordingly, Patañjali recognizes not only the *yoga* discipline as detailed above for securing freedom but also an alternative one of *bhakti* or devotion to Īśvara and communion with him which, without all the elaborate preparation of *yoga*, qualifies one for *samādhi*—the immediate means of release.

We have so far referred to the attainment of the good and the vision of the true; and the Sāṁkhya, like the generality of Indian doctrines, subordinates the one to the other. There remains another value of life, viz. the æsthetic, and we shall refer to one or two important features of it before we conclude. An impersonal view of man and nature, but devoid of enlightenment in the above sense, is, according to the Sāṁkhya, the characteristic feature of æsthetic experience. The narrow view common to human life is not overcome here by the acquisition of complete knowledge; but the conditions of ordinary personal life are, all the same, transcended here, though only temporarily, as in the case of a *jīvanmukta*. The æsthetic attitude is therefore disinterested like the insight that brings freedom with it. The detachment characteristic of the attitude is the result chiefly of the *ideal* status of the objects portrayed in art, which divests them of all personal references and thereby renders them similar to the actual things as contemplated by the perfected *yogin*. Art, indeed, may be defined as the layman's *yoga*, for it also affords an escape from the realm of the *guṇas*. Great artists attain such detachment directly through the impulse they receive from nature—from 'woods and rills, the silence that is in the starry sky, the sleep that is among the lonely hills.' But that is not so, to any conspicuous extent, as regards ordinary men; yet even they can rise to that level with the help of the artistic creations of a genius. In either case, we must note, the stimulus comes from outside, although response to it is impossible without a certain aptitude in the individual. In other words, the act of will, as compared with the acquisition of right knowledge, plays here quite a secondary part. The impersonal attitude comes of itself; it is not sought deliberately and found. Speaking of this distinction between the artist's success and the saint's, a thinker,[1] who is known to have developed a

[1] Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. See Commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 29.

theory of art on the basis of Sāṁkhya philosophy but with particular reference to poetry, states—somewhat exultingly—that the bliss of peace, which the *yogin* strains himself to win, is no match for that with which the poetic Muse spontaneously requites her votaries. But he is really reversing the truth here, because the artistic attitude is temporary and will be followed sooner or later by what, in spite of the culture it may involve, must be regarded as a lapse into the routine of ordinary life. The saint also who has achieved true freedom may revert to common life from his state of trance; but it can, in no sense, be taken as a lapse, for the knowledge and wisdom he has gained remain with him ever after inspiring all his thoughts, words and deeds.

YOGA PSYCHOLOGY

The Yoga system of Patañjali is not primarily a psychological system and its treatment of psychological problems is only incidental to its main metaphysical and ethical purposes. But it differs from other systems of Indian thought, excepting Buddhism, in being more systematic in its handling of psychological problems. The Yoga system was forced to this course almost inevitably by its presuppositions, and so without a knowledge of those presuppositions it is not easy to understand its main lines of speculation. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga twins started with a dualism of matter (Prakṛiti) and spirit (Purusha), and although neither could explain when exactly spirit became involved in matter, both assumed, as did the other Indian systems, that it was possible to put an end to the undesirable entanglement of spirit in matter. Both assumed that spatio-temporal existence was somehow painful in its ultimate nature,[1] although to ordinary minds the world presented many pleasurable aspects; and both concerned themselves with the task of eradicating pain without caring to state precisely whether the dissociation of spirit from matter would lead to some kind of happy existence.[2] Both, again, assumed that spirits were infinite in number and that each spiritual being must earn its release from the grip of matter by individual effort.[3] They agreed also that the final state of a released soul was one of splendid isolation (*kaivalya*)—complete freedom from material contact and no communion of any kind with any other released soul.[4] In this state of salvation the soul was supposed to recover its innate purity, self-illumination and freedom through the falling off of the drapery which served to produce a sense of identity with material existence. Although orthodox speculation had a tendency to think that Nature, of herself, moved away from the proximity of an enlightened soul, so that both entanglement and release of spirit were really her doing[5] (the soul, inactive by nature, being incapable of willing either the bondage or the salvation), the general philosophical attitude

[1] *Yogasūtra*, ii.15; *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, 1.
[2] *Y. S.*, ii.14; iii 51; iv.30; *Sāṁ.-Kār.*, 1.
[3] *Y. S.*, ii.22; *Sāṁ.-Kār.*, 18, 56. So also in Buddhism an *arhat* is advised to be a lamp unto himself; similar is the Jaina belief.
[4] *Y. S.*, iii.50, 55; iv.26, 34; *Sāṁ.-Kār.*, 17, 19, 21, 64, 68. The term was used in this technical sense both in Jainism and in Buddhism.
[5] *Sāṁ.-Kār.*, 62; also 56 f.; *Y. S.*, ii.18.



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was that the soul must desire, strive for and deserve its freedom from the shackles of material existence. The tentacles of Nature were supposed to be multiform: beginning with gross material objects and passing through finer stuff, Nature might assume almost the form of the spirit itself to prevent the soul from realizing its true essence. This increases the risk of spiritual degradation, for under the impression that spiritual safety has been obtained the soul may rest in a false sense of security and thus ultimately fail to achieve its proper object. Nature, in course of her evolution, makes herself almost indispensable to spirit, for she evolves successively into the intelligence-stuff (*buddhi* or *mahat*), the ego-principle (*ahaṁkāra*), and the eleven organs (the five organs of sense, the five organs of action and mind) to make spirit fit for apprehending the external and internal worlds, and she evolves at the same time the objective world of subtle essences (*tanmātras*) and gross elements (*mahābhūtas*) to complete the subjugation of spirit. Nature in this way takes vengeance on spirit for disturbing her original placidity and the equilibrium of the three *guṇas* or elementary principles of which she is composed. She now begins to spin out of herself the gossamers that, though in reality of the flimsiest strength so far as spirit is concerned, begin to bind the soul which, through its ignorance and false identification with these evolutes of Nature, loses its spiritual orientation and gets more and more involved in the meshes of material existence. The Yoga system professes to free the soul from this material bondage by laying down a progressive scheme of self-realization. The main objective of Yoga psychology is to lay bare the process of thinking in its ethical aspect of progress towards or away from that self-illumination which is identical with salvation; incidentally it has to discuss the difficulties and dangers that beset the path of the aspirant after liberation at different stages of progress. The means it suggests to achieve this *summum bonum* of the spirit is to turn the material impediments themselves into weapons of attack so that Nature becomes ultimately hoisted with her own petard and retires from the field of battle.[1]

Now, spirit is enclosed within a triple barricade of matter and until all the barriers fall off the soul would remain in bondage to matter. The physical body supplies the gross vestment of spirit, and material comforts often pass for spiritual blessings. This was the basis of the Chārvāka

[1] By concentration on Nature's objects they are subdued and seen through. See, for instance, *Y. S.*, i.17, ii.10, 11, also *Vibhutipada* of *Y. S.*

philosophy where the soul and the body were identified and the existence of a disembodied soul (or even a purely spiritual soul) was denied.[1] Then there is the belt of the external sense-organs. As contrasted with the organic sensations mediated by the gross body, these bring reports of external objects and fascinate the soul by the beauties of diversified Nature. The reaction to sensory knowledge is effected by means of the organs of action, and this brings in more knowledge of the external world and more material pleasures. Then there is the group of internal principles (*antaḥkaraṇa*)—mind (*manas*), ego (*ahaṁkāra*) and intelligence (*buddhi*), which forms the last and the most insidious chain of bondage forged round the soul. Thus the Yoga philosophy reiterates the main Upanishadic conclusion that the soul must not be identified either with the body or with the senses or with the mind or even with the ego and the intelligence-principle, and that one must penetrate into the inner spiritual core after ripping open the "sheaths" (*kośas*) of materiality.[2]

But how are we to think of the soul apart from these? If the soul is the principle of consciousness and matter the unconscious stuff of reality, what would remain of consciousness if the necessary paraphernalia of cognition are removed? How would a soul function without a body, a group of sense-organs and a group of internal principles? If the stream of consciousness dries up for want of materials and means, how are we to know that the soul has not evaporated at the same time? The Yoga philosophy cuts the Gordian knot by denying that the process of awareness in time, which involves the duality of subject and object, belongs to the soul as such,[3] and thus, by introducing the distinction between relational thinking and self-illumination, it throws to the side of unreality the whole process of empirical thought and reserves for the soul's insight the entire field of spiritual reality. But the language employed was not always happy, for it was often asserted that self-illumination was identical with the knowledge of the ultimate distinction between soul and matter (*viveka-khyāti*)—a position which would involve the persistence of the knowledge of the non-spiritual at least as the opposite of the spiritual reality—as something, however diaphanous, from which the self distinguished itself. Possibly what was intended is that the rise of pure spiritual insight was identical with a cessation of the awareness

[1] *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* (Abhyankara's Ed.), pp. 2, 13; *Shaḍdarśanasamuchchaya* (with Guṇaratna's *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*), p. 306.
[2] *Tait. Up.* ii.2-5; see *Bh.-G.*, iii.42.
[3] *Y. S.*, i.2, 3; iv.25, 34.

of the non-spiritual, the psychological duality of compresent subject and object being transcended in a logical duality of which both terms could not simultaneously exist.' In other words, we are to understand by the rise of spiritual insight (*prajñā*) a positive realization of the true nature of the self and not a mere consciousness of distinction between Nature and spirit.[1] But this introduced a second danger. The knowledge of the self being incapable of being characterized by the categories of objective contemplation, it was not easy to say what kind of knowledge dawned on the cessation of objective knowledge. Although the Sāṁkhya had talked of the redeemed soul as eternal, pure, illumined and free,[2] and the Yoga presumably followed suit, it was evident that both took insight not as the attribute but as the essence of the soul, just as the Vedānta did in the case of Brahman.[3] The refusal to regard insight as the essence would have landed the Sāṁkhya-Yoga in the same predicament as the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika where the dissociation of spirit and mind was supposed to reduce the former to the condition of an insensate stone (*śilā-śakala*)[4]—a contingency, which the Sāṁkhya-Yoga could not face in view of their theory that the soul in its true essence is insight (*bodha-svarūpa*). But omniscience, such as is acquired by the highest sages, was not what the released soul recovered on attaining its proper nature after the disappearance of the material vestments; for while omniscience is an *attribute* of the advanced spirit, insight is the *essence* of the soul released. Unlike Jainism, which ascribed to the delivered souls a physical persistence and both omniscience and bliss,[5] the Yoga denied all but knowledge as essence to these; its main line of enquiry, therefore, was directed towards emptying the thought-process of all phenomenality in order to arrive at the noumenal consciousness of the self. The process consisted in attenuating the phenomenal series with the ultimate object of erasing it altogether from the surface of the soul[6]—no mere improvement of the thought-process could lead to self-realization, for the two were entirely different in kind. One could not jump off the one into

[1] *Y. S.*, i.51; iii.50.
[2] *Nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāva*; see *Y. S.*, iv.18.
[3] The word used is *chitiśakti* in *Y. S.*, iv.34.
[4] Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (1st Ed.), p. 225; *Shaḍdarśanasamuchchaya* (with Guṇaratna's Commentary), p. 188.
[5] The general belief is that the Siddhas have no body and the occupation of boundless space by them is not to be physically understood. See Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, p. 169; *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* (Abhyankara's Ed.), p. 88.
[6] *Y. S.*, i.2, 3, 4, 51; ii.6, 20; iii.50; iv.34.

the other but must win every inch of ground, through the painfully slow and slippery process of self-discipline, to obtain insight.

The starting point of the enquiry is constituted by an investigation into the nature of phenomenal consciousness, which is an unceasing flow of cognitive states, using the word 'cognition' in its most extended sense to include all types of awareness, impulse and affection. This is called *chittavṛitti*, mental modifications or fluctuations of the mind-stuff, the word *chitta* being a comprehensive designation of the collocation of the five vital airs, the eleven organs (including the mind proper) and the other conditions of knowledge like egoism (*ahaṁkāra*) and intelligence (*buddhi*).[1] It roughly corresponds to the Western conception of consciousness as a stream in which there are both apprehension of objects and appropriation by the self of the states of awareness as its own.[2] This aspect of *chitta* is called *kārya-chitta* which is conditioned in the nature and extent of its operations by the nature of its organic basis.[3] It must be remembered that all types of beings are not capable of the same type of experience nor do two individuals of the same species agree about their mental contents. The reason for this is to be sought in the law of *karma* which determines what type of embodiment and experience is to be expected of any particular embodied soul, when unaided by Yogic proficiency.[4] The contracted field of knowledge and activity is at once an effect of ignorance and demerit; for the *kāraṇa-chitta* or the potential mind-stuff is essentially ubiquitous (*vibhu*) and yogic practices can recover this potential ubiquity in any individual cases (the Sāṁkhya denying, however, the absolute ubiquity of the *kāraṇa-chitta* and admitting only its relative expansiveness in different types of bodies).[5]

This then is the first handicap which the potential *yogin* has to meet. The *chitta* is not a perfectly uniform pliable stuff—it differs from individual to individual, making the task of one easier than that of another. Past *karma* has set limits to its capacities, so much so that certain types of embodiment are only expiatory in character without the right and the capacity to improve one's lot by personal endeavour, just as probably other embodiments are only meant for enjoying the fruits of past *karmas*

[1] Dasgupta, *The Study of Patañjali*, p. 96; *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 261; *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, p. 94, Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* II, p. 345.
[2] See James, *Principles of Psychology* I, p. 225
[3] Dasgupta, *The St. of Pat.*, pp. 95-6, Radhakrishnan, *Ind. Phil.* II, p. 345; see also Dasgupta, *Yoga Ph.*, p. 262; *Yoga as Ph. and Rel.*, pp. 92-4.
[4] *Y. S.*, ii.13; iv.4.
[5] Dasgupta, *St. of Pat.*, p. 95; *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, pp. 93-4; *Yoga Ph.*, p. 262.

and are equally devoid of the capacity of improvement (the gods, for instance, being regarded by some as incapable of acquiring saving knowledge except when re-embodied as men).[1] All individuals do not have to begin at the same point on the onward path and the same disciplines are not necessary for all to bring about spiritual insight. The *chitta*, again, is differently equipped with instinctive cravings in different kinds of beings in accordance with the types of their embodiment. As beings have been coming and going during the whole period of their eternal life, they must have assumed many shapes in course of transmigration and a deposit of impressions of those different lives is left in the *chitta* as *vāsanās*. These *vāsanās* become active according to embodiment, so that a human body is never prompted by bovine instincts nor a cow by human impulses.[2] These *vāsanās* are eternal in the sense that they are not habits, memories and dispositions acquired during the lifetime of the individual, nor do they disappear like these with the cessation of the body. The *yogin* has to fight not only against visible enemies but also against invisible foes; for, in addition to the conscious contents of his mind, there are also native tendencies like natural introversion and extroversion, innate propensities peculiar to the species carried over from past lives, and also latent deposits (*saṁskāra*) of past activities of this life. It is not enough, therefore, to stop the flow of conscious states alone, for latent tendencies of different kinds sprout up into overt thoughts and activities so long as they are not totally burnt up by the fire of discriminating knowledge (*viveka*).[3] When, therefore, *yoga* is defined as *chittavṛitti-nirodha* (suppression of the modifications of the mind-stuff), it must be understood not only as the stoppage of the flow of presentations but also as the eradication of those potencies or latent tendencies that generate new streams of thought and new lines of action.[4] Much of yogic direction is, therefore, aimed at the uprooting of potencies that make for fresh bondage through lapse in inhibition. Hence the *yogin* (in Brāhmaṇism, Buddhism and Jainism) is enjoined to consolidate conquests as well as to attack new outposts if he wishes to attain the condition of a *kevalin* or an *arhat;* the different *samādhis, bhūmis* or *guṇasthānakas* mark the line of

[1] See the writer's article on "The Vicissitudes of the Karma Doctrine" in *Malaviya Commemoration Volume*, p. 515.

[2] *Y. S.*, iv.9; Dasgupta, *St. of Pat.*, p. 111.

[3] Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, pp. 96-7; *Yoga Ph.*, p. 280, 285-6; *Y. S.*, i.51; ii.26; ii.50; iv.26-34.

[4] *Y. S.*, i.2, 50-1.

advance in spirituality,[1] and woe unto him who forgets that positions attained with arduousness can be retained only by vigilance and effort and that to make no effort to advance is the surest way to court retreat.

Now this *chitta* whose modifications are to be suppressed in order to obtain insight is not homogeneous in character. There are distracted natures (*kshipta*), unsteady minds (*vikshipta*), passionate and stupid egos (*mūḍha*), attentive dispositions (*ekāgra*) and intuitive tempers (*niruddha*).[2] The perpetually restless, the occasionally steady, the infatuated, the mono-ideistic and the restricted exhaust the different types of minds and they are faced with difficulties of different degrees and kinds in realizing their true selves. We need not refer to the difference in the grades of beings in which, according to Buddhism, trance conditions of different orders are natural.[3] Men are themselves obstructed by different elements in their nature—the impulsive, the vacillating, the scatter-brained, the obstinate and even the speculative are all infected with a latent danger to a greater or less extent. So insidious are the ways of mentation that alike in truthful thought (*pramāṇa*), false knowledge (*viparyaya*), verbal knowledge or objectless and inarticulate thinking (*vikalpa*), sleep and dream condition (*nidrā*) and memory (*smṛiti*)[4] we are really carrying on some process of thinking or other that draws the soul away from its proper vocation. All avenues of empirical or phenomenal knowledge must be closed before transcendental cognition can arise.

The reason why phenomenal knowledge must be abolished is that it owes its origin and continuance to the operation of non-spiritual factors. According to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga phenomenal cognition arises when the intelligent but inactive Purusha comes into proximity with non-intelligent but potentially active Prakṛiti and sets up the evolutionary process in the latter. Intelligence-stuff (*buddhi*), egoity (*ahaṁkāra*) and mind (*manas*), though bearing psychical titles, do not really belong to spirit—they are all successive stages in the evolution of blind Prakṛiti and represent that aspect of Nature in which the approximation to the psychic character of Purusha

[1] *Y. S.*, i.17, 18; ii.27; iv.29. See also Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, pp. 288-89, 374; also p. 109; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. 110-19; Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, Chap. XII; also *Essays in Zen Buddhism* (First Series), pp 70-2; S. Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, p. 185 f.; Nahar and Ghosh, *An Epitome of Jainism* Ch. XXXVI. See in this connection Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism* (First Series), pp. 81-2. Also Law, *Human Types* (Puggala-Paññatti), p. 82; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics* (Dhamma-Saṅgāni), pp. 43-75.

[2] *Vyāsabhāshya* on *Y. S.*, i.1; Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, p. 95 f.; *St. of Pat.*, p. 97 f.

[3] See Warren, *Bud. in Trans.*, p. 289.

[4] *Y. S.*, i.5, 6.

assumes greater and greater prominence. The reflection of the Purusha in this constellation produces an illusory spiritual double and Nature seems to have become conscious through this reflected intelligization. According to a different view, there is a double reflection—that of Purusha on *buddhi* and that of *buddhi* on Purusha—with the effect that while Nature assumes a psychical aspect Purusha begins to identify itself with the intelligized phenomena of *buddhi*.[1] The effect of this reflection of Purusha in *buddhi* is similar to that of a motionless person on a rippling surface of water: the water bodies forth a man and at the same time distorts his real form, stature and posture. If the man on the shore were to look at his own figure in the water, he would be under the impression that his whole frame is dancing in the ripples, although as a matter of fact he is standing motionless. The apparent process or change is due to the medium of reflection and does not indicate the real nature of the man. So also Purusha which is inactive and has no essential relation to Nature begins to consider itself as an active agent and a cognizer of worldly happenings as soon as it forgets that its phenomenal double is really a creation of Prakṛiti.[2] We need not discuss seriously the palliating theory that Nature evolves in order ultimately to redeem the soul; for it is doubtful if without effort the soul would ever get rid of Prakṛiti, and even the cessation of effort in Purusha requires some kind of active participation in the plan of salvation by Purusha itself. The whole yogic scheme would be unmeaning if no personal effort is needed to put a stop to the ceaseless flow of mental states; what the Yoga probably intended to convey is that the *sense* of effort and appropriation is phenomenal, although the transcendental operation of the soul must be presumed to sustain the spiritual effort and progress. We may, in fact, see here something analogous to the distinction between the logical ego and the psychological ego of Kant—there is no empirical knowledge of the existence and operation of the former either in the Yoga or in Kant. Consciousness is a function of the confluence of the logical ego and the thing-in-itself in Kant; so also in the Yoga the noumenal Purusha and the undifferentiated Prakṛiti must co-operate before any phenomenal knowledge can arise and a sense of agentship can invade the soul. Without knowledge on the part of the phenomenal ego, the thing-in-itself of Kant and the Prakṛiti of the Sāṁ-

[1] See Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, pp. 15-23; *Tattvakaumudi* on *Sāṁ-Kār.*, 27. See Sinha, *Indian Psychology: Perception*, p. 124, for the distinction between Vāchaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikshu; see Dasgupta, *St. of Pat.*, pp 15-24, in this connection.

[2] *Sāṁ.-Kār.*, 19, 20; *Bh.-G.*, iii.27.

khya-Yoga lapse back into an uncharacterizable condition; similarly; without objective cognition, the ego ceases to be known and lapses back into a transcendental or logical condition both in Kant and in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga. There is, however, this distinction between Kant and the Yoga system that while the former denies that the logical ego can know itself, the latter postulates a spiritual illumination of the transcendental ego in its released condition—an illumination so different in kind from empirical knowledge that consciousness ceases to be an attribute and becomes an essence. Students of philosophy are familiar with the concept of Brahman as *chaitanyasvarūpa* in Indian speculation and of the Ultimate Reality as Absolute Experience in Western thought; the Sāṁkhya-Yoga rejects the personal soul of the theistic systems, the illusory soul of the Vedāntist and the Buddhist, the unconscious soul of the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika and the embodied soul of the Jaina, and is thus left with soul as experience much in the manner of Śaṅkara's Absolute. When insight becomes wholly immanent and ceases to be transeunt, it ceases to be a form of activity; hence knowledge has very seldom been regarded as a *karma* by Indian thinkers. The Yoga does not deny that phenomenal thinking is a form of activity, but it agrees that the rise of pure experience is not a mode of activity at all. In fact, we are told that concentration (*dhyāna*) becomes perfect when self-reference is lost and the self becomes almost emptied of all contents and only the object to be contemplated shines forth[1]; this indicates that, prior to the final leap, the spirit loses the activity that differentiates and reacts upon the object, and, being divested of all relativity, it loses the flow of awareness which is responsible for the sense of activity. Like the central point of a revolving wheel the soul remains unmoved in the midst of changes— it is the unmoved mover of the phenomenal series which, being gradually contracted, leaves the unmoved mover alone behind.[2] As one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*) comes nearest to this ideal of psychical immobility, the *yogin* is enjoined to cultivate it as a means of total suppression of psychical states.[3]

The relation to their conduciveness to the realization of the nature of the self divides mental states (*vṛittis*) into *klishṭa* (afflicted or hindered)

[1] *Y. S.*, iii.3 See also *Y. S.*, i 43

[2] The distinction between Buddhism and Brāhmaṇism on this point is that while Buddhism thinks that the evaporation of the phenomenal series does not leave any permanent substance behind, Brāhmaṇism believes that an abiding entity called soul (*ātman*) is left behind.

[3] *Y. S.*, iii.11, 12.

and *aklishṭa* (unafflicted or unhindered).[1] The former can all be reduced to one category, namely, states of ignorance (*avidyā*), while the latter can all be called states of knowledge (*prajñā*). Now, ignorance takes the forms of mistaking the not-self for the self (*asmitā*), the impure for the pure (*rāga*), the really painful for the pleasurable (*dvesha*, inasmuch as in anger and hatred there is a peculiar pleasure attached although the experience is really painful),[2] and the evanescent for the eternal (*abhiniveśa*).[3] The combined effect of all these forms of ignorance is that men look upon the pleasures of the body as the delights of the soul, the impure bodies of friends and relatives (and women) as pure and desirable, the really beneficent sufferings of the body as objects of aversion and the changing scenes of the mental and physical worlds as constant and abiding. The *yogin* must cultivate a habit of thinking in which things would appear in their true perspectives and the attractions of the physical world, the pleasures of the senses, the delights of the body and the pride of possession would all disappear, and even the distinction between virtue (*puṇya*) and vice (*pāpa*) would vanish, for this is true only of the phenomenal ego, and not of the transcendental self.[4] It is not enough to kill the manifestations of the afflicted states, for in addition to the condition of active manifestation (*udāra*) these states are sometimes intercepted by other states (*vichchhinna*), sometimes they operate with reduced intensity (*tanu*) through the practice of certain forms of meditation and activity like study, austerities, etc., and sometimes they even sink below the level of consciousness and lie dormant (*prasupta*) in the form of *vāsanās* (latent tendencies) and *karmāśayas* (latent deposits of past actions).[5] One must get rid of these root and branch and burn up the possibility of future life not only by ceasing to have any hankering after it but also by taking steps to destroy its conditions. In this matter the *yogin* must go against the inclination of the natural man whose constant prayer is that he may continue to live and not be destroyed—a continuation of phenomenal existence that embraces both this life and the life hereafter.[6] He must not even aspire after a higher form of existence like that of gods or dis-

[1] *Y. S.*, i.5. [2] *Y. S.*, ii.2-9.

[3] The terms may also be taken in *Y. S.*, ii.5 without reference to ii.3. In that case the *yogin* would be expected to get beyond ignorance about the nature of the self, all attachments towards pleasurable things, all hostile tendencies towards harmful things and all tenacity of mundane existence. Ultimately they could be all reduced to interest in the physical and apathy towards the spiritual. The Yoga reiterates in ii.15 the Buddhistic dogma that all is ultimately painful.

[4] *Y. S.*, ii.14; iv.7.

[5] *Y. S.*, ii.4. See also i.50 51; iv.9. [6] *Y. S.*, ii.9; iv.10.

embodied beings (*videhalīnas* and *prakṛitilīnas*),[1] for even these are born and dissolved and birth in *any* form is bondage. On this point Brāhmaṇism, Buddhism and Jainism are singularly unanimous, namely, that attaining a higher form of phenomenal existence is not the ultimate objective of a spiritual aspirant.

Now, the indispensable condition of all spiritual advance is the cultivation of detachment (*vairāgya*)—not in a spasmodic fashion but in a systematic way (*abhyāsa*).[2] A person must be habituated to discriminative knowledge and this habit can be established only by long practice, with no exception being permitted on any pretext, and with faith in its utility and efficacy—in fact, the Yoga gives the same direction for the formation of habit as William James does.[3] In spiritual matters, a further condition is the cultivation of a spirit of detachment which in its advanced form takes the shape of loss of interest in both seen and revealed objects (*dṛishṭānuśravikavishaya*)[4]—in sensible objects like women, food, drink, power, etc., and in revealed objects like heavenly joys and states of disembodied existence. The Yoga system advises a control of the affections as the indispensable condition of the disappearance of the phenomenal world. So long as we retain interest in any object, we are bound to notice its presence and feel the effects of that knowledge; even subliminal cravings are to be checked by suitable means to ensure perfect freedom. The process starts with a desire that the senses should not

[1] *Y. S.*, i.19; also iii.51. We have a classification under iii.51 of *yogins* into *prathamakalpika*, the beginner whose practice of *vairāgya* is showing signs of success in the form of knowledge of other minds; *madhubhūmika*, the one who has set his heart upon conquering the world of external objects and his sense-organs and who is described in *Y. S.*, i.48, as one who, by hearing the scriptures (*śravaṇa*), consideration of their intent through thinking or inference (*manana*), and reflecting upon their object through contemplation (*nididhyāsana*), obtains the truth-bearing insight (*ṛitambharā prajñā*); *prajñājyotiḥ*, the one in whom after the conquest of elements and organs by practising constraint as laid down in *Y. S.*, ii.47 there has been effected an acquisition of all necessary means to uninterrupted progress towards passionlessness; and *atikrāntabhāvanīya*, the one whose sole object is to resolve the mind-stuff and whose present life is the last. The invitation of the gods is meant neither for the first who are not yet objects of serious consideration nor for the third and fourth classes for they do not care for heavenly joys, but only for the second class who may in this way be deflected from their purpose by the attraction of heavenly joys. The third class is described as starting from *viśoka* state (*Y. S.*, i.36). The fourth class is possessed of the seven stages of insight as described in *Y. S.*, ii.27. After the fourth stage, at which thinkables end, there remain three stages of *chittavimukti* only; that is why it is called *atikrāntabhāvanīya*, for the cause of release has been known and nothing else remains to be known. The parallelism of these four classes of *yogins* with the four just to be mentioned, namely, *yatamāna*, *vyatireka*, *ekendriya* and *vaśīkāra*, is not perfect, but in *vaśīkāra vairāgya* there is the same apathy towards heavenly (and worldly) joys as in the stages beyond *madhubhūmika* (see *Y. S.*, i.15). For the literal use of *prakṛitilaya*, see *Sāṁ.-Kār.*, 45.

[2] *Y. S.*, i.12-14; *Bh.-G.*, vi.35.

[3] *Y. S.*, i.14. See James, *Principles of Psychology* I, pp.123-7.

[4] *Y. S.*, i.15. See *Sāṁ.-Kār.*, 2.

stray into the fields of their normal activity: this is the condition of the striving (*yatamāna*). The next stage is represented by the knowledge that interest in certain objects has ceased but not in others: this is the condition of differentiation (*vyatireka*). The third stage is attained when interest in sense objects has completely ceased, but there still lingers a residual anxiety in the mind (whence it is called one-organed, *ekendriya*). Students of abnormal psychology will readily remember cases of anxiety-neurosis (and anxiety-hysteria) where the knowledge of the originating cause has disappeared from conscious memory and yet the effect appears in the form of anxiety. It is only when this stage is crossed and the state of detachment from seen and unseen delectations arises that the condition known as control (*vaśīkāra*), which is the highest form of lower detachment (*aparavairāgya*), may be said to have been attained.[1] Beyond this stage is *paravairāgya*, highest detachment, in which complete indifference even to the elements of nature (*guṇas*) is reached because of self-knowledge; and this discriminative knowledge becomes the cause of salvation only when it is never disturbed or broken (*aviplavā*)[2] by a return of the consciousness of the subject-object relation or the agent-patient relation.

Side by side with the control of the emotional aspect of mental life there goes on a transcendence of crude cognitions in a progressive fashion. Every phenomenal cognition implies three factors, namely, the knower (*grahītṛi*), the process of knowledge (*grahaṇa*) and the object to be known (*grāhya*)—a trinity which noumenal knowledge wholly transcends.[3] The *chitta* or mind-stuff has a tendency to identify itself with the object which it cognizes when its fluctuations are weakened; if its activities were absolute in character, then there would be no possibility either of improvement or of final liberation. Hence the importance of fixing the mind-stuff upon the right object, for what a mind thinks it tends to become. The Vedāntists say that the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman; the Yoga admits the truth of this proposition to this extent that in phenomenal cognition it is an advantage to fill the mind with proper objects of contemplation, for the mind tends to empty itself (*svarūpaśūnya*) and reflect the character of the object (*arthamātra-nirbhāsa*) with the development of concentration.[4] When the *yogin* is

[1] *Tattvakaumudī on Sāṁ.-Kār.*, 23; *Y. S.*, i.15. See Brill, *Psycho-analysis*, p. 89 f. (esp. p. 99).
[2] *Y. S.*, i.16; ii.26; iii.9-12.
[3] *Y. S.*, iii.47 (with *Vyāsabhāshya*).
[4] *Y. S.*, i.43.

asked to concentrate his mind on some dispassionate soul (*vītarāga-vishaya*), as, for instance, on Buddhas and Jinas in Buddhism and Jainism respectively, or on Īśvara, the omniscient and eternally free Lord and Instructor of the whole world, in Hinduism,[1] the hope is entertained that by so doing he would rise at least partially to the height of his ideate and speedily bring about his own salvation. Similarly, if the Upanishads could compare the state of dreamless sleep to the intuition of the Absolute, because in that condition all externality and duality disappear,[2] the Yoga system could advise the novice to take dreams (where external knowledge is at an end and only internal knowledge persists) and sleep (where both external knowledge and internal knowledge are at an end) as objects of concentration, for in that case the cessation of mental fluctuations, as in those conditions, would be easily attained.[3] In this way the mind can use any physical events or operations as objects;[4] the one principle that cannot be made the object of concentration is the self which is always the subject, though not in the phenomenal sense of being the possessor (ego) of states or objects. Even God and other spirits are, therefore, possible objects of phenomenal cognition, but not so the soul itself, for in absolute cognition the soul loses all sense of duality and becomes isolated (*kevalin*).[5]

It has already been remarked that the path to liberation lies through the fields of Nature herself—that the soul uses the phenomena of Nature themselves to conquer her finally. The process of conquest consists in the different kinds of knowledge in the *chitta* corresponding to the different kinds of Nature's manifestations. Thus, the ordinary mind is filled with contemplations of the grosser aspects of Nature—the products of the *mahābhūtas* which Prakṛiti evolves last. Using a word which is common with Buddhism but not entering into such niceties of distinction as Buddhism does regarding the different kinds of intellec-

[1] *Y. S.*, i.23, 37.

[2] *Brih. Up.* II i.15-17; *Chh. Up.* VI viii.1, VIII.iii.2, *Pr. Up.* IV.4. See Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, p. 125; also Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 248 f., 297 f.

[3] *Y. S.*, i.38 (the *Tattvavaiśāradī* points out that the sleep must be of *sāttvika* quality namely, such as is accompanied by the memory on waking that we had slept well). Sleep itself, however, is a hindrance as it means the predominance of the *tamasa* quality. In Buddhism also torpor is condemned although it was permitted to the *arhat* to take a periodical repose. (C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Man. of Psy. Eth.*, p. 312, with foot note 2).

[4] *Y. S.*, i.39.

[5] *Y. S.*, ii 18, 20, 25; iii 50; iv.34.

tion (*mano, chitta, vedanā, viññāna, saññā,* etc.),[1] the Yoga calls this stage of knowledge *savitarka samādhi*—here the mind synthesizes its impressions and ideas into the percept of a gross object like a cow or a jar and keeps itself fixed thereon.[2] In this stage all the elements of perceptual knowledge, namely, the sound (*śabda*) or the name, the meaning (*artha*) conveyed to the mind and the actual object (*vastu*) are all rolled up together so that the experience is as much a mental as a physical fact.[3] The duality of subject and object is, in its full significance, present in this cognition and the mind does not rise here above the relativity which all concrete knowledge implies, the knowledge of one object being dependent upon a contrast with that of others. Now this gross cognition can be superseded either in respect of the objective content or in that of the elements involved. Thus, when the three elements of sound (in the case of auditory cognition), meaning and object intended are reduced to the last, *i.e.* when the mind understands the nature of objects in a direct fashion without the help of words or psychical doubles, we reach the stage of *nirvitarka samādhi.*[4] Words often tend to conceal the real nature of an object and also to produce the illusion of a sensible content (as in the case of negative words), whence the mental state called *vikalpa* follows.[5] It is necessary to rise above the complication of knowledge by verbal and meaning factors and to get a direct unverbalized knowledge of things, such as is possessed by babes and deaf-mutes:[6] when this is accomplished the *savitarka* stage is superseded by the *nirvitarka* stage and knowledge about things is transcended in a direct acquaintance with them.

But the *yogin* must go beyond this stage of gross content altogether and try to grasp the subtle elements of Nature (*tanmātras*) in their true essence. Here also the first stage is characterized by verbal complications as in the case of gross objects and it is only at the end that the mind grasps the nature of the subtle things without these complications.

[1] See C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, Chap. III; S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 12 f., p. 94 f.; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Man. of Psy. Eth.* (*Bud. Psy.*), pp. lxii-lxxxii.

[2] Y. S., i.42. The term is found in the *Nikāyas* in the sense of attention applied. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Psy.*, p. 07, 110; Aung and Rhys Davids, *Comp. of Ph.*, p. 95; see esp. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Psy. Eth.*, p. 10, f.n.1 where the distinction between *vitakko* and *vichāro* has been carefully drawn).

[3] Y. S., i.42.

[4] Y. S., i.43.

[5] Y. S., i.9.

[6] On the whole subject of *nirvikalpaka* (undeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate) perception, see Sinha, *Indian Psychology: Perception*, Ch. II (p. 31 f).

The two stages here are respectively called *savichāra* and *nirvichāra*, reflective and super-reflective, in contrast with *savitarka* and *nirvitarka*, contemplative (or deliberative) and super-contemplative, because while the latter types deal with objects whose existence is a matter of ordinary experience, the former types deal with objects whose existence can only be indirectly proved, so far as ordinary minds are concerned.[1] It is claimed, however, that the *yogins* are able to know even these subtle things directly after they have acquired certain powers by the practice of meditation. We are told, for instance, that in *savichāra samādhi* the *yogin* acquires the power of knowing such subtle things as atoms (which are invisible to ordinary persons till three binary atoms have formed a *trasareṇu* or the minimum visible magnitude), space, time, air, *manas*, and even the laws of morality by direct experience.[2] The list varies from system to system, but there is a general agreement that the obstacles that prevent the grasp of subtle and supersensible things in the case of ordinary men do not operate in the case of the *yogins* and that these can see through the non-spiritual character of even the subtle manifestations of Nature. An instructive parallel to the distinction between *savitarka* and *savichāra* is the Kantian distinction between forms of intuition and categories of the understanding—the former being apprehended direct and, therefore, requiring only exposition and the latter being known only indirectly and, therefore, requiring deduction; to a *yogin* both the gross and the subtle are matters of direct knowledge, although to the ordinary individual the one is sensed and the other inferred. In the *nirvichāra* stage the *yogin* gains a direct non-conceptual non-verbalized knowledge of these subtle things.[3]

But even this stage is transcended when the *yogin* passes on to the *sānanda* stage. After he has discovered that neither the gross nor the subtle things of Nature are really final objectives and that identification with neither in a state, technically called *samāpatti* (a term probably borrowed from Buddhism),[4] where the object alone seems to exist and the

[1] The term *savichāra* is found in Buddhism in the sense of sustained attention (see the references, p. 343, f.n. 2). *Y. S.*, i.44.-4. The object of *savichāra samādhi* is said to be everything subtle of the external order inclusive of Pradhāna or Prakṛiti, but not the self which also is subtle (*Vyāsabh.* on the *sūtra*). This would make a partial cross-division of the objects as other *samādhis* also have some of these subtle things as objects of their thought. See Sinha, *Ind. Psy.*: *Perception*, p. 348 f.

[2] See Sinha, *Ind. Psy.*: *Perception*, Ch. XVIII for the distinction between yogic perception and other forms of supernormal consciousness like *ārshajñāna*, *siddhadarśana* and *prātibhajñāna* (*Y. S.*, iii.32-3).

[3] *Vyāsabh.* on *Y. S.*, i.44.

[4] See Rhys Davids, *Bud. Psy.*, p.114.

self-reference is almost lost, is conducive to the realization of the true self, the *yogin* passes on to still more subtle forms of Nature to discover if the self could be found there. There is some difference of opinion about the things that should be included within the class of 'subtle objects,' but the general tendency is to include within it everything of Nature, exclusive of the gross objects of sense, in which the elements of *rajas* (activity) and *tamas* (inertia) preponderate.[1] This leaves the sense-organs, which are the products of *ahaṁkāra* under the influence of the *sattva* (purity, balance) element, and also *buddhi*, and possibly also *ahaṁkāra* itself if we take the alternative view that it is not out of *ahaṁkāra* but out of *buddhi* direct that the objective series of *tanmātras* and *mahābhūtas* and the subjective series of *ahaṁkāra* and the sense-organs developed on parallel lines.[2] In *sānanda samādhi* the *yogin* may be supposed to gain an insight into the nature of these subjective or, rather, illuminating principles, with the exception of *buddhi*, which Nature evolves. We may, in fact, think that in *sānanda samādhi*, as Vāchaspati Miśra holds, there is an identification with the *grahaṇa* or means of knowledge just as in *savitarka* and *savichāra samādhi* there is an identification with the *grāhya* or objects of knowledge.[3] But the real difficulty is to understand why the term *ānanda* (and sometimes also *nirānanda* to indicate the super-*ānanda* condition)[4] should be used. Do we have here the psychic process that is designed to get rid of *rāga* and *dvesha* that attend the knowledge of the phenomenal world and of which the residual effect remains in the form of anxiety when the object-consciousness disappears? In that case there would be some sort of relation between the five *klishṭa* states and the five kinds of *samādhi* (including the highest), although even then there would not be a strict one-to-one relation, as *savitarka* and *savichāra* would jointly correspond to *abhiniveśa*, *rāga* and *dvesha* would jointly have *sānanda* as corresponding, and *sāsmita* and *asamprajñāta* would correspond to *asmitā*

[1] *Y. S.*, i.45.

[2] There is some divergence of view about the process of evolution from *buddhi* or *mahat* to the organs of perception and action, *manas* and the *tanmātras* and also about the element that predominates in each case. The *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* (*śls.* 22, 24) upholds the classical view and most of the commentators accept the same. The other view is represented by Vijñānabhikshu who derives the parallel series from *buddhi* (see Radhakrishnan, *Ind. Ph.*, Vol. II, p. 269, f.n.3). This seems to follow *Vyāsabh.* on *Y. S.*, ii.19, but the commentators on the *Y. S.* are not unanimous on this point. For a thorough discussion of this matter, see Dasgupta, *St. of Pat.*, p. 60 f.

[3] See *Vyāsabh.* and *Tattvavaiśaradī* on *Y. S.*, i.41.

[4] See Sinha, *op. cit.*, pp. 349-50.

and *avidyā* respectively. But the statement that the states of the five *kleśas* are suppressed by *dhyāna* lends colour to the supposition that a correspondence with the five types of *samādhi* was intended in some way.[1] The other supposition, namely, that the affective residues of cognitive states are intended, cannot be altogether barred out and we may believe that before the self finds out that no kind of cognition, not even the sense of personal identity, is really self-knowledge, it has to rule, first of all, the affective self-feeling out of court. The tendency, for instance, to identify the self with cœnæsthesis, organic sensation or the feeling arising out of the proper or improper functioning of the bodily system, must be abandoned as the self can have nothing to do with anything that is of the nature of a disturbance and that makes for clinging to mundane existence through its hedonic effects.[2] In the *sānanda* state this identification with the psychical accompaniments of vital functions is effected only to be transcended in *sāsmita samādhi*. It is also likely that by *sānanda samādhi* was intended the attention paid to the stream of awareness as such, as distinct from the objects revealed therein and the self-consciousness attending it. This would mean that the mind could attend to its own subjective states without reference to the objects of the physical world which they originally revealed to the spiritual novice. This does not explain the term *ānanda* but would satisfy Vāchaspati Miśra's division of *samādhi* into three classes of which the second has reference to the process of awareness, provided we do not mean by *grahaṇa* the sense-organs but the process of thought that apprehends.[3]

But the *yogin* can go further. He may transcend both the object and the process of thought and fix his attention on the consciousness of self itself. We have already seen that this self-consciousness is only phenomenal, for here there is a reflection of the Purusha in the Janus-like *buddhi* whereby an illusory self-sense is generated in the first evolute

[1] *Y. S.*, ii.11.

[2] The difficulty of this interpretation is that the vital airs are not separately recognized in the Sāṁkhya system although their existence is taken for granted and in the *Yogasūtra* directions about their control are to be found. Vijñānabhikshu takes *ānanda* in the sense of bliss due to the influx of *sattva* quality and denies that there is also a *nirānanda samādhi*. See Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, p. 153.

[3] Nagoji Bhaṭṭa thinks that by *grahaṇa* are to be understood three distinct classes of sense-organs. We may mean either the different kinds of senses possessed by different kinds of beings, both sessile and moving, or the sense-organs as ordinarily understood, or *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra*. The first would be the cosmic, the second the gross, and the third the subtle meaning of the term. See his commentary on *Y. S.*, i.41.

of Prakṛiti, namely, *buddhi* or *mahat*. Nature is so transparent in *buddhi*, owing to the preponderance of the element of *sattva*, that the self has great difficulty in dissociating itself from the consciousness of self, the 'I' from the 'me,' the transcendental self from the phenomenal ego. *Buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra* are the two principles which closely operate together in producing individual centres of cognition, affection and conation, and although they require the help of the sense-organs to come into contact with the external world, they are sufficient by themselves to generate, or at least to conserve, a sense of private ownership of ideas and actions. *Buddhi*, like the *nous* in Plotinus, supplies the principle of intelligibility to Prakṛiti which, like the One or Being of Plotinus, would remain unmanifested (*avyakta*) without its aid. But intelligibility in general becomes particularized through *ahaṁkāra* or ego-making principle, which canalizes intelligibility into individual channels and lays the foundation of personal ownership. In the *sāsmita samādhi* the self concentrates on the sense of personal cognition and effort only to transcend that stage also.[1] It discovers that the sense of personal identity is also phenomenal and depends upon the compresence of Prakṛiti and Purusha —the former supplying through *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra* that medium in which alone Purusha could produce an image of itself and a sense of personal identity. But this is the stage hardest to overcome, for here the identity with the real self is so close that most people stop here, thinking that the final stage has been attained. As a matter of fact, the *Yogasūtra* refers to two classes of beings—the *videhalīnas* and the *prakṛitilīnas*—both belonging to the *bhavapratyaya* class or the class of beings who are born without organic encumbrances like our own, and possessing a natural capacity to know themselves if they would shake off the little ignorance that keeps them from salvation.[2] The *yogin* is an *upāyapratyaya* or one who has acquired his discriminative knowledge by adopting proper means;[3] but he is not in any way inferior to the above two classes of beings, for he can win his salvation by going beyond the stages of *sānanda* and *sāsmita samādhis* in which these classes are held fast.[4] It is not enough to renounce the world or practise austerities—the

[1] There is similar difficulty about the significance of the term *asmitā*. We may mean by it either the principle which because of its *sāttvika* character almost takes the form of the self (which interpretation would make *buddhi* the object of concentration) or a Purusha who is eternally free (*i.e.* God) or has become free (*i.e. muktapurusha*). See Nāgoji's commentary on *Y. S.*, i.41; also Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, p. 153; Sinha, *Ind. Psy.: Perception*, p. 351.

[2] *Y. S.*, i.19.

[3] *Vyāsabh*, on *Y. S.*, i.20.

[4] *Ibid.*

yogin must gain complete insight into the distinction between his self and the phenomena of the physical world and thereby win his freedom if he wishes to avoid the condition in which the gods are or some other types of beings caught in the finer meshes of Nature are at present. He must know that no amount of introspection or knowledge through *buddhi* would ever give a knowledge of the noumenal self, for in the empirical condition the self can be *inferred* from the operations of *buddhi* but never *experienced* directly—we get the 'me' or the object-self but never the 'I' or the subject-self as this can never be objectified without absorbing material factors like *buddhi, ahaṁkāra,* etc. Extremes have a tendency to meet, for both the Behaviourists and the Patañjalites are at one so far as the value of introspective knowledge is concerned, as both deny its validity for the purpose of self-knowledge; but while the Behaviourists would say that the self is non-existent, the Patañjalites would say that the self requires some other method of knowledge to be known in its true essence.

It is evident that after the *savitarka* stage we are dealing with matters that are more or less supernormal, for the ordinary man can have no direct experience of the subtle elements or the organs of knowledge or the *buddhi* in which the *sattva* element has completely subordinated the other elements of *rajas* and *tamas*. When, therefore, these four kinds of meditation are called *samprajñāta samādhi,*[1] we are to understand by the term the kind of knowledge in which the duality of subject and object is present, although the object may vary from gross things to subtle, and even so-called psychical, entities, and the cognizer may be a novice in the art of concentrated thinking or a spiritual adept. It is instructive to compare this Yoga scheme with the Buddhistic system of *jhāna* (*dhyāna*), for it would show not merely that the practical part of the mind-training was similar but also that the term *sānanda* may have been borrowed from Buddhistic sources and then its origin forgotten. In the *Anupada-Sutta* (Series-Discourse) occurs the following seriation of the concentrated states:

"For instance, *bhikkhus,* Sāriputta, aloof from sensuous desires, aloof from bad ideas, enters into and abides in first *jhāna*, wherein attention is applied and sustained, which is born of solitude and filled with zest and pleasurable feeling. And the presentation in that First Jhāna, to wit thinking applied and sustained (*vitakka, vichāra*), and zest and pleasurable feeling (*pīti, sukha*) and singleness of object (*chitt'ekaggatā*), and

[1] *Y. S.,* i.17.

contact, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness (*chitta*), desire (*chhanda*), choice, effort, mindfulness, indifference, adaptation of attention (*manasikara*)—these are for him serially determined; these, as they arise, are for him things understood, and as they are present and as they depart, are for him things understood."[1]

A similar seriation is to be found in other places too. Here, for instance, is another description of "right concentration":

"When aloof from sensuous ideas, aloof from evil ideas, he enters into and abides in First Jhāna, wherein attention is applied and sustained (*sa-vitakka, sa-vichāra*), which is born of solitude and filled with zest and pleasant emotion; when next, from the subsiding of attention applied and sustained, he enters into and abides in Second Jhāna which is inward tranquillizing of the mind, self-contained and uplifted from the working of attention, is born of concentration, full of zest and pleasurable emotion; when next, through the quenching of zest, he abides with equal mind, mindful and discerning, experiencing in the body that pleasure whereof the Aryans declare: 'Happy doth he abide with even, lucid mind,' and so enters into and abides in Third Jhāna; when next, by putting away both pleasant and painful emotion, by the dying out of the joy and misery he used to know, he enters into and abides in Fourth Jhāna, that utterly pure lucidity and indifference of mind, wherein is neither happiness nor unhappiness—this is the training of the higher consciousness."[2]

We may very well believe that the Buddhistic ideal of realizing the non-permanent character of the ego finds its parallel in the yogic ideal of transcending the *asmitā* stage. Both the systems hold that the stream of thought which is responsible for the generation of the ego-sense must be stopped, even though an ultimate divergence of views becomes noticeable when the question of a transcendental self arises. The Buddhist transcends the ego-stage only to realize *nirvāṇa* and the *yogin* goes beyond the empirical ego to realize the noumenal self.

The Yoga analysis practically stops here and we pass on immediately to *asamprajñāta samādhi* or concentration where the object has become reduced to mere disposition (*saṁskāra*) and where, therefore, knowledge involving the duality of subject and object has ceased.[3] But there are indications in the *Yogasūtra* itself that other stages of the soul's growth were once known, and possibly for these it is best to turn to Buddhistic

[1] See C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Psy.*, p. 97.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 110; see also Warren, *Bud. in Trans.*, p. 288.
[3] *Y. S.*, i.18, 50. For *asamprajñāta samādhi*, see Sinha, *op. cit.*, pp. 342, 352.

literature from which most probably the stages were borrowed. We have already referred to the four trances (*jhāna*); but here are some more stages of knowledge which spiritual advancement possesses serially. Thus it is described of Buddha that after he had instructed his disciples, on the eve of his decease, to work out their salvation with diligence—

"The Blessed One entered the first trance; and rising from the first trance, he entered the second trance; and rising from the second trance, he entered the third trance; and rising from the third trance, he entered the fourth trance; and rising from the fourth trance, he entered the realm of the infinity of space; and rising from the realm of the infinity of space, he entered the realm of the infinity of consciousness; and rising from the realm of the infinity of consciousness, he entered the realm of nothingness; and rising from the realm of nothingness, he entered the realm of neither perception nor yet non-perception; and rising from the realm of neither perception nor yet non-perception, he arrived at the cessation of perception and sensation."[1]

In the *Visuddhi-Magga* we are told[2] that a limit of time may be set to this condition by the concentrated mind provided that the termination of life, or respect for the Order, or a summons from the teacher does not interfere, and that when a person rises from this condition he completes the process of never-returning (*i.e.* he will not be reborn after the end of this life) or attains the full stature of sainthood and his mind is thereafter inclined to *nirvāṇa* which is also described as isolation. The distinction between a dead man and a man who has entered on the cessation of perception and sensation is that in the latter bodily *karma*, vocal *karma* and mental *karma* all cease and become quieted, but vitality does not depart, the natural heat does not subside and the senses do not break up as in the former case.[3] But the person in this condition effects a threefold deliverance—he passes from a knowledge of the conditioned to that of the unconditioned, from a state of desire to desirelessness, and from the sense of falseness of the ego to the sense of the empty.[4]

Echoes of these are to be found in the *Yogasūtra*, for we are told that it is possible for the *yogin* to realize a sense of escape from the trammels of the body in the state of attention (*dhāraṇā*) called *mahāvideha*, which may be either relative (*kalpita*) when the knowledge of the body from which escape has been effected persists, or absolute (*akalpita*) when even this knowledge drops out.[5] We are also told that

[1] See Warren, *Bud. in Trans.*, p. 109 [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 385-6. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 389. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 378. [5] *Y. S.*, iii.43.

a *yogin* attains the infinity of consciousness in the state called *viśokā* (or *jyotishmatī*—a term reminiscent of the Buddhistic *archishmatī*, a condition in which the residues of ignorance and passion are burnt up by practices conducive to the perfection of *bodhi*).[1] There is also a reference to the condition of mind in which there is a sense of the body being expanded to infinity (*anantasamāpatti*) and which favours fixity of posture (*āsana*).[2] It is true that the finer distinctions of the Buddhistic *arūpa-jhāna* in which the individual passes over more or less into a cataleptic condition[3] are not so nicely drawn in the *Yogasūtra*, but the general outlines are the same and even the graduated sense of nearing the goal is present in both the systems. Thus in the doctrine of *prajñā* or insight, which is described as sevenfold and as advancing by stages to the highest (*prāntabhūmi*), we are told that a *yogin* passes through the four stages of *kāryavimukti* (release of insight from effects) and the three stages of *chittavimukti* (release of mind-stuff) as soon as the defilements due to impurity disappear and discriminative knowledge arises.[4] He has a knowledge that the things to be escaped have been thought out, that the causes that produce the things to be avoided have dwindled away, that the escape has been perceived through restricted mentation (*nirodha-samādhi*), that the means of escape, namely, discriminative knowledge, has been cultivated. These four stages, we may suppose, come after the *vaśīkāra* stage has been attained in the path of concentration. The stages of *chittavimukti* do not depend upon effort but represent the progressive stages of dissolution of the objective or phenomenal order after the proper subjective condition has been attained. They are that the jurisdiction of the intelligence-stuff is at an end, that the *gunas* are being dissolved into their ground which also is disappearing, that the soul has passed out of relation with the *gunas* and become isolated (*kevalin*) and pure (*amala*). The *yogin* in this condition is called fortunate (*kuśala*) and it is implied that he possesses a knowledge of the stages through which he has passed on his way to liberation, although the last three stages are more or less automatic after discriminative knowledge has been established.[5] These stages are not identical with

[1] *Y. S.*, i.36. See Suzuki, *Out. of Mahā Bud.*, p. 316.

[2] *Y. S.*, ii.47. The traditional interpretation is that the mind is to be fixed on the Serpent King on whose hood the earth rests steadily. For the juxtaposition of *samādhi* and *samāpatti* in Buddhistic literature, see Suzuki, *Studies in the Lankāvatāra Sutra*, pp. 74, 75.

[3] For which see Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Comp. of Ph.*, pp. 64, 90; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Budd. Man. of Psy. Eth.*, p. 71 f.

[4] *Y. S.*, ii.27, with *Vyāsabh.*

[5] *Vyāsabh.* on *Y. S.*, ii.27.

the ten stages of a Bodhisattva's perfection (*daśabhūmi*) in Mahāyāna Buddhism;[1] but the fact that the Buddhistic tenth stage, *dharmamegha*, turns up without context in the *Yogasūtra*[2] shows that the Yoga manual possibly knew also of these stages, perhaps in a vague and distorted way, and used only the last stage in its scheme of liberation. Similarly, the word *āvaraṇa* to indicate the veil which keeps the soul from its freedom is probably more technically used in Jainism and conveys a similar sense in the *Yogasūtra* also;[3] but the Jaina term *guṇasthānaka* to indicate the stages of spiritual progress[4] corresponding to the *daśabhūmis* of Buddhism was not accepted. The moral discipline of the three systems is more or less uniform because the soul's impediments are identical, but the psychological analysis is different in each owing to the different philosophical presuppositions of the three systems. Still it appears that Buddhism and Yoga move in a similar atmosphere of thought, possibly because both had a background of Sāṁkhya philosophy. The similarity becomes greater if the *vibhūtis* or magical powers are taken into consideration and also the objects and methods of meditation; but as these are partly extra-psychological, we need not bring out the similarity by detailed comparison. Both believed in a complete transcendence of discursive reason and in the attainment of a state of cognition to which empirical mind could lay no claim.

What happens to the soul after the *kuśala* condition cannot, from the nature of the case, be described, for the conditions of empirical knowledge all disappear then and the self regains its proper nature. Although described as witness (*sākshin*), seer (*drashṭṛi*) and knower (*jñātṛi*) of states, the transcendental self is really known only indirectly by a kind of implication so long as the condition of empirical knowledge persists.[5] Nature has evolved to ensnare and liberate the self;[6] the progressive knowledge of the divergence of Nature and spirit is owned by the self with the help of *buddhi*. But all vicissitudes of knowledge, feeling and conation leave the sense of self unaffected; as the impurities fall off, the realm of the knowable begins to shrink without affecting the sense of the knower. All these imply that there is a self behind the states; but as the states are inessential to its existence, inasmuch as they might

[1] For which see Suzuki, *Out. of Mahā. Bud.*, p. 313 f.
[2] *Y. S.*, iv.29.
[3] Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, pp. 132-3.
[4] For which see *Ibid.*, p. 185 f.
[5] *Y. S.*, ii.20.
[6] *Y. S.*, ii.18.

be suppressed altogether, the self must be construed as a spiritual essence which is experience itself without the attributes and limitations of empirical personality. Language was not devised to indicate this spiritual condition—hence the mystery of the self's nature remains ever unsolved to those who are in the empirical plane. All that we are permitted to know is that in that condition the fluctuations of consciousness are at an end, the sorrows of life have all disappeared, the residues of the moral life (good or bad) have all been burnt up so far as future embodiment is concerned. The Yoga system did not acknowledge the possibility of knowing that one more life remained to work off the fruits of action, as Buddhism did in its doctrine of the once-returner (*sakṛidāgāmin*); for it denied that after the saving knowledge had dawned there was any chance of rebirth, although in its doctrine of sevenfold insight it did admit a knowledge of the dissolution of the material conditions of the bound soul. Buddhism itself acknowledged that such knowledge was transcendental (*lokuttara*) and was higher than that experienced in the *kāmaloka*, the *rūpaloka* and the *arūpaloka*, but it also held that the consciousness of the never-returning and that of the *arhat* were higher in the scale than the consciousness of the once-returning.[1]

We may now leave these transcendental states aside and turn to the more immediately useful materials furnished in the *Yogasūtra* to bring about the complete cessation of mental states. A careful analysis was made of the impediments to concentrated thinking and moral earnestness, and practical steps to overcome them were laid down. As is natural, the obstructions to meditation come in for fuller treatment than the aids and, even in the list of accessories, inhibitions figure quite prominently. It may be presumed that the Yoga as well as Buddhism knew of the usual methods of facilitating concentration by choosing the right time, place and circumstances. The *Śvetāśvatara Upanishad*, the *Maitrāyaṇi Upanishad* and the *Kaṭha Upanishad* (and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*) show Sāṁkhya-Yoga leanings in a systematic way;[2] but some of the characteristic Yoga practices can be traced back to much earlier literature and the psychological processes involved in contemplation and concentration were quite familiar phenomena before the *Yogasūtra* systematized them.[3]

[1] See B. C. Law, *Designation of Human Types* (*Puggala-Paññatti*), pp. 26-27; Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Comp. of Ph.*, pp. 88-91.
[2] See Deussen, *Ph. of the Up.*, p. 246 f., 382 f.; also Ranade, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-90.
[3] See Dasgupta, *Yoga Ph.*, p. 42 f.

The obstacles to concentration were classified under different heads[1]:

(*a*) Sickness

It was laid down that the humours of the body, the secretions and the sense-organs were to be kept in proper order before *yoga* could be satisfactorily practised. In later Yoga works, like the *Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā*, it was mentioned in fact that *yoga* itself kept the body in a healthy condition.[2] Various indications about the progress of the mind towards *yoga* were found in the proper functioning of the different systems of the body. In the Haṭhayoga minute prescriptions about ridding the body of all impurities were laid down[3] and the results attained were heightened sensibility, increased control over the activities of the body (including levitation, immersion in solids, walking over fluids, etc.)[4] and even the power of voluntary death. Continence and restraint of various kinds were as much in the interest of the body as of the mind and were accordingly prescribed. Over-indulgence and improper diet were tabooed for the same reason and fasting and austerities, in so far as they did not endanger life, were recommended.[5] When *yoga* is established the powers of clairvoyance, clairaudience, etc., are obtained, and also the knowledge of past, distant and future things.[6] In one word, the absence of bodily infirmity would include the disappearance of all those impediments that limit the operations of the mind in time and space on account of bodily defects, diseases and decays. Concentration cannot thrive when the body refuses to act as a pliant tool in the hands of the *yogin's* mind and sets up organic disturbances. How, for instance, is a *yogin* to assume a fixed seat or posture when he is restless with fever or fix his mind when he is in a delirious condition?

(*b*) Listlessness, idleness or lassitude; langour

Closely related to infirmity is the heaviness of the body due to the preponderance of phlegm, or of the mind-stuff on account of the preponderance of the *tamas* element. When the mind is *unwilling* to stir, then it is a case of idleness; but when it is *unable* to stir, then it is a case of langour (*styāna*).[7] So it is not enough to possess the capacity of

[1] *Y. S.*, i.30.
[2] *Haṭhayogapradīpikā*, ii.20, 78 (Panini Office Edition).
[3] *Ibid.*, ii.22 f.
[4] *Y. S.*, iii.39, 42, 45.
[5] *Y. S.*, i.60-65.
[6] *Y. S.*, ii.39; iii.16, 18, 25, 41.
[7] *Vyāsabh.* on *Y. S.*, i.30.

concentration—one must actually will to exercise that capacity. A *yogin* may fail for lack of drive just as he may fail for lack of energy.

(*c*) Doubt; heedlessness

It is not enough to possess the will and the energy to achieve concentration: one must also hold fast to a single object and persevere in the attempt to grasp it completely. The lack of definiteness gives us doubt (*saṁśaya*), where the mind is assailed with alternative thoughts and the necessary faith in the sole efficacy of the ideate is absent. Heedlessness (*pramāda*) is a lack of reflection upon the means of attaining concentration[1]: here there is no doubt about the object of knowledge, but steps are not taken to bring about the concentration by the adoption of appropriate means.

(*d*) Failure and instability in attention

It was found, however, that in spite of their willingness and application some could not attain a particular level of concentration. These could not make any progress in their spiritual quest. The explanation of this type of distraction is not forthcoming in the *Yogasūtra,* but possibly it is due to congenital impediments or subconscious opposition. In its comprehensive scheme the Yoga system repeatedly draws attention to the necessity of taking the residues of our past thoughts and actions into consideration and we may very well suppose that the past takes its vengeance on the present by obstructing progress.

It may so happen, however, that a position is won with effort, but very soon it is lost again. It is not enough to secure an advance—it is necessary to retain it also. In spiritual matters, not to advance is to recede; and so effort is necessary to maintain positions by trying to go beyond them. The tendency to slide back to an inferior position, which does not require much effort to retain it, is a danger which always besets the path of the spiritual aspirant. Hence continual effort is needed to keep up one's attainments in the spiritual domain. A *yogin* should never be satisfied with anything less than total suppression of the modifications of the mind-stuff, or even the intermediate stages attained would slip out of his grasp.

(*e*) Worldliness; erroneous perception

One of the gravest impediments is moral defect in the shape of greed or addiction to objects of sense. If the purpose of *yoga* is to draw the mind away from thoughts and impulses leading to the recognition of of the material world in the interest of the spirit, it is obvious that

[1] *Vyāsabh.* on *Y. S.*, i.30.

excessive fondness for the world of sensibility would obstruct the effort to detach oneself from empirical thinking. The *yogin* must therefore cultivate not only a habit of thought but also a habit of action conducive to the attainment of the maximum spiritual height. He must control his feelings as well as his thoughts and actions. So long as the desire to enjoy persists, no amount of intellectual effort to fix the mind on higher things would succeed; and as *vairāgya* or dispassion will not thrive under such a condition of worldly attachment, the suppression of the mental states would not be brought about.

Hence the root-cause of all distraction must be eradicated by cultivating true knowledge and abolishing all false or illusory knowledge. Without an adequate knowledge of the principles of reality and the distinction between self and not-self all effort to get rid of mental fluctuations would be futile. Hence we come back to the old position that at the root of all distraction stands man's imperfect knowledge, and so the removal of distraction and the removal of ignorance are one and the same problem. Many have failed to obtain salvation because they mistook the acquisition of certain powers or the appearance of certain agreeable mental conditions as the attainment of *samādhi*. Many have also been tempted to deviate from the main purpose of attaining isolation by their quest of magical powers (*vibhūtis*); and many have transferred their attention from the end to the means, as when they perfected the technique of bodily control, e.g. the *haṭhayogins* of later times, but desisted from the attempt to know themselves. The *Yogasūtra* warns the learner to beware of these pitfalls and to forge ahead with the proper objective without being distracted by irrelevant considerations.[1]

In addition to the nine distractions mentioned above, namely, sickness, langour, doubt, heedlessness, listlessness, worldliness, erroneous perception, failure to attain a particular stage of concentration and inability to keep it when attained, the *Yogasūtra* refers to certain other obstacles to concentration. These are (a) pain proceeding from the mind itself, the external world and the gods, (b) despondency owing to the non-fulfilment of desires (the passions being included within pain), (c) unsteadiness of the body, and (4) breathing (inspiration and expiration).[2] They accompany the distractions proper and disappear when the mind-stuff is concentrated. It is obvious that the *Yogasūtra* itself initiated that

[1] See, for instance, *Haṭhayogapr.*, iv.97, where the happiness of Rājayoga is preferred to *mukti*.

[2] *Y. S.*, i 31.

enquiry into the bodily conditions of attention which attained some amount of scientific precision in later Yoga literature. We have here the rudiments of Physiological Psychology of which traces are to be found in the Upanishads also.[1]

Now each kind of distraction is to be met with an antidote of its own, although it is not unlikely that the distractions and their remedies are mutually related among themselves. The *yogāṅgas* (helps to *yoga*) represent the method of getting rid of the distempers of the soul in a progressive fashion. Thus, if bodily infirmity, unsteadiness of the limbs and breathing upset the mind and render concentration difficult or impossible, these must be controlled and eradicated. Cleanliness (*śaucha*) of the body, as of the mind, is therefore necessary for concentration.[2] Then again, the *yogin* must learn to control his limbs—he must try to sit straight like the trunk of a tree (*sthāṇu*), with the spine, the neck and the head in one line, and assume certain postures (*āsana*) that are favourable to concentration.[3] The *Yogasūtra* knows nothing of the later prescriptions about *mudrā* (pose of fingers, hands or body) and *nyāsa* (touching the various parts of the body) which came in the wake of Tāntrikism and theism. The *nyāsa* in which the different muscles of the body are brought into exercise by rotation looks almost like a physical drill; but the idea that the whole body becomes suffused with divine energy and the devotee becomes one with his god[4] saves it from degeneration into a mere physical exercise and invests it with a deep spiritual significance. The *mudrās*, however, cannot be so easily spiritualized and were probably magical symbols in their original forms and were later on invested with esoteric meaning. The *Yogasūtra* which believed in immobility could not consistently advocate the use of these modes of moving the body lest they should disturb the attention. For the same reason it could not recommend the practice of the eighty-four *āsanas* of Haṭhayoga, for many of these would have contravened the Yoga ideal of *āsana* as steady and easy in character.[5] Nevertheless, the *Vyāsabhāshya* mentions a few, showing that many of the forms were well known and modelled on the postures of different types of animals.[6] The *Yogasūtra*, however, recommends the practice of controlled breathing (*prāṇāyāma*)

[1] *Vyāsabh.* on *Y. S.*, ii.32.
[2] See *Bhagavad-Gītā*, vi.13
[3] See Nalini Kanta Brahma, *Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā*, p. 320.
[4] For *mudrās* see *Gheraṇḍa Saṁhitā*, Lesson II; *Haṭhayogapr.*, Lesson III.
[5] *Y. S.*, ii.46. See *Gher. Saṁ.*, Lesson II; *Haṭhayogapr.* I, 19 f.
[6] *Vyāsabh.* and *Tattvavaiśāradī* on *Y. S.*, ii.46.

with the ultimate object of suspending it for as long a period as possible.[1] The breathing, both in and out, should be over as small an area as possible; its number should be diminished; and its duration should be expanded. In this way the body will breathe as few a number of times as possible and in a gradually shallow manner till it is able to hold the breath for a fairly long period without any risk of asphyxiation.[2] That the autonomic system could be controlled through the slender connection with the nervous system was a great discovery of the Yoga system[3] and it still retains its title to the sole possession of the technique to bring that about. The Tāntrika system developed at the same time a method of controlling the different plexuses (*shaṭchakra*)[4] and indulged in physiological speculations suited to the purpose; but the *Yogasūtra* limited itself almost entirely to the practice of breathing and laid down the suspension of breath as the objective of all spiritual aspirants. The idea that controlled breathing cleanses the system and that the elements of the body are thereby rid of all impurities (*bhūtaśuddhi*) came later;[5] originally breath was controlled because it disturbed the attention and because the control of breath not only made the mind attentive but also scoured away the *karma* that veiled discriminative knowledge.[6] Still, even in the *Yogasūtra* an exaggerated importance given to breath-control for purposes of concentration and ultimate salvation is noticeable.[7] This may be reminiscent of the Upanishadic view that man is continually offering sacrifice to the gods through breathing (called Pratardana sacrifice after King Pratardana who taught this doctrine)[8] and that all the scriptures were breathed out by the Absolute Being[9]: in fact, in later literature we are told that when inhaling a man makes the sound *saḥ* and when exhaling he emits the sound *ham* and in this way he is unwittingly repeating the formula (*ajapā japa*) that the *jīvātman* is identical with the Paramātman (*so'ham*) without intermission.[10] That the regulation of breath had a therapeutic effect on the bodily system and increased the

[1] *Y. S.*, ii.50. For *prāṇāyāma* see *Gher. Saṁ.*, V. For a similar Buddhistic belief, see Warren, *Bud. in Trans.*, pp. 354-6.

[2] *Y. S.*, ii.51. See also Warren, *loc. cit.;* also Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, pp. 146-7.

[3] See Lickley, *The Nervous System*, pp. 30-31.

[4] See N. K. Brahma, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-90; A. Avalon, *Tantra of the Great Liberation* (*Mahānirvāṇa Tantra*), pp. lvii f.

[5] N. K. Brahma, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-20.

[6] *Y. S.*, ii.52. See *Chh. Up.* 1.3.5.

[7] *Y. S.*, ii.52, 53.

[8] *Kau. Up.*, 2.5.

[9] *Bṛh. Up.*, 2.4.10 (*Maitri* 6 32).

[10] *Gher. Saṁ.*, v.84 (this is called *kevalīkumbhaka*); see also *Haṭhayogapr.* II, 72-4.

beauty and longevity of the person practising it was not the primary motive of *prāṇāyāma* in the *Yogasūtra,* although perfection of body (*kāyasampad*), including beauty, grace, power and compactness of the thunderbolt, was regarded there also as a supernormal power (*vibhūti*) acquired by the *yogin* in the course of his progress towards concentration.[1] It is interesting to note that austerities (*tapas*) play a very small part in the *Yogasūtra,* although they are regarded as a form of *yoga* (*kriyāyoga*)[2] and form one of the five observances (*niyama*);[3] this is an index of the attitude towards mortification of the flesh practised much more widely at an earlier time. Similarly, the Vedic sacrifice (*yajña*) practically disappears as a mode of spiritual progress, although the *Bhagavad-Gītā* admitted its utility even when it depreciated its value.[4] It is likely that the Yoga shared with the Sāṁkhya an abhorrence of sacrificial cruelty and readily adopted the Buddhistic and Jaina prescription of non-injury (*ahiṁsā*) as the cardinal tenet of spiritual emancipation.[5] Besides, after castigating bodily movement as impediment to concentration, it could not logically back the Vedic mode of attaining liberation, for sacrifice involved a lot of manipulation and movement. On the other hand, the Upanishadic formula of *Om* as the mystic syllable *par excellence* proved attractive because its monotonous repetition had the effect of bringing about concentration, if not stoppage, of thought; so it was made the subject of meditation and was also regarded as the most natural expression for Īśvara.[6] Like James, the *Yogasūtra* discovered that the most intimate nature of the attentive process was the control of the body and that attention was more a function than a producer of bodily adjustment.[7]

But mere bodily control is not enough to bring about the cessation of the mental process. The senses are assailing the soul through the operations of the *buddhi,* and unless the mind withdraws from the senses or unless the senses are otherwise rendered inoperative, the disturbance to the soul will continue. Hence the practice of withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*) of the senses must be resorted to.[8] The Yoga system does not recommend

[1] *Y. S.,* iii.46; also *Tattvavaiśāradī* on *Y. S.,* iii.37. See *Haṭhayogapr.* II.78.
[2] *Y. S.,* ii.1. For *kriyāyoga,* see Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.,* p. 142 f.
[3] *Y. S.,* ii.32. [4] *Bh.-G.,* iv.33; xi.48.
[5] *Y. S.,* ii.30, 31. See *Dīgha Nikāya, Kūṭadanta Suttanta* (*Sacred Books of the Buddhists,* Vol. II, pp. 160-85).
[6] *Y. S.,* i.27.
[7] James, *Principles of Psychology* I, 435.
[8] *Y. S.,* ii.54. See Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Psy.,* pp. 82-3, for similar Buddhistic teaching.

the plucking out of any sense, if that were possible, nor does it advise mutilation of any organ of knowledge or action; for unless the thoughts are controlled, the mere disappearance of any sense-organ will not smooth the path to salvation. When the organs of sense cease to connect themselves with their proper objects, they imitate the mind-stuff itself which is not in direct contact with the objects and is naturally undifferentiated in respect of its contents.[1] There was some difference of opinion, it seems, about the exact meaning of the term 'mastery of the organs,' but all agreed that complete mastery was synonymous with singleness of intent followed by loss of interest in objects of sense, whether this itself was or was not followed by the disappearance of the panorama of the external world.[2] In fact, insight and detachment are synonymous so far as objects of sense are concerned, and the whole yogic prescription can be put in the formula '*Contemplate, concentrate and conquer.*' In the second and third books of the *Yogasūtra* we are told of the various powers (*vibhūtis*) that are acquired by concentrating on this or that object. While to the novice these powers prove intoxicating and he revels in their practice, the adept is advised to treat them as mere signs of the development of the spirit and to pass on to the stage of conquest of the organs of sense. It is not enough to know the things of the world in all space and time or to acquire the various perfections (*siddhis*) that enable one to dominate the objects as one pleases.[3] It is necessary to transcend that stage altogether and to realize the essential non-spiritual character of the world of matter. This is achieved by loss of interest in worldly things consequent on the mastery of the senses. The mutability of mind is most dependent on the presentations, and restriction of these is the first step towards realizing the cessation of the mental states. Representations depend on presentations and presentations depend upon the interests of life. Ultimately, therefore, knowledge becomes a moral problem, for people know in order to act in the world for purposes of self-aggrandizement and enjoyment.

How then is interest in the world to be abated? Here we come upon the formula which is common to Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism—in fact, to all philosophies that condemn worldly pursuits without any exception. It is to concentrate on the abominable aspects of the attractive things

[1] *Y. S.*, ii.54. [2] *Vyāsabh.* on *Y. S.*, ii.55.

[3] *Y. S.*, ii.39; iii.18, 25-9, 41-2, 45. These are called *abhijñās* or psychic faculties in Buddhistic literature (Suzuki, *St. in the Lank. Sūtra*, p. 383). Cf. *Akankheyya-sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (see Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 303) and *Sāmañña-phala Sutta* of the *Digha Nikāya* (*Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, II, pp. 88-89). See Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Comp. of Ph.*, p. 63.

of the world. Here, for instance, is a specimen from Buddhism[1] about the type of thought that one ought to indulge in if one wishes to avoid being attracted by physical beauty:

"For as the body when dead is repulsive, so is it also when alive; but on account of the concealment afforded by an adventitious adornment, its repulsiveness escapes notice. The body is in reality a collection of over three hundred bones, and is framed into a whole by means of one hundred and eighty joints. It is held together by nine hundred tendons, and overlaid by nine hundred muscles, and has an outside envelope of moist cuticle covered by an epidermis full of pores, through which there is an incessant oozing and trickling, as if from a kettle of fat. It is a prey to vermin, the seat of disease, and subject to all manner of miseries. Through its nine apertures it is always discharging matter like a ripe boil. Matter is secreted from the two eyes, wax from the ears, snot from the nostrils, and from the mouth issue food, bile, phlegm, and blood, and from the two lower orifices of the body fæces and urine, while from the ninety-nine thousand pores of the skin an unclean sweat exudes, attracting black flies and other insects. . . ."

"Accordingly, it is on account of the concealment afforded by this adventitious adornment that people fail to recognize the essential repulsiveness of their bodies, and that men find pleasure in women, and women in men. In reality, however, there is not the smallest just reason for being pleased. A proof of this is the fact that when any part of the body becomes detached, as, for instance, the hair of the head, hair of the body, nails, teeth, phlegm, snot, fæces or urine, people are unwilling so much as to touch it, and are distressed at, ashamed of, and loathe it. But in respect of what remains, though that is likewise repulsive, yet men are so wrapped in blindness and infatuated by a passionate fondness for their own selves, that they believe it to be something desirable, lovely, lasting, pleasant, and an ego."

Here is the same theme treated in an earlier literature:[2]

"Just as if, O priests, there were a double-mouthed vessel full of various sorts of grain, to wit, *śāli*-rice, common paddy, beans, pulse,

[1] See *Maitri Up.* 1.3; 3.4 (Deussen, *Ph. of the Up.*, pp. 284-85); Warren, *Bud. in Trans.*, p. 298; also p. 242, where occurs the following passage: "When this body comes into existence, it does not arise in the midst of nymphæas, nelumbiums, lotuses and water-lilies, etc., nor of jewels, pearl-necklaces, etc.; but ill-smelling, disgusting, and repulsive, it arises between the stomach and the lower intestines, with the belly-wall behind and the backbone in front, in the midst of the entrails and mesentery, in an exceedingly contracted, ill-smelling, disgusting and repulsive place, like a worm in rotten fish, carrion, or rancid gruel, or in a stagnant or dirty pool or the like."

[2] See Warren, *op. cit.*, pp. 359-60.

sesame, and husked rice; and some intelligent man were to open it and consider its contents, saying, 'This is *śāli*-rice, this is common paddy, these are beans, this is pulse, this is sesame, this is husked rice,' in exactly the same way, O priests, a priest considers this body upwards from the soles of the feet, and downwards from the crown of the head, enclosed by skin, and full of all manner of uncleanliness, saying, 'There is in this body hair of the head, hair of the body, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinew, bone, marrow of the bones, kidneys, heart, liver, pleura, spleen, lungs, intestines, mesentery, stomach, fæces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, lymph, saliva, snot, synovial fluid, urine."

Let us continue the theme a bit more in order to show the final attitude towards the things of sense.[1]

"Just as a man might have a wife beloved, delightful, and charming, from whom he could not bear to be separated for a moment, and on whom he excessively doted. If he then were to see that woman standing or sitting in company with another man, and talking and joking with him, he would be angry and displeased, and experience bitter grief. But if subsequently he were to discover that she had been guilty of a fault, he would lose all desire for her and let her go, and no longer look on her as 'mine.' From that time on, whenever he might see her engaged with any one else, he would not be angry or grieved, but simply indifferent and neutral. In exactly the same way the ascetic by grasping the constituents of being with the reflective insight becomes desirous of being released from them, and perceiving none of them worthy of being deemed 'I' or 'mine,' he abandons all fear and joy in regard to them, and becomes indifferent and neutral. When he has learnt and perceived this, his mind draws in, contracts, and shrinks away from the three modes of existence, the four species of being, the five destinies in rebirth, the seven stages of consciousness, the nine grades of being, and does not spread out, and only indifference or disgust abides."

The *Yogasūtra* calls this thinking *pratipakshabhāvanā* (thinking of the opposite) and advocates this method of weeding out one kind of disposition by cultivating the converse disposition through thought.[2] People will not lose interest in things or withdraw their gaze from them so long as they do not find the silliness and the unworthiness of the process of being attracted by objects of sense. It is only thus that attachment (*rāga*) can cease. Who would care to have connection with other bodies when he remembers with what difficulty and perpetual care his own body can be kept clean?

[1] Warren, *op. cit.*, pp. 376-77; pp. 359-360. [2] *Y. S.*, ii.33, 34.

But this implies the power of keeping the mind fixed on one subject till a habit and a disposition grow up. The *Yogasūtra* lays down a progressive scheme of fixation of attention in order to avoid distraction. Thus the mind could be fixed on any visible part of the body like the navel or the tip of the nose or of the tongue or, later, on some hidden constituent of it like the heart-lotus (*hṛidayapuṇḍarīka*) or the light within the head (*mūrdhajyotis*) after fixation on external objects has been practised.[1] The binding of the mind-stuff to one place in this way is called *dhāraṇā* (fixed attention)[2] and is intended to bring about a kind of auto-hypnotism without external suggestion. The effect of such concentration is a similarity of presentations (*ekatānatā*), and when this is achieved the mind is said to have attained *dhyāna* (contemplation)—a condition of mind which is characteristic in the meditation on divine nature.[3] When the knower almost loses himself in the object, the ultimate goal of the process of concentration is reached, namely, concentration (*samādhi*). The distinction of these three (*dhāraṇā, dhyāna* and *samādhi*) is so small that the *Yogasūtra* calls the three together constraint (*saṁyama*)[4] and lays down that in proportion as constraint becomes stable, concentrated insight (*samādhiprajñā*) becomes clear.[5] These three represent the direct aids to conscious concentration (*samprajñāta samādhi*)[6] as compared with the other five aids, namely, *yama* (to be presently explained), *niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma* and *pratyāhāra,* which may therefore be called indirect aids. But even they are only indirect aids to super-conscious or seedless concentration (*asamprajñāta* or *nirvīja samādhi*), for, according to *Vyāsabhāshya,* this can be brought about by other means also; and these other means, according to Vāchaspati, include contemplation of God.[7]

Before we consider that final condition of the mind, let us turn for a moment to the practical conditions of withdrawing one's self from all activities that increase the range of thought. The *Yogasūtra* agrees with Buddhism and Jainism that men's minds are constantly swayed by thoughts of expanding the self at the cost of others. Thoughts of injury, deceit, unlawful gain, sex and greed toss the soul from object to object and keep up the stream of thought and activity. It is very necessary for the *yogin* to control these wild propensities of the mind by cultivating

[1] *Vyāsabh.* (and Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa) on *Y. S.*, iii.1.
[2] *Y. S.*, iii.1.
[3] *Y. S.*, iii.2; see also Vāchaspati on *Y. S.*, iii.1. For *samādhi*, see *Y. S.*, iii.3.
[4] *Y. S.*, iii.4. [5] See *Vyāsabh.* on *Y. S.*, iii.5. [6] *Y. S.*, iii.7.
[7] Vāchaspati on *Y. S.*, iii.8; also *Y. S.*, ii.45. For the relation between *Īśvarapraṇidhāna* and the *yogāngas*, see Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, p. 145.

habits of non-injury (*ahiṁsā*), truthfulness (*satya*), non-stealing (*asteya*), continence (*brahmacharya*) and non-acceptance of gifts (*aparigraha*)[1] and also contentment (*santosha*).[2] The first five make up the abstentions (*yama*) while the last falls under observances (*niyama*). So long as mental control does not include these in their widest denotation, the mind is sure to go after the things of the world and to pile up the fruits of unholy action. Hence the sage must cultivate the habit of putting himself in the position of his intended victims and in this way get rid of unsocial, perverse and immoral thoughts. As an example, we are told to rejoice at the happiness of others (*maitrī*), to pity those in distress (*karuṇā*), to take delight at the virtuous deeds of our fellowmen (*muditā*) and to practise indifference towards the vicious (*upekshā*)[3]: it is only thus that one can get rid of jealousy at the material and spiritual advancement of others, hatred and anger towards sinners, and indifference towards the poor. The main object of all mental discipline is to uproot all dispositions that have a tendency to sprout into overt thoughts and aspirations. If we could establish a sufficient amount of disposition towards restriction of mental states, the mass of disposition towards emergence of states tends to dissolve and the mental states become gradually restrained with the development of the power of restriction.[4] But the *Yogasūtra* takes care to point out that a good disposition is as bad as a bad disposition in so far as the ultimate object of Yoga is concerned; for dispositions form a kind of residual mental existence, and the purpose of Yoga is to get rid of mental existence altogether.[5] When presentations and dispositions lose their difference, when the past, the present and the future are not distinguished, when the intensity of mental states does not vary and qualitative changes disappear altogether from consciousness, then and then only can the *yogin* be said to have almost attained his object. Singleness of intent (*ekāgratā*) is the nearest approximation to this condition, and so the cultivation of a disposition of monoideism is essential for the destruction of that tendency towards dispersiveness which makes for mental flow and spiritual bondage.[6]

[1] *Y. S.*, ii.30. In the Buddhistic list temperance in drink takes the place of *aparigraha*. See *Saṅgīti Suttanta* in *Dīgha Nikāya* (*Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, IV, p. 225).

[2] *Y. S.*, ii.32, 40.

[3] *Y. S.*, i.33. See Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Man. of Psy. Eth.*, p. 65 f.; *Bud. Psy.*, p. 95. These constitute the four meditations of the sublime abodes (or states)—*brahmavihārabhāvanāni*, or the four "infinitudes" (see *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, IV, p. 216)

[4] *Y. S.*, iii.9. See Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, pp. 155-56.

[5] *Y. S.*, i.51; iii.50; iv.34.

[6] *Y. S.*, iii.11.

The Yoga proceeds on the liberal principle that different natures can achieve their object by concentrating on different things. The theistic bent is brought out by the admission that one of the quickest ways of getting rid of obstructions is to fix the mind on God, for men become Godlike in freedom from defilement (*udayavyaya*), hindrance (*kleśa*), multiplicity (*dharmādharma*) and accidents (*jātyāyurbhoga*) when they become devoted to Him.[1] It is true that God is introduced in a rather irrelevant way in the First Book of the *Yogasūtra*, and the continuity of the discourse would not be affected if *sūtras* 23 to 29 were omitted altogether. It is perhaps also true that by calling devotion to God a *yoga* of action (*kriyāyoga*) a lower plane was assigned to it in relation to the *yoga* of knowledge (*jñānayoga*)—a position understandable by reference to the Sāṁkhya system in which knowledge is accepted as the only method of salvation. It is also true that this devotion appears only as one of the observances (*niyama*) along with cleanliness, contentment, austerities and study. But it is not improbable that the rise of the theistic religions of Śaivism and Vaishṇavism some time before the Christian era made it almost obligatory to accord a place to devotion in the Yoga scheme; and if we believe that the *Yogasūtra* underwent revision at theistic hands, we can understand why devotion to God should be regarded as being able to bring about unaided the highest kind of *samādhi* and also why the study of sacred literature should produce communion with the chosen deity.[2] It should be made clear, however, that the Yoga system had no intention to preach identification with and dissolution in God (or Brahman) as the ultimate condition of the finite soul, for, as Mādhavāchārya points out, that being the express purpose of the Mīmāṁsā (Vedānta) system, the Yoga system would then be simply doing over again the same task.[3] Even when God is meditated upon, the ultimate purpose is to stop the flow of mind in its conscious

[1] *Vyāsabh.* and *Tattvavaiśāradī* on *Y. S.*, i.29. The word *Īśvarapraṇidhāna* occurs four times in the *Yogasūtra*, namely, in i 23, ii.1, ii.32 and ii.45. Dasgupta thinks that the meaning of the word is not uniform in the *Yogasūtra*, for whereas in i.23 it stands for 'love, homage and adoration of God,' in later portions it means 'bestowal of all our actions upon God.'—See Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph & Rel.*, pp. 142-3, also p. 161.

[2] *Y. S.*, i.44.

[3] *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* (Abhyankara's Ed.), pp. 346-47.

The following quotation from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* is interesting: "By tranquillity is meant oneness, and oneness gives birth to the highest Samādhi, which is gained by entering into the womb of the Tathāgatahood, which is the realm of supreme wisdom realized in one's inmost self."—See Suzuki, *St in the Laṅk. Sūtra*, p. 85; see also p. 121 and 201. On page 148 occurs this passage which is also interesting: "Srotāpatti-phala, Sakridāgāmi-phala, Anāgāmi-phala and Arhattva—they are all perturbed states of mind. Sometimes I speak of the Triple Vehicle, sometimes of the One Vehicle, and sometimes of

and subliminal aspects and to bring about the cessation of the modifications of the thinking principle. This alone explains why the Yoga manual can be, and has been, used even by those who do not believe in the reality of God.

The Yoga can, therefore, be best described as a manual of psychological ethics, to use the words of Mrs. Rhys Davids, intended for developing the powers of the mind with the ultimate object of seeing through the futility of exercising them in spiritual interests. Once it is recognized that the soul is different from matter in all its forms, unconscious and pseudo-psychical, there will be no inclination to attend to the objects of Nature or to indulge in any kind of thinking, feeling or action. The soul is above all opposite modes of awareness (*dvandvātīta*) and relativity of subject and object. It is non-modifiable (*apariṇāmin*) and in it thinking and being coincide.[1]

The Yoga admitted, however, that Nature could be dominated by the sage before being annulled. The risk was not foreseen that the search after powers (*vibhūtis* and *ṛiddhis*) would prove a snare or that the means of bringing about concentration would usurp the rightful place of the end to be achieved. The newly discovered power proved intoxicating at the end and the various processes of posture (*āsana*), gesture (*mudrā* and *nyāsa*) and breathing (*prāṇāyāma*) were practised for the sake of acquiring powers over the body and also with a view to controlling the forces of Nature or transgressing her laws. In Buddhistic literature the exercise of such powers was prohibited;[2] but even there miracles abound and moving through space is not infrequent.[3] The many stories about the performance of miracles even by petty saints, to be found in sectarian religious literature all over the world, confirm the suspicion that spiritual power is seldom understood in terms of illumination and ethicality alone. While the *Yogasūtra* thought that

No Vehicle; all these distinctions are meant for the ignorant, for men of inferior wisdom, or even for the noble-minded. As to the entering into the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*), it goes beyond dualism When one is abiding where there are no images (*nirābhāsa*), how could the Triple Vehicle be established? All kinds of Dhyāna, Apramāṇa, Arūpya, Samadhi, and the Extinction of Thoughts—they do not exist where there is Mind itself (*chittamātra*)"

[1] Dasgupta, *Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, pp. 148-9, 152, 155, 163.

[2] For the ten *iddhis* in Buddhism, see Aung and Rhys Davids, *Comp. of Ph.*, p. 61; also Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 303 f. See also *Sāmañña-phala Sutta, Kevaddha Sutta* and many other places in the *Nikayas*. The performance of magical feats was prohibited in Buddhism and Buddha refused to perform magical feats to win disciples.—See *Paṭika Suttanta* (*Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, IV, p. 8); also *Brahma-Jāla Sutta*.

[3] The miracle at Śrāvasti and the ascent to Tushita Heaven are the most notable superhuman feats; but there are many other magical wonders performed by Buddha and his disciples. See, for instance, *Pāṭika Suttanta*.

powers were incidentally acquired by a *yogin*, the popular mind demanded that they should be deliberately gained. It is time to remember once more that the object of Yoga Psychology was to teach the way to self-knowledge and that to this everything else—including devotion to God—was subsidiary.

The Yoga system of achieving salvation is a bold man's creed; and although there is theistic reference in this system, the ultimate effect of all process of thinking does not differ very much from that in Buddhism and Jainism where the theistic implication is absent. The gods figure as colourless in this system as in the heterodox schools and they are shown as inferior to the sage in all these schools of thought.[1] The Yoga system, like Buddhism, insists on certain fundamental traits for achieving success in spiritual culture. These are *śraddhā*, faith in the efficacy of concentration, *vīrya*, increased effort or energy arising out of that belief, *smṛiti*, mindfulness or capacity to call up the desired object before the mind repeatedly by that energy, *samādhi*, concentration of the mind on a single object with a view to stopping all dispersiveness, and, lastly, *prajñā*, insight into the nature of things by concentration.[2] This list, with various additions, is to be found in Buddhistic enumeration also and apparently comprised those factors which were regarded as indispensable for narrowing down thought to a single object.[3] They are not processes but faculties which the individual must possess in order to obtain discriminative knowledge.

Here our imperfect study of a great subject ends. It is our considered opinion that the Yoga Psychology cannot be properly understood without constant reference to the much fuller analysis of Buddhism on which very probably the Yoga system largely drew. Within the Sāṁkhya framework the Yoga introduced the theism of orthodoxy on the one hand, and the psychological analysis of the heterodox systems, specially Buddhism, on the other.

[1] See the writer's article on "The Polite Atheism of Indian Philosophy" in *The Dacca University Studies*, Vol. I, No. 11, pp. 206-8.

[2] Y. S., i.20. Dasgupta includes these, as also *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya*, within *yogāṅgas* (*Yoga as Ph. & Rel.*, p. 135).

[3] See Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 335; *Sacred Books of the Buddhist*, IV, pp. 228, 236; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Psy. Eth.*, pp. 15-18, Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Comp. of Ph.*, pp 176, 180.

SYNTHESIS OF PATAÑJALI'S YOGA-ŚĀSTRA

Among the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy the Yoga holds an important place. All the six systems of our philosophy deal with the various ontological categories; they discuss also the relation between the individual soul and the Supreme, and the nature of bondage and release. Still each lays emphasis on particular aspects alone. But the idea that the annihilation of *duḥkha* (misery) and the attainment of bliss can be secured only through *tattvajñāna* (knowledge of the ultimate Reality) is common to all these systems. Our ancient thinkers have made investigations in various ways and have arrived at this truth. But research and *a priori* reasoning can at best help in obtaining knowledge of the nature of truth, but not in the realization of the truth itself. The end and aim of the Yoga-śāstra is the exercise of the various faculties whereby *tattvajñāna* is attained. The Upanishads have often expatiated upon the utility of the Yoga-śāstra and emphasized that mere intellectual pursuit cannot bring about the realization of the highest truth.

The course of instruction on the various *sādhanās* (disciplines) to this end requires a particular method, and the Yoga has adopted the system of the Sāṁkhyas inasmuch as it conforms largely to our reason. The Sāṁkhyas have in turn followed the Yoga view of *sādhanābhyāsa* (practice of disciplines). In view of this similarity, these two systems have generally come to be regarded as one. But as a matter of fact there are important differences between them in regard to their views on certain *sādhanās* and *tattvas* (principles), and it is therefore legitimate to view them as separate and distinct from each other.

Matter as known to us is of an infinite variety. In our actual experience new objects are seen to be created every moment and several things get also destroyed. A careful analysis will show that these phenomena of creation and destruction are not real. Matter cannot be destroyed, nor can anything new come into existence. What, however, we see as new or created are nothing but combinations in a variety of ways. In our investigation along this line we shall have to posit certain entities as the basis of all manifestations. The Sāṁkhyas have posited *sattva* (purity or balance), *rajas* (activity) and *tamas* (inertia) as the basic principles of matter.

A state of equilibrium of these three is known as Pradhāna or Prakṛiti. When this state of equipoise is disturbed, one or other of the *guṇas* (lit. qualities) asserts itself. This state is called *mahat.* So long as these qualities are in equilibrium, it cannot be said whether they are *sat* (real) or *asat* (unreal), and they are therefore termed *nissattāsatta.* When, however, this condition is disturbed, one of the qualities gets into prominence, and we are able to distinguish it from the others. This state is therefore consistently called *astitā* (existence). A state of motion in the unruffled calm of the sea gives rise to ripples, waves and billows. Thus out of the *mahat* comes out what is called *ahaṅkāra.* It also goes by the name *asmitā* (egoity). *Ahaṅkāra* is commonly understood to mean egoism, pure and simple.

Naturally, *ahaṅkāra* is of three kinds, according as the *sāttvika, rājasa* or *tāmasa* quality gets the upper hand. From the *tāmasa ahaṅkāra* we have the five *tanmātras* (vibrational values) and the primal elements. The *sāttvika ahaṅkāra* gives birth to the eleven organs of knowledge and action. The *rājasa ahaṅkāra* helps the other two in their evolution into their evolutes. And from these elements the material world as we experience it has emanated.

Since all the above are inert and unconscious, there must be someone to utilize and profit by them. And he is termed the Purusha (self) or *chit-śakti* (self-consciousness) that stands quite apart from all these manifestations of matter. The selves or individual souls are countless, since the experiences of one man are different from those of another. Every body, *i.e.* product of the five elements, affords a vehicle or working medium to a self.

Let us now analyse the contents of a man's body. First, there is the gross body; next the larger and subtler conglomeration of the elements; next the five *tanmātras;* next the *ahaṅkāra*, their source; next the senses and the mind that are derived from it; next the *mahat,* the source of *ahaṅkāra;* and then the series culminates in Prakṛiti. All the above, when they are external to the body, are devoid of self-consciousness; but through their association with the *chit-śakti* they are able to act variously. *Mahat,* though inert externally, is yet able to discriminate and goes under the name of *buddhi* (the faculty of determination, *adhyavasāya*). *Ahaṅkāra* determines the form and nature of things arbitrarily. The senses and the mind receive the impressions from outside and place them before *buddhi.* The impact thus brought about between the above

impressions and the *sāttvika* element in *buddhi* results in the sensation of pleasure; pain is the result of their association with the *rājasa* element; and *moha* or confusion is what results from their association with the *tāmasa* element of *buddhi*.

Though all these three are experiences within the sphere of *buddhi*, yet the Purusha believes himself to be the actor and enjoyer thereof. The bondage of material existence is nothing but a misconception. The Sāṁkhyas have concluded that *kaivalya* or the state of absolutism is attained when the Purusha realizes himself as entirely apart from, and independent of, all such limitations and is centred in his own pure, unsullied condition, *i.e.* realizes his nature. All these have been accepted, enunciated and worked upon in the Yoga-śāstra too. It might, however, be objected that all these points have not been fully and clearly dealt with in the *Pātañjala-sūtras*. But some expressions here and there are enough to substantiate our position. Negatively also, while a *prakriyā* (process) of this kind is an essential ingredient to any complete and self-contained system of thought, no such *prakriyā* is explained by *Patañjali*, and we might therefore safely conclude that he views the Sāṁkhya system as a basis to build his superstructure of the Yoga upon.

Patañjali subscribes to the Sāṁkhya view that all the various conditions of existence are but manifestations of the *mahat*. The past and the future are present in any substance in the shape of impressions or images. We lose nothing that has ever happened to us; it is only removed from us for a time and is in a latent or subtle state. Even so the future is in us by way of anticipation. Neither of these can manifest at any time otherwise. The present looms large in our eyes so as to shut out the past and the future. In the *Kaṭha Upanishad* (II.4.1) it is said that the Lord fashioned the senses so as to receive and respond to external impressions; hence we see the externals of things and not the Lord that is in us. The Śruti deplores this misfortune on the part of created beings to receive and respond to external messages alone and not the internal ones. Yet there is consolation enough in the thought that all these (gross and subtle, past and future) are embedded in the *mahat;* and that is verily the principle of *buddhi*. The passage[1] that 'all beings (for their nescience) are unable to realize the Truth even though they pass into the realm of Brahman every day emphasizes the same point.

[1] *Chhāndogya Upanishad* VIII 3 2.

Let us leave aside for the time the idea of attaining supreme wisdom through *yoga*. It, like any other science, sets itself to reveal the inmost nature of things. It will be admitted on all hand that deep and concentrated thought on anything brings out its basic truth better. They are *yogins* who are endowed with this power of concentration. It can truly be said that in this sense the modern scientist is also a *yogin*. But he uses material instruments to carry out his investigations and penetrate the heart of things. This is good enough in itself; but we do not know whether or how far this method will lead us on the road to the real nature of things. On the other hand the Yoga system has thoroughly analysed, examined and decided upon its methods and modes of procedure. The great *ṛishis* are living examples of the truth of it. Even in modern times when the practice of *yoga* has fallen into desuetude, we find here and there a few who are devoted to it. To come at the truth through this channel, it needs no external aids or material advantages. Continence as regards the body and dispassion as regards the mind are quite enough. The true *yogin* does not set himself to lift the external veils, as the scientist does, but tries to look at the thing itself by removing the ignorance which screens his intellect.

Let us see how we sense objects which are gross and not hidden from us. The all-pervading *śabda-tanmātra* (sound-element) is present in the ear which is the medium of hearing. Whenever any particular aspect of sound is generated in the external medium, it impinges on the instrument of hearing and gives rise to a similar formation. The sensation of sound arises in us through its impact on the mental and the egoistic principle or unit. The same method applies with regard to the other senses also. This has been dealt with in Vāchaspati's commentary on the *Yoga-bhāshya*. *Yoga* perfects the instrument of hearing so as to make it possess clairaudience, on the same principle as the radio refines our natural power of hearing. Concentration on the relations between the organ of hearing and the *ākāśa* (ether) removes the barrier between the two and puts the former in touch with every manifestation of sound. This is technically known as the divine ear. Science is gradually approximating to *yoga*, so that it has brought the latter within the limits of possibility. This leads us to conclude that the yogic method is the open door to omniscience.

It has been pointed out that the *yogins* hold that the present contains within itself the past and the future in a subtle form. They therefore

hold that concentration on the basic formation of any object makes the past and the future an open book to us. No motion is lost; it leaves for ever its traces behind it in subtle forms.[1] And these are imprinted in our subtle bodies and follow them through our lives. So we can take it that our past lives are available to us through their picture galleries in our present vehicle.[2] This is illustrated in a talk between Āvaṭya and Jaigīshavya in the *Vishṇu Purāṇa.*

Let us now consider in some detail the methods enjoined by the Yoga-śāstra for attainment of *tattvajñāna* envisaged by it. The eight *yogāṅgas* or auxiliaries enunciated by the system are (1) *yama* (moral virtues), (2) *niyama* (observances), (3) *āsana* (posture), (4) *prāṇāyāma* (control of the vital force), (5) *pratyāhāra* (withdrawing of the senses from external objects), (6) *dhāraṇā* (retention), (7) *dhyāna* (meditation) and (8) *samādhi* (perfect concentration). Ethical principles of human existence like character, conduct and other qualities are all included in the eight mentioned above and it will be made clear as we proceed. It may be observed here that these auxiliaries are intended gradually to remove the impurities of the mind and enlighten it. The brushing aside of these impurities from the mind and bringing it under control will result in a capacity to know and understand things in their true perspective. One may naturally raise the question, how is this possible? An answer may be attempted as follows: What is known as *buddhi* in the Sāṁkhya system is an entity in which, as already said, all things of the world are immanent, albeit in an unmanifested state. This *buddhi,* which is of the nature of *sattva,* is the prime cause of all things. If this is so, how is it that certain things are not cognized by it? The *Yoga-sūtra* (IV.3) gives the reason for this. *Dharma* (virtue) and *adharma* (vice) cannot influence the *buddhi* and other principles into evolving into their evolutes; but they can prevent them from evolving. When impurities are removed by the practice of the Yoga auxiliaries, the *tattvas* act of their own accord, even as the water of a lake flows out when the dam is removed.

Yama and niyama: Our scriptures declare that abstinence from injuring any being, truthfulness, cleanliness, etc., are qualities which help to develop our morality. Considered carefully, these help in the subjugation of the qualities of *rajas* and *tamas,* and develop the *sāttvika*

[1] *Yoga-sūtra* IV.9. [2] *Ibid.* III.18.

instincts of man. All that is contained in the ritualistic portion of the Vedas is only certain aspects of what are known as *yama* and *niyama*. These have been divided into five kinds each by Patañjali; and they have been classified into ten each in the *Yogi-yājñavalkya*, the *Maṇḍala-brāhmaṇa Upanishad* and other texts. They may be classified still further. Everyone of these is calculated to promote the development of man.

***Āsana*:** The posture of sitting is considered to be a very important factor in *yoga* practices. The *Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā* and the *Kshurikā Upanishad* give it the first place among the auxiliaries to *yoga*. The reason for this is that the body, being the abode of the organs and mind, must be kept steady if we wish to bring them under control. The *āsanas* have been divided into eight classes; they have been further subdivided into eighty; nay it has been declared that they are innumerable. Vyāsa, in his *bhāshya* on the *Yoga-sūtras*, has enumerated eleven varieties of *āsanas—padma, bhadra, vīra,* etc. One of the essential and visible results of the adoption of any kind of *āsana* is the regulation of the body and the digestive functions. Many a disease of the body which is a direct outcome of the want of digestive power is removed by a practice of these *āsanas*.

When one has to attain what is known as *abhyāsa-yoga* or concentration of the mind; it is essential that the humours of the body should be kept in a proper condition, which can be secured only by a constant practice of the various types of *āsanas*. It is not proper to regard the Yoga as intended only for a few. Everyone should resort to its practices, because they will be found useful in this world and in the world to come.

***Prāṇāyāma*:** A practice of the yogic *āsanas* conduces to the cleanliness of the body. The next step is the control of the *prāṇa* or the vital force which pervades the entire body and is the mainstay of every kind of activity. It acts in different ways in different parts of the body and on that account it has been classified into five by some and into ten by others. Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that the *prāṇa* is the basis of all activity. The Sāṁkhya and Yoga philosophers hold a different view in this matter. The *prāṇa* is the common factor behind the functions of the five motor and the five sensory organs. It is compared to a parrot's cage. Even as the cage is vehemently shaken when all the birds inside it act collectively, so also when the motor and the sensory organs function together, some kind of movement is produced in the body

which is called *prāṇa*. So when the *prāṇa* is controlled, all the organs are automatically controlled.

What is the purpose of *prāṇāyāma*? It is intended, say the followers of the Yoga-śāstra, to destroy the sins of man which prevent his acquiring correct knowledge and disturb his mental equilibrium through undesirable emotions as, for instance, intense desire or violent anger. It is a matter of common knowledge that anger and other emotions do not exhaust themselves just after their first manifestation, but continue to be latent in the mind and impel the agent to repeated undesirable actions. These emotions are the result of the preponderance of the *rajas*. *Prāṇāyāma* exercises enable a person to get rid of such defects. It is noteworthy that our scriptures prescribe *prāṇāyāma* as one of the means of expiation in cases of a variety of faults and sins. One might naturally ask how sins can be removed by alternately stopping the nostrils and ears. But this is only to betray one's ignorance of the real nature of *prāṇāyāma*. Its true value could be assessed only if it is practised at least for some time. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* (IV.29) also echoes this idea.

It has been remarked that the *prāṇa* is the substratum of all the sensory and the motor organs. When it is controlled, it is easy to withdraw the senses from the external objects; then alone a steady retention of the mind is possible. The *Gītā* lays particular emphasis on these two, viz. the control of the body and the control of the *prāṇa*, as indispensable. It is by these practices that the *yogins* are able to ward off all diseases of the body and obtain various supernatural powers. Those that are interested in Yoga generally seek to follow Haṭha-yoga practices inasmuch as these enable them to acquire easily and quickly a few abnormal powers. This circumstance has tended in some measure to the decline of Rāja-yoga. Haṭha-yoga practices came in course of time to be used by undesirable persons in the garb of *yogins* for gross material ends It has therefore led to a predisposition on the part of people to look upon those who call themselves *yogins* as charlatans. Many people even in modern times associate the practice of Yoga with inaccessible places It is also claimed that the *yogins* transcend all ordinary physical laws They are looked upon as possessing superhuman powers and are taken to be good physicians. It needs only to be pointed out here that these viewpoints are based on some fundamental misconceptions. Yogic practices need not necessarily be associated with any of these things. In fact, Patañjali makes it clear that the *yogin* should not unduly stress

the acquisition of supernatural powers. Yogic powers, when properly utilized, may be beneficial, but when used for nefarious purposes, they are dangerous. It is on this account that the *Gītā* decries them. And Patañjali also, speaking of Rāja-yoga, emphasizes *vairāgya* (dispassion) alone for the same reason.

Prāṇāyāma is divided by Patañjali into four stages, viz. *rechaka, pūraka, kumbhaka, kevalakumbhaka. Rechaka* is letting out the air from inside the body; *pūraka* is inhaling the air; and *kumbhaka* is the retention of the air inside the body. With regard to these three there are restrictions as to the number of times the air should be inhaled, the force with which it should be let out and the time for which it should be retained. The fourth transcends these limitations.

Pratyāhāra is the withdrawing of the senses from external objects. *Prāṇāyāma* and *pratyāhāra* are indispensable to a proper control and regulation of the mind.

Dhāraṇā, dhyāna and *samādhi* are only forms of *yoga* proper and they will be treated in detail later on.

We have pointed out how the Yoga-śāstra furnishes us with the means of attaining wonderful powers even in our workaday world. Through yogic practices we acquire also health, clean life and serenity. While these alone are enough to furnish the *raison d'être* of the Yoga, they are not the be-all and end-all of this system. On the contrary, they hamper and handicap us when we enter the loftiest regions of *samādhi*. After all Jaigīshavya turned his back on these powers and cultivated dispassion which led him on to perfection. *Samādhi* alone leads us to the realization of truth. Patañjali's second *sūtra* presents this conception to us most clearly.

The word *yoga* has various senses. Union is the most patent one. But the *Gītā* takes it to signify the shaking off of the fetters of sorrow. An effective concentration of the mind on one's higher self is another of its connotations. The control of the mental processes and freedom from dispassion constitute, according to another authority, one of its meanings. The Upanishads and *Yogi-yājñavalkya* read it as absolute unification of the individual self and the universal Self, and so on. That explanation, however, of the word *yoga* which contrasts the word with Sāṁkhya would appear to be the proper and more intelligible one, as the system is practical all the way and not theoretical or metaphysical like the other

systems. It is therefore most appropriately defined by the Sūtrakāra as *chitta-vṛitti-nirodha,* the control of the functions of the mind.[1]

Chitta is an instrument in the body itself to inquire into the nature and relation of objects. Many are its functions; and *yoga* is the control thereof. Since the mind is but a modification of Prakṛiti, there are the correlations of the three *guṇas* in it, and the three forms go under the names of *mūḍha* (confused), *kshipta* (scattered) and *vikshipta* (unsteady). The first is the result of the *tāmasa* element; the second is the outcome of the *rājasa* element; and the last is what results when the *sāttvika* element tends to take the rhythmic and harmonious line of action. When one of these predominates, the other two are held in abeyance. But none of these stages can properly be termed *yoga. Yoga* is that *sāttvika* level where one is free from *avidyā* (wrong conception) and the other resultant forms of misery, as also the karmic tendencies. Though *vikshipta* partakes largely of the *sāttvika* quality, it cannot be classed as *yoga,* since it is transitory and subject to frequent changes. One-pointedness and complete control are the essentials of *yoga.* Of these, concentration (*ekāgratā*) is the same as meditation with form, where the substance is clearly rid of doubt or misconception; and control (*nirodha*) is meditation without form, where absolute identification takes place between the knower and the known. These are the stages of the former: (1) *savitarka,* where the object with its qualifications is meditated upon; (2) *nirvitarka,* where the object alone presents itself; (3) *savichāra* and (4) *nirvichāra,* where the same process holds good on a subtler level; (5) *sānanda,* where the *sāttvika* element in the *buddhi* is held in prominence for meditation; and (6) *sāsmita,* which is the higher state where *sattva* alone occupies the attention. These are but material in their nature, and phenomenal powers accrue to one who resorts to them. But the *yogin* who aspires after liberation does not stop here, but goes onward to meditation without form. If concentration on subtle elements is carried on right up to Prakṛiti, he attains to a level where he knows everything subtle and distinct; in other words, he has knowledge of everything in its complete state. If this is made permanent, material impressions fade out through meditation with form. And this in its turn, when its functions are restrained, leads to the next higher stage of *asaṁprajñāta samādhi* (meditation without form). Absolute dispassion is the sole means of it. This *samādhi* again is of two kinds, natural and

[1] *Yoga-sūtra* I.2.

acquired. The gods attain it naturally, but this is not permanent with them. *Yogins* reach the same goal through their practice of *śraddhā* (serenity), highly regarded by *yogins* even as their mother, through enthusiasm, remembrance and discrimination between the self and non-self. This last, practised along with extreme dispassion, takes one to *asaṁprajñāta samādhi*. Like the fire in the fuel, the mind gets gradually extinguished through the practice of the above course. At a very advanced stage one attains omniscience and omnipotence. But those who do not care even for these attain the realization of the highest Self. This centres one in *kaivalya*, absoluteness, where one's real self stands unaffected by anything. And this is the goal of the Yoga philosophy according to Patañjali.

This Yoga-śāstra branches off into Haṭha, Mantra, Laya and Rāja Yogas according to the variety of temperaments and tastes. *Āsana* and *prāṇāyāma* form the background of Haṭha-yoga, which has many forms. The essence of the system is as follows: Two nerves called *iḍā* and *piṅgalā* run along the left and right sides of the spinal column respectively, from their base called *mūlādhāra*, the sacral plexus, from which a very subtle channel called *sushumṇā* extends along the centre of the column to the head with an aperture in it called *brahma-randhra*. In the *mūlādhāra* there is a pent up energy called the *kuṇḍalinī* (lit. 'coiled up'), which is set free by *prāṇāyāma* opening a passage for it and rises step by step through the *sushumṇā* to the head. When this happens, the *yogin* attains illumination. Haṭha-yoga prescribes many postures and forms of muscle control. Successful practice of these postures along with *prāṇāyāma* qualifies the yogin for the stage of *dhāraṇā*, in which he meditates upon *prāṇa* at various points of the body from top to toe. He has to purify thoroughly the five constituent elements of the body by meditating upon their presiding deities. Then follows the upward journey of the *kuṇḍalinī* through the six centres called *chakras* or plexuses, beginning with the *svādhisṭhāna*, situated just above the *mūlādhāra*, and ending with the *sahasrāra* located in the head. The four intermediate stages are *maṇipura*, *anāhata*, *viśuddha* and *ājñā*, situated opposite the navel, the heart, the throat and the junction of the eyebrows, respectively. In the *brahma-randhra* of the *śahasrāra* he meditates upon the light of the soul as Śiva. Through this process he transcends the mind.

The recitation of the *mantras* (sacred formulæ) that have as their deities, Śiva, Nārāyaṇa, etc., along with touching particular parts of the

body associating them with different deities, and meditation on them form the principal feature of Mantra-yoga.

Laya-yoga aims at the merging of the mind in the object meditated upon. Of the numberless methods that may bring about this condition, sound is the easiest and best. The stopping of the outlets in the head and concentration on the sound audible within the body makes one hear a series of sounds. The flute and *vīṇā* sounds come in for their share at the end and they tend to facilitate fixity of the mind.

We have thus detailed the chief points of difference between the three kinds of Yoga. These three lead to Rāja-yoga. Rāja-yoga is beyond the reach of such as cannot pass through the stage of *vichāra* (inquiry) and *viveka* (discrimination). The *Yogavāsishṭha* says that there are two means of controlling the mind, viz. *yoga* and *jñāna*. Some find the former impossible, and some the latter.

It is this Rāja-yoga that is referred to in general terms by the words *dhyāyet, upāsīta*, etc., occurring in the Vedas here and there. We may find them at greater length in the *Kāṭhaka, Śvetāśvatara* and *Maṇḍala-brāhmaṇa Upanishads.* The origin of Laya-yoga may be traced to the *Sāma-Veda* and a somewhat elaborate explanation of it is to be had in the *Chhāndogya Upanishad.* The *Tāpanīs* generally deal with Mantra-yoga, and the Mantra-śāstras are the regular treatises on this subject. The *Kshurikā Upanishad, Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā* and other works deal with the subject of Haṭha-yoga. Rāja-yoga being the most important of the group finds elaborate treatment in the *Mahābhārata,* and in the *Vishṇu, Mārkaṇḍeya* and other *Purāṇas.*

Research reveals the fact that the Yoga system is the bed-rock also of the various Tantra, Āgama, Kashmir Śaiva and Kāpālika treatises. The Naiyāyikas (logicians) and Vaiyākaraṇas (grammarians) also have spoken in praise of it. Every branch of physical and mental activity enjoined in our Vedic, sociological and historical literature begins with some one of the *āsana* and *prāṇāyāma* processes. The invocation of the gods during sacrifices and the contemplative methods associated with religious rites point to the yogic processes as much as the three occasions of our worship of the *sandhyā-devatā.* The *nididhyāsana* stage which is laid down as the immediate precursor to realization in the Vedānta-śāstra is the highest form of Rāja-yoga. Thus the system of Yoga is common to all stages and orders of life and knows no barriers of caste or *āśrama.* It pervades all the various faiths and scriptures in our

land. We cannot point out any other body of teachings which is as cosmopolitan and comprehensive as the Yoga. The essence of other systems of thought has been shown to be embedded in the Yoga-śāstra. The other systems also bear out the teachings of the Yoga and we can therefore never dream of ignoring it in the least. Bādarāyaṇa in his *Vedānta Sūtras* criticizes the various systems of his day; and the Yoga comes in for its share. But Śaṅkarāchārya does not view it as having reference to the doctrines of the Yoga philosophy in general. His explanation of the criticism is that the Sūtrakāra's intention is only to criticize some features of the Yoga system which seem to militate against the teachings of the Upanishads. Śaṅkara says that it can, on the other hand, be shown that the Sūtrakāra regards the Yoga as a very useful system.

The Pātañjala system deals mainly with Rāja-yoga and bestows little attention upon the other three. Further the *sūtra*—*Īśvarapraṇidhānādvā*, "or by self-surrender to God" (I.23), suggests that Bhakti-yoga, the path of devotion, is of very great importance. *Praṇidhāna* is absolute surrender to the Lord in thought, word and deed. Enthusiasm and conviction are highly important to the *yogin* in attaining to the *samādhi* level. But the path of devotion is more appealing and fructifies sooner. The Vedāntins too recognize its supreme value. Patañjali has referred to self-surrender in four places simply because it should be taken up at the very outset and practised throughout. This emphasis on devotion enhances the greatness of the Yoga as against the Sāṁkhya. Vedānta speaks of meditation upon the Lord in His aspect of existence, consciousness and bliss (*sat, chit* and *ānanda*) and the realization of it as his own self constitutes the particular method of this school of thought. The *Kaṭha Upanishad* mentions it under the name Adhyātma-yoga. The great *yogin* Gauḍapāda calls it Asparśa-yoga, since it is beyond the reach of other *yogins* who cannot rise to the level of formless meditation. Thus he who follows this path of Yoga has his desires fulfilled here and hereafter. Through the gates of this Asparśa-yoga he passes on to the final stage *kaivalya* characterized by the realization of Truth and boundless spiritual joy.

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE YOGA THEORY OF THE RELATION OF MIND AND BODY*

The word *yoga* is used to denote either the union of the lower and the higher self (*jīvātman* and *Paramātman*) or the arresting of the mental processes and states and all physical, mental and moral accessories connected with them. The word *yoga* is also used to denote mental energy by which the mind is disciplined and the goal of *yoga* attained. Patañjali defined *yoga* as the partial and complete or temporary and permanent arrest or cessation of mental states. Patañjali's main theories were elaborated by Vyāsa, Vāchaspati, Bhoja and Vijñāna Bhikshu. There are many important points of difference in the exposition of these scholars of the main theory of Yoga. But at the present moment we are not concerned with these. The theory that mental states can be arrested by our efforts is an extremely original one and up till now we know of no country other than India where such a possibility was ever conceived. In an interview that I had with the famous psychologist Dr. Sigmund Freud, he expressed great surprise, in the course of a long discussion, that such a thing should be conceived possible, but he admitted that this experiment had always been made and that therefore it would be hazardous to deny its possibility. In India the *yoga* has always been practised from the earliest dawn of her civilization and carries with it the testimony of many decades of centuries.

Underlying the possibility of the fact of *yoga* there is a concept of mind and a theory of psychology. In spite of many differences in the attempts at the exposition of this psychology among the different thinkers of the school of Patañjali, there is a general agreement regarding the main position of the Yoga psychology. We shall try to give here a brief outline of this psychological theory.

This theory is based upon a metaphysical theory of causation, namely, that like causes produce like effects. A cause is regarded as a potential effect. Even before the causal operation the effects exist in identity with the cause. The function of the causal operation is not to produce anything new, but to actualize the cause as the effect or to exhibit manifestly

*The article cannot obviously be justified as an interpretation of the Yoga texts. It represents, however, the way in which some of the fundamental ideas of Yoga can be utilized in our present-day conceptions of philosophy and science.—S. N. D.

in the effect what was already contained in the cause. There can thus be no interaction between unlikes, for in that case the interaction would have to be supposed to bring into being effects which were not contained in either of the two causal elements or in the interaction itself. Again, if interaction is supposed to be an extraneous relation, then being a relation it would be outside the causal entities, and whatever is outside the causal entities would be incapable of entering into them; so the relations will have to be conceived as having no relata at their two ends and this would baffle the very nature of relations. Thus relations cannot have any separate existence from the relata. It is the different aspects and manifestations of the relata that are interpreted as relations. Relations are thus certain constructions that are made by us by which the relata are held apart and connected in a certain manner which is called relation. This analytico-synthetic function of the mind which manifests the mere relata is related, and all relationed states of the mind are technically called ***vikalpa***. Since the concept of relations is abolished, the problem of the relation of substance, attributes and motion does not also arise. Attributes are but modes of the substance and substance is also a mode of the attributes. The distinction of substances and attributes and their mutual relation of inherence are due to the constructive function of the mind, the ***vikalpa***. They are one and the same. The apparent difference is only due to the different types of constructive emphasis of the mind. Now the whole universe, physical or mental, is a field of interactional relations. But if there are no extraneous interactions and no extraneous relations, it must be composed of a neutral stuff which is neither material nor mental. This neutral stuff cannot obviously be of a homogeneous nature, for in that case the diversity of the phenomenal effects cannot be explained. It is therefore supposed that this neutral stuff is composed of an infinite number of reals different in nature among themselves, though they may be broadly subdivided into three classes as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Only some typical class characters of these reals can be mentioned and these innumerable characteristics exist only from the point of view of our phenomenal consciousness. As they hold within themselves the whole universe and all its characteristics in a potential form, it is impossible to determine the noumenal nature of these reals. It is also wrong to call them either substantive entities or qualities or characters, for these distinctions are unreal. They have their value only to the constructive functions of a phenomenal mind. The only safe course, therefore, is to call this

ultimate stuff neutral entities or neutral reals, whatever this may signify. It is said that the noumenal character or nature of these original entities called *guṇas* is unspeakable and indefinable. What appears as their characteristics in the phenomenal world is due to the constructive nature of the phenomenal mind and the phenomenal conditions. It is from these neutral reals that the mental and physical spheres have emanated through a course of evolution corresponding to their diverse kinds of aggregation, and directed by a tendency, inherent in them, which we may regard as teleological in the sense that it operates in such a manner that the universe is harmonious in its productive activity towards all its changes and all its later evolutions, and consequently towards the evolution of man and the shaping of his ultimate physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual destinies. That there is such a teleology is not a matter of *a priori* belief or any deduction from any such belief, but is an inductive truth based on observation, experience and the testimony of the wise men of the past.

It is obvious that a psychology based upon such metaphysical data cannot hold that mind and body or mind and matter are two distinct entities which act and react upon each other. The psychological view of interactionism that the mental phenomena are the results of nervous changes in the cortex, or that the muscular changes are determined by mental changes of thought, emotion and volition, would naturally be quite inconsistent with its metaphysical background. The theory of parallelism with a metaphysical background of pan-psychism, though somewhat nearer to its metaphysical position, cannot also be admitted by it. The theory of parallelism holds that neither the mind influences the body nor the body influences the mind; but though neither determines the other, the mental phenomena run parallel to the bodily phenomena. The pan-psychical parallelist would hold that the mental and bodily changes are the effects of some common elements present in the mind and the body. But we know that the introduction of certain drugs in the system almost immediately produces mental changes. Alcohol is a chemical compound of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen. When introduced into the body it is absorbed directly from the gastro-intestinal tract mainly into the portal blood and partly by the lymphatics, and within a short period of its introduction into the system it produces a sense of mental exhilaration. Now if interactionism is discarded, how are we to account for the mental change through the metabolic changes

produced in the body by alcohol? The one explanation according to the pan-psychic theory would be that alcohol should not be regarded merely as a compound of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, but that in itself it liberates a psychical energy which directly affects the mind. If the body which is a conglomeration of material elements can have a mental counterpart, then even a compound like alcohol may have its own psychical counterpart which directly affects the mind. Such a view implies the metaphysical theory of ultimate entities which are double-faced; on the one hand they behave in a physical manner and on the other they behave psychically also. But when we speak of physical and psychical energy, we miss the essential connotation of "psychical." If what we call psychical is merely a form of energy, then it may well be regarded as a product of nervous change. Physico-chemical changes are being always produced in the body and we should always have a corresponding influx of psychical energy all the time. The action of alcohol in the body is partly chemical and partly physiological. If the liberated psychical energy is to act on the mind, what would be the *modus operandi*? What would again be the relation between the psychical and the material energy as existing in an object? These and many other relevant criticisms are almost unanswerable in the above theory.

The metaphysical theory of *yoga* is a theory of neutral pluralism and not of pan-psychism, for both matter and mind and all their effects are nothing but diverse kinds of aggregates of the ultimate reals, the *guṇas*. The nervous changes that accompany the psychical states occur in the sphere of the body and are associated with various bio-chemical, mechanical or physiological changes which have a definite history with reference to the body in which they occur and in relation to the physical environment in which that body is located. In a remote manner each body-system is associated with the parents from which it was produced, the nourishment that it had, the climate, temperature, environment and the associated biological functions that are being discharged in the system. The psychical sphere or the mind also has its own history and is a universe in itself. What appears on the surface at any given time as a state of awareness is only a temporary phenomenon. But its conservation, repression, reappearance, its contribution towards the inner history of the mind and towards the determination of future psychical occurrences are associated with a peculiar definite history of its own. As the body-system develops in relation to mind and in relation to its

external environment, but is always internally determined by its constitution and history, so though the mind develops in relation to the body and the external environment, it is always internally determined by its own history and constitution. The physical, biological or physiological and the psychical are essentially of the same stuff of neutral reals. But each sphere is internally determined by its own laws of emergence, evolution, order and correlation in consonance with the interrelation of the other two spheres. The contribution of the material to the biological is possible only because the two have the same essence. Such contribution simply means the participation of one in the history of the other. The biological, however, means only the stage where the material has come but partially within the history of the psychical. What we call biological force or life-functioning is nothing but the intermediate sphere where the psychical is partially adapting the material elements within its history. Such an adaptation is possible only because of the fact that there is an inherent tendency or teleology in the reals themselves to pass into the history of their others and thus to help the due functioning of the history of each of the different spheres. It is for this reason that the development of the psychical is in direct relation to the physiological organs, functions and structures in all animals.

The manner in which the neutral reals may combine among themselves has a limitation grounded in the very nature of the reals themselves as also of the particular combinations. As the reals themselves have their own inherent natures or qualities, so each of their combinations has special characters or qualities and the manner in which these combinations may enter into the history of other combinations is limited by the structural quality, character or nature of such combinations. In the spheres of theoretical science we try to discover the nature of such limitations through induction and such deduction as is associated with it, and try to formulate what are called the laws of nature. The uncertainty associated with all inductive propositions and laws relating to cause and effect and even to the uniformity of nature is grounded in the fact of our ignorance of the ultimate limitations of the noumenal reals and of their combinations in relation to one another. From the point of view of pure theoretic science or metaphysics it would be possible to overcome the limitations of any combination of reals and to transform one combination into another, provided we had the exact knowledge of the nature of the limitations of each combination and had the apparatus by which

we could relate any combination with those other combinations in the presence of which each combination would change its history. A practical chemist not only studies the properties of elements and compounds but also tries to determine in the presence of which compound other particular compounds change their internal history. We know that a catalytic agent, either in the outside world or in the animal body in the form of enzymes, produces chemical change in other compounds without itself undergoing any change. A practical physicist not only studies the ultimate electronic structure of elements but also tries to discover the possibility of effecting such structural changes in the constitution of an atom of an element by the forces of heat, electricity or pressure that the atom may change its history as one element into that of another. Thus in the material world we find that in the presence of force as electrical, thermal, chemical or doubtfully chemical (e.g. in the case of a catalytic agent) chemical compounds or elements change their individual or mutual history. By history I mean properties or behaviours of an entity in the presence of other entities in determining or effecting change in itself or in those entities which form its environment, or which are copresent with it. History thus is self-determination and other-determination in the copresence of other entities.

The nature of this determination must be different in the physical, chemical, biological, physiological and the mental world. But history means the manifestation by a real of new qualities as actualization of the potential in copresence with others, participation in the history of others as their constituents or change of its own history in copresence with others. No case of causation is a case of external determination, but the elements that seem to determine a causal change or effect a causal operation are but the conditions under which a composite unity determines or changes its own history. The so-called other-determination mentioned above is also to be regarded as self-determination from the point of view of the composite unity that undergoes the change. The nature and ground of this self-determination are to be sought in the inherent tendency of the neutral reals forming the structure of any composite unity to change its history in copresence with other composite unities, in consonance with the mode in which alone the entire evolutionary process from the inorganic to the organic and from the organic to the highest development of man and his spiritual powers, has proceeded. The limitations in the behaviour of any composite unity are in

consonance with this universal tendency with regard to the entire whole, which has to emerge or evolve as an actualization of its potential career. Every individual history, be it of an atom, or molecule or compound, of the physical, electrical or thermal behaviour of inorganic substances, of living units, of mind, or of societies or nations, is only a part (abstracted mentally) of the universal history which is in a process of unfolding. Every individual history is at once its own self-determination as well as its determination by the universal history; it is an epitome of the universal history. The concept of causation is not one of production of change by an extraneous entity, nor one of assemblage of conditions or transformation of energy or of parallel changes in the causal conditions and the effect, but the self-evolution of an entity in copresence with its conditions from the proximate to the remotest. Such a self-evolution may mean either the unfolding of the nature of an entity, its contribution to the unfolding of the nature of other entities or its participation in the history of the unfolding of other entities. The tendency that guides the modes of self-evolution of any entity is on the one hand the actualization of its potentiality and on the other, its subordination to the history of development of other composite entities in the interest of the total cosmic development, of which every individual development is a part and towards which it has a tendency.

It may be remembered that in accordance with the fundamental metaphysical position of this system space and time have no separate existence; they are not the general conditions of all occurrences, but are only the modifications or combinations of the ultimate neutral reals and are thus continuous with objects. Space is not like a box in which all things exist, but it is continuous with all objects. All matter has evolved out of space, and time has its first physical manifestation as a mode of space. The first physical category in the evolution of the neutral reals is space. Time is nothing but the constitutional or structural movement in space and in all space-products. Thus it may be regarded as a determining or structural mode of matter or space. In some older schools of Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory time is regarded as an original dynamic existing prior to space and determining the evolution or emergence of space, and also of the neutral reals in their active capacity, from an original hypothetical state of equilibrium in which their functions were inoperative. It is thus seen that time is not a separate entity, but is an original function inherent in the neutral reals, space, the psychical

spheres, and all products of space as matter. When it is said that time is the first physical manifestation of space, what is meant is that since time in the phenomenal world means the structural movement of the ultimate 'reals', it exists even in the psychical sphere, as is realized in the apperception of time in the mind. Time exists as a structure of the mind or the psychical sphere as a pre-condition of its apperception which is a result of a process that may be either mental or physico-mental. Space is the first category that emerges in the physical plane as a result of the combination of the neutral reals. But since time is the dynamic in the structural changes of the reals and since space is the first result of structural changes in the reals, time may be regarded as manifesting first in the physical plane in space. But as the ground of the emergence of all other physical categories from space has the structural movements of the reals, time exists in all the products of space in the material and the biological world. There is a difference between our apperception of time as measurable moments of the phenomenal time and the noumenal time represented in the very nature of the structural changes of the *guṇas*. The phenomenal time or time as apprehended in consciousness has a measurable form. We may look forth for the finest, the smallest measure of such time and the limit of such smallness may be fixed in an imaginary fashion as the movement of an atom in the space of its own dimension. But even then such a unit of time or any time conceived by the addition of such units would not represent the real time either as the mode of space or as the structural changes of the neutral reals. Time as apprehended by us is thus false not only in its measure as a unit but also in its functional aspect; it is conceived as a flowing stream and as associated with the changes of matter and our experience of it. It will be realized that such a conception of time is false as it does not show either the structural or the modal function of time. The apprehended time, therefore, is false both in its aspect as measurable and in its function as the locus of all experiential and material changes. It is therefore held that the apprehended time is a mental construction (*buddhi-nirmāṇa*).

Returning to the problem of causation and regarding the relation among the assemblage of conditions that effect a causal change, we find that these factors of the causal operation, apparently existing in different points of space and separated by the time-element involved in the process, are not in reality discontinuous from one another. The so-called

primary cause and the conditions are to be regarded as forming one organized whole theoretically associated together with the entire organization of the universe. Individual organizations, when looked at from the standpoint of their separable or separate existence, are but the results of our mental construction (*vikalpa*) generally from the point of view of our practical needs and interests. When the potter makes a jug out of a mass of clay, we may say that the clay evolves itself into the jug by its self-evolving process through the contributions of its conditions, the energy of the potter, the wheel and the like. But the proper scientific view of causation would be to regard the clay, the potter, the wheel, the associated space and the associated time as one organized whole evolving forward in its self-evolving process. In this self-evolving process each element of the organized whole undergoes a change peculiar to its own nature, but none of these elements can be conceived as having an existence by itself independent of other elements. None of the elements are in reality separable. They can all be taken together in relation to the organized whole as discharging a function with reference to the whole and also with reference to each and every constituent of the whole. The ordinary definition of cause as invariable unconditional antecedent is no true definition and has only a methodological value. It only serves to separate a certain entity in which we are directly interested from others in which our interest is more remote. In the Yoga view of the situation the difference between cause and conditions also ceases to have any real significance and has only a methodological value. The conditionals, the spatio-temporal elements of the mentally separated causal whole, are conterminous with the organization of the effect-whole constituting its own spatio-temporal and material elements. The differentiation of the effect-whole from the causal whole is also the result of a mental construction. The effect-whole exists in the causal whole as involved in its self-evolving process as its moments of self-expression.

The ordinary objection against the Yoga view of causation that since the effect exists in the cause, the apparatus of the causal operation and its movement is inexplicable, arises from a misapprehension of the whole situation. It is not the so-called material cause that evolves by itself independently of everything else, but it is the self-evolution of the entire organized whole of the so-called material cause and all its conditions including the spatial and the temporal elements. When it is said that the oil exists in the sesamum, it does not mean that such an existence

is a ground for its self-evolution. The oil exists in the sesamum as much as the plant of sesamum exists in it. As a matter of fact the whole universe may exist in the sesamum, for it has for its constituents the neutral elements which are the constituents of the universe. The Yoga theory of causation is not interested merely in the barren assertion of the existence of effects in the material cause. The true effectuating existence of the effect in the cause is with reference to the organized whole and it is this alone that can be called the true material cause. In the Yoga theory of causation there cannot be any place for an extraneous entity as an outside agent. Such an internal organization is possible from the fundamental notion of the neutral reals which co-operate together for mutual self-evolution and the evolution of the organized whole. But when the different elements constituting an organized whole move forward for their own individual self-expression in consonance with the self-expression of the organized whole, which in itself is a unity and has its own specific self-expression, the contribution in the joint effectuation of any of the constituent elements may be regarded as extraneous from the point of view of the contribution of the elements which we emphasize from our practical interests. Thus when a seed is put under the moist ground, the moisture, the temperature, the pressure, the space, the mineral and other elements present in the soil, the contribution of the microbes as the fertilizers may be regarded as extraneous causes (*nimitta kāraṇa*) and the seed as the material cause. In the seed also, if we consider the function of the cellular walls which allow the passage of the proper nutrients through osmotic pressure, the cellular walls may be regarded as extraneous to the operation of the seed as a material cause. So, if we continue our analysis of the different physiological operations of the different structural elements inside the seed, we shall see that the so-called material cause as apart from the extraneous causes is reduced to a mere fiction or to the tendency of the organization as a whole towards its specific self-expression. When a number of joint operatives work as an associated whole, which from our point of view seem to be more intimately associated in their operations, or which may somehow be regarded from our point of view as belonging to a different order in their modes of operation, we may ignore the internal, structural and functional activities of that integrated whole, regard it as one unit and as separate from the environmental influences and call it the material cause.

Thus the different structural elements have their independent

existence and discharge independent functions through which new products come in and new bio-chemical and physiological operations set in. Such operations take place through the joint co-operation of the structural elements, their functions and products and signify the self-expression of the organized whole--as the seed of its growth. The joint operatives inside the seed may be regarded from the point of view of our separative intellect as being more intimately associated with one another than the environmental influences which may be more easily separated from them. It is from this point of view that the seed is regarded as a separate entity and the material cause. But in reality the seed in its production, existence, its effectuation as shoot and plant, its processes of growth and changes and variations of growth as well as in its destruction depends entirely on the environmental influences and their contributions. The potential and actual life of the seed is thus as much a function of the integral organization of the seed as that of the environment. It is for this reason that the fauna and the flora of a country are determined by its climatic and other conditions. Even the position of the earth in the limitless space determines the conditions of the production and growth of animals and plants. Thus the true cause is the organized whole and it is from a purely methodological point of view that the separative intellect may introduce different concepts of causation, which may seem to be conflicting with one another when the true point of view is not held before the mind. Thus in the *Vyāsa-bhāshya* (II. 28) we hear of nine kinds of causes, viz. cause as production or transformation by which the indefinite makes itself definite, cause as integral maintenance of the whole through inner teleology, cause as manifestation to consciousness of what is already existent, cause as determined in change of directions in a process, cause as determined in mental movement of syllogistic nature by deduction or induction, cause as attainment of a true state of consciousness negating the false ones, cause as negating the false state, cause as extraneous agent determining the transformation and cause as a sustaining agent. It will be seen that at least four or five of the above concepts apply in the mental field and the rest are of universal application. But it can be shown that these concepts of causality are drawn from the application of the fundamental principle of causality as applied in different spheres or as looked at from different points of view. As such, they are not in any sense exhaustive and have only a methodological value.

We have seen so far that causation means self-determination of an organized whole; each organized whole holds within it further organized systems and in tracing the subtle history of these related organizations and sub-organizations we may bring ourselves up to the limit of the assumption of structural determinations in space of almost an incomprehensible nature. The reference of these determinations to the ultimate neutral reals comes to the domain of metaphysical hypothesis. Each organization works in general harmony with all other possible organizations and in specific harmony with certain other organizations with which it may be more directly or proximately related. What is generally called force is an illusory abstraction and as such the enquiry into the association of force with a substance in which it is supposed to inhere is also an illusory attempt. The manifestation of the so-called force is but the behaviour of any organization or sub-organization or element with reference to its own self-expression or the self-expression of any other organized whole or wholes with which it is related. Electricity is regarded as a force, but in reality it is nothing but a behaviour. Thus Russell says: "Electricity is not a thing like St. Paul's Cathedral; it is a way in which things behave." The so-called force is a self-relationing process involved in all specific self-expressions which again cannot be distinguished from the very nature of any organization.

That there are no instances of simple entities in the universe may require a few words of explanation. If we start with a lump of matter, we find that it is divisible into molecules existing together in different degrees of cohesion and dispersion which determine the existence of solids, liquids and gases. These further determine along with other conditions the state of its existence as a solution, mixture, emulsion or colloid. The molecular structure of an object not only determines its ordinary physical conditions but is associated also with various physical properties of colour, texture, taste and the like and also with certain kinds of physiological characters. The molecule itself has in it a molecular structure of atoms of the same element or of diverse elements. Even when the atoms are of the same element, the molecular structure effects a great change in physical characters and possibly also in chemical characters. Diamond and charcoal may be cited as an instance. In the case of an inter-molecular structure of atoms of diverse elements, even when we have the same number of atoms of the diverse elements, the mere difference in their structure makes an enormous difference in the

physical and chemical characteristics of the two molecules. Both organic and inorganic chemistry abound in instances of the formation of new compounds by such inter-molecular rearrangement. If we descend to the atoms, we find that they have a definite system of structure of protono-electronic arrangement. The exact nature of this arrangement is not definitely known, though it has been supposed with a fair amount of assurance that it consists of concentric ellipses or circles, the complexity of which increases as we ascend from one group of elements to another in accordance with the Periodic Classification of Mendeleeff and Lothar Meyer. We know that the simple addition of one or two electrons in the outer ring of the atom of an element may result in the production of such intensely different chemical substances as carbon and oxygen. We know also that at least in some instances it has been possible to degenerate one element into another merely by the repulsion of one or two electrons from the outer ring of electrons. Electron itself is identified with an electric charge, though it has a definite volume and a definite weight. Light is regarded as electronic and as predicted by Einstein it has been found to suffer from the influence of gravitation. Since electrons have weight it may be supposed that they also have a structure and an internal organization, and we are on the threshold of new discoveries and theories in which they are regarded as crossing points of millions and millions of sub-ether waves. The nature of these sub-ether waves is not definitely known and it is possible that they represent some indefinitely known structure of space. That space has a structure is one of the fundamental assumptions of Einsteinian Theory of Relativity. From where comes the structure of space may be left to the guesswork of metaphysical speculation. Coming to the domain of life we find that even the microscopic and the ultra-microscopic bacteria reveal in them the presence of chromatin granules which may be regarded as homologous in nature to the nucleus of higher organisms. It has been found that bacillary bodies contain within them deeply staining structures. These structures show a preponderance of slender rods which are cylindrical with rounded ends. The development of a bacterial life shows separation, rearrangement and growth of these internal structures in a manner homologous with the growth on the cell-bodies of higher animals. The fact that the cellular bodies of higher animals contain an internal specialized structure and different kinds of internal apparatus, is too well known to need any elaboration here. Apart from the function of the chromatins and the

chromosomes, I may refer here only to the Golgi apparatus. The Golgi apparatus is a centre of synthetic processes. It is engaged primarily in the production of secretory granules which are excretory in nature. These products are of a temporary character such as mucous, serous, lipoid granules, yolk, acrosomes, Nissl's granules, etc. The apparatus undergoes hypertrophy during the process and is not transformed into the various products. We need not enter into further details, but it will be evident from what has been said above that even in the crudest beginning of life we have definite proof of complex structures associated with complex functions. It can also be proved that the process going on inside the cell-life consists not only of localized actions at particular points but of a totalized action of the entire structural area, which is much more than merely additive. It is thus evident that both in the inorganic and in the organic sphere of plant and animal life we have to deal with structural organizations and sub-organizations which are constantly in an evolving process both in their specific interests and in the interest of other organizations. Their actions are both of a localized nature and also of the nature of a totalized whole transcending the limits of a localized action. The localized actions are actions of sub-organizations which may be taken successively to any of its minus powers. The action as a whole is the action of the sub-organizations towards the self-expression of the successive organizations of which the successive sub-organizations are constituents.

Causal operation cannot always be interpreted as involving definite functioning of each of the constituent elements, which may be interpreted as the exertion of force or as offering positive contributions in the parallel plane with the contributions of the other constituent elements. Thus in the case of a catalyst we find that a catalytic agent may in most cases excite chemical action in other compounds simply by its very presence in a measure quite incommensurable with the relative proportions of those compounds and without undergoing observable change in itself. Thus sucrose will act on at least two hundred thousand times its weight while rennin of the gastric juice will clot at least four hundred thousand times its weight of casein, the coagulable protein of milk. The very presence of the catalytic agent is the cause of the chemical change in the sucrose of the milk, though we are not aware of any definite contribution on the part of the catalytic agent in the same plane with the contributing actions of the constituents of sucrose and milk. No contri-

bution of any definite force can be conceived as the catalytic agent itself remains unchanged, though only by its presence four hundred thousand times its weight of casein undergoes a change. Again a causal operation would not necessarily always be a prior event to the effect as may be expected from Hume's definition of cause as an invariable antecedent. When a planet approaches its perihelion its motion is accelerated. The cause of the acceleration is its specific position in the gravitational field which can be regarded only as a coexistent event, but not a prior one. Again from what has been said above it will be apparent that no cause can be unconditional. This view will be further apparent when we consider that the cause may also be defined as an assemblage of conditions, the remote conditions of which may sometimes be pressed backwards in an infinite regression. Thus we see that all the so-called defining characteristics of the causal concept have only a methodological interest. Causal operation is a process of self-emergence and self-expression or other-emergence and other-expression of organized wholes.

If we consider the nature of organizations in the non-living and the living world, we find that though their general nature is the same, yet there are remarkable differences in the specific modes of their operation. The behaviour of inorganic organizations is dominated by the law of inertia. The laws of force and their quantitative and qualitative directions are fixed. There is self-maintenance and self-expression, but there is no growth. There is aggregation and accretion, but no production. One atom of copper, one atom of sulphur and four atoms of oxygen produce the integral combinations of a copper-sulphate molecule. Two atoms of hydrogen, one atom of sulphur and four atoms of oxygen produce a molecule of sulphuric acid. There are processes inside the molecules of copper-sulphate and of sulphuric acid by which they hold themselves in *status quo* and which regulate their behaviour with reference to their environment and other substances contained within it But no processes inside a molecule try to generate further molecules from it. A slight exception is perceived in the formation of crystals. We find that the electrical energies associated with the poles of a crystal help the formation of synchronously shaped crystals from a mother-solution. Here though a crystal supports the formation of other crystals, these crystals are not produced from a disintegration of one crystal through the operation of the materials absorbed within it. The contribution of a

crystal towards the formation of its sister-crystals is through the adhesive and formative forces exerted in the peripheral regions of the crystal. As such, it is entirely different from the process of cell-division which secures the history of production and growth in the living world. The chief characteristics in which the living differs from the non-living may briefly be summarized as follows:

I. Persistence of a complex specific metabolism (comprising metabolism of protein, individuality of metabolism and persistence in spite of change) and the corresponding specific organization.

II. Capacity of growth, reproduction and development.

III. Effective behaviour, registration of experience and variability.

It was sometimes held, particularly in association with the theory of vitalism, that the environment of an organism, physical or chemical, must be regarded as existing outside of it, that it may be explained independently according to the well-known physical and chemical principles and that even within the organism the same physical and chemical conceptions may be applied except in so far as there is interference by a peculiar influence within the organism by which the self-maintenance of the organism as a specific whole could be explained. We now know that the conception of life embraces the environment of an organism as well as what is within its body. The conception of life implies that the relations of the parts and the environment of an organism are such that a normal and specific structure is actively maintained. Thus the famous biologist Dr. Haldane says: "The environment is expressed in the structure of each part of the organism and conversely. When, moreover, we examine what appears to us as organic structure and the structure of organic environment closely, we find that it is the expression of continuous activity so co-ordinated that the structure is maintained. We cannot separate organic from environmental structure, any more than we can separate the action of the environment from the reaction of the organism. Moreover, the spatial relations of the parts do not imply their separate existence from one another, since we cannot define them as existing separately when their very existence expresses co-ordination with one another. The co-ordination extends over surrounding environment, and the spatial relations of parts and environment express unity, not separation. They also cannot be described as existing within space; for the co-ordination embodied in them is not

limited to a certain position in space, but extends indefinitely beyond any spatial position which we might attempt to assign to it."[1]

Even the Darwinian theory of hereditary transmission implies the fact that life is a unity and it constantly maintains and reproduces itself. Such a self-maintenance is consonant with variation involving adaptation of an organism as regards structure and activities to new circumstances. Structure expresses the maintenance of function and function expresses the maintenance of structure, and a physico-chemical environment cannot be separated from the living organisms, as if the former was the content and the latter the container. The environment and the living whole together form one whole, one organization. Morphology cannot be separated from physiology and no physico-chemical theories can explain the self-maintaining and reproductive nature of life. The science of life is an exact science, the concepts of which are original and are not in any way applications of or deductions from physico-chemical concepts. The time when it was thought that physico-chemical concepts could explain the concept of life is fast passing away and we have indications of a new era when explanations of physical concepts will be attempted on the analogy of biology. Thus a hard-boiled scientist like Whitehead says that science is taking on a new aspect which is neither purely physical nor purely biological. It is becoming the study of organisms. Biology is the study of larger organisms whereas physics is the study of the smaller organisms.[2] According to him an event may be taken as the ultimate unit of natural occurrence and it contains within it two aspects, an aspect of self-maintenance and an aspect in which it holds itself in unison with the self-maintenance of other events. An event corresponds to two patterns, namely, the pattern of aspects of other events which it grasps into its own unity and the pattern of its own aspect which other events severally grasp into their unities. There is thus an intrinsic and an extrinsic reality of an event, namely, the event in its own prehension and the event as in the prehension of other events. The ordinary scientific ideas of transmission and continuity are details concerning the empirically observed characters of these patterns throughout space and time. Considered from these points of view, the biological and the physico-chemical events are in one sense alike and on that account we get a peculiar insight into the nature of physico-chemical events when

[1] *The Philosophical Basis of Biology*, pp. 14-15.
[2] *Science in the Modern World*, Chap. VI.

we look at them from the point of view of biology. The idea of self-expression in the interest of other expressions is most prominent in biological studies. The idea of the universe as an interrelated organization in the interests of one another receives an important justification from a biological outlook. We have seen so far that biological organizations belong to an order different from physico-chemical organizations. Yet they are conterminous with the physico-chemical organizations which form their environment. Plants seize the radiant energy of the sun and utilize it in building the compounds they use. Animals digest them to build their own. The complex activities of the animals have three powerful groups of governors, the ferments, the endocrine secretions and the vitamins, all chemical compounds and all acting chemically. All the processes of life are governed by the same quantitative laws that have been proved to hold for non-living matter. Life can neither create energy or matter nor cause their disappearance. The two great laws of physics and chemistry are conservation of matter and conservation of energy and all living processes conform rigidly to these laws. An organism carrying on an active metabolism accounts for all matter taken within itself during a measured period of time, so that the difference in weight between the matter ingested and that excreted is exactly balanced by a gain (or loss) of weight by the organism itself. So the total intake of energy from the potential energy of the food ingested and the actual energy acquired from food hotter than the organism is equal to the total energy output consisting of (a) radiation, conduction and convection, and (b) actual and potential heat lost with the excreta and the work done by the organism. Many of the chemical compounds and elements are directly produced and stored up by the endocrine glands. Thus the thyroid stores up iodine and forms definite iodine compounds. The para-thyroid glands secrete compounds which assist in the control of calcium metabolism. The pancreas secretes compounds which help the catabolism of glucose and so on. Many other acids and salts are prepared in the body by a mechanism entirely different from that in which they may be prepared outside the body. Many of the compounds prepared in the body are such that we have no indication as to how they are produced inside the body by the chemical processes that are known to us. Some of the compounds which may be produced outside the body by the application of considerable heat and various chemical reagents are produced in the body in a very

simple manner under entirely different conditions. It will thus be seen that though ultimately the constituents of our body are homogeneous with the radiant energy of the sun or the electrical conditions of space indicated thereby, our organism is an organization of an entirely different nature from all other non-organic organizations. It uses non-organic methods and assimilates and transforms non-organic matter and energy for its own interest in its own peculiar way. Whatever is taken inside the body is made to enter into the specific processes of the organism and to obey the laws of the organism which are different and yet consonant with the loss of non-organic nature. When an organism fails to do so in any respect we have diseases. Thus the larger protein-molecules do not under normal condition reach the circulation, but when by any chance they do reach the circulation they act toxically producing certain reactions which may reveal themselves by definite symptoms. The cells of the organism then form and excrete compounds which can unite with them and de-toxicate them and these are called anti-bodies or anti-gens.

The mechanistic view of life implies that if at any instance of time we were to know the precise distribution of the matter and energy which are present in an organism, we should have a complete understanding of all its properties. In other words, the behaviour of living systems can be completely defined in terms of laws that are fundamentally similar to those which describe the behaviour of inanimate systems. But the theory of the spontaneous evolution of the animate from the inanimate, though it may give us a comfortable feeling of continuity of thought, is on the whole untenable. It is just as probable for a stone to leap spontaneously from the surface of the earth as for a living organism to evolve spontaneously from inanimate matter. The probability of simultaneous co-ordinative movement such as we find in living organisms is extremely small on the assumption of a purely physico-chemical arrangement. The organization of the simplest living organism is clearly more complex than that of a stone or of a motor car and it carries out processes that are infinitely more complex than what can be explained as chance coincidences. No chemist can seriously think that the proteins can spontaneously originate from carbon-dioxide, water and simple salt, any more than a physicist can admit the spontaneous origin of a motor car. Biology itself provides not one shred of observational evidence to support the spontaneous origin of living matter. There are a few biologists, however, who postulate the spontaneous origin of the

intermediate stages between the living and the non-living world. But the physical events that have to be assumed in such a theory are such that our present concept of physical "laws" can hardly be applied there. It may be said that in past ages events which are now very improbable were, in fact, of common occurrence. But no man of science can give any credence to such a supposition unless he had some assurance as to the nature of those events and conditions which made the origin of life inevitable or even probable. The distribution of energy and of matter in past epochs may have been different, but if there were conditions prevalent at the time which could produce the living organisms through the spontaneous co-ordination of matter and material energy, it would be extremely strange that every attempt to reproduce them in the laboratory should fail so completely. If the spontaneous origin of the animate from the inanimate cannot be held as a plausible theory, there is no ground for hoping that we shall ever be able to express all the properties of an organism in terms of physical laws. Under the circumstances it would be more logical to accept the existence of matter in two states, the animate and the inanimate, as a fundamental initial assumption. Some properties are naturally common to matter in either state and it is therefore legitimate to study the so-called physical properties of living matter. But just as the fundamental concepts of physics must be based on observed facts, so the fundamental concepts of biology must also be based upon observation in that specific sphere.

From one point of view a mass of protoplasm may be regarded as a very fine colloidal emulsion, the fundamental units of which are extremely small. The properties of the whole may thus in some sense be regarded as being essentially those of each individual. There is some evidence to show that even a single differentiated cell represents an aggregate of very small living units. Even a single spermatozoon shows the growth and decline of its mechanical and respiratory activities in such a manner as if it represented the joint behaviour of a large population of much smaller units of activity. Yet when we try to think of the mechanism whereby the cell differentiates itself as a whole, we have to postulate some form of co-ordinated relationship which is more than additive, and which cannot be explained except as an organized behaviour of a total indivisible agent. If so long physical concepts were fruitlessly applied for the explanation of biological facts, the time has come when biological concepts are being employed to explain physical behaviour.

M. Poincare and others really define physical phenomena in terms of biological conceptions when they say that "modern physics is presenting us with apparent examples of spontaneity and foresight." When the dividing cells of a molluscan egg rotate in order to reduce their centripetal pressure, the rotation in the clockwise direction would be as effective as the counter-clockwise direction. But in every case it takes one direction rather than the other, though no mechanical difference of the inside force-arrangement can be observed. The cells of a molluscan egg turn one way or another for intrinsic reasons quite independent of any external influence. This and many other considerations of a similar nature show that the cell has an individuality of its own which is free from the limitations of the statistical laws of physics. Probably this may be extended to the minutest living components of the dividing cell. We are now in a position to assert that a living organism—or even the minutest parts of it—behaves as an individual and determines itself in consonance with both its own nature and its immediately associated life-entities and probably also with its external environment. Every case of its self-determination is also a case of other-determination. The variability of Darwin's law is the function of this self-determination. The concept of self-determination does not imply the exclusion of the need of others, but it involves within it both its own self-expression and the expression of others. Its individuality is not negative and abstract, but is positive and concrete in the sense that its very consideration for itself is also a consideration for others with which it is associated.[1]

Coming back to the problem of causation, we find that though from the ultimate point of view the determination of all causal operation is based upon the fundamental nature of the neutral reals, yet each individual organization, be it material or organic, may be regarded as different individual organizations each of which involves the relevant 'other' of it within itself. This also has its ground in the very nature of the different reals which co-operate together for self-expression, other-expression and whole-expression. Thus the statement that like co-operates with like or like is produced from like is as true as that like co-operates with unlike or that like is produced from unlike. All dialectical discussions on the subject prove to be barren simply because of the fact that the concrete nature of the process is ignored and emphasis is put upon abstract

[1] Cf. the Presidential Address of the Geological Section of the British Association, 1933, 7th September, and *Nature*, 1933, pp. 661-664.

generalities which exist nowhere excepting in the brains of the quarrelling metaphysicians.

From the above considerations we come to the important conclusion that the sphere of the living is in a very relevant sense an independent sphere which has its own concept and own laws that may be known by observations and experiments, just as the laws of the inorganic world may be known. We know also that all the higher forms of life contain within them as integrated in their history the dominant potential tendencies and functions of the lower forms of life, just as even the most complex inorganic compounds contain within their history the tendencies and functions of electronic matter. The behaviour of any higher form of life can be revealed in its historical aspect only as involving within it all the lower forms as also a tendency towards further history in its further higher forms. Each form below the highest represents within it a process of events which can be interpreted only by a backward and forward oscillation of the mind in search of an integrated meaning.

Just as in the case of life it has been shown that it is a definite and independent world by itself having its own growth, function, structure and reactions to environment determined by itself, so in the case of mind also, we have to assume its existence as an independent world having its own inner history integrated within it which regulates its growth, function, structure and reactions to environment determined by its own specific laws. There is a difficulty, however, in making any definite assertions about the nature of 'mind' and its definite conception. In the case of living units, their processes consisting of physico-chemical changes were directly observable. The inference in their case was with reference to their specific inner urge that regulated their co-ordinating movements. But in the case of mind we have no sensual evidence of any organized whole. The phenomena of mind as thoughts, emotions and volitions can be observed by introspection or can be inferred from the manner in which they induce physiological changes or changes in the movement of the organism in consonance with changes in the environment. These may be studied to some extent, using the methods of exact science which involve definite measurements made under standard conditions. These experiments may be performed by oneself or by two persons, the observer who makes the introspection and the experimenter who handles the instruments and makes the record. But even in these there are obvious difficulties in carrying out the introspective work. There is

always a chance of its being unduly affected by the temperamental characteristics of the observer and the association of ideas and feelings on the part of the observer at the time of the experiment. Then again, what we may observe is almost always the phenomenal behaviour of mind, an idea, an emotion, and image or the like. There have been philosophers and religious teachers who have denied the existence of any organized whole as 'mind.' Thus the Buddha said that there were the petals, the pollens, the corolla, the stalk and the like, but there was no lotus; similarly, there is this or that passing idea, passing emotion, images and their momentary aggregate, but there is no organized whole behind them which can be called the mind or the ego or the self. Again there have been philosophers on the other side who, judging from the fact that all our assertions regarding extra-mental objects are dependent upon our various modes of awareness as sensations, ideas, emotions and relations, denied the existence of the extra-mental entities and regarded them either as wholly non-existent or as modes of our thought. It has been supposed by many of them that all our knowledge of the objective world is of a relational nature enunciated in an ideational form and regulated by the fundamental laws of thought of identity and contradiction. Sensations, images, ideas and relations are mental and as such it is only the mind that exists. There are others who think that relations have both an external and an internal reality and the mind is like a window. The perception of an event is the occurrence of a relational event both inside and outside the mind. The presence of the occurrence in the mind does not in any way involve any change in the nature of the occurrence and it leads only to the phenomenon we call awareness. There are others who are prepared to regard mind as a combined totalized concept of the various physiological functions which express themselves in the behaviour of the organism.

These divergences of opinion are due to a fundamental advantage and disadvantage of the mind-situation. On the one hand the mind has this great prerogative that all assertions regarding mental or extra-mental existence can only be made by the peculiar phenomena of awareness which we call mental. From this point of view there is nothing which is outside the mind. Though intimately associated with a physiological organism the processes of which take place in a definite spatio-temporal situation, the mind apparently has no such limitation. The modes of its working, the laws of its relationing, retaining, reviving, discriminating or

assimilating, determine the nature of all our scientific knowledge and its acquisition. It is true that most mental phenomena are associated with physiological, neural and biochemic changes in the body, but these changes are so very different from the associated mental factors that even by the wildest stretch of imagination they cannot be regarded as their modifications. If the biological entities cannot be regarded as the functions of the physico-chemical process, it is infinitely more impossible to regard the mental phenomena as the functions of the biological world. It is not possible to give any reply to the question as to what may be the ultimate nature of the mental phenomena and we know that it is equally impossible to say anything about the ultimate biological units or the ultimate units of matter. We cannot define anything except in terms of behaviour. We know that probably each and every conscious mental phenomenon has its correlative in the physiological condition of the body, particularly in the neural substances in the brain. In our bodies there are two more or less distinct systems, the relation of one of which to the mental phenomena must at any rate be distant. Thus the normal movements of heart, respiratory muscles, blood vessels and intestines are generally regarded as being largely unaccompanied by any kind of conscious emotion. But even in their case we know that strong emotions or deep concentration produce great changes in the functioning of these processes. The other system, namely, the neuro-cerebral, undergoes great changes along with conscious processes. The muscular processes, however, undergo changes by the volitional behaviour of the mind by which we can move our limbs according to our will.

Studies in biochemistry show that corresponding to the various phases of our emotions there are probably produced various kinds of secretory chemical compounds. We know that when there is a strong emotion or mental excitement, it affects the adrenal glands through certain nerves and leads to the secretion of an increased amount of adrenine from the *medulla*. This output of adrenine has its twofold effect, a general "stringing up" of the organism through the increasing blood-pressure, and mobilization of liver-glycogen to produce a heightened level of blood sugar. The animal is thus conditioned, but as yet we know nothing of the mechanism by which adrenine is produced in the gland. It is known to us to be present in the poison gland of the tropical toads. Thus we see that the mental processes of emotion, attention and the like produce physiological and biochemical changes which are in consonance with

them. We know also that though the neuro-cerebral system is more directly and intimately associated with mental phenomena, the muscular system of the body and the organism as a whole are also influenced by the mental changes. If we try to find any criterion of mind even in levels lower than the human mind, we see that the introspective process by which the mental phenomena are revealed to the perceiver cannot be of any avail. As regards the presence of mind in human beings other than ourselves we have also no direct evidence, but we have to accept their testimony as supported by corroborative behaviour and observable behaviour, physical and physiological changes. If we have to observe the objective existence of mind in other fellow-beings or in animals, it can only be done by the joint application of the deductive and the inductive methods. The objective test of volition is attainable from a comparison of the universal nutritive and sexual impulses. It is only as a result of sensory excitations that the animal changes its behaviour, which implies voluntary actions. We have to call these actions voluntary, because they do not appear in mechanical regularity in response to external stimulus, but they are variable in accordance with the inner conditions of the living being. Judgements in individual cases may remain doubtful, for most biological processes are largely automatic and unconscious, and are selective towards the adoption of means with reference to particular means. But a close observation of the nature of living beings may enable us to decide between the two alternatives, that is, whether the determination is primarily biological or mental.

The observation of experts on the subject leads almost unanimously to the view that consciousness is a universal possession of living organisms from man down to the protozoa.[1] In the lowest stages the processes of consciousness are restricted to very narrow limits and the will is determined by the universal organic impulses in the very simplest manner; yet the manifestations of life even among the protozoa are explicable only upon the hypothesis that they possess a mind. The amœba, which morphologically is only the single cell with a nuclear protoplasmic body, will return after a short time to the starch particles that it accidentally came upon and will take in a new portion of it for the nutrition of its body. The infusoria pursue others which they kill and devour. This shows that the choice of means for the furtherance of their biological satisfaction is determined inwardly by some kind of mental process as it

[1] *Principles of Physiological Psychology* by Wundt, London, 1910, p. 29.

cannot be explained as a result of any mechanical or chemical influence. We cannot however say anything definitely as to whether mind emerges only at the stage of protozoic life or whether it can be supposed to extend to still lower stages, that is, whether mind can be affirmed of every living organism. There are some grounds for asserting the fact that wherever living protoplasms occur there are certain phenomena which are akin to mental, which possess a determining activity not explainable by physico-chemical influences. It is evident that mental characteristics other than voluntary cannot be demonstrated in these lower forms of life where there are no means of communication. Thus Wundt says that from the standpoint of observation we must regard it as a highly probable hypothesis that the beginnings of the mental life date from as far back as the beginnings of life at large. Fechner goes even further in expressly attributing consciousness to the earth and the other heavenly bodies, making the cosmic consciousness the whole, of which the individual forms of consciousness in plants and animals are parts. Such hypotheses emphasize the intrinsic impossibility of the view that mental life suddenly appears at some point of time and space as a new thing and that we need not seek for its general conditions in the universal substrate of the vital processes. Such theories imply further metaphysical speculations into which we need not enter.

But from what has been said we may assume that the psychosis of mind as such has to be admitted as having a sphere of its existence which, on the one hand, is associated with the physiological and physical substrate and, on the other hand, is an independent existence having its own inner laws of determination. The concept of the psychical sphere has to be formed on the obvious analogy of the biological sphere and the biological sphere is associated with the physico-chemical sphere. As the biological sphere is on the one hand associated with the physico-chemical sphere and yet has its own independent determinant principle in accordance with which the former maintains its relations with the latter, so the psychical sphere or the mind is also an independent sphere which can manifest itself in its diverse forms and ways only in association with a definite physiological system and physico-chemical environments. The psychical sphere in accordance with our theory has a definite substratum and reality, being the result of the modification of the neutral reals. As such it has its own existence by itself, but it can manifest itself only with the help of suitable physiological and physico-chemical organizations.

The fact that things may exist without manifesting themselves is so obvious that it is not necessary for us to enter into any long discussion about that. A ray of light and an eye may both exist, but the condition of visibility can arise only when the former is reflected from a surface to the latter. The sound-waves may be there, but it is only within a certain range and in the presence of the ear that they can manifest themselves. The long waves of wireless or the short waves of X-ray manifest themselves only under the conditions of suitable mechanical apparatus. According to our assumption, then, the psychical sphere and the living sphere have been both existing, for aught that we know, even when the earth was undergoing nebular changes. The material, the living and the psychical may all three be independent organizations of which the last may manifest under the conditions of the first two, and the second may manifest under the conditions of the first, or it may also be that the second is a relative function due to the varying degrees of co-operation of the first and the last. But we need not enter into the further metaphysical implications or discussions of such a situation for our present purposes. What we are interested to affirm is that mind or the psychic sphere does not consist of passing waves of consciousness and emotion, but that these constitute together an integrated whole which has its own laws of behaviour and operation in consonance with the operation of its internal laws and constituents and with its intimate physiological, biochemical and physico-chemical environments. Mental efforts determine metabolic changes, metabolic changes involve expenditure of energy and expenditure of energy is dependent upon the intake of energy through the assimilation of physical food. Thus mind determines not only physiological conditions but also physical conditions. On the other hand metabolic changes may induce various types of mental states. The consumption of alcohol may produce exhilaration and the smelling of chloroform may induce a semi-conscious or unconscious state. From the superficial point of view one system of organization may seem to be determining the other and be determined by it; but a keener appraisal of the entire situation shows that each system works independently by itself according to its own constitutional laws only under the co-operative conditions of other systems of organization.

According to the Sāṁkhya we have the concept of the Prakṛti which, on the one hand, covers all that is physical and, on the other, all that is mental. The mental events and the physical ones are both abstractions

if they are taken as entirely separate and distinct from each other; for they are both the manifestations of the same ultimate reals behaving towards one another according to their own specific laws. The mental and the physical are not two distinct worlds, as it is ordinarily supposed, but they are two co-operating wholes within one whole, the Prakṛiti. The ordinary difficulty as to how two entirely dissimilar wholes can come in contact with each other vanishes when we look at the point from the Sāṁkhya-Yoga perspective. From what we have already said it will appear that the relation between the mind and the body or the physical world is not one of interaction or parallelism, but one of co-operation. As it is a case of wholes within a whole, the operations in each whole follow certain universal laws in such a manner that the operations in other wholes follow a course of correspondence in co-operation, so that from a methodological point of view one may regard the operations in one whole as determining and conditioning, in a large measure, the operations of the other. In every sphere operations are self-determining and yet other-determining. That the operations in any sphere, by being self-determining, can also be other-determining satisfies for us the concept of co-operation or teleology or mutual determinism. When through the operation of the physical phenomenon of light the mental functions so determine the organ of the eye as to facilitate its co-operation with them, or when through the operation of light change is produced in the operative functions of the eye so as to secure the co-operation of the mental functions, we have the perception of an object which is regarded as a mental fact. But this mental fact is, on the one hand, continuous with the sense organ, the physical object and its environment, and, on the other hand, with the final illumination by its association with Purusha or its incorporation in a final scheme of meaning which is the ultimate end of the knowledge process. There is an apparent duality between the physical and the physiological, the physiological and the mental, and the mental and the meaningful conscious. But this duality is only an apparent duality, for there is a continuity of process from the mental to the physical, signifying the functioning of one whole within the other, each following its own law in consonance with the law of others. Even the meaningful conscious event is regarded as neither similar (*sarūpa*) nor dissimilar (*virūpa*) to the other events, for it is a final emergent fact which arises out of the conditioning processes of the other wholes. Even the universal and particular are not mental; but the objective things are

themselves of the nature of universal and particular and in accordance with diverse kinds of mental processes either the universal or the particular may be more or less predominantly manifested as facts of consciousness. Thus in perception the notion of the particular is more predominant and in inference the notion of the universal. So the relation of mind and body is no special problem in the Yoga theory, but is deducible from the general metaphysical position of the system.

THE NYĀYA-VAIŚESHIKA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTORY

Although in the earliest stages of their inception the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeshika held independent positions both in epistemology and metaphysics, it was recognized from the very beginning that the two schools had very much in common and their differences were of minor importance. The later fusion of the Vaiśeshika metaphysics with the Nyāya epistemology was not an arbitrary or unnatural attempt at a *rapprochement*, but was dictated by an inner logical necessity of giving a complete philosophy of realism, with the deficiencies of each being made good in a well-founded synthesis. It should be clearly recognized that Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra*, even with the *Bhāshya* of Vātsyāyana and the *Vārttika* of Uddyotakara and the *Tātparya-ṭīkā* of Vāchaspati Miśra, does not give as full and free a consideration of the metaphysical issues as is found in the Vaiśeshika system. Though the professed objective of both the systems is to provide a clear-cut formula for the achievement of salvation or freedom from the limitations of personalized existence, and the entire philosophical enquiry is dominated by this ultimate motive, the detached study of philosophical problems on their own merits does not suffer from a lack of speculative interest; and particularly in the course of its development the purely philosophical interest comes to occupy more and more an importance of overmastering magnitude, and we feel tempted to believe that the ultimate problem of salvation is forgotten or shoved to the background, at any rate for the time being, in the zeal of philosophical speculations. Of course the question of salvation is a problem of paramount importance and constitutes the justification and ultimate *raison d'être* of philosophical enquiry. Philosophy in India has never been a mere speculative interest irrespective of its bearing on life. Perfection in knowledge was believed to culminate in perfection in life, although, conception of perfect life was not uniform or identical. It will not be a fair attitude to condemn philosophical enquiries of India as unspeculative or unfree because the goal was of a practical nature. Philosophic conviction was the necessary correlate of practical perfection in the life of the soul and knowledge of truth necessarily resulted in the true freedom of the aspiring soul. The goal loomed

large in the philosophical horizon, but it was recognized that there was no short cut or easy walk-over to it. The full price had to be paid in the shape of unfaltering philosophic realization of the ultimate mysteries of existence achieved through a rigorous moral discipline; and mere academic and intellectual satisfaction accruing from philosophical studies was considered to be of value only in so far as it was calculated to bring about the happy consummation.

In the very first aphorism Akshapāda (Gautama) states that salvation is the *summum bonum* and the ultimate objective of a spiritual aspirant, and the achievement of this highest perfection and complete freedom is possible through a proper understanding of the real nature of sixteen topics, viz. (1) proofs or sources of authentic knowledge, (2) the objects of authentic knowledge, (3) doubt, (4) the end or objective, (5) example, (6) approved conclusions, (7) members of a syllogism, (8) corroborative reasoning, (9) determinative conviction, (10) discussion with a view to discovery of truth, (11) sophistical argument, (12) wrangling or purely destructive argumentation, (13) fallacies, (14) quibbles, (15) false analogical arguments and (16) clinchers or points of defeat. It is not possible here to discuss the exact value of every one of these topics, which are discussed in all their bearings in the original work and further and further developed in the later exegetical literature which has centred round it. But it will be apparent from a bare specification of the names that barring the first and second topics, which cover the epistemological and metaphysical positions of the system, the remaining topics are possessed of a subsidiary value and by themselves have very little philosophical importance. The first topic refers to the approved sources or instruments of valid knowledge, which are subsequently specified to be of four distinct types, viz. perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. The question of cognitive instruments and valid cognition has from the very beginning received an elaborate treatment, and the *Tattva-chintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa, which forms the main foundation of Navya-Nyāya, is almost exclusively devoted to a consideration of this topic alone. The latterly developments in Navya-Nyāya in Nadia are accordingly of the nature of epistemological enquiries and the interests in metaphysics are purely of a subsidiary character.

In fact, the metaphysical interests of Nyāya philosophy even in the *Sūtra* and *Bhāshya* periods occupy only a subordinate place and the main energies are directed to questions of practical importance such as the

proper guidance of philosophical debates. The problems of psychology, ethics, metaphysics and epistemology are all discussed incidentally and the purely logical and philosophical aspects are not sharply distinguished. Theoretical logic is pronouncedly under the domination of practical logic and this gives us an idea of the development of pure philosophy from an inchoate beginning to the clear-cut logical divisions which took place rather very late. It is only in the *magnum opus* of Gaṅgeśa that we find that Nyāya philosophy has shaken off the incubus of extra-logical influence. But here also the metaphysical problems are given scanty treatment and the interests are confined to pure logic and epistemology. In the lucubrations of the Nadia school this tendency is further accentuated and, practically speaking, the divorce of epistemology from metaphysics is found to be complete. Of course in the later manuals of a syncretic character attempts have been made to effect a synthesis of metaphysics and epistemology and the reconciliation of Nyāya and Vaiśeshika is almost complete. From the very beginning it is pronouncedly felt that Vaiśeshika categories are presupposed throughout by Akshapāda, and the doctrine of the atomic structure of the material world is admitted *totidem verbis*.

Vātsyāyana speaks of the Vaiśeshika categories in terms of approval and justifies the Nyāya enumeration of the objects of cognition (I.1.9) on the ground of their special relevancy to the achievement of salvation. The enumeration is said to be not an exhaustive statement of all the categories of being or thought, but only to relate to those objects the knowledge of which is essential to the achievement of absolute freedom and the ignorance of which perpetuates bondage. This very vindication shows the spirit and the attitude to purely philosophical problems, viz. that the interest is more practical than theoretical. The Vaiśeshika philosophy on the other hand stands in a better position, being directed to a critical evaluation of the world of reality, both subjective and objective, although it is not less emphatic in its pretensions to show the unerring way to salvation than Nyāya. It is, therefore, not at all a matter of regret that in the course of their development the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika schools were welded into one system and this only shows the growing clarity of logical vision and the courage of conviction of later philosophers which enabled them to rise superior to false considerations of prestige and allegiance and to produce a well-rounded, compact and consistent philosophy. The prestige and honour which Nyāya philosophy enjoys in the present

day are entirely due to this happy synthesis of Vaiśeshika metaphysics and Nyāya epistemology, which made this branch of philosophy fuller, richer and more consistent. The Vaiśeshika philosophy is poorer in its epistemological interest and is pre-eminently metaphysical, and contrariwise Nyāya is pronouncedly lacking in its metaphysical interests and its strength lies in its logical and epistemological contributions. A combination of the two was a logical necessity.

A SURVEY OF ITS EPISTEMOLOGY

We now propose to give a running survey of the development of the epistemology of the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school. It is absurd to expect that any justice can be done to the subject dealt with here as a side issue, when volumes can be written on it. But a student of general philosophy will have some idea of the development of thought that took place in this school. It is unthinkable how from the inconspicuous scrappy beginnings adumbrated in the *Sūtra* of Gautama, Nyāya logic and epistemology have come to occupy the position of universal recognition and undisputed authority. The latest contributions of the Neo-logical schools of Mithilā and Navadvīpa present a formidable array of facts and arguments, which scare away even a bold student. Nyāya philosophy grew in its strength and volume in consequence of its fight with rival schools, pre-eminently Buddhistic schools. Gautama's epistemology and logic as developed by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāshya* were mercilessly attacked by Diṅnāga and their prestige suffered a rude shock. This gave the occasion to Uddyotakara to write his *Nyāya-Vārttika*. Uddyotakara in course of his comments criticized Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga and defended the Nyāya position. Dharmakīrtti, Dharmottara and others took up the challenge and showed the weakness and inadequacy of Uddyotakara's defence. Next came Vāchaspati Miśra who again gave replies to the animadversions of the Buddhist philosophers and the defence of the Nyāya school of thought was carried forward by Jayantabhaṭṭa, Śrīdhara and Udayana. After Udayana we do not hear of any Buddhist philosopher who caused trouble to orthodox systems. Even a casual survey of the works of these writers will convince the reader how keen and acute was the fight that was carried on between the two rival schools of thought.

The result was precision of definitions in which every word, nay, every particle, was duly measured and had to be defended. Nyāya in

one sense came to be regarded as the science of definitions, the importance and necessity of which are now coming to be recognized in Modern European philosophy on account of the attacks of Neo-Realists of Europe and America. Every concept has been accurately defined and there is no room for doubt or speculation as to the meaning and purpose of the philosophical arguments. Clarity of thought and accuracy of expression have become the characteristic features of works on Nyāya philosophy and of other schools as well owing to the preponderating influence of Nyāya speculations on the course of philosophical thoughts of India. The uninitiated complain of the undue waste of skill and ingenuity on the elaboration of definitions and of the attention devoted to the consideration of linguistic problems. Although the interests of verbal accuracy might have been pushed too far in some cases, the results on the whole have been salutary. The room for misunderstanding due to careless expression has been narrowed down to the minimum extent and a course of discipline in Nyāya is a sure propædeutic for philosophical accuracy. It is not a matter of surprise therefore that the scholarship of a student of Indian philosophy of whatever school it may be is looked upon with scepticism unless he can produce a proof of his acquaintance with the Navya-Nyāya speculations.

Udayana is the greatest exponent of Nyāya philosophy in modern times. In fact he can be looked upon as the pioneer of the new school. Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattva-chintāmaṇi*, the *magnum opus* of the new school, has adopted the main substance of his work from the writings of Udayana. But the greatest achievement of Gaṅgeśa consists in the marshalling of the arguments of all previous writers in his work with an accuracy and ingenuity which evoke spontaneous admiration. In a short compass he has given us the best and solidest fruits of the labours of past masters and focusses the attention of the student on the most fundamental and characteristic contributions of the school. Naturally this work alone has come to monopolize the attention of later students and commentators. Gaṅgeśa's main purpose is to treat of the four *pramāṇas*—*pratyaksha* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison) and *śabda* (verbal testimony). In the first part dealing with *pratyaksha*, he has discussed all the relevant problems associated with the epistemology of perception—its source, conditions and results. The division of perceptual knowledge into indeterminate and determinate has received a thoroughgoing treatment and the rival schools of thought, pre-eminently

that of Prabhākara, have been relentlessly criticized. The disappearance of the schools of Buddhist logicians rendered the refutation of the Buddhist positions a matter of abstract academic interest only and all the energy and attention were directed against the school of Prabhākara, who had close affinities with the Buddhist philosophers in regard to certain fundamentals. The most outstanding contribution of Gaṅgeśa in his *Pratyakshakhaṇḍa* is, however, found in his dissertation on the problem of truth and validity of knowledge (*Prāmāṇyavāda*). In this chapter the positions of Kumārila, Prabhākara and Murāri Miśra, who were advocates of the theory of self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*), have been thoroughly discussed and criticized and the Nyāya position of *parataḥprāmāṇyavāda,* which believes in the correspondence theory of truth and ascertainment of truth by verification, has been established. Much ingenuity has been spent in the formulation of a definition of truth consonant with the positions of the three philosophers, who had sharp differences on the nature of knowledge. Then again, the problem is bifurcated into a twofold issue, viz. (1) the origin and source of validity (*utpatti*) and (2) the ascertainment of the same (*jñapti*). The Mīmāṁsist maintains that knowledge and validity are two necessary correlates and have their origin in the self-identical conditions and as regards the discovery of truth, it is effected by the self-same instrument of discovery of knowledge. Knowledge is self-revealing according to Prabhākara and so truth too will be self-certified. Kumārila thinks knowledge to be imperceptible and its ascertainment and discovery are made by the help of inference. The validity of knowledge too will be discovered by the self-same instrument, viz. inference . Murāri Miśra holds knowledge to be revealed by introspection and so likewise its truth. Gaṅgeśa criticizes these three positions as absolutely untenable on the ground of contradiction of experience. If all knowledge was self-validated, there would be no occasion for a doubt or misgiving and this doubt is dispelled only by means of verification by another piece of knowledge. Of course there is scarcely to be found a single novel argument and Udayana has given all these in his works. But new issues are raised and the whole problem has been studied afresh.

It is on the chapter of inference (***anumāna***) that Gaṅgeśa and the later writers have shown their best ingenuity. The conditions of inference have been thoroughly analysed and explained. Inference is defined to be the judgement produced by the knowledge of the minor premise

qualified by the knowledge of the universal proposition, the major premise, which states the connexion between two terms in their universal reference. This universal connexion is termed *vyāpti* and a long discussion of the concept of *vyāpti* and its diverse definitions is undertaken. The possibility of the knowledge of the universal proposition, in one word, induction, receives a thorough treatment and the position of the sceptics has been shown to lead to self-contradiction and impossibility of practical life. A thorough exposition of each of these problems will require a separate article and so we content ourselves with only indicating the lines of enquiry that have been pursued by later logicians. It should be observed in this connexion that the later developments of logical speculations were necessitated by the hostile criticism of Nyāya concepts and definitions by Śrīharsha, Chitsukha and other Vedāntists, who revelled in demonstrating the absurdity of the Realists' attempts to explain the actual world in terms of reality. Gaṅgeśa came after Śrīharsha and took upon himself the task of vindicating the orthodox Naiyāyika standpoint. Whether and how far he has succeeded in his self-chosen undertaking it is very difficult to say with any amount of certitude. The quarrel between the Naiyāyika realist and the Vedāntist dialectician has not come to an end and will perhaps never come to an end, because they represent two diametrically opposite standpoints and attitudes of thought. The value of the contributions of the Naiyāyikas should not be judged by the numerical strength of their adherents and followers, but by other standards. There is scarcely a characteristic Nyāya doctrine which has not been challenged by other philosophers. But this does not detract from the merits of Nyāya speculations. The chief value of Nyāya philosophy consists in its contributions to method and terminology, which have been invariably adopted by all other schools of thought. The consequence has been that whatever school of thought one may follow and whatever may be one's philosophical predilections and convictions, one must speak in the language of the Naiyāyikas.

Before we proceed to the next topic, viz. verbal judgement as a cognitive proof, it is desirable that we speak of some of the speculations on the conditions of inference and fallacies, which will be regarded as original contributions in the sphere of logic. We have observed that inference is produced by the combined knowledge of the universal proposition (*vyāpti*) and of the minor premise (*pakshadharmatā*). The

minor premise states that the probans (middle term), which is stated to be essentially related to the probandum (major term) in the major premise, exists in the subject of inference (the minor term). But there is a preliminary condition which must be fulfilled in order that inference as a psychical process may follow as a natural consequence from the premises mentioned above. This condition is called *pakshatā*—the essential character of the subject and it is defined to be the absence of a previous conviction that the subject is possessed of the probandum as an accomplished fact. This however requires some elucidation. Now, inference as a vehicle of knowledge aims at proving the existence of the probandum (*sādhya*) in the subject on the strength of the existence of the probans (*hetu*) and this knowledge is the objective and *raison d'être* of inference as a means of proof. If, however, there is a previous knowledge of the conclusion, inference will be entirely superfluous and uncalled for, as it will have no scope for its own. So the preliminary condition of inference is that the subject (*paksha*) must not have been known to be possessed of the probandum before it is inferred. But the previous knowledge of the conclusion is not found to operate as a bar to inference provided there is a positive desire to prove it by inference. A man may actually perceive fire and smoke in a place; still he is at liberty to prove the existence of fire on the basis of the existence of smoke, provided he feels the urge of a desire to prove by inference what he knows by perception. Previous knowledge of the conclusion is a bar only when it is not accompanied by a desire for inference. Desire for inference alone is not the universal condition of inference, since there are cases of spontaneous and unpremeditated inference, as for instance, when we infer the rise of a cloud from hearing a roar or the clap of thunder. Nor, again, can doubt of the issue, *i.e.* the existence of the inferable predicate in the subject, be regarded as the condition, as it is not infrequently observed that inference takes place without a previous doubt of the issue. The full definition of the character of the subject (*pakshatā*) as the universal condition of inference can be thus propounded to be the absence of previous conviction of the existence of the inferable predicate in the subject provided there is not a desire to prove it by inference, and the legitimate subject of inference (*paksha*) is accordingly one which is not the object of such conviction. The consequences of this complex condition are observed in the following cases: (1) Inference is permissible where there is no previous conviction of the predicate in

the subject irrespective of the presence or absence of a desire for inference; (2) inference is permissible where there is a desire for inference irrespective of the presence or absence of the previous conviction of the conclusion; (3) inference is not permissible where there is previous conviction together with the absence of a desire for inference.

Now a question arises—why should previous knowledge of the conclusion operate as a bar to the realization of inference? Knowledge of the predicate *per se* cannot be believed to preclude a second knowledge of the same, since there is such a thing as continuous repetition of knowledge of the self-same object. Nor can it be believed to preclude inferential knowledge since an object, though perceived, can be known again by inference. The answer is that previous knowledge acts as a bar to subsequent knowledge having reference to the self-same object only if it prevents the emergence of a desire for that kind of knowledge. Now knowledge may be of a general or specific character and desire for a general sort of knowledge is satisfied by any kind of knowledge, perceptual, inferential or the like. It is not possible to maintain that a desire for knowledge as such can be satisfied only by the possession of all possible kinds of knowledge, simply because the possession of all possible kinds of knowledge of even a single object is not possible of attainment and if this impossible condition is insisted upon, the result will be an impossibility of the satisfaction of any desire for knowledge. It must therefore be admitted that desire for knowledge as such is satisfied by any kind of knowledge. In the case of desire for a specific kind of knowledge, it can be satisfied by the possession of that kind of knowledge alone. A man may feel called upon to prove a thing by inference for his own or other people's satisfaction, though there may be a perceptual knowledge of the same, if there is a demand for inferential proof, either felt by himself or urged by another person. So previous conviction of the conclusion debars an inference when there is no subjective or objective demand for specific inferential knowledge, but only a knowledge of the predicate in general is aimed at. Desire is satisfied by the attainment of the object aimed at. Now a man may desire to have a pen and any pen may satisfy him. But if the desire is for a specific kind of pen of a specific make and quality, the desire will not be set at rest if he is provided with a pen other than the one that he desires. Thus previous knowledge of the conclusion cuts at the very root of inferential knowledge if the knowledge desired is of a general, unspecified kind.

But it will prove no obstacle to inference if the previous knowledge is other than inferential and if inferential knowledge alone be the objective.

Now, it easily follows as a corollary from the previous observations that previous knowledge acts as a bar only by removing the psychological condition of knowledge, viz. desire for the same and in so far as it exercises the hostile influence on this psychological condition, it comes to be regarded as an obstacle to inferential knowledge. This law, however, holds good only in the case of inference and not in the case of perceptual or verbal knowledge. The reason is that perceptual knowledge is not conditioned by desire but by the compresence of the conditions of perceptual knowledge, e.g. the presence of the object, the fitness of the sense-organ, the alertness of the percipient and so on. In verbal knowledge also desire has no function and it never fails to materialize if there is a knowledge of the sentence. In inference too the law of obstruction holds good only if the previous knowledge is on all fours with the inferential knowledge aimed at and if there is an additional element in the subsequent knowledge, the former will not operate as a bar. In other words, the two pieces of knowledge must be in no wise different in content or to be precise, the previous knowledge must not be deficient in content in reference to the subsequent one. Accordingly if there is previous knowledge of the predicate in a particular individual, it will not bar out the inference of the same in all individuals of the same class. To take a concrete example, our knowledge that John, Dick, Harry and many other men are mortal will be no obstruction to our inference of mortality with reference to the whole class of men, because the subsequent knowledge is wider in its content and reference than the previous one. But if there be a previous knowledge in a universal reference, the inference of the predicate either in a particular individual or in the class as a whole will be ruled out.

An interesting problem may be raised in this connection. What is the subject-matter of inference—in one word, what is the nature of the conclusion? Is the predicate only the object of inference or the predicate as related to the subject or the relation of the two *in abstracto*? Now, the predicate alone cannot be the objective of inference, as the predicate in and by itself is known in our knowledge of the universal proposition. The subject too is known by other means of proof, perception and the like. The relation *in abstracto* is unmeaning nonsense and even the relation between the subject and the predicate in the concrete

cannot be supposed to be the objective. If it were so, the conclusion would be expressed as 'there is a relation between the subject, say man, and the predicate, say mortality.' It must be admitted therefore that the objective of inference is the entire judgement in which the subject and the predicate are held together by a relation. The subject and the predicate together with the relation binding them together are all objects of inference—to be precise, the conclusion is a unitary judgement in which the subject and the predicate merge their individuality and become integral parts of an organic whole. Thus when a person infers fire in a hill on the evidence of the smoke, the subject-matter of inference is neither fire nor the hill in isolation, but the judgement 'the hill is possessed of fire.' The hill is actually perceived, though fire is not; still the whole situation, the hill and fire together, is the object of inference and it would be an error of judgement to suppose that the hill is known by perception and fire alone by inference. We discover in this situation an interesting psychological law, which can be formulated in the following terms: 'In a situation where the conditions of perception and inference are present alike, inference will prevail over perception if the object to be cognized is different in each case.' In the present case, the object of perception is the hill and the object of inference, admittedly on all hands, is fire. Here the conditions of inference overrule and prevail over those of perception and the resultant knowledge (the hill is possessed of fire) is to be accepted as inferential in character. If this law be not admitted, no case of inference will be possible where the subject is an object of perception. In other words, our knowledge would be cognizant of the hill alone and fire will never be inferred, the conditions of perception being stronger than those of inference. So the above law must be accepted under pain of absurdity. Moreover, no inference will be possible if the law formulated is not accepted. Now inference is caused by the combined knowledge of the universal proposition and the minor premise which can be expressed as the knowledge of the subject possessed of the probans in its necessary universal relation to the probandum (the predicate). This synthetic judgement (*parāmarśa*), if we may be permitted to coin a new expression, is the immediate cause of inference—that is to say, of the knowledge of the conclusion. Now when this synthetic judgement arises in the mind, there is an equal possibility of this knowledge leading either to inference or to introspective knowledge of itself. According to the Naiyāyika the

existence of a thing, be it a brute physical fact or a psychical phenomenon, can be attested by knowledge of the same, and the knowledge of a psychical fact, be it a cognition or a feeling or conation, is styled mental perception or introspection (*anuvyavasāya*). The condition of introspection is the presence of a psychical phenomenon in the soul and the association of the mind with the latter. Now inference is effected immediately by the synthetic judgement. Thus when the synthetic judgement emerges into being under the stress of the knowledge of the premises, the conditions of inference and of introspection (which is a species of perception) are invariably found to be present. It is to be decided which of the two kinds of knowledge, inference and perception, will have the chance to come into being. If the conditions of perception are thought to be of superior strength, the introspection of the synthetic judgement as the object will invariably be the resultant knowledge, and inference as a psychical fact will be reduced to an impossible fiction. But this is opposed to the deliverance of psychology. The law formulated above saves the situation.

Again, 'in a situation where the conditions of inference and perception are alike present and the object to be cognized is self-identical, the conditions of perception will prevail over those of inference and the resultant knowledge will be perception.' The impugnment of this law will lead to absurdities. To take a concrete example: A person finds himself in a puzzle when he cannot make out in a dimly lighted place whether the object standing ahead is a human being or an inanimate post. On closer and minuter observation he discovers that the object is possessed of hands and feet and he at once decides that it is a human being, as hands and feet are characteristic of a human being alone and absolutely incompatible with an inanimate post. In this circumstance the condition of perception, viz. the contact of the visual organ with the human being, and that of inference, the synthetic judgement comprehending the existence of the probans, the possession of hands and feet, as the invariable concomitant of humanity in the object standing in front, are present alike and the resultant knowledge may be perception or inference, but not both, being mutually contradictory. The object to be cognized is however the same, viz. a human being. If we are to declare that the knowledge at issue is inference, we shall have to accept the conclusion that perceptual knowledge after a doubt is impossible. But if we consult the deliverance of our experience, we must adjudge it to be perceptual

So also with regard to the corrective knowledge which arises after an illusion. The law formulated at the beginning of the paragraph states this fact and helps us to emerge from a quandary. But one important fact has not yet been stated. Both the laws are subject to a proviso in their operation. The first law rules supreme if there is not a positive desire for perceptual knowledge at work. If the latter is found to operate, it will swing back the pendulum and the result will be perception and not inference. In the second law, also, the presence of a desire for inference will operate as a counteracting condition and the condition of inference thus reinforced will push the condition of perception to the wall and will eventuate in an inference. So both the laws are to be qualified by a rider to the effect that they hold true provided there is not a desire for the opposite kind of knowledge.

We have dealt with the problem of *pakshatā* and we now propose to deal with fallacies (*hetvābhāsas*), on which the Indian logician has furnished the evidence of his penetrating insight and critical observation and his findings will be hailed as astonishingly original contributions. The study of fallacies in standard works on logic has been a favourite and useful pursuit from very old times both in Europe and India. Perhaps the necessity of exposing fallacies in the arguments of the opponent preceded the systematic and scientific study of logic as a separate science and discipline. In India we find that the distinction of fallacies of reason, which are strictly of a logical character and value, from the aberrations which resulted from inadvertence and sophistical motives was clearly recognized even in the *Sūtra* period. Many of the fallacies treated of in standard works on European logic are not fallacies of inference and they have been set apart in a different category by Indian logicians. The *nigrahasthānas* (grounds of defeat) are rightly believed to form a wider class which comprehends logical fallacies (*hetvābhāsas*) in their scope as a particular variety and were never confounded with purely logical aberrations. The fallacies, which have been called fallacies *in dictione* by Aristotle and which have their origin in ambiguity of language, are not regarded as fallacies proper by Indian logicians and they have been judiciously placed under the head of *chhalas* (quibbles). Many of the fallacies of the *extra dictionem* variety also are not regarded as fallacies of reason and they may be placed either under the head of quibbles or that of *nigrahasthānas*, which are symptomatic of other than logical delinquency. The fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi*, which consists in

proving another conclusion than what is intended, will be subsumed under the head of *arthāntara*, a variety of *nigrahasthāna*, which serves to show that the arguer has no clear grasp of the issue. *Hetvābhāsas* or false reasons are precisely those fallacies in middle terms which when discovered are found to lack any bearing on the conclusion sought to be drawn. A study of fallacies in a work on Logic is justified on the ground that it contributes to the discovery of truth or defeat of the opponent by creating a habit of mind to avoid or to discover the flaws in our reasoning.

A *hetvābhāsa* is defined to be a false probans, the discovery of which works as a deterrent towards inference; in other words, it is what makes inference impossible and illegitimate. A *hetvābhāsa* may be regarded either as a false reason (*hetu*) or as a defect vitiating the reason. Whichever view may be taken of the nature of a *hetvābhāsa*, the undeniable fact remains that the concept of *hetvābhāsa* (which will be henceforward rendered by us as fallacy) does not extend to any defect or shortcoming of a personal nature and strictly stands for those objective defects alone which obstruct the process of inference. We have seen that previous conviction of the conclusion is an obstacle to inference and according to the definition it should be regarded as a case of fallacy. But that is not the case. The concept of fallacy does not include the cases which serve as impediments to inference only under definite conditions and cease to function as deterrents when those conditions are removed. A previous knowledge of the conclusion does not operate as a bar to inference when it is accompanied by a desire for inferential proof of the otherwise known thesis and so it does not fall under the category of a fallacy. The definition, however, covers the accredited cases of recognized fallacies which according to the Naiyāyika are of five different types, viz. (1) *anaikāntika* (the inconclusive probans lacking invariable concomitance with the probandum); (2) *viruddha* (the contradictory probans which is invariably concomitant with the absence of the probandum; (3) *asiddha* (unproven probans); (4) *satpratipaksha* (the counterbalanced probans); and (5) *bādhita* (the contradicted probans). We propose to consider how far these varieties of fallacies fulfil the terms of the definition. The inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) probans thwarts the process of inference by violating the universal concomitance (*vyāpti*), which is one of the conditions of inference. The frustration of inference may be direct or indirect through the violation of the conditions of inference. Now, the conditions of inference are (i) the universal con-

comitance of the probans with the probandum; (ii) the subsistence of such probans in the subject—which is expressed in the minor premise. The combined product of these two premises is the synthetic judgement (*parāmarśa*) which immediately leads to inference of the conclusion. If by reason of any defect the synthetic judgement fails to materialize, the conclusion will not follow and a deadlock will be the result.

(1) The first type of fallacy (*anaikāntika*) admits of three sub-divisions, viz. (i) the common (*sādhāraṇa*); (ii) the uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*); and lastly, (iii) the inconsequential (*anupasaṁhārī*). (i) The common inconclusive probans is one which is found to co-exist with the probandum (*sādhya*) and the absence of the probandum (*sādhyābhāva*) alike. It violates the condition of necessary universal concomitance, which is fulfilled when the probans is found to be invariably concomitant with the probandum and to be absent in a locus wherein the probandum is absent. In other words, the concomitance must be attested both in agreement and difference. The common inconclusive fallacy is illustrated in the following argument: 'Word is imperishable, because it is a cognizable fact.' The concomitance of cognizability with imperishability is not necessary and does not exclude the opposite possibility. Even perishable things are cognizable. So the probans 'cognizable' is inconclusive, being common to perishable and imperishable things alike. It is fallacious because it obstructs inference by violating the condition of necessary concomitance. (ii) The fallacy of uncommon inconclusive probans thwarts inference by thwarting the ascertainment of the concomitance in agreement, which is a necessary condition of inference. 'Word is imperishable, because it is a word.' 'The hill is possessed of fire, because it is a hill.' These arguments are illustrations of the aforesaid fallacy, because the concomitance between the fact of 'being a word' and 'being imperishable' is not capable of being ascertained. (iii) The inconsequential inconclusive probans arises when the subject is the totality of existent things and the probans and the probandum are absolute universal concepts, as for instance in the argument, 'All things are namable, because they are cognizable.' There is no case left over where the concomitance between the probans and probandum can be tested, as all existents have been included in the denotation of the subject. This sub-species of fallacy however has been a subject of heated controversy and Gaṅgeśa succeeds in vindicating this fallacy on the psychological ground of failure of a knowledge of

universal concomitance, the failure being due to the absence of an accredited example where the concomitance can be ascertained.

(2) The contradictory probans (*viruddha*) being invariably concomitant with the contradictory of the probandum contradicts the cognition of the necessary concomitance of the probans with the probandum and thus thwarts inference by removing one of its conditions.

(4) The counterbalanced probans (*satpratipaksha*) is one which is vitiated by a counter reason advanced in a separate argument to prove the contradictory of the thesis sought to be proved by it. To take a concrete instance, the argument 'Word is imperishable, because it is amorphous like space' is counterbalanced by the argument 'Word is perishable, because it is a product like a jar.' The first probans 'amorphous' is contradicted by the second probans 'product.' The result is a deadlock, as one probans is offset by another and consequently no inference is possible. The difference between the contradictory and the counterbalanced probans is this that the opposite thesis is proved by a second probans advanced in a supplementary argument in the fallacy of the counterbalanced probans, whereas in the former fallacy the self-same probans proves the opposite thesis and is further instrumental in proving the incompetence of the arguer in employing a probans to prove a thesis, which proves the reverse of it.

(3) We now propose to discuss the third class of fallacy called '*asiddha*' (unproven). It admits of several sub-divisions, varying with the terms of the syllogism that may be unproven. (i) The subject may be a fiction and this would involve the fallacy of the ***unproven subject*** (*āśrayāsiddha*). The argument, 'The golden hill is possessed of fire, because it is possessed of smoke,' is abortive, inasmuch as no synthetic judgement cognizing the presence of smoke-concomitant-with-fire in a fiction is possible, while this judgement is invariably the immediate cause of inference. (ii) There may be a case of ***unproven probans*** (*svarūpāsiddha*) where the probans is known to be non-existent in the subject, as in the argument, 'The lake is on fire, because it is possessed of smoke.' The probans 'smoke' does not exist in the subject 'lake' and this affords an illustration of the fallacy of unproven probans. (iii) There may be a case of ***unproven probandum*** (*sādhyāsiddha*), as in the argument, 'The hill is possessed of golden fire, because of smoke.' The fallacious character of the unproven probans and the unproven probandum is evidenced by the failure of the synthetic judgement owing to the absence of the probans in

the subject in the former and the absence of the probandum in the latter. The synthetic judgement has for its constituent terms the probans, the probandum, the concomitance between them and the subject as qualified by such probans; and the absence of any one of these factors will make the judgement and through it the inference an impossibility. The same consequence arises when the probans is qualified by a fictitious or superfluous attribute. Hence 'golden smoke' has no probative value and even 'blue smoke' is no proof of fire, as concomitance with fire is understood in 'smoke' in its simple character of being a smoke and not as 'blue-smoke.' The probanses under discussion are regarded as fallacious, as they preclude the knowledge of concomitance and through this failure, the synthetic judgement (*parāmarśa*) and inference (*anumiti*) are rendered impossible.

(5) We have now to deal with the last-mentioned fallacy called *bādhita* (contradicted). This fallacy arises when the absence of the probandum in the subject is ascertained by means of another evidence. Thus, for example, when a person would like to argue, 'Fire is not-hot, because it is a substance and all substances such as water, earth and air are known to be not-hot,' the probans employed will be a contradicted probans. Fire is known to be hot by direct perception and this directly contradicts the inference. The general definition of fallacy applies to this case *a fortiori*, as it thwarts inference directly. In fact, the contradicted probans and the counterbalanced probans are cases of direct fallacy as they thwart inference proper and the other fallacies are indirect as they frustrate inference only by thwarting the instrument (*vyāptijñāna*) or its operation in the shape of the synthetic judgement (*parāmarśa*).

This fallacy, however, is not admitted by the Buddhist and Jaina logicians as a fallacy of probans; they would rather believe it to be a case of false probandum (*pakshābhāsa*). Others again have contended that this is not an independent fallacy and the failure of inference is due to the presence of other fallacies. Thus, for instance, if the probans is found to be non-existent in the subject, the fallacy would be a case of 'unproven probans.' If it is existent in the subject, it will be a case of inconclusive probans, as the concomitance of the probans with the probandum will be found to be absent in the subject itself by means of perception and the like. The Naiyāyika meets these contentions by appeal to psychology. The sense of contradiction is different from that of non-concomitance. Again, when a person argues the presence of odour in

the earthen jug at the very moment of its origination, the fallacy becomes a case of purely 'contradicted probans.' A substance remains divested of its attribute at the moment of its origin and comes to be vested with it only in the second moment. The probandum 'odour' is predicated of the earthen jug at the moment of its origin and this is contradicted by the law of causality—the jug being the cause of odour cannot synchronize with the effect. Considerations of space prevent us from entering into further controversy over the subject and our purpose will be fulfilled if this brief discourse serves to stimulate the interest of the reader in the speculations of the Naiyāyika.

The Naiyāyika again has his own contributions to the study of linguistic problems. Language has been studied in India both in its phonetic and semantic aspects. In the realm of semantics, so far as the logical value of import of terms and propositions is concerned, the Grammarians, the Mīmāṁsist and the Naiyāyika have each their own views, which are in sharp conflict with one another. There is a discussion of the expressive powers of words, of the objects denoted, of the meaning of the suffixes, the syntactical relations and the resultant verbal judgement. It will be exceedingly cumbrous if we attempt to give an account of these speculations in English. But it must be stated to guard against a possible misunderstanding that these linguistic enquiries have not only achieved results which throw light on the structure of the Sanskrit language, but have also led to the discovery of universal laws which will apply to all the languages of the world. Though the syntactical structure of languages varies, the laws of combination of the meanings will apply *mutatis mutandis* to all languages. To take an example, 'Here is a blue cup' (*atra nīlaghaṭo'sti*), the syntactical relation of the adjective 'blue' to the substantive 'cup' is designated as *tādātmya* (denotational identity with connotational difference). The 'blue' does not denote an object different from the 'cup,' so the relation is one of non-difference of denotation. The individual words have their specific individual meanings, but the relations of these meanings, which cement them into one unitary judgement, are not expressed by the component words, but by dint of their juxtaposition in a sentence in obedience to certain laws. These laws are called '*ākāṅkshā*' (mutual expectancy), *yogyatā* (relevancy) and *sannidhi* (proximity both in regard to place and time). If only the adjective 'blue' were uttered, it would not give a complete meaning and there would be an expectation for another term, viz. 'cup.' This

capacity for giving rise to expectation in a human mind constitutes one of the cementing bonds of individual terms by reason of which they produce a judgement in a rational mind. The second law of relevancy is also a necessary condition. We cannot speak of a 'cold fire,' because the meanings are incongruent and irrelevant. The separate articulation of the individual words after long intervals will not give rise to the verbal judgement. So these three laws must be satisfied before there can be a consistent proposition. The syntactical relations however are understood only if the terms in a proposition fulfil the conditions noted above. So these relations are the import of the whole sentence. The whole, though made of parts, has got a distinct individuality and a distinct function from that of the component factors. The meaning of the proposition cannot be made known by any other instrument of knowledge, say, perception or inference and hence the necessity of postulating a separate means of cognition, viz. verbal testimony (*śabda*). This is of course not the universally accepted position. The Vaiśeshikas and the Buddhists do not admit the logical necessity of verbal testimony as a separate instrument of knowledge and they would fain include it under the head of inference or perception. The result has been an interminable tangle of polemics, into which the space at our disposal prevents us from entering.

Comparison (*upamāna*) is a special kind of *pramāṇa* and there is a difference of views between the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṁsist both in regard to their nature and function. The Naiyāyika thinks it necessary to requisition the aid of this cognitive instrument when a person has to affix verbal label to an unknown entity from analogy. To take an instance: A person is told that there is a wild animal called *gavaya* which closely resembles a cow. It so happens that the person so informed goes into a forest and actually sees a *gavaya* and then recognizing its close resemblance to a cow he recollects the words of his informant and at once concludes that the animal is *gavaya*. The designation of the animal as *gavaya* is made possible only by means of *upamāna*, a separate source of knowledge, and neither by perception nor by the recollection of the informant's testimony. Whatever may be its logical value, which has been challenged by rival philosophers, it must be admitted that comparison as a proof has such a limited scope and its achievement is so meagre that it can be safely dispensed with in a scheme of epistemology. The centre of interest is found in the three other *pramāṇas*, of which

again *anumāna* and *śabda* have come to monopolize the entire attention of later students.

THE PLACE OF GOD IN THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

It will not be possible within the limits of this paper to discuss all the metaphysical problems that have been broached in the *Sūtra* and elaborately developed in the subsequent exegetical literature. We propose to deal with the following fundamental problems: the position and nature of God and the relation of God to the individual souls and the world. The *Nyāya-sūtra* like the cognate *Vaiśeshika-sūtra* postulates the ultimate reality of atoms as the material cause of the world and God is rather the organizer and engineer of the world-order. The world-process proceeds in cycles and so far as its cyclic existence is concerned it is without a beginning and is coeval with God. The individual souls are eternal entities dating from a beginningless time and so have a parallel existence with God and the world. The Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school is in this matter of beginningless creation fully in agreement with other Indian schools of philosophy. In fact, the doctrine of beginningless existence of the individual souls together with the cyclic world-process is a fundamental postulate of most of the schools of Indian philosophy and it deserves to be examined whether this doctrine is sanctioned by logical necessity or is an unreasoned dogma, uncritically accepted without question. A detailed examination of this problem will not be relevant to our present enquiry and we must content ourselves only with showing that this conception is neither absurd nor unnecessary. Unless we accept the position of unqualified scepticism or absolute illusionism, we have to admit the existence of a timeless entity, be it God or time or atoms or the individual souls. It is generally accepted in Western philosophy that the soul is immortal, but its immortality is not clearly defined as existence through all time, but rather as existence after death. If the soul is denied pre-existence and is believed to come into being with the birth of the present body, it becomes difficult to believe in its endless future existence. It is a truism that things that have a definite origin are liable to destruction. And so unless we are prepared to accord a timeless existence to the soul, it will not lie in us to assert its immortality categorically. Again, God is at any rate believed to be a timeless entity and if God is by nature an active principle, His activity too will be co-eternal with His being and it must express itself

in the process of creation or destruction, and whatever it may happen to be reasonable to prédicate of God in the way of His activity, it must be supposed to exist through all time. Then again, the individual selves, who are *prima facie* supposed to have a somewhat independent existence apart from God, cannot be supposed, without giving rise to absurdities, to have begun their career from a definite point of time. If they are supposed to be created by God in time and as such to be destitute of a pre-existence, no proof can be put forward to establish their immortality, which is the accepted position of most of the philosophers of Europe, barring of course the materialists and sceptics. It is refreshing to find that Dr. McTaggart is a staunch believer in the pre-existence of the self and he has proved his thesis by arguments which are not liable to be easily assailed. But to the problem of immortality we shall have to advert in the course of our enquiry and we now propose to deal with the position of God in the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeshika Sūtras*.[1]

It is a matter of surprise that in the enumeration of the objects of authentic knowledge (I. i. 9) there is no specific mention of God and in the proofs adduced for the existence of a unitary soul-entity as distinguished from the psychological processes, there is not the slightest allusion to God either as a supreme soul *primus inter pares* or as a separate category. We also miss any reference to God in a most expected quarter. The Nyāya and Vaiśeshika schools are zealous advocates of the supreme authority of the Vedas in the matter of religion and though they do not believe either in the eternity of word-essence or the uncreated character of the Veda like the Mīmāṁsaka, there is no explicit statement of God as the author of Vedic revelation in the *Sūtra* and this seems to be curious, inasmuch as the authority of verbal testimony, not excepting the authority of the Veda, is derived from the veracity and infallibility of the speaker or writer. In the *Bhāshya* of Vātsyāyana too there is no clear reference to the divine authorship of the Vedas, although Vātsyāyana is a staunch believer in the existence of God. In the *Vaiśeshika-sūtra* (II.i.18) the authorship of the Vedas is attributed to persons of superior wisdom, who are said to be possessed of the power of direct intuition of supersensuous things spoken of in the scripture. In the aforesaid work again (VI. v. 1-4) the Vedic sentences are said to be the product of intelligent persons who had first-hand

[1] For a somewhat elaborate treatment of the problem the reader is referred to my article entitled 'Immortality of the Soul or After-life' published in the Centenary Number of the *Udbodhana*, the Bengali organ of the Ramakrishna Math

experience of the facts. Now there is no decisive evidence, so far as the wording of the *sūtras* is concerned, which can enable us to conclude that the *Vaiśeshika-sūtra* definitely and clearly assigns a place to God in its scheme of metaphysics. The evidence of the *Nyāya-sūtra* too, we shall see, is not more definite and there is room for speculation that these systems were, at any rate in their period of inception, without definite predilections or commitments in favour of God. The *sūtras* 19-21 of chap. IV, sec. i, in the *Nyāya-sūtra* are the only textual passages which allude to God as the creator of the world. But the first *sūtra*, which speaks of the inadequacy of the individual's *karma* (moral actions) as the causal principle and makes God the creator of the world, is treated of as the *prima facie* view, which is rejected in the next *sūtra*. The third *sūtra* in the present context is interpreted by Vātsyāyana as establishing the necessity of God's agency. The whole discourse can be summed up in the following words: The actions (*karma*) of men are not the self-sufficient cause of the world and so for the creation of the world we must postulate the agency of God. The answer to this contention is that this position cannot be maintained. If the actions of men were immaterial and God alone was the sufficient cause of the world-order, there would be no *raison d'être* for moral activity. But we cannot conceive that results can take place without previous deeds. The third *sūtra*, *tatkāritatvādahetuḥ*, has been interpreted by Vātsyāyana in the following way: 'The actions of men are by themselves incapable of producing their fruit, but these are made fruitful directly by the agency of God. So the previous argument is inconsequential.' The results of this discourse, as interpreted by the scholiast, seem to establish the fact that for the creation of the world God's agency is indispensable, as it is God alone who can dispense the rewards and punishments proper to men's actions in previous lives. But men's actions are not sufficient to produce their results which are realized in the creation of the world only because there is an omniscient and omnipotent Being behind them as the judge and ordainer of the fruits. So actions too are contributory factors to creation, but the direct agency is in the hands of God.

But this is not the only possible interpretation. The Vṛittikāra has given an alternative explanation which entirely dispenses with God's agency and seeks to explain the failure of men's actions as due to the absence of previous merit (*adṛishṭa*). The divergence of interpretation, which is made possible by the cryptic language of the *sūtras*, leaves

room for honest doubt whether the admission of God into the architectonic plan of Nyāya-Vaiśeshika metaphysics is strictly demanded by a logical necessity. Moreover, the introduction of this question of God's agency into the discussion of the origin of the world is made by way of incidental reference in the *Nyāya-sūtra* and cannot be regarded as clinching the entire dispute. The purport of the *sūtra* seems to be to wage a crusade against those theories which denied the efficacy of *karma* and hence the moral foundation of the world-order. But in spite of the fact that the *Sūtra* literature is obscure and non-commital on this vital issue, the later Nyāya-Vaiśeshika literature beginning with Vātsyāyana and Praśastapāda and down to the latest developments in the Nadia school is noted for its staunch defence of God's existence against the attacks of atheistic schools and the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school has rightly come to be respected as the masterful champion of theism. We, therefore, propose to consider the contributions of these writers to the evolution of the theistic doctrine in this school.

Vātsyāyana holds that God is a soul *primus inter pares*, although distinguished from ordinary souls by reason of the absence of impiety, error and inadvertence and the eternal presence of superabundant righteousness, pure knowledge and supernormal powers, by virtue of which He is capable of creating the world by a mere fiat of the will. He is the shelter of all creatures and protects all beings like an affectionate father. He is possessed of eternal knowledge of all things. God is not a simple existent without any characteristic, as an uncharacterized entity is only a conceptual fiction. Vāchaspati Miśra gives voice to a possible objection to the possession of superabundant mercy by God on the score of the presence of undisputed suffering and pain in the created world. The usual explanation of the inequalities in the world-order by reference to the unequal values of the past actions of individual souls is but a poor defence, inasmuch as these actions are not self-productive of their results and if God abstains from dealing out the fruits of actions, the world-order would be destitute of the imperfections and limitations that are unfortunately ruling rampant. Vāchaspati answers the objection with his usual boldness. Although God is all-powerful and there is no limit to His mercy, He cannot subvert the moral laws, which are by their nature immutable. God's omnipotence is subject to the supremacy of the moral law and the moral law is rather the law of His own being and also of the being of individual selves. There

can be no escape from the consequences of moral actions except by enjoyment thereof. Man remains unfree so long as he is not absolved from the bonds of actions, good or bad, and the creation of the world is solely motivated by the supreme desire of God to create opportunities for the individual selves to work off the load of their actions. Suffering is not an unmitigated evil. It serves to make men feel disinclined to the things of the world and helps them to realize the vanity of worldly pleasures. This detachment and disinclination is the condition precedent for all spiritual progression, as it induces man to contemplate the means of escape from the worries of transmigration and he finds the means in the philosophic realization of the true nature of the self and the world and their mutual relationship. So suffering is a blessing in disguise.[1] Unalloyed pleasure on the other hand would make a man forget the highest interests of life and its true mission and degrade him to the rank of the lowest brute. Suffering is thus a propædeutic discipline and a necessary preparation for the achievement of the highest goal, viz. unfettered freedom, the *summum bonum* of life.[2]

Another difficulty is raised: Why should there be a will to creation at all? All activity is normally motivated by some ulterior purpose of satisfying a need either in the way of acquisition of an advantage or avoidance of an evil. In the case of God no such motive can be supposed to set free an activity, as He is *ex hypothesi* free from all disadvantages and is self-sufficient and self-satisfied. A God with an unsatisfied want will be a contradiction in terms. It has been maintained that God engages in creative activity in a sportive mood. Creation is but a game and pastime with Him and no question of motive, therefore, can be urged as necessary. But Uddyotakara refuses to be convinced by this argument, as even a play is not a motiveless activity. It is resorted to only with a view to enjoyment of pleasure which is derived from it and also because abstention from play causes uneasiness to those who are lovers of sports. But such a contingency cannot be conceived to be possible with reference to God, because He is absolutely free from all shades of uneasiness and worry. The theory of playful activity, therefore, cannot be regarded as a satisfactory explanation of God's creative

[1] *Nyāyakandali*, p. 53.

[2] Cf. But he that creeps from cradle on to grave,
Unskilled save in the velvet course of fortune,
Hath miss'd the discipline of noble hearts.
W. R. Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 346.

impulse. The second theory that God's creative activity is inspired by a desire for demonstrating His infinite powers and glory in and through the inconceivable varieties and complexities of the created world does not seem to stand a better chance of success. The question arises, why should He be eager to give a demonstration of His glory? Certainly God does not gain any advantage from His adventure, nor do we conceive of any possible loss on His part if He ceases from this enterprise. If any advantage or disadvantage could accrue, God would be a lesser God—in other words, would cease to be God. What then is the explanation? No explanation can be offered beyond positing that it is God's nature to do so. Cosmic activities are an essential part of His being and Godhood minus cosmic functions is an unintelligible fiction. It may be interesting to observe in this connection that Gauḍapāda too in his *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* has summed up these views in a couplet and draws the same conclusion with Uddyotakara that it is the essential nature of God to engage in creative activities, as no motive can be alleged with reference to one who has no unsatisfied want. There can be no questioning again with regard to ultimate facts and constitution of things. It is absurd to interrogate about the nature of even material objects as to why they should behave in the peculiar way they do and not otherwise. God is a dynamic principle and His dynamism is manifested in His cosmic activities and it does not leave any room for speculation as to why God should be dynamic and not be quiescent and inactive. The ultimate nature of things can be understood only from observation of their behaviour and not *a priori*. So no question of motivation is either legitimate or profitable.

But the opponent raises another objection. Granted that God is dynamic by His very constitution and nature, but this would make His activity a perpetual necessity, since one cannot resist one's nature, and perpetual cosmic activity would make the periodic dissolution of the world-process an impossibility. Moreover, there would be simultaneous creation of all objects, but this is opposed to our experience. Things are produced on a graduated scale and the process of creation and dissolution, of distribution and redistribution of causal energies, is attested to be the ruling order by scientific researches and popular experience as well. Uddyotakara in reply observes that this objection would be insurmountable if the ultimate principle were conceived to be a blind force without intelligence and prevision. But God is an intelligent prin-

ciple and creates those things for which He thinks that there is an occasion and necessity and His cosmic activities, although not compelled by an external necessity, are conducted and guided by a moral self-urge which takes the direction best calculated to bring about the deserts of actions accumulated by individual souls, in pursuance of intrinsic spiritual laws which have their seat in the fundamental morality and the spiritual nature of God and the souls, and are unfolded in the spatio-temporal order of the universe. So no such consequences are possible.

God again is the supreme ruler of the universe and this supremacy is co-eternal with His being. His powers are infinite and unlimited. Ordinarily power is acquired by virtue of moral excellence, which again is achieved by moral exertion and activities. If God's powers were co-eternal with His own being and as such not acquired by religious merits or moral activities, then the universality of the moral law would be untenable, as God would be placed above its jurisdiction. But this should not cause a difficulty. If the moral law is to be an eternal ruling principle, it must be found to exist in its perfection *ne plus ultra* somewhere and it is found in God. The moral law is supreme because God is supreme and the law is but the manifestation of His being. In the case of individuals their powers are but the outcome of moral and spiritual excellence, which too is actually acquired, no doubt. But this achievement is made possible by the eternal moral perfection that is in God and if the supremacy of God were the product of acquired moral excellence, the unobstructed supremacy of the laws of morality would be an impossibility and a chimera, a consummation that might be piously hoped for but never possible of realization. Moreover, the hypothesis of acquired perfection and acquired supremacy in God would be tantamount to a denial of God and the eternity of divine justice, and the result would be a negation of the moral foundation of the world-order.[1]

The previous arguments have served to make it clear that God may be a plausible existent, but no proof has been adduced to establish the existence of God as a matter of logical necessity. Is there any logical proof of God? Is it absolutely necessary that we must admit His existence and that the world-order cannot be explained except on this hypothesis? We propose to consider the logical proofs that have been advanced by the philosophers of this school. Now, we are familiar with three different classes of existents. In the first place, there are objects

[1] *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 464.

which are obviously known to be products of intelligent and thoughtful agents, such for instance as palaces, gates, walls, pens, chairs and tables. In the second place, there are existents which are admitted by a general consensus of opinion to be destitute of any author and as such to be eternal existents, such for instance as atoms and space. In the third place, we meet with existent facts which are susceptible of being suspected as made by some intelligent agent, viz. the body, the mountain, the sea, the tree and other such objects. The suspicion of intelligent authorship legitimately arises with regard to the last-mentioned category of objects on account of their striking similarity with objects of the first class and also on account of the divergence of views among philosophers of rival schools. There is no categorical evidence for the absence of intelligent authorship either. It is certainly true that no man has seen them to have been produced by an intelligent author, but absence of perceptual evidence is no proof of the absence of an intelligent author, as such an author may legitimately be supposed to be invisible like atoms etc. Absence of perceptual evidence can be regarded as proof of absence of the object only when the latter is amenable to perception and not otherwise. In the case of the body, the tree, the mountain, etc., they are known to have a definite origination in time and to be non-existent before their origination. Who has brought them into existence? It can be legitimately inferred that they have been brought into existence by an intelligent maker who had knowledge of the material causes and the process of production, just as palaces and roads are built by a knowing person. Both these sets of phenomena are seen to come into existence at a definite point of time and they evince the same intelligent plan and teleology. Why should then one set of phenomena be supposed to come into existence independently of a maker and not the other set, although we find very little difference between them so far as the teleological plan of their construction and their definite origination in time are concerned? But it may be objected that the origination of the grand phenomena of nature—the mountain, the sea, the forest, the river and so on—is not definitely perceived by any man whose testimony may be accepted as proof. In the circumstances how can an origin be predicated of these doubtful objects, even if it is allowed that origination is proof of an intelligent agent? The answer is that objects which are capable of being divided into parts cannot be supposed to be ultimate existents and as the process of division and analysis shows the constituent

factors, they must be supposed to have come into existence by means of a previous integration and combination of the component factors. And none but an intelligent being could bring about such a combination with a view to the result. This is certainly the case with regard to productions of arts and crafts. Why should there be a difference in the case of natural objects, though the same intelligent planning of means to ends is observable in them also? It should be admitted then that objects which are seen to be possessed of parts arranged according to a purposive plan must have been made by some intelligent maker.[1]

It has, however, been contended that this teleological argument is futile as it leads to self-contradiction. 'Even if it is granted that the world has an agent who is possessed of intelligence and forethought, there is no escape from antinomies. The reason is that all knowledge is produced by an impact on our organic sensibilities and if the ultimate author of the universe be possessed of a psycho-physical organism, all his cognitions would be contingent events and so he could not be regarded as omniscient. Moreover, all his cognitive activities would be subject to the limitations of sense-faculties, and he would not be able to envisage the super-subtle causes of the world and so would not be the creator. If it is supposed that God is independent of a physical organism, it will be extremely difficult to imagine how He can have knowledge at all, and still further how He can operate upon the atoms, the ultimate constituents of the material world. If you deny a bodily organism to God, you will have to deny all intelligence and purposive activity on His part, and to think that He will have an eternal body associated with Him will lead to absurdities, as an eternal body is as impossible as an eternal world. And if He is possessed of a body of limited dimension, it will be liable to origin and destruction and furthermore he will not be in touch with all matters lying outside the body. If sense-organs are added to the organism, all the cognitions and volitional activities will be as transitory as ours. The result will be that an unthinking and unintelligent God will have to be posited and this will be an absurdity. Nor can we suppose that God is entirely unassociated with a physical organism and is possessed of eternal intelligence, eternal desire and eternal will, because there is absolutely no warrant for this supposition, as all knowledge and volitional activity are seen from experience to be contingent on the possession of a nervous system and cerebral functions, which are sought

[1] *Vide Tātparyaṭīkā*, pp. 602-3; *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 54-55.

to be denied of God. God thus becomes a chimera and a fiction of the imagination, whether we affirm a physical organism with a cerebral system and nervous organization or we deny the same of Him. It is better, therefore, if we desist from the supposition that the world-order has an intelligent author.

In reply to these charges the philosophers of this school have pointed out that the opponents have failed to appraise the relation of the body to the psychical activities at their proper worth and to observe that voluntary activities are not in any way contingent on the possession of a foreign organism, although from a surface view of things this may seem to be the necessary condition. What is the condition of voluntary activity—the association of the physical organism or the influence exerted by an active principle possessed of relevant causal efficiency? The mere association of the physical organism is irrelevant to volitional activity, as we do not find any such activity when a person is indifferent or in deep sleep, in spite of the fact that the physical organism is present intact. So we must set down voluntary activity to the exertion of an active agent possessed of causal efficiency irrespective of its association with a physical organism, which has been found to have no bearing upon it. If the possession of a physical organism be a necessary condition for the exercise of voluntary activity, we cannot explain how the agent can control his own body, as the help of another bodily organism cannot be available for the purpose. It can be contended that even in the controlling of the body the presence of the body is an essential condition. Yes, but the body is not present as the condition, rather it is the object of the controlling activity and in the case of God's activity the object to be operated upon is present in the shape of the atoms which are the constitutive principles of the material world. But it has been further urged that the controlling activity that is exercised upon one's own bodily organism is made possible by dint of a desire and volitional urge and this desire and the volitional urge are seen to occur only in association with a bodily organism and not in its absence. So the presence of the bodily organism must be admitted to be the condition of these psychical activities which are admittedly the internal springs of the physical control, and thus the bodily organism will be the indirect condition of all physical controlling movements. The presence of the physical organism is thus to be set down as the necessary condition of all voluntary activity and if God is *ex hypothesi* destitute of any such

organism, the exercise of voluntary controlling activity will be impossible. But this argument too is not convincing. Even if it is admitted that the medium of the physical organism is a necessary condition for the emergence of psychical activities, for which there is no proof beyond the matter-of-fact evidence that we have no experience of a psychical activity except in association with a body which may be a mere accident, still it may be legitimately maintained that the causal efficiency of the physical organism with regard to bodily movements is not proved, although its bearing on such psychical activities as desire and volitional urge may be left a moot question. The controlling of the bodily organism and its movements and activities is urged by a purely psychical force without any assistance from the bodily organism, barring the fact that it is present as the object to be operated upon. The very fact that the spirit can control and activate an inanimate object simply by dint of a desire and voluntary exertion without any assistance from any bodily organism, should clinch the proposition that 'all effects are the products of an intelligent agent.' But it may be contended that the emergence of desire and volition is contingent upon a bodily organism and for the emergence of these psychical activities at any rate, God will stand in need of a physical organism. Yes, the contention may have some plausibility with regard to those psychical activities which are events in time, but with reference to eternal psychical facts it has absolutely no force and no bearing. Nor is there any logical incompatibility in the supposition that God's cognition, desire and volition are eternal verities, uncaused and unproduced. Of course these psychical phenomena are always observed to be transitory events in our experience, but that is no argument that they cannot be eternal in any substratum. Such qualities as colour and taste are ordinarily perceived to be transitory, but they are admitted to be eternal verities in atoms. The transitoriness or permanence of qualities is relative to the substrata in which they are found. So psychical attributes too may be permanent fixtures just like the physical attributes of colour etc., and there is no inherent logical absurdity in this supposition.

The permanent existence of these necessary psychical activities in God has been shown to be plausible and we think it possible to prove it by a *reductio ad absurdum*. The arguments of the opponents have failed to shake the foundational universal proposition that whatever is possessed of an origin has for its author an intelligent agent and once

the origination of the world-process is admitted, the inference of an intelligent author becomes irresistible. And if an intelligent author of the universe is established as a matter of logical necessity, the nature of his intelligence or volitional activity will be determined in conformity with his authorship. They will have to be admitted to be of such a character as not to be in conflict with his cosmic activities. The cosmic activities presuppose an intelligent agent who have a direct knowledge of the materials and the *modus operandi* necessary to bring about the universe. Certainly this knowledge of all existent facts extending over all divisions of time cannot be a contingent event, as in that case God will have to be assumed to be ignorant of whatever has happened in the past and so will have no agency in that regard. If His knowledge is as transitory as ours, it will have no application to the future and so God will not be the controller of the future course of events. If, however, it is supposed that God has an infinite series of cognitions, volitions and desires, produced in regular succession and all these have reference to all things, possible or actual, still we shall have to admit a number of psychical acts which are absolutely without any similarity to our psychical activities. It will be simpler and more convenient to suppose that God's cognitive activity is one and eternal and so also the other psychical activities. The admission of God as an author of the universe will necessitate the postulation of eternal psychical activities which are necessary for the creation, superintendence and control of the universe. These attributes are consequential to God's cosmic functions and to seek to refute the existence of God on the ground of the impossibility or improbability of these attributes will be a roundabout procedure, without any logical validity. If you expect to deny God with any show of plausibility, you will have to prove either that the universe does not presuppose an intelligent maker or that it is existing as a finished product for all eternity, which is the position of the Jainas and the Mīmāṁsakas. If, however, the positions adumbrated cannot be maintained with any semblance of logic, the admission of God and of His consequential attributes and powers will follow as a matter of indisputable logical necessity. The opponent, who builds his destructive logic on the apparent absurdity of the consequential attributes of God, has only to be reminded that his generalization that psychical attributes cannot be eternal is based upon purely empirical data and does not bar out the contrary possibility by a *reductio ad absurdum*. We have, however,

seen that the eternal existence of relevant psychical activities in God follows as a corollary from the nature of the universe, which becomes unintelligible unless an omniscient and omnipotent creator and ruler is postulated.

We now propose to discuss certain other consequential problems before bringing this dissertation to a close. The main ground of the proof of God has been shown to be teleological and this teleological argument again is ultimately based upon the argument of the moral law —the law of *karma*. The *raison d'être* of creation is found in the moral necessity of providing the rewards of actions done by individual souls in their previous lives and so in the philosophy of the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school or of all schools of Indian thought which believe in creation, the individual self holds a prerogative position of honour, since the entire creation is believed to centre round him and to provide only the stage on which the drama of his destiny will be played. God has no destiny and no personal mission. He is only the judge and ordainer of the moral deserts; in other words, He has only a judicial and executive duty which He discharges out of an irresistible sense of justice to uphold the supremacy of moral laws, and we have seen how God's justice is tempered with mercy. But a question of logical difficulty raises itself in this connection, viz. the relation of God with individual selves whose destiny is guided by Him. The merits of individuals inhere in the individual souls and if God is to operate upon these merits, it has to be shown how God comes into relation with these. The individual selves are held to be ubiquitous substances and so also is God. It has been held by some thinkers that two ubiquitous substances may be related by way of uncaused conjunction and if this relation is accepted, we can explain the relation of God with individual selves as one of uncaused conjunction, God being connected with the individual souls for all eternity and through this with their merits. But this relation of uncaused conjunction is not universally admitted and so another relation acceptable to all has been propounded by Vāchaspati Miśra. The individual selves are connected with the atoms as they also are eternal entities, and these atoms are connected with God. So God and the individual selves are connected through the medium of atoms. Even indirect relation is of service for causal operations. Here also the relation of God to individuals may be explained either through atoms or through the mind, both of which are eternal existents and are eternally conjoined with God. So

we see that the relation of God and individuals is not logically inconceivable, although it is not possible to give any definite judgement as to the peculiar extension of the relation, whether it is of unlimited extension or of limited extension. The question is inspired by idle curiosity and does not have any metaphysical importance. It is sufficient that a relation is logically conceivable and the question of extension and the like appears to be based upon irrelevant analogy of spatial relations of material bodies, which cannot be pushed too far.

Another question may be raised. Granted that God is the creator of the universe, but then He may take a holiday and retire from the cosmic functions which may take their destined course under their own laws. What argument makes you suppose that God will be the eternal controller and guide of every detail of the world-process? The answer is that the same necessity which makes God's activity inevitable in the past is present throughout the world-process. The blind forces of nature cannot be self-guided and for their control and guidance the supervision of an intelligent being is necessary. The movements of natural forces, the elements, the atoms, the electrons and so on are perpetually going on and they are meant to serve some purpose; and who makes their movements fruitful and who again imparts activity to them but God? So God is an eternal living force and the eternal judge and ordainer of the moral order, but for whose intervention and guidance the world would fall to pieces like a rotten cloth.

But a question arises—is a plurality of Gods possible? No, there is but one God and one God alone. Why should a plurality of Gods be postulated at all? If one God is impotent to bring about the world-order or to maintain discipline, a number of Gods with different functions allotted to them may be necessary and we shall have a republic of Gods and not absolute monarchy. But are these Gods omniscient? If they are not omniscient and omnipotent, they will be as impotent and helpless as we mortals are and so they will not be equal to the task of creation and control of the world, which requires just these attributes. The result will be a failure to explain the world-order. If they are omniscient and omnipotent one and all, it is logically simpler and more economic to postulate the existence of one such God, for He will be able to discharge the cosmic functions alone and unaided. Apart from considerations of simplicity and logical economy, the postulation of a number of equally omniscient and omnipotent Gods will lead to insoluble complications.

There is no certitude that they will act in unison and accord for all time and there may arise occasions when they may differ. The result will be an unrelieved anarchy and confusion. If, however, it is supposed that these Gods will be guided by the counsels of one among them who will be the President, a *primus inter pares,* just as we see in the systems of democratic government, then again the President will be the virtual God and the supreme ruler, if his mandate is obeyed by all. If it is supposed that these omniscient Gods will never have occasion for dispute, since they will be all persuaded of the wisdom of a particular line of action and will, therefore, act in complete agreement, then of course none will be the ruler of the universe and so none will be God. But why should we at all believe in such a republic of Gods—what logical necessity is there which will make us bless the theory? Absolutely no case can be made out for this hypothesis and so we must reject it without hesitation or scruple. Polytheism as a philosophical doctrine is absolutely an illogical and superfluous hypothesis and it should be clearly recognized that India never favoured this doctrine either in theory or in practice, though unsympathetic critics, owing to their ignorance of the inwardness of Indian religious practices, have maligned the people of India and their religion on this ground. It is high time that critics should approach Indian philosophy and religion with scientific detachment and unbiassed attitude and if they care to know the truth, they will be disabused of their prejudices and religious animosity will be a thing of the past.

We shall conclude our dissertation by adverting to a question of supreme importance. It is a truism that the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school staunchly believes in the infallibility of Vedic religion and its allegiance is not confined to the ritualistic portion of the Veda alone, but equally accepts the supreme authority of the Upanishads also, although this school follows its own interpretation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school does not believe in monism and its philosophy can be characterized as uncompromising pluralism. The relation of individual souls to God is neither one of pure identity nor one of identity in difference, but one of absolute and unqualified otherness. The relation of God to the individual selves is not internal but strictly and purely external. God is alluded to as being in the position of a father to the suffering souls and His cosmic activity has been spoken of as inspired by considerations of justice and mercy alike. The supreme solicitude of God for the deliver-

ance of suffering creatures from the meshes of transmigration is also alluded to in clear and unambiguous language in the *Bhāshya* of Vātsyāyana. But man's relation to God is not clearly emphasized in the ancient literature. It is only in the works of Udayana that we find this topic broached. Udayana begins his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* with an impassioned salutation to God and in the course of his writing he speaks of worship of God to be instrumental in the achievement of salvation and enjoyment of heavenly bliss, whichever may be cared for by His devotees. He goes further to state that philosophical speculation is a kind of worship of the Deity and has its supreme justification and fulfilment only in so far as it leads the enquiring soul to surrender himself to God's protection and mercy. We are tempted to believe that the predominance of the devotional attitude in subsequent Nyāya literature is entirely due to the influence of Udayanāchārya. It is remarkable that Vardhamāna took great pains to reconcile this statement of Udayana with the orthodox Nyāya position that salvation is achieved by an unerring realization of the true nature of the self and this supreme saving knowledge is effected by proper understanding of the sixteen topics only. There is no room for love of God or worship of God or knowledge of God as an instrument of salvation. Vardhamāna, therefore, was at great pains to bring it into line with the central position of the Nyāya philosophy and he succeeds by making knowledge of God contributory to self-realization. But Udayana in the concluding passages of the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* emphatically maintains that worship of God is essential for salvation and his pleadings and advocacy of the necessity and logical possibility of self-surrender and meditation of God are unsurpassable for their devotional ardour, impassioned enthusiasm and moral fervour. A better and more successful advocacy of theism is difficult to conceive. The *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* will remain, we may be permitted to remark without exaggeration or partisan spirit, one of the best works on theism in the whole of world literature, noted alike for its spiritual earnestness and logical consistency. The philosophical literature of India, not only of the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school, would have been *pro tanto* poorer and weaker if Udayana had not been born to enrich it by his masterly contributions. The brilliant exposition of the problem given by Gaṅgeśa in a chapter of his *Tattvachintāmaṇi*, entitled *Īśvarānumāna* (Inferential proof of God) is however nothing but a *réchauffé* of Udayana's arguments and in so far as it confines itself to the logical proofs of the existence of

God we scarcely meet with a single argument, which has not been anticipated by the previous writers on the subject. Its principal merit consists in its compact treatment and its attraction is due to the logical elaboration of the concept of effect in so far as it is applicable to the world-order. Once this point is established the conclusion follows as an inevitable consequence. It is Udayana who speaks throughout in the fashionabe logical terminology of the day and Gaṅgeśa appears to do the duty of a mouthpiece. It is a matter of serious doubt if Gaṅgeśa's brochure on God could have come to us in its present shape had not Udayana written his masterpiece in advance.

THE RELIGION OF THE NYĀYA AND VAIŚESHIKA SYSTEMS

In dealing with the 'religion' of a particular system, we have to consider it (1) in its *theoretical aspect, i.e.* its conception of God, and (2) in its practical aspect, *i.e.* its conception of the rules of life and conduct.

NYĀYA CONCEPTION OF GOD

The world has the atoms for its *constituent* or *material* cause; its *efficient* cause is God, as influenced by men's acts. 'God' is the Ātman endowed with two sets of qualities, *negative* and *positive;* the negative set consisting of the absence of demerit, wrong knowledge and negligence, and the positive set consisting of the presence of merit, knowledge and intuitiveness; He is also endowed with the eightfold *siddhi* (power), *aṇimā* and the rest. His merit follows the bent of His volition; He controls the residuum of the merit and demerit subsisting in each individual *jīvātman,* as also the earth and other material substances. He is omnipotent in regard to His creation, not, however, failing to be influenced by the results of acts done in their past lives by the beings He creates. He has no ends of His own to serve by what He does. He continues to act for the sake of His own creatures, just as the father acts for the benefit of his children. From the scriptures we learn that God is the 'Seer, Cognizer and Omniscient.' He is discernible by the presence of *buddhi* and other such indicatives of the Ātman, and is beyond the reach of ordinary perception, inference and words. If God were regarded as creating things irrespective of the acts done in the past by His creatures, then He would be open to the charge of being cruel and arbitrary, unjust and merciless. On the other hand, if His creation is influenced by the past record of His creatures, however 'merciless' He might be, He would be absolutely just and fair. The efforts of man and other creatures are aided by God, in the sense that He stimulates the activity of man in due accordance with its true character and in due consideration of the time of its fruition in course of the man's experience.

The existence of God is proved by the following reasoning: People have ascribed the origin of the world either (1) to primordial matter, or

(2) to atoms, or (3) to *karma,* the collective residue of the acts of men. Any one of these can act only when, prior to the beginning of creation, it is controlled by an intelligent Being. As all these by themselves are lacking in intelligence, like an axe and other implements which can operate only when handled by the intelligent carpenter, so from the operation of primordial matter, or atoms, or *karma* in the making of the world, we infer the existence of the controlling Agent, God.[1]

NYAYA RULES OF LIFE AND CONDUCT

The four stages of life, *āśramas,* form the basis of our life and conduct according to all our systems except the system of Karma-mīmāṁsā which deprecates *sannyāsa,* the fourth stage. This scheme of the *āśramas* embraces the entire code of life and conduct for all; and there is no difference of opinion on this point. It is only in regard to the final culmination of human effort, *moksha* (liberation), that there are slight divergences.

That *moksha* is attained by means of true knowledge is practically the common ground among all *darśanas.*[2] That which keeps man in bondage is what has been called 'the concatenation of aberrations,' *kleśa,* viz. ignorance, egoism, affection, hatred, and yearning for life. These form the motive for all worldly activities. When, therefore, on the dawn of knowledge all these cease, there is either no activity at all, or there is just that amount of activity which is needed for the exhausting of the *prārabdha-karma;* and when there is no 'aberration,' and hence no activity, the man attains *moksha.*

The knowledge that leads to *moksha* is the knowledge of that thing the wrong notion whereof is the potent cause of birth and rebirth. This wrong notion consists in the conceiving, as Ātman, of what is not-Ātman, *i.e.* the regarding of the body and other things as 'I.' This notion of 'I,' *ahaṅkāra,* is at the root of the whole trouble. It appears as a rule in regard to the body, the sense-organs, the mind, feelings and cognitions, and it ceases with the dawn of true knowledge of 'the causes of defects,' *i.e.* of all objects of cognition, viz. body, sense-organs, perceptible things, apprehension, mind, activity, defects, rebirth, fruition and pain. These are called 'the causes of defects,' because these are

[1] Those interested in further discussions should read the *Nyaya-vārttika,* translated in the *Indian Thought,* and the *Tātparya-tīkā* thereon; and also the *Nyaya kusumāñjali*

[2] The schools of Hindu philosophy

what form the subjects of wrong notion. Consequently, when the true knowledge of these appears, it sets aside the 'notion of I' with regard to them; and there is a cessation of pain, which is followed by the cessation of birth, which in its turn is followed by the cessation of activity; this again is followed by the cessation of defects, which leads to the cessation of wrong notion; and this finally leads to *moksha*.

VAIŚESHIKA CONCEPTION OF GOD

God is the creator and controller of all things. He possesses innate intuition embracing all things. Being omniscient, He can have no illusions; free from illusions, He can have no attachment or aversion; free from these, He can have no activities; hence no *dharma* (righteousness) or *adharma* (unrighteousness). The process of creation by this God is as follows: For the sake of making the beings experience the fruits of the actions of their past lives, there arises in the mind of God a desire for creating the world over again, after the periodic dissolution that was brought about by God's desire to reabsorb the whole creation within Himself, in order to provide rest for all living beings wearied by their wanderings. When this desire for creating things appears in God, it sets in motion all the potential tendencies and forces in all *jīvas*, which, operating upon the various atoms, lead to the formation of things suited to the experiences of the *jīvas* going to function during the coming cycle. There is only one God, ever free from all limitations.

VAIŚESHIKA CONCEPTION OF RULES OF LIFE AND CONDUCT

Dharma is that quality in man which is conducive to happiness and ultimately to *moksha*. The qualities conducive to *dharma* are faith, harmlessness, benevolence, truthfulness, freedom from desire for undue possession, freedom from lust, purity of intentions, freedom from anger, cleanliness, purity, devotion to God, fasting and alertness. These are common to all men. Then there are specific qualities prescribed for particular castes and life-stages. Here come in all the *varṇa-dharmas* and *āśrama-dharmas*. The contact of mind and soul, aided by all these qualities and kept on without a desire for visible results and with the purest of motives, brings about *dharma*.

So long as man has not attained the true knowledge of things, and hence is still under the influence of affection and aversion, if he does a righteous deed, he is born in the celestial regions in a body suited to the

experiencing of pleasures resulting from his past righteous action. On the other hand, if he does an unrighteous deed, he is born in the lower regions, equipped with a body suited to the experiencing of pain resulting from his past unrighteous action. In due course the man comes to be reborn on earth, where also his birth and life are determined by his past righteous and unrighteous deeds. Thus man passes through the various divine, human and animal existences again and again. This is what constitutes the wheel of bondage.

When a man with due knowledge and intelligence performs righteous acts without any selfish motives, he comes to be born in a pure family and within holy surroundings. Thus circumstanced, he comes to be seized with a longing for learning the means of removing the triad of pain inseparable from birth and rebirth. With this end in view he has recourse to a teacher and obtains from him that true knowledge of things which entirely removes his ignorance; after this, through dispassion, he becomes free from all attachment and aversion and other feelings. Freedom from these leads to the cessation of all forces of *dharma* or *adharma*, the cause of birth and rebirth. All his acts henceforth tend towards peace and calm, contentment and disregard for the body. Finally, he attains the highest degree of bliss and peaceful contentment as the culmination of his *dharma*, whereupon this *dharma* also ceases, and when his present body falls off, there is no further body for him. This cessation of equipment with bodies and organs constitutes what is called *moksha* (final deliverance).[1]

[1] I have let the authorities, *bhāshyas* and commentaries speak for themselves and h[ave] added no words or ideas of my own.

THE NYĀYA-VAIŚESHIKA THEORY OF SALVATION

The definitions of salvation, which are discussed in the *Muktivāda*[1] of Gaṅgeśa, the doyen of the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school, fall into two classes—the negative and the positive; the negative, again, into three classes corresponding to the three classes of negation known as destruction or the negation subsequent to origination,[2] the negation antecedent to origination,[3] and the absolute negation.[4]

The theory that salvation is of the nature of a destruction or subsequent negation admits of two forms according to the nature of the counterpositive[5] which is considered to be either suffering or the cause of suffering. Gaṅgeśa who maintains the destruction theory in the first form defines salvation as 'the destruction of suffering, which (destruction) is not concomitant with the antecedent negation of suffering, of which (antecedent negation) the locus is the same (as that of the destruction).[6] If in an individual the destruction of suffering should be present together with the antecedent negation, it means that in spite of the destruction he would have to undergo suffering again in some form or other. The presence of the destruction of suffering apart from the antecedent negation is, therefore, impossible in an individual except in the state of salvation in which he has to undergo suffering no more.

In the *Kaṇāda-sūtra-vivriti*[7] Jayanārāyaṇa attributes the theory of salvation as enunciated in the above definition not only to the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika, but also to the Sāṁkhya school, relying, it would seem, on the first two *kārikās* of Īśvarakrishṇa in which 'the discrimination of the patent, the latent, and the intelligent'[8] is declared to be superior to both the empirical and the ritual means of destroying suffering, on the ground that the destruction that results therefrom is not followed by the origination of suffering in any form whatsoever. Although Gaṅgeśa

[1] I have attempted in this article to elucidate the main propositions which are supported or controverted in this book.

[2] *Pradhvaṁsābhāva*. [3] *Prāgabhāva*. [4] *Atyantābhāva*. [5] *Pratiyogī*.

[6] *Samānādhikaraṇa-duḥkhaprāgabhāvāsahavritti-duḥkhadhvaṁsaḥ*: *Muktivāda*, p. 40, ll 2-3; ed. by Jīvānanda Vidyasāgara, with *Tattvachintāmaṇi* (*Anumānakhaṇḍa*) and *Didhiti*, New Skt. Press, Cal., 1872.

[7] P. 16, ll.1-4 (ref. *Sūtra* I.i.4); pub. with *Vaiśeshikadarśana* and *Upaskāra*, Baptist Mission Press, Cal., 1861.

[8] *Vyaktāvyaktajña-vijñāna*.

agrees with Īśvarakṛishṇa[1] in maintaining that in the state of salvation the destruction of suffering is not concomitant with the antecedent negation, nevertheless his agreement is outweighed by his disagreement, when he equates the destruction of suffering as laid down in the above definition with the destruction of the ultimate suffering,[2] and not with the destruction of all the three classes of suffering,[3] as Īśvarakṛishṇa would have it. For the same reason Gaṅgeśa's theory stands in contrast with that of Śivāditya who, in the *Saptapadārthī* which is one of the earliest works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school, defines salvation as 'the negation, of which the locus is the same as that of the destruction of the cause (of sufferings), namely, false knowledge, which (destruction) is originated by true knowledge—of all sufferings which are the effect of that (false knowledge).'[4] Whilst it is far from Gaṅgeśa's intention to deny that in the state of salvation there is negation of all sufferings, he takes exception[5] to the general destruction theory on the ground that salvation would be neither a single nor a practicable task, if it should present itself to an individual as the general destruction of sufferings, and not as the destruction of the ultimate suffering.

In the course of the discussion of the absolute negation theory Gaṅgeśa substantiates his contentions by offering a second definition, according to which salvation is 'the (subsequent) negation of suffering, which (subsequent negation) is not contemporaneous with the suffering, of which the locus is the same (as that of the subsequent negation).'[6] It is interesting to note that whilst there is no mention of the first definition either in Viśvanātha's *Nyāyasūtra-vritti*[7] or in Gadādhara's *Mukti-vāda*,[8] in both of which there is, however, mention of the second; and,

[1] A detailed discussion of the Sāṁkhya theory, based on the works of Gauḍapāda, Vāchaspati and others, is outside the scope of the present article.

[2] *Charamaduḥkha-dhvaṁsa*: *Muktivāda*, p. 40, ll.14-15 and 25. [3] *Duḥkhatraya*

[4] *Tattvajñānotpādya-mithyājñana-kāraṇa-pradhvaṁsa-samanādhikaraṇa-tatkāryasamasta duḥkhābhāvaḥ*, p. 19, ll 4-5; ed. by V. S. Ghate, with *Padarthachandrika*, Nirnaya Sagara Press, Bom., 1919; *duḥkhābhava* in Śivāditya's definition is equated with the absolute negation of suffering by Jīnavardhanasūri, with the antecedent negation of suffering by Śeshānanta, and with the destruction of suffering by Mādhava: *vide* Ghate's Notes pp. 25-27. Whilst according to Jīnavardhanasūri and Śeshānanta *tattvajñanotpadya* qualifies *pradhvaṁsa*, according to Mādhava it qualifies *duḥkhabhāva*.

[5] P. 41, ll.1-6.

[6] *Samānādhikaraṇa-duḥkhāsamānakālina-duḥkhābhāvaḥ*, p. 43, l.25.

[7] P. 14, l.4, and p. 29, l.1 (ref. *Sūtra* I.i.22); ed. by Jivānanda Vidyāsāgara, with *Nyāyadarśana* and *Vātsyāyanabhāshya*, Vachaspati Press, Cal., 1919.

[8] P. 14, ll.4-5; ed. by Dhundhiraj Sastri, with his *Chandrikā*, Vidya Vilas Press, Ben. On p. 13, ll.4-5 read *sva-samanadhikaraṇa-duḥkhāsamānakālīna* for *sva-samanādhikaraṇa-duḥkha-prāgabhāvāsamānakālīna*: *vide* Kalipada Tarkacharya's ed., p. 35, l 4, and Śivarāma's *Tīkā*, p. 36, ll.4-5, pub. together, Skt Sahitya Parishad Series, Cal., 133[illegible] Beng. Era.

again, whilst there is no mention of the second definition in Śaṅkaramiśra's *Upaskāra*[1] in which there is, however, mention of the first, the two definitions are combined into one in Pañchānana's *Upaskāra-parishkāra*[2] in order to avoid the technical defect from which each of them suffers, the first, by being applicable to the state of the ultimate suffering in which the destruction of the pre-ultimate sufferings is present in an individual without being attended with the antecedent negation; and the second, by being applicable to the state of deep sleep in which the destruction of suffering is present in an individual without being attended with suffering.

The theory, according to which salvation is 'the destruction of the cause of suffering, which (destruction) is not concomitant with the antecedent negation of suffering,'[3] denies that the negation of suffering is a task to which it is possible for an individual to apply his efforts,[4] because, in the first place, neither the antecedent nor the absolute negation is subject to origination; and secondly, it is not possible for the destruction or subsequent negation of suffering, which follows the destruction of the cause of suffering as a matter of course, to become a task except in the form of the destruction of the cause.

Of the two forms in which the theory is discussed by Gaṅgeśa, the first equates the destruction of the cause of suffering with 'the destruction of false knowledge which is the seed of the painful recurrence of births and deaths;'[5] and the second, with 'the destruction of the body, the senses, the intellect, etc., together with the merits and demerits which are the cause of these,'[6] the first being attributable to the *advaita* school in so far as it considers salvation in its negative aspect; and the second, to a certain section of either the Nyāya[7] or the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā school.[8]

[1] P. 10, ll 13.14 (ref *Sūtra* I i.4).

[2] *Samānādhikaraṇa-duḥkhāsamānakālīnatve sati samānādhikaraṇa-duḥkha-prāgabhāvāsamānakālīnatvam*, p 21, ll 3-4; pub. with *Vaiśeshikadarśana* and *Upaskāra*, Vangavasi Press, Cal., 1313 Beng Era

[3] *Duḥkha-prāgabhāvāsahavṛitti duḥkha-sādhana-dhvaṁsaḥ*, p. 41, ll.8-9.

[4] P. 41, ll.9-19. [5] *Duḥkhamaya-saṁsāra-vīja-mithyājñānasya dhvaṁsaḥ*, p 43. ll 5-6

[6] *Śarīrendriya-buddhyādi-tannidāna-dharmādharma-dhvaṁsaḥ*, p. 43. ll 7-8.

[7] Cf. the definition *atyantika-durita-nivṛittiḥ* which is attributed in *Kaṇāda-sūtra-vivṛiti* to Nyāyaikadeśins, p 16 ll 4-5.

[8] Madhusūdana mentions two theories, of which one says that salvation is possible even without *ātmajñāna* and that it consists in *sakalakarmochchheda*, the present ones being destroyed through sufferance, and the future ones being incapable of origination on account of the avoidance of *nishiddha-kāmyas* and the performance of *nitya-naimittikas*; and the other says that salvation consists in *dehendriyādi-sambandhochchheda* on account of *dharmādharma-parikshaya* following the performance of *vaidika-karmas* and the attainment of *ātma-jñāna*. Both of them are Mīmāṁsā theories, the latter being expressly attributed to Prābhākaras: *Vedānta-kalpalatikā*, p. 4, ll.4-11; ed. by Ganganath Jha and Gopinath Kaviraj, Govt. Skt. Library, Ben., 1920.

According to Gaṅgeśa the theory is untenable in both the forms, the first, because[1] it renders salvation possible in the state of incarceration in which an individual has to continue, in spite of attaining true knowledge, till the merits and demerits which have commenced producing results completely fulfil themselves; and the second, because[2] it excludes from salvation the nature of a good that is achievable by true knowledge, the merits and demerits which are not subject to destruction through expiatory actions being destroyed through sufferance. As against the general thesis that salvation is the destruction of the cause of suffering, Gaṅgeśa contends,[3] besides attacking it from the viewpoint of the antecedent negation theory which he upholds for the time being, that the destruction of the cause of suffering is only an instrumental good, that is to say, a means to a good, and not a good in itself.

The antecedent negation theory is attributed by Gaṅgeśa to the Prābhākara school[4] of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, according to which true knowledge by destroying demerits and thereby preventing the origination of suffering, of which demerits are the cause, brings about salvation in the sense that it permanently conserves the antecedent negation of suffering. Whilst[5] granting that the antecedent negation of suffering is capable of becoming a task in the above sense without being subject to origination, Gaṅgeśa refuses to admit that it is indestructible, because a negation that is not subject to origination, at the same time that does not end in originating the counterpositive is an absolute, and not an antecedent negation. The theory, however, receives support from Śaṅkaramiśra by whom it is argued in the *Upaskāra*[6] that the antecedent negation requires the co-operation of a number of other causes in order to originate the counterpositive and consequently if these causes should be destroyed, the antecedent negation would become permanently impotent in the sense that it would continue without ever originating the counterpositive.

The theory that equates salvation with the absolute negation of suffering[7] by qualifying it with the destruction of the cause of suffering

[1] P. 43, ll.6-7. The *Advaita* theory of *jīvanmukti* is not accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeshikas.

[2] P. 43, ll.9-10; read *apurushārthatvāt* for *purushārthatvāt*.

[3] P. 43, l.2.

[4] P. 44, ll.2.-8; Madhusūdana, by whom the second form of the cause-destruction theory is attributed to Prābhākaras, mentions a Bhaṭṭa theory, according to which salvation consists in *duḥkhābhāvamātram eva* caused by *mānasa-jñāna*: p. 4, ll.16-17.

[5] P. 44, ll.14-17.

[6] P. 11, ll.4-7.

[7] *Vide* supra, note on Śivāditya's definition.

establishes[1] the equation thus: The negation in which salvation consists should satisfy two conditions, of which the first requires that it be a good in itself, and the second, that it be a task in the sense of an event to be brought about in an individual through his own efforts. Whilst the destruction of the cause of suffering is incapable of satisfying the first condition, because it is the absolute negation of suffering which an individual has as the good in view, when he strives for the destruction of the cause of suffering, the absolute negation is incapable of satisfying the second, because being eternal it is not subject to origination. By qualifying the absolute negation of suffering with the destruction of the cause of suffering, it would, however, be possible to obtain a negation which, besides being a good in itself, would satisfy the second condition, because if the adjective should be a task, the substantive as qualified by the adjective would become a task as well.

The theory is rejected[2] by Gaṅgeśa, because, in the first place, if the counterpositive of the absolute negation should consist in an individual's future suffering, there would be possibility of suffering even after the attainment of salvation, and consequently, of the supersession of salvation by reincarceration; otherwise it would be impossible for the negation of the future suffering to become a task; secondly, if it should consist in an individual's present suffering, it would be concomitant with its negation; thirdly, if it should consist in an individual's past suffering, it would again be impossible for its negation to become a task; fourthly, if it should consist in another individual's suffering, its negation would be subject to the same disability in so far as the first individual is concerned; and finally, there is no evidence for the absolute negation of suffering being related to the destruction of the cause of suffering as its substantive. Whilst it is true that an individual's judgement about the negation of suffering is sometimes expressed in a proposition like: "The cause of suffering being destroyed, there is absolutely no suffering," Gaṅgeśa maintains that the negation there denotes a subsequent,[3] and not an absolute negation in the proper sense of the term.

In the above context the theory, according to which salvation is 'the negation (in an individual) of the relation of the antecedent negation of all sufferings'[4] is also rejected[5] by Gaṅgeśa, because, in the first

[1] P. 43. ll.9-17. [2] P. 43. ll.18-26.

[3] The special features of this subsequent negation are mentioned in Gaṅgeśa's second definition of salvation: *vide* supra.

[4] *Sarva-duḥkha-prāgabhāva-sambandhābhāvaḥ*, p. 43. ll.28-29.

[5] P. 44. ll.1-2.

place, the negation of the relation is a means to the thorough negation of suffering, and therefore it is not a good in itself; secondly, if it should be an absolute negation, it would be incapable of becoming a task; and thirdly, if it should be a subsequent negation, that is to say, if it should consist in the destruction of the antecedent negation of suffering, it would be equivalent to the origination of suffering and as such it would be an object of aversion, and not of desire.

Of the theories according to which salvation has a positive aspect, Gaṅgeśa discusses the following:

(1) 'Salvation is the revelation of the eternal bliss (in the self).'[1]

(2) 'On the destruction of nescience resulting from the intuition of the Truth, namely, of the non-dual Brahman, there exists in (the state of) salvation the pure self which is of the nature of intelligence and bliss.'[2]

(3) 'Salvation is the dissolution of the individual self in the Supreme Self which is of the nature of bliss. And the dissolution (occurs when there) is elimination of the subtle body (from the individual self).'[3]

(4) 'Salvation is the course of mentation bereft of affliction.'[4]

The first theory which is generally attributed to the Bhāṭṭa school of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā has, however, a more ancient history, because it is attacked in Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-sūtra-bhāshya* from which the objections that Gaṅgeśa advances against it are ultimately derived. The first difficulty[5] with which the theory is faced arises from the nature of the relation that the eternal bliss has to the self. If the two should be identical, it would be possible for an individual to have consciousness of the eternal bliss in having consciousness of himself, or no consciousness of himself without having consciousness of the eternal bliss. If, however, the two should be different, the theory would be faced with the further difficulty[6] arising from the nature of the revelation that the eternal bliss has in the self, because whilst the eternity of the revelation would render incarceration impossible, the non-eternity would subject salvation to destruction.

As against the second theory[7] which is attributed to the *advaita*

[1] *Nityasukhābhivyaktir muktih*, p. 46, l. 21 [2] P. 47, ll. 17-18.
[3] P. 47, ll. 22-23. [4] P. 47, l. 28.
[5] Pp. 27-29. Vāchaspati interprets *nityasukhābhivyakti* from the *advaita* viewpoint *vide* p. 239, ll. 11-13 in *Tātparya-ṭīka*; ed. by Rajesvara Sastri, Vidya Vilas, Ben., 1925
[6] P. 46, ll. 21-28. [7] P. 47, ll. 18-22.

school, Gaṅgeśa maintains that if the self should be identical with Brahman which is of the nature of eternally self-revealed intelligence and bliss, and if salvation should be but another name for this identity, there would be no salvation which would be capable of becoming a task and in the achievement of which would consist an individual's *summum bonum*. Nor would the *advaitin* be justified in defending his position by saying that even though salvation should be a fact existing independently of an individual's efforts, nevertheless it would be capable of becoming a task in the form of the destruction of nescience that misleads an individual into imagining himself as undergoing suffering, because the effect produced by the destruction of nescience would consist in the negation of suffering, and not in the identity of the self with Brahman, which, according to the *advaitin's* own admission, is not an effect.

The third theory which, according to Gaṅgeśa, is maintained by the *tridaṇḍin Vedāntins* of whom some belong to the *bhedābheda* and others to the *viśishṭādvaita* school, is, however, attributable only to the *bhedābheda* school,[1] because, whilst, according to the *viśishṭādvaita* school, the released individual remains different from Brahman as a servant from the Lord, according to the *bhedābheda* school, he becomes identical with Brahman. Again, whilst according to the *advaita* school an individual is identical with Brahman even in the state of incarceration, the medium of incarceration being false and not real, according to the *bhedābheda* school he is both identical with and different from Brahman—identical in the state of salvation and different in the state of incarceration, the medium of incarceration, namely, the subtle body, being real and not false.

The *bhedābheda* theory is untenable,[2] because in the first place, the elimination of the subtle body from the individual self is a means to the negation of suffering, and therefore it is not a good in itself; secondly, it is impossible for an individual's *summum bonum* to consist in the destruction of himself; thirdly, the destruction would be impossible, if he should be identical with Brahman; and finally, identity and difference being contradictories, it is impossible for him to be both identical with and different from Brahman.

The fourth theory which is attributable to the *yogāchara*[3] school of

[1] *Vedānta-kalpalatikā*, p. 5, ll.9-12. The theory is wrongly attributed to the Śaṅkara school by Dhundhiraj Sastri; *vide Chandrikā*, p. 36, ll.9-10.
[2] P. 47, ll.25-27. [3] *Vedānta-kalpalatikā*, p. 2, ll.12-16.

Buddhism is also untenable, because the good that any individual has in view when he strives for salvation consists in the negation of affliction, and not in the course of mentation; and also because mentation is impossible on account of the destruction of the body in the state of salvation.

The objections against which Gaṅgeśa defends his theory fall into two classes—general and special. Of the general objections which are directed against defining salvation as 'the thorough negation of suffering,'[1] I propose to consider only the following:

If[2] salvation should consist in the thorough negation of suffering, it would be impossible for an individual to attain salvation without destruction of all the merits and demerits, of which the consequence would be not only the thorough negation of suffering, but also the thorough negation of happiness—which, however, is far from desirable on account of the fact that all desires for or against other objects are determined by the desire for happiness. Further,[3] the thorough negation of suffering is incapable of becoming an object of desire, because it is like a state of swoon which is incapable of becoming an object of knowledge.

In reply Gaṅgeśa points out[4] that it is not uncommon for an individual to desire the negation of suffering without desiring happiness. If it should be true that in desiring the negation of suffering an individual desires happiness, it would also be true that in desiring happiness he desires the negation of suffering. In other words, if happiness should be a good in itself, the negation of suffering would be a good in itself as well, and consequently the knowledge of the negation of happiness would be no more inconsistent with the desire for the negation of happiness than the knowledge of the negation of suffering would be inconsistent with the desire for happiness. Nor is the second objection of greater weight than the first, because when an individual strives for happiness or for the destruction of suffering, he does so in order that there may be happiness or no suffering for him, and not that he may have the knowledge of happiness or of the negation of suffering. Further, even as the perception of the lightning is capable of having also the thunder[5] for its object, although the thunder is not present at the moment the lightning is perceived, so too the perception of the ultimate suffering

[1] *Ātyantika-duhkhanivṛtti* [2] P. 44, ll.27-29. [3] P. 45, ll.12-13.
[4] P. 45, ll.1-5.
[5] This is called *upanīta-bhāna*, the absent object being perceived through *alaukika sannikarsha*.

(in the destruction of which salvation consists) is capable of having also the destruction of the ultimate suffering for its object, although this destruction is not present at the moment the ultimate suffering is perceived.

The special objections are directed against defining salvation as 'the thorough destruction of suffering.'[1] Of these only two are mentioned below, the rest having been already considered in connection with the negation theories maintained by the rival schools.

Salvation[2] is not of the nature of a destruction or subsequent negation, because, in the first place, if the counterpositive of the destruction should consist in the past suffering, the destruction would be an already achieved event; secondly, if it should consist in the future suffering, that is to say, suffering that has not yet originated, the destruction would be an impossible task; and thirdly, if it should consist in the present suffering, the destruction would occur, independently of an individual's efforts, in consequence of the origination of inimical qualities in the soul. Further,[3] if the thorough destruction of suffering should consist in the destruction of the ultimate suffering, an individual, in desiring salvation, would have to desire the ultimate suffering as well—which, however, is impossible, because the desire for suffering in any form whatsoever is contrary to an individual's nature.

Gaṅgeśa refutes[4] the first objection by explaining how the present suffering by becoming the final or ultimate suffering, is capable of undergoing destruction through an individual's efforts. True knowledge which arises in an individual through his own efforts leads to the destruction of false knowledge and this to the non-origination of impressions and passions, merits and demerits, and births and deaths, in consequence of which there is, again, the destruction of the present suffering in the form of the final or ultimate suffering. In reply to the second objection Gaṅgeśa points out that the desire for the ultimate suffering which is entailed by the desire for its destruction is a desire for suffering as a means to an end and not an end in itself, and as such it is far from inconsistent with an individual's nature.

To sum up, salvation is a good in itself and not a means to a further good; secondly, it is a task in the sense of a state to be originated in an individual through his own efforts; and thirdly, it is a state that is not subject to destruction. If salvation should be a positive something, it

[1] *Ātyantika-duḥkhadhvaṁsa.* [2] P. 40, ll.3-11.
[3] P. 40, ll.22-25. [4] P. 40, ll.11-14.

would be incapable of satisfying all the three conditions. It is, therefore, of the nature of a negation. The counterpositive of the negation in which salvation consists is suffering, and not the cause of suffering, of which the negation is only a means to a further good, that is to say, the negation of suffering. Further, the negation of suffering, in which salvation consists, is a subsequent, and not an antecedent nor an absolute negation. And finally, the suffering in the destruction of which salvation consists denotes the ultimate suffering, because it is a suffering of which the destruction is caused by true knowledge and is, therefore, not concomitant with a co-referent suffering or antecedent negation of suffering.

THE PŪRVA-MĪMĀṀSĀ

I

The great sage Jaimini is the author of the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* (aphorisms). There is a difference of opinion among scholars as to his identity. Whether he is the disciple of Vyāsa mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* or some other person is a controversial question. Two *ṛishis*, Bādarāyaṇa and Bādari, are mentioned in Jaimini's *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra;* and Jaimini is mentioned in Maharshi Veda-Vyāsa's *Śārīraka-sūtra*. But none of these texts clearly indicates the relationship of teacher and disciple between Vyāsa and Jaimini. Though this led to a controversy among Western scholars, yet Śabarasvāmī, the famous commentator of Jaimini's *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra,* while explaining the use of the word 'Bādarāyaṇa' in *sūtra* I.i.5, says that it is used here to denote that Bādarāyaṇa's opinion is also the same; and by this the opinion expressed in the *sūtra* has been strengthened and not opposed.

According to Śabarasvāmī, therefore, it is clear that Bādarāyaṇa was respected by Jaimini, and his name is mentioned to show that the self-demonstrability of knowledge as advocated in the *sūtra* has the sanction of Bādarāyaṇa also and is therefore valid.

Though it is not clearly mentioned that this Bādarāyāṇa is Maharshi Veda-Vyāsa, the author of the *Mahābhārata* and the teacher of Jaimini, yet on the authority of this hint of Śabarasvāmī ancient Indian scholars have accepted the relation of teacher and disciple between Veda-Vyāsa, who is mentioned as Bādarāyaṇa, and Jaimini.

It is not necessary to enter into this controversy here for the study of our subject.

The object of Jaimini's *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* is to explain the meaning of the Vedas. The Vedas directly or indirectly indicate what is *dharma* or virtue and what is *adharma* or vice. They do so in order that qualified persons may practise *dharma* and abstain from *adharma*. The *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra,* therefore, should not be regarded as a commentary on the Vedas like other *bhāshyas*, but its function is to explain how to arrive at the real meaning of the Vedas which is acceptable to the wise. Every student of the book should remember well that its main object is to lay down and

explain in detail rules for removing doubts and thus arriving at the real meaning of the Vedas.

The Vedas come under the proof known as *śabda-pramāṇa*. The Pūrva-mīmāṁsā has considered at great length whether *śabda* or verbal authority is itself a *pramāṇa*. The conclusion is that like perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāṇa*), etc., it also is a form of proof. Ordinary words, however, are of two kinds: some words uttered by man may be regarded as true (*pramāṇa*), while others may be regarded as untrue (*apramāṇa*). Whether the assemblage of words in the Vedas may be taken as true *in toto* is discussed in detail in the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra*, and the result is that the authority of the Vedas has been accepted in their entirety. The first part of this paper aims at briefly discussing those reasonings which are used by the Mīmāṁsakas to arrive at this conclusion.

Before entering into this discussion it is essential to find out what is understood by the Mīmāṁsakas by the term 'Veda.' The Mīmāṁsakas regard the Vedas as self-revealed (*apaurusheya*), that is to say, they have not been written or composed like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* by man. Had they been so written, then the author of the Vedas, like Vālmīki and Veda-Vyāsa, the authors respectively of those two books, would have been remembered by us. The Vedic teachers and disciples have maintained a continuous chain of the study of the Vedas from time immemorial, but nobody ever heard the name of the author of the Vedas. From this it may be inferred that there was no author of the Vedas, because in that case some one or other of these people would have heard his name. It is, therefore, the unanimous conclusion of the exponents of the Mīmāṁsā philosophy that the Vedas must be regarded as self-revealed, since there is no remembrance from time immemorial of any special man as the author of the Vedas. The purport of what Śabara-svāmī says in order to arrive at this conclusion is as follows:

"We must not think that some one has connected the Vedic words with their meanings in order to give currency to the Vedic rites and ceremonies. This relation is self-evident. Had there been any man who connected the Vedic words with their meanings and introduced the Vedic rites, then at the time of performing such rites the performer must have remembered the author. This remembrance of the connection between the author and the user of the text is absolutely essential to the fulfilment of the aim and object of such performance. For instance, Pāṇini coined

the word *vriddhi* for certain vowel modifications. If we remember him when we hear this word, then only we know that the word *vriddhi* denotes such and such, and can use them according to the method invented by him and obtain the appropriate result. But when we do not remember the word as a definition of his, we do not ascribe to it any such meaning, do not use it according to his rules, nor get the result thus obtainable. Similarly, a *rishi* named Piṅgala, who is the author of the science of Prosody, takes *ma* to denote any word with three long vowels. When we remember him, we take *ma* to denote a word with three long vowels, e.g. Vaiśālī, and use it in connection with metrical compositions and get the desired result. But when we do not think of it as a technical term used by Piṅgala, it fails to suggest to our minds a word with three long vowels like Vaiśālī, and we do not use *ma* according to the rules of Prosody. It follows, therefore, that unless a sect has been exterminated, we always remember the author and user of the technical terms current in the usages of that sect. This is the general rule. It is now clear that had the Vedas been created by any man and the rites depending on them been first performed by him, then we should always have remembered the author. As we cannot understand the meaning of Pāṇini's aphorism *vriddhiryasyāchāmādiḥ* (I.i.73) and cannot apply it unless we know the meaning of his other aphorism *vriddhirādaich* (I.i.1), so we should be unable to follow and apply the Vedas. But our actual experience is quite contrary to this. We do not know of any author or originator of the Vedic rites and ceremonies; yet we have been performing them continually from the beginning. Hence it cannot be established by any direct proof that some man conceived the relationship between the Vedic words and their meanings and introduced the Vedic rites of his own free will, and thus was the creator of the Vedas."

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the famous author of *Ślokavārttika,* an explanatory treatise on Śabarasvāmī's commentary, explains the passage quoted above thus: "The study of the Vedas has always been dependent on previous study; for this study is carried on through words, as the modern system of Vedic study will show."[1]

This conclusion of the Mīmāṁsakas regarding the self-revealed character of the Vedas is not accepted by the Naiyāyikas. According to them, the Vedas were made and revealed by Almighty God as the source of all happiness and prosperity for the first race of men created in

[1] *Ślokavārttika, Vākyādhikaraṇa,* verse 336.

this land. It should not, however, be understood that He composed anew the Vedas as a set of books; but that He only revealed the Vedas which existed in the previous cycle (*kalpa*). This He did in the previous cycle also. Hence there is no author of the Vedas except God.

Āchārya Udayana, the author of *Kusumāñjali,* says on this point: "What is Veda? Every word cannot be called Veda. Words denoting unseen things cannot be called Veda, because the words of an impostor are not regarded as Veda. The words of Maharshi Manu and others about virtue and vice and other unseen things are not regarded as Veda. To this the reply is that those words which cannot be traced to any other source and which are accepted by the wise as authority, constitute the Vedas. It cannot be said that the words which have come down to us as the Vedas originated from perception and other proofs. Nor can it be said that they sprang from the error of an ignorant person or the imposition of a cheat; for then they would not have been accepted as authority by the good and the wise. The view of the Mīmāṁsakas that the chain of teachers and students from time immemorial is the source of the Vedas is also not tenable, because at the time of dissolution (*mahāpralaya*) such a chain cannot exist."

Āchārya Udayana has clearly said that the source of the Vedas cannot be the perception or inference of any human being like ourselves; because the supernatural subject-matter of the Vedas is unintelligible to a man with human reasoning. The argument that some one without understanding it rationally has ascribed his own imaginary meaning to it and has introduced it for some selfish motive, is also not sound; for there is no proof that the results of the actions mentioned in the Vedas are not attainable. And as they have been regarded as authority by the wise (*śishṭa*) and sages (*mahājana*), their author cannot be an ignorant person or a cheat.

His criticism of the Mīmāṁsaka view deserves careful consideration. He says, "Like the words used by us, the Vedas also are composed of words and hence they have been made by some one. The argument of the Mīmāṁsakas that there is no author of the Vedas, since the memory of such an author is not handed down to us, is also not valid, because the scriptures themselves declare the divine origin of the Vedas. Says the Smṛiti: 'Then the Vedas came out of His mouth. Thus in the beginning of each cycle different Vedas are composed;' and 'I have composed

the Vedānta and I am the knower of the Vedas."[1] And the Śruti: 'From that God has sprung all offering of oblations as well as the *Sāma*, *Ṛik* and other Vedas."[2] Such remembrance also is current among the students of the Vedas. It may be urged that these are laudatory words designed to praise the Vedas and not to establish the divine origin of the Vedas. But this does not stand the test of reason. There being no rule laid down in the Vedas that the author must be remembered, the priests did not remember the author while performing the rites, and a time came when the author was totally forgotten; but that does not prove that there was no author at all. If words must be regarded as authorless (*apaurusheya*) when there is no remembrance of the author, then, if the name of Kālidāsa be forgotten, *Kumārasambhava* also should be regarded as authorless– a view which nobody would accept."

But the Mīmāṁsakas have not accepted the divine origin of the Vedas as believed by the Naiyāyikas. Their reasons for rejecting the Naiyāyika view are briefly given below:

It has already been shown above that in the opinion of the ancient Mīmāṁsakas like Śabara and Kumārila, there is no reliable evidence to show that some one composed the Vedas in the beginning and introduced the Vedic rites. Moreover, it is admitted by the Naiyāyikas also that though the Vedic rites are current among the learned and the wise at all times throughout the length and breadth of India, yet there is no evidence to show when and by whom these were introduced first. On these arguments the Mīmāṁsakas base their belief in the authorlessness of the Vedas.

How man was first created on this earth has been explained by different learned men in different ways which do not agree among themselves. This was done in the past; this is done at the present time; but there is none which has either been accepted by all or has any chance of being accepted by all in future. Therefore no one will be willing to accept some imaginary person as the author of the Vedas on imaginary grounds only. Those who seek to postulate the existence of the author of the Vedas on the ground that a sentence (*vākya*) must be the creation of man, should remember that the first creator of the Vedic sentences must have been a man; for it is not possible for any other creature to create them. Because it is common knowledge that it is beyond the power of any other creature to compose a sentence consisting of words

[1] *Gītā*, XV.15. [2] *Ṛ. V.* X.90.9.

made up of vowels and consonants. It is clear, therefore, that the first author who composed these sentences was a man. It must also be admitted in this connection that that man had the knowledge of the technique of combining words into sentences to convey the desired meaning. If it be so, it may be asked how that first man acquired the knowledge of words and the things they signified. We find that one who frames a sentence learns the words and their meanings and their mode of combination from some one else before he can compose a sentence intelligible to others. Hence the existence of the author clearly indicates the existence of a previous author of the words and their meanings. Otherwise it is impossible to frame a sentence to express one's feelings or ideas. We do not come across any deviation from this rule. If this be an established rule for composition by man, it is but an imaginary supposition that this rule is violated in Vedic composition.

No theory or conjecture propounded by scientists and philosophers from time to time about the origin of the first man or the mode of his use of words or formation of society, has received universal acceptance; and no sane man can hope to find a consensus of opinion in this respect. On the other hand we find at the present time among those who perform Vedic rites that the student learns them from his teacher who in his turn learnt it from his own teacher, and so on. This continuous chain has come down to us from time immemorial. No reliable evidence is before us to show that this chain was actually broken some time in the past. Hence this eternal continuous chain of the teacher and the taught is the bed-rock of our belief in the authorlessness of the Vedas. It will remain absolutely unshaken so long as any philosopher or scientist does not come forward to prove convincingly and conclusively all about the first creation of man and the first introduction of the Vedas among men.

Consideration of space compels us to be brief here. Those readers who are interested in the subject and want to know more details are referred to *Śabara-bhāshya* and Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*.

Granting that the authorlessness of the Vedas has been proved, how can the authority (*prāmāṇya*) of the Vedas be established? Take for example a local rumour regarding the abode of an evil spirit on a particular banyan tree. Nobody knows who first gave currency to this report: the people of the locality, however, know it for a long time as bein handed down from father to son. But is it reasonable to accept it as authority on this ground? There are hundreds of such stories curre

among us; but should we take them as authority? Similarly, though there has been an unbroken chain of disciples and teachers of the Vedas, yet is it reasonable to accept the Vedas as authority on this ground?

In reply to this the Mīmāṁsakas say that one should first understand clearly the axiomatic nature of authority. Correct knowledge is called truth (*pramā*) and incorrect knowledge is called error (*bhrama*). Every item of knowledge is not correct and hence not truth. The question, however, is how one should discover what is truth. Different answers are given to this question by different schools of philosophy. According to the scholars of Nyāya and Vaiśeshika the correctness or incorrectness of knowledge cannot be found out at once. If, after proper investigation, we find that the senses through which the knowledge has come are in a reliably sound condition, then we infer that the knowledge gained is correct. When, for example, the eye sees an object under normal conditions, we conclude that the knowledge obtained is correct (*pramā*). If such knowledge comes from abnormal causes, or is based on insufficient data, we know that it is an error. This is the view of the Naiyāyikas and other philosophers who accept circumstantial evidence (*parataḥ-pramāṇa*) as the source of knowledge.

The Mīmāṁsakas say in reply that the above argument cannot bear scrutiny. For the circumstances under which the vision of an object takes place have been assumed to be true or favourable for correct vision without any proof that they are really so. To prove that they are really favourable, normal or sound, one must prove that their causes are sound and correct, and this process should continue *ad infinitum*. We are thus landed into the haze of mere imagination; the practical result of such a process is the inability and impossibility of ascertaining the truth of the knowledge in question. In practice also we find that nobody takes the trouble of testing the correctness of a piece of knowledge in this way; on the other hand man utilizes the knowledge because he thinks that it is correct. Suppose that a man is sitting somewhere in the thick darkness of a new-moon night. A sudden flash of lightning reveals to him a big tiger in his front with jaws wide open. No sooner does he see the monster than he runs away in bewilderment without caring for any proof whether the sight of the tiger is real or only an illusion. Still less does he care for the favourability, suitability or soundness of the causes which led to the terrible ocular experience. He believes in the presence of the beast more firmly than any truth proved by anybody, and attempts

to escape by running away from it. It is clear from this that the power of judging the correctness of the knowledge acquired is inherent in our nature. That is why man has always been carrying on his practical affairs accordingly in all ages, and will be doing so in future. It must be admitted by all, therefore, that knowledge does not depend for its validity on the subsidiary knowledge of the soundness of its causes. Knowledge is self-revealed and its correctness (*pramā*) self-evident, and on this self-evident correctness are based all the actions of man.

Though the proof of the correctness of knowledge is inherent in it, no one of us admits that there can be no error at all. Though we naturally and automatically accept the validity of knowledge by intuition, yet on occasions we question the validity of knowledge under compulsion, and at times we do oppose, criticize, reject and declare it to be an error. But when are we compelled to do so? We do so when we find that the knowledge in question is opposed to or sublated by another piece of knowledge which has been already proved to be true; or when we find that the causes from which the knowledge has sprung are faulty and consequently unable to produce the correct knowledge. In short, we reject a newly acquired piece of knowledge as error for two reasons: first, when it is contradictory to what has already been proved to be true; secondly, when the cause of the knowledge is found faulty. The faults or defects of the cause of knowledge are briefly shown below:

Knowledge is of two kinds, direct (*pratyaksha*) and indirect (*paroksha*). Knowledge acquired through the perception of the senses is called direct knowledge; and knowledge gained from inference or *śabda-pramāṇa* (verbal authority) is called indirect knowledge. If the eye is weak or suffering from jaundice or any other disease, the knowledge acquired through it cannot be free from error. Thus the degree of error in the knowledge is proportional to the weakness or defect of the sense-organ through which the knowledge is gained.

The cause of indirect knowledge is *vyāpti-jñāna*, or the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of two things. If it is not correct, the inference drawn from it is sure to be erroneous. Thus even when a word is faultless, the indirect knowledge of its meaning, which is based on the word itself, is regarded as an error if the man using it is unable to pronounce it correctly or is careless or deceitful.

According to this rule, if the indirect knowledge derived from the Vedic words be regarded as erroneous, then we are compelled to admit

that there is some fault in the Vedic words themselves, or there is some knowledge in this world higher than what is derivable from the Vedic words.

In reply to the above the Mīmāṁsakas say that there is no possibility of the knowledge springing from the Vedic words being tainted with the faults mentioned above. From the Vedic words we understand that those who want to go to heaven should perform certain sacrifices like *jyotishṭoma, darśa-paurṇamāsa, agnishṭoma,* etc. We do not find any contradictory proof, namely, that eternal happiness in heaven is not derivable from these sacrifices. Heaven cannot be proved by any evidence that can be used by men. Similarly, we have no strong reason to think that after death a happy life in heaven is not possible. Therefore there is no strong contrary reason to prove the knowledge of the duty of performing Vedic sacrifices as erroneous. Next, the doubt that the authority of the Vedas must be rejected owing to the faults like error, carelessness, defect in the sense-organ, deception, etc., in the author or the propounder of the Vedas, is also not reasonable; for it has been shown above that so long as this doctrine is not refuted by strong reason and evidence, the knowledge of the supernatural meanings derivable from the Vedic words and the self-evident truth inherent in them cannot be discarded. If the existence of the author of the Vedas be proved, then only the possibility of his faults like error etc., is imaginable. Since the Vedas consist of words which have come down from time immemorial, and since there is no author of the Vedas, its axiomatic authority stands unassailable. This is the sum and substance of the Mīmāṁsaka view regarding the authorlessness and self-evident authority of the Vedas.

Though the monistic Vedāntists accept the self-evident authority of the Vedas, yet they do not believe in the Mīmāṁsaka theory about the authorlessness of the Vedas. According to them the Vedas have been naturally revealed without any effort, like respiration, from the eternal, pure, wise and ever free God at the beginning of the new cycle, and as such their self-evident authority cannot be rejected.

An interesting point to note is the difference of opinion between the earlier and later schools of Mīmāṁsā. The latter do not agree in the arguments adopted by Jaimini, Śabara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa to establish the self-evident authority of the Vedas without postulating God and admitting His authorship of the Vedas. The later Mīmāṁsakas like Āchāryas Prabhākara, Khaṇḍadeva, Gāgābhaṭṭa and Āpodeva do not

hesitate to assert that the author of the Vedas cannot be any one but the omniscient and omnipotent God; more than this, they declare in unequivocal terms that the existence of an omniscient and omnipotent God and His authorship of the Vedas have been proved beyond any shadow of doubt with the help of the Vedas themselves.

II


It is necessary here to know the exact meaning of the word *mīmāṁsā*. It means the reasoning which has to be adopted in order to understand the connotation of a word or a sentence. The interconnected words and sentences which teach the method of such reasoning constitute what is called Pūrva-mīmāṁsā. The epithet *pūrva* is added because it deals primarily and exhaustively with the method of reasoning regarding the rites which form the *pūrva* or earlier portion of the Vedas.

It is also known as Karma-mīmāṁsā, since it seeks to find out the real nature of these rites and the results accruing from their due performance.

However, it is necessary for every student of this philosophy to remember that the subject-matter of this system is the study of the Vedic rites.

Acts are divided into two classes ordained and forbidden. *Darśa paurṇmāsa, agnihotra, jyotishṭoma*, etc., are ordained acts. Drinking wine, killing a Brāhmin, etc., are forbidden acts. The Pūrva-mīmāṁsā discusses at length, in the light of the Vedic texts, the nature of the Vedic rites, their primary and secondary character, their priority and posteriority in the matter of performance together with their results and purposes, and also the particular sense or method in which a Vedic injunction, ordained or otherwise, is to be interpreted to bring about the desired result. This, in short, is the aim of the Mīmāṁsā philosophy. A detailed discussion on the above points is not possible in this short article. We, therefore, proceed to a consideration of some of those features which account for the high esteem in which this philosophy has ever been held in India, and which constitute its contribution to the development of the religious life of the country.

Though very little has been said in this system about the real nature of the self of man, who alone is entitled to perform the ordained acts such as sacrifices (*yajña*), offering of oblations in the consecrated fire


द्वितीयः प्रस्तारः
षट्पञ्चाशदुत्तरं लोकम्पृणाः १५६
इष्टकाः २००
अर्धेष्टकाः ५२
षोडश,इष्टकाः ३६
पक्षेष्टका २१२/२००
एवमेव चतुर्थ प्रस्तार
पक्षेष्टकाः ११२
षोडशी ३६

VEDIC ALTAR



YAJNAPURUSHA

(*homa*) and charity (*dāna*), we shall briefly discuss this subject from the standpoint of the Mīmāṁsakas.

Like other dualistic schools of philosophers such as the Naiyāyikas and Vaiseshikas, the Mīmāṁsakas believe in the separateness of the self (*jīvātman*) from the body, senses and mind, and look upon special properties like intelligence, will and effort as the natural attributes of the self.

There is no specific mention, however, of the real nature of the *jīvātman* in the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* of Jaimini. Śabarasvāmī, the commentator of this book, makes only a passing reference to it in his commentary, but even that is not his own. He only quotes some earlier commentator whose identity has not yet been determined. Some are of opinion that the commentator was his teacher Upavarsha. But there are reasons to disbelieve this assumption.

There is no clear mention of the *jīvātman* as either infinite or of the size of the body; or atomic, either in the original *Sūtras* or in Śabara's commentary. Later Mīmāṁsakas, however, accepting the Naiyāyika view regard it as all-pervasive like ether.

From such Vedic texts as "This is he, the performer of sacrifices, who attains heaven thereby," the Mīmāṁsakas concluded that heaven is the *summum bonum* of human life. There is, however, no indication in the works of Jaimini, Śabara and Kumārila as to whether this heaven (*svarga*) is identical with bliss, or it is a place where happiness unalloyed with pain or grief can be enjoyed. Later Mīmāṁsakas understood the term in the latter sense. But most of the Mīmāṁsakas maintain that heaven does not mean anything but bliss. In support of this view they cite the following saying of the *rishis*: "That happiness which is not mixed with sorrow, or eclipsed by any other mental state, which has no cessation and which is available for the mere wish, is heaven (*svarga*)."

Śabarasvāmī has openly declared that this heaven cannot be enjoyed on this earth. To attain it one must leave the body behind. According to him, people offer oblations and perform sacrifices with the desire of attaining heaven; but when it is not possible to realize heaven in this body, the faithful performer of these sacrifices is forced to believe that this body is not the soul; for heaven cannot be attained unless this body is destroyed, though people spend huge sums of money and undergo many hardships in performing sacrifices with the desire of going there.

The self-revealed Śrutis clearly say that the performance of sacrifices, the offering of oblations and charity are the means of attaining heaven. Yet when the present body is not fit for enjoying it on this earth, the soul must be encased in a suitable body for the purpose. It must therefore be admitted by all who have faith in the authority of the Vedas that there is the eternal soul as an entity distinct from this body. This is the conclusion of Śabarasvāmī.

There is no clear indication in the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* or the commentary of Śabara about the possibility of emancipation (*moksha*) of the self. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who was the immediate predecessor of Saṅkarāchārya, states in his *Ślokavārttika* that emancipation (*moksha*) is the supreme end of the self. But his emancipation does not include happiness. The real nature of emancipation is the perfect extinction of sorrow. Kumārila has no hesitation in discarding the view that the realization of the bliss of the soul is the real nature of emancipation.

The Mīmāṁsakas do not believe in the absolute dissolution (*mahāpralaya*) of this world. They say that this universe exists as it is from eternity, and there is no proof that this eternal religion of the Vedas and its followers belonging to the three castes will ever be totally extinct. From Kumārila Bhaṭṭa downwards the Mīmāṁsakas have propounded this view with great force.

Man is not omniscient. We can know of supernatural things only through the Vedas, as did Manu and other great sages. The above Mīmāṁsakas believe that man can never acquire omniscience without the help of the Vedas.

In the Mīmāṁsā philosophy, work recommended by the scriptures has been convincingly proved to be the source of all blessings that man can get. It is through such work that man can fulfil his desires and at last attain to emancipation, which is tantamount to the extinction of all misery and sorrow. The Mīmāṁsakas do not believe that knowledge divorced from ritualistic work can enable a man to rise to the full stature of his being. Man is born to do this kind of work. Renunciation of this work, in other words, the non-performance of ordained acts instead of doing him any positive good either in this world or in the next, plunges him into a sea of troubles and sufferings here and hereafter. The Mīmāṁsakas proclaim with a clarion voice that it is a pity to be born as man in this world if the individual fails to perform ordained actions.

To preclude the possibility of slackness in ritualistic work, the Mīmāṁsakas give more importance to the ordained acts, namely, sacrifices etc., than to the deities in whose favour these sacrifices, accompanied with the offering of oblations, are performed. The deities occupy a secondary place in this system; nay, it even denies their existence as something separate from the *mantras*. The duty of performing ordained actions throughout life is emphatically enjoined in this school of philosophy, which defines this duty and classifies it. The Mīmāṁsakas hold that a knowledge of the innumerable ordained actions which a man has to perform throughout life is obtainable from the Vedas only and not from any other source or authority. They cite the following Vedic story to give an idea of the extent and depth of this great ocean of knowledge, the Vedas: "There was a famous sage named Bharadvāja. By dint of penance he attained a long life of three hundred years, during which time he led a celibate life, performing the ordained Vedic rites and studying the Vedas. At last he was crippled with age and was confined to bed. One day Indra himself came to him and said, 'Bharadvāja, if I extend your life by a hundred years more, what will you do with it?' He replied, 'I shall utilize it in the same way as I have done so far.' Whereupon Indra showed him three large mountains that he had never seen, placed before him a handful of dust from each and said, 'Bharadvāja, the three mountains that you see are the three Vedas—*Sāma*, *Ṛk* and *Yajuḥ*; they are eternal and endless; what you have collected from your teacher and from the study of the Vedas by observing celibacy is equal only to these three handfuls of dust; the endless remainder still lies unexplored before you. Come, learn from me the real import of the Vedas. They are the source of all knowledge.' So saying Indra initiated him into the mysteries of the worship of that fire which is connected with the sun as a means to the attainment of Vedic knowledge. Bharadvāja worshipped it properly and obtained eternal life in heaven" (*Tait. Br.* 3. I. 12).

There is an elaborate discussion in Śabara's commentary on whether the deities have forms. The Mīmāṁsā philosophy emphatically maintains that man can get all his desires fulfilled by performing properly and at the proper time the rites enjoined in the Vedas, and the question whether the gods have bodies or not need not trouble him, as it is immaterial to his purpose. Students of this philosophy should always remember the purport of the system, without which the study will be fruitless.

Śabarasvāmī, while establishing the Mīmāṁsaka theory of the eternal nature of sounds (or words), has refuted *sphoṭavāda* in his commentary. According to the *sphoṭavādins*—the grammarians and philosophers—words (*i.e.* sounds) like *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ*, etc., are elementary sounds without any component parts; *g*, *au* and *ḥ* are not considered parts of *gauḥ*. But Śabarasvāmī says that *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ*, etc., are not elementary sounds; *gauḥ* is nothing but a combination of *g*, *au* and *ḥ*; hence the word is not elementary, but a combination of some successive letters, of which it is composed. Therefore no word is conceivable as elementary, as the *sphoṭavādins* would have it. There is, besides, no proof in support of their view. In this connection Śabara quotes Upavarsha as follows: "Bhagavān Upavarsha says that *gauḥ* is formed by combining *g*, *au* and *ḥ*."

Jaimini has not mentioned in his work anything about the existence of the omniscient, omnipotent and all-merciful God, the creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe. Śabarasvāmī and Kumārila are also silent on this point. But the later exponents of this system, viz. Khaṇḍadeva and Gāgābhaṭṭa, have clearly expressed their views on this point. They rather declare unhesitatingly that it is not the object of this philosophy to deny the existence of the benevolent God, but to explain the real nature of the Vedic rites and ceremonies and other allied topics. They opine that about God and salvation the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā system has nothing new to add to what has been so exhaustively discussed in the Uttara-mīmāṁsā or Vedānta. Hence there is no reason to conclude that Jaimini, Śabara and Kumārila did not believe in the existence of God or salvation.

Many topics, sufficiently interesting to the specialist, have been omitted in this treatment, which is meant for the general reader, who, we hope, will get here a bird's-eye view of the nature, scope, method and main conclusions of this ancient system of philosophy.

THE CHĀRVĀKA PHILOSOPHY

The Chārvāka philosophy has passed through four stages of development. In its first stage it was a mere tendency of opposition. It called in question all kinds of knowledge, immediate as well as mediate, and all evidence, perception as well as inference. It denied the authority of even the Vedas. In that period, its name was Bārhaspatya. In its second stage, *svabhāvavāda*, recognition of perception as a source of knowledge and the theory of the identification of the body with the self were incorporated into it. In that stage it took the form of a system of philosophy. However low its position may be in the rank of philosophical systems, it can by no means be denied that at that remote period of Indian history it was the only system of philosophy worthy of its name. In this period flourished famous materialists, like Ajita Keśakambalin, Kambalāśvatara and Purāṇa Kāśyapa, and it came to be known as 'Lokāyata.' In its third stage an extreme form of hedonism, which was due perhaps to the corruption of freedom of thought—social, religious and political, formed the most important feature of this school. Gross sensual pleasure superseded bliss or contemplative joy, and licentiousness replaced liberty. As a consequence of this impact of corruption and misunderstanding, Chārvākism originated. In that stage this school preached: "Eat, drink and be merry, for to-morrow you may die." The reaction to this extreme form of licentiousness was destructive of the very vitality of this school. From that time this extreme form of the materialistic school leaned towards spiritualism. Hitherto it had maintained that the body was the self; now, being severely attacked by the spiritualists, it gave up the theory that there was no self apart from the body and tried, gradually, to identify the sense organs, the vital principle and the organ of thought with the self. Before that the materialists had affirmed that inference was not a means of knowledge; but now they accepted at first probability and then even inference, though in a restricted form, as a source of true knowledge. Philosophers like Purandara were the advocates of this form of Indian materialism. In its fourth stage it came to be at one with the Buddhists and the Jains in opposing the Vedicists and got the common designation of *nāstika*. A *nāstika* is one who condemns the Vedas. As the literature of this school is now entirely lost except what

has reached us in fragments, we are quite unable to give here verbatim the original *sūtras* (aphorisms) of this school that represent its various aspects and phases. But there are passages both in *sūtra* and *śloka* (verse) form which embody in substance these different stages of the Lokāyata school. We can have a complete systematic work of the materialists of India if we gather them together in a sympathetic manner.

Tradition ascribes to Bṛihaspati the first treatise of this school and there is no reason for rejecting this view. It is evident from the *sūtras* extant and quoted under his name that he was not a mythical figure. He was a historical personage. But it is very difficult to ascertain who this Bṛihaspati was. It is probable that the conception of this school first dawned on Bṛihaspati, the preceptor of the gods, who is regarded by scholars like Professor Belvalkar as the first founder of this Bārhaspatya system. If we may give the credit of founding this system to more men than one, we should like to mention the names of Ajita Keśakambalin, Chārvāka and Purandara as the founders, respectively, of the Lokāyata, Chārvāka and Nāstika systems. We know from the *Mahābhāshya* of Patañjali that Bhāguri was one of the expounders of the Lokāyata dogmas. Not a single *sūtra* attributed to Bhāguri of the Lokāyata school having been recovered, we cannot assign him any place in these stages of development of Indian materialism. We shall now deal more fully with these four stages.

PRE-BUDDHISTIC PERIOD

In ancient India, the necessaries of life being abundantly provided for by nature, the struggle for existence was not very keen. The metaphysical and religious problems formed the main subjects of speculation for the people. They meditated on how and why the world in which they lived was created: What were they? Whence did they come? Whither would they go? What had they to do? They made an endeavour to answer these questions in their own way and thus laid the foundation of philosophical enquiries in India. These queries are recorded in the Vedas, the oldest literature of mankind still extant. These earliest attempts cannot properly be called philosophical systems, rigidly consistent and calmly reasoned. They are more like landmarks. After a long course of development they became systematic and perfect. Amongst these systems of Indian philosophy materialism can be counted as very old. Some go so far as to regard it as the oldest and adduce

among others, the following reasons in support of their opinion. It is a fact that all other schools of thought try to refute the truths established by this school, thus admitting its priority. It is also a fact that the word *darśana* in its primary sense means perception; in its secondary sense it means the *śāstra* (scripture) which is as good an authority as perception. This emphasis on perception reminds us of the materialists and there are scholars who maintain that the word first originated with the followers of Bṛihaspati. It was from them that it was borrowed by other schools. This fact induces them to establish the priority of this *darśana* to all others. Scholars are even bold enough to declare that the materialistic school is the only original school of philosophy; all other schools originated simply for the sake of refuting and destroying this school, whose teachings, according to them, were detrimental to the best interests of mankind. Others, again, say that it may be as old as other schools of philosophy, but not older. Materialism is preached nowhere as a doctrine of philosophy, except as a reaction against some perverted ideas or practices. The materialists of India, namely, Bṛihaspati and his followers, do not pretend to lay down a constructive system of philosophy of their own. They try to refute the foolish orthodoxy of other schools. This, in their opinion, proves that the system of Bṛihaspati cannot be the first system; it is rather the last. It raises objections against the views of all other systems, which presupposes their existence.

But all systems of philosophy are the growth of years, nay, centuries. The systems which we possess of the different schools of philosophy, each distinct from the others, are rather the last summing up of what had been growing up among many generations of isolated thinkers and cannot claim to represent the very first attempts at a systematic treatment. A large mass of philosophical thought must have existed in India long before there was any attempt at dividing it into well-defined departments of systematic philosophy or reducing it to writing. But such a growth must have required a great length of time. So it is probable that during that long period the views of one system were discussed in another. Then anything could be added or left out. Subsequently each system reached the form in which we find it. It is not improbable that the Lokāyata school, being developed as the first system of philosophy, raised objections against the views of other schools which were yet mere tendencies and took shape as systems later on. Thus, although as mere

tendencies almost all philosophical thoughts are contemporaneous, as systems they belong to different ages.

Originally, this school of Bṛihaspati meant *vitaṇḍā* or casuistry and nothing else. With its impatience of all authority, it tried to refute the views of other schools. It was, in its original stage, without any constructive element and without any positive theory to propound; it was negative and destructive. This negative aspect finds expression in the Vedas themselves. From the earliest Vedic times there were people who denied the existence of even the Vedic deities. The Vedic hymns pointedly refer to scoffers and unbelievers. Those hymns which are traditionally ascribed to Bṛihaspati, the son of Loka, contain the first germs of protest against a mere verbal study of the Vedas and emphatically declare that a man who tries to understand them is far superior to a mere priest. The celebrated hymn on frogs is a satire, says Prof. Max Müller, upon Vedic priesthood or better upon the system of hymn chanting. Yāska clearly tells us that those who merely memorize the texts without knowing their meaning do not see the real form of the Vedas and that such people are deluded, inasmuch as the way to attain the *summum bonum* is not revealed to them. In various Brāhmaṇas mere knowledge of a performance has been mentioned as having the same effect as the performance itself. In the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* it is stated that a performance accompanied by knowledge, produces a better result than a performance without knowledge. Jaimini, in his *Purva Mīmāṁsā Sūtras,* recording this opposition devotes an entire chapter to drawing the conclusion that study consists not only in learning by heart the letter of the Vedas but also in clearly understanding their spirit Traces of an opposition to the religion of the Vedas appear in the Vedas and in later works. In the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* we find, "Why should we repeat the Vedas or offer this kind of sacrifice!" Later on the very authoritativeness of the Vedas was questioned. Opposition was the only duty of the followers of Bṛihaspati and they did it from the very beginning of their career. They opposed the Vedas and the practice of repeating them mechanically. But all these represent only the negative aspect of the Bārhaspatya system, which therefore appeared to be incomplete. To remedy this, it found out a way. While in its first stage it admitted no authority other than its own, in its second stage, in explanation of the why of an event or product it accepted the doctrine of *svabhāva* (nature). This doctrine maintains that "the effects ar

self-existent and are produced neither by different things as causes nor by themselves, inasmuch as no cause can be found for the filaments of the lotus or the eye-like marks on the peacock's tail. If it cannot be found, it certainly does not exist. Such is the case with this diversified universe. Similarly, feelings like pleasure, pain, etc., have no causes, because they appear only at times." This doctrine of *svabhāva* had been in vogue in independent forms. In the course of centuries it came to be affiliated to the Bārhaspatya system, which thus became the earliest representative of the extreme form of *svabhāvavāda*. From this time the rejection of the causal principle and of the good and evil consequences of actions formed its most important feature. The product comes into existence without any cause. This materialistic view was emphasized by Bṛihaspati in Vedic times: In the first age of the gods the existent was born of the non-existent. The *Śvetāśvatara Upanishad* enumerates some of the most popular theories current at the time in explanation of the origin of the universe, and naturalism is one of them. Up till then it was an independent doctrine and the Bārhaspatyas were merely the oppositionists. Bṛihaspati, with a lofty enthusiasm, flung away the fetters of religion so that he might be righteous and noble. Some of the verses of the Vedic hymns ascribed to him are quite edifying. Whatever may be said of his followers, his own teachings were of an elevated character. Bṛihaspati had many followers and all of them were independent thinkers raising objections against the current superstitions. It is perhaps for his freedom of thought that he was regarded as the priest and teacher of the gods. But this state of things changed; a reaction against the school of Bṛihaspati set in, for which its negative attitude was perhaps responsible. The Vedic literature posterior to the Mantras is disfigured by anecdotes in which the pious sages poured out their wrath on the heads of those early oppositionists, *i.e.* Bṛihaspati and his followers. The ***Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa*** relates an interesting anecdote which runs as follows: "Once upon a time Bṛihaspati struck the goddess Gāyatrī on the head. The head smashed into pieces and the brain split. But Gāyatrī is immortal. She did not die. Every bit of her brain was alive." Some scholars find an allegorical meaning behind this: Gāyatrī is the symbol of Hinduism; Bṛihaspati tried to destroy it by introducing opposition. But Hinduism is eternal, it was not destroyed. In the ***Maitrāyanī Upanishad*** we find another anecdote: Bṛihaspati having assumed the form of Śukra brings forth false knowledge

for the safety of Indra and for the destruction of the *asuras*. By it the *aśuras* show that good is evil and evil is good; and they say that this new law, which upsets the Vedas, should be studied. Here Bṛihaspati is painted as a deceiver, a hypocrite. The *Mahābhārata* records a story of this period relating how Bṛihaspati the sceptic had a long discussion with Manu, one of the founders of the sacrificial cult, and was in the end converted to the latter's viewpoint. The worst that is said of Bṛihaspati's teaching is that it is drawn from a study of the female intellect which is full of subtlety and deceit! The *Vishṇupurāṇa* records that a number of demons, in ancient times, began to practise severe penances according to the injunctions of the Vedas. This caused great apprehension to Indra. At his prayer Māyāmoha was created who preached to the demons the pernicious doctrines of Bṛihaspati, not for their benefit, but for their destruction. Thus they became enemies of Brāhmaṇas, gave up their duties and were averse to the study of the Vedas. Then, as they had strayed from religious observances, Indra killed them. Almost similar is the account recorded in the *Padmapurāṇa*. Human institutions prosper through opposition. As a reaction against the opposition of Bṛihaspati and his followers, the Vedic schools strove to popularize the Vedic creed of life by means of the most elaborate and thoroughgoing expositions. Never has religion flourished with such luxuriance and in such wide variety, from the purest to the most objectionable, as in this period of Indian cultural history. A dark shadow fell upon the oppositionists; and independent thinking became, for hundreds of years to come, an impossibility through the powerful influence of various schools of the Vedicists. Opposed by the strong advocates of the orthodox community, the Lokāyatikas returned with the affiliation of naturalism (*svabhāvavāda*). Neither of these two doctrines accepted the good or evil consequences of actions. The Lokāyata school, which was so long a mere tendency, now formed a philosophical system. Thus originated the first *darśana*, Lokāyata. Perception was emphasized in the name of this newly built system. So long the Bārhaspatyas did not admit any authority whatsoever. Now, in its new shape, the school accepted the authority of perception. The principle of causation was rejected, because sensuous perception is not an evidence in support of it. Mere perception of two events which stand isolated and self-contained is not sufficient to establish between them a causal relation. "To ascertain whether a given antecedent condition

has the character of a true cause, it is really necessary to find out with certainty the elements of invariability and of relevancy involved in such a notion. But this certitude can never be arrived at." The universal propositions cannot be established by our limited perceptions. Perception presupposes actual contact of the object with the perceiving organ and is thus necessarily confined to the present. It is a case of here and now; it does not extend to the past or the future and is thus unable to establish universal connection of things. In other words, sense perception can give us only particular truths. But the knowledge of particular facts cannot give us knowledge that is universally true. Therefore perception cannot give us universal relations. Nor can they be established by inference alone. For the inference which yields a universal relation as its conclusion cannot work unless it presupposes another universal connection as a necessary pre-condition of its possibility, and that again another, and so on. In other words, the process of reaching a universal conclusion is always like arguing in a circle. Thus even inference in itself is not sufficient to produce a universal proposition. Nor is the universal relation supplied by testimony; for testimony involves inference. Comparison is equally unable to establish a universal relation; it only establishes the relation of a name to something that bears that name. Now such relation of the name and the named is a particular relation, whilst we are in search of an unconditional universal relation. Thus the universal relation, which is indispensable to all inference, is not given by any of the so-called sources of knowledge. Therefore universal relations cannot by any means be established. As inference is not possible without universal connection and universal connection is unattainable, the Lokāyata as a system discarded in its earlier stages inference as a source of knowledge.

It rejected ether as an element, because ether cannot be known by perception, and it maintained that the four elements, viz. earth, air, fire and water, are original principles of all things. These elements, in their atomic condition, when mixed together in a certain proportion and according to a certain order, become transformed into an organism.

Consciousness is a function of the body which is an indispensable factor for its manifestation. Consciousness does not inhere in particles of matter. When these particles come to be arranged into a specific form, in a manner not yet scientifically explicable, they are found to show signs of life. Life and consciousness are identical. Our think-

ing power is destroyed with the dissolution of the elements by whose combination it is evolved. Consciousness is produced from the body which is endowed with life or vital air. Without sensation no consciousness is possible. When the body perishes no consciousness can remain; it must perish also. So there is nothing to transmigrate. The body, consciousness and sense organs are momentary. The mind is merely the product of a combination of elements, just as wines are the results of chemical combinations. The four elements when combined produce or manifest the mind; there is no other reality than they. The instinctive movements and expressions of new-born babes are due to "external stimuli as much as the opening and closing of the lotus and other flowers at different hours of the day or night, or the movement of iron under the influence of loadstone. In the same way the spontaneous generation of living organisms is frequently observed, e.g. the case of animalcules which develop in moisture or infusions or of the maggots or other worms which are developed in the constituent particles of curds and the like and which begin to live and move in so short a time." It is an indisputable fact that sensations and perceptions can arise only in so far as they are conditioned by a bodily mechanism. But it would not be so, were not the body the receptacle of consciousness. The properties of particular preparations of food and drink, conducive to the development of the intellectual powers, afford another proof in favour of the fact that consciousness is a function of the body. As contraction is the function of muscles, so does the brain generate thoughts, movements and feelings. The mind, therefore, has no substantial reality of its own, but springs out of the vibrations of the molecules of the brain. When the molecular activity of the brain sinks below a certain level, consciousness disappears and the mind ceases to exist as in sleep. When again it rises above a certain degree, consciousness reappears. The conscious life is not a life of continuity. It is coming out of and again going into nothing. The hypothesis of a continuous stream of consciousness is a myth of divines and theologians.

One may object that since the body is declared to be the agent of all actions, it should be held responsible for their natural consequences; but this is impossible. The particles which form the body are always in a state of flux and the body which performs an action at one moment does not persist at the next to feel its reaction. It is on the other hand undeniable that the body suffers change. To this the reply of the Lokāya-

tikas is that their system does not admit the existence of consequences of good or evil actions. According to this school the experience of pleasure and pain comes by chance. This is refuted as follows: The theory of matter is unable to account for the facts of memory and recognition. Reason demands that memory and the original experience which gives rise to it should be referred to one and the same conscious subject. But this is possible only when the subject is fundamentally an unchangeable entity. This difficulty is met by the Lokāyatikas in the following manner: The traces left by previous experiences are capable of being transmitted from the material cause to its direct product, an analogous instance being the transference of the odour of musk to the cloth in contact with it. But the general answer of this school to every question is that everything happens through the influence of *svabhāva*. It is *svabhāva* or a law of nature that consciousness is a function of the body and the body is the self.

The Lokāyatikas deny past and future births as there is no reality existing before birth or after death except the four primary elements, and the mind is the product of these. So it cannot be maintained that the mind at death passes on to another body. The mind must be different in different bodies. The consciousness of a body which has already perished cannot be related to the new body which comes into being. One mind cannot produce another mind after total annihilation. The theory that the fœtus is endowed with consciousness is untenable. For consciousness presupposes sensation through the sense organs, all knowledge being posterior to and derived from experience. And the sense organs do not function in the fœtus. Since no power can exist without a subject, therefore when the body perishes, consciousness cannot persist; it must perish with the body. If it be urged that past, present and future births are nothing but particular conditions of the stream of consciousness which according to the Vedicist is eternal, the Lokāyatikas would say that the chain of consciousness is not an entity, and a condition that can be predicated only in respect of an entity cannot be proved with regard to it. A future existence of an entity that is non-existent cannot be predicated. This is how the Lokāyatikas reject the existence of future or previous births.

They also maintain that there is no soul apart from the body. If there be any soul, it is only the living principle of all organisms. It exists so long as the body exists, and ceases to exist with it. It is the

body that feels, sees, hears, remembers and thinks. When one says, 'I am stout,' 'I am lean,' 'I am dark,' one evidently means the body. Stoutness, leanness or darkness attaches only to the body. Phrases like 'my body' are only metaphorical. Just as a knave might induce an innocent person to accept glass and other such worthless materials in exchange for precious stones, so has the Śruti misled the innocent devotee by making him believe that the soul is distinct from the body, thus displacing his inborn and therefore the right belief that the body and the soul are identical. As nothing answering to the soul exists after death to go to the next world, there is no necessity of admitting the existence of such a place.

With the denial of *karma* this school denies the existence of the universal mysterious agency called fate (*adṛishṭa* or *daiva*). It denies the existence of merits or demerits acquired in our previous existence. In answer to the objection that fate must be admitted as the cause of the differences and determinations of the phenomenal world, Bṛihaspati's followers bring forward the doctrine of *svabhāva* or spontaneous generation of things according to their respective natures. Religion is as harmful as opium; prayer is the hope of men who are weak, without the will-power to do anything; worship is insincere egotism to save oneself from the tortures of hell, and prophets are the greatest liars among men. The Vedas are no authority; for they contain *mantras* (formulæ) which do not convey any meaning whatsoever: some are ambiguous or absurd or contradictory, and some repeat what is already known. As regards the other portions of the Vedas, we always find discrepancies and contradictions among them; cases are not rare where a line of action prescribed by one text is condemned by another. Again, they speak of results that are never realized. If it were possible for the sacrifices to make one reach heaven after the performance of them has ceased, the performers themselves have perished and the requisites have been used up, then the trees of a forest burnt down by fire might as well produce abundant fruit. Religious exercises and ascetic practices are merely a means to livelihood for men devoid of intellect and manliness. A *Putreshṭi* sacrifice performed for the birth of a child may or may not be followed by that event. When a child is born, the knaves say that it is due to the power of their incantations uttered in the course of the rite; and when a child is not born, they explain it as being due to the rites being incomplete in some way or other. The priests say that a beast slain in a sacrifice

goes to heaven. Then how is it that they do not kill their own old fathers in a sacrifice in order to send them directly to heaven? If the offerings in a funeral ceremony may produce gratification to beings who are dead, then in the case of travellers, when they start, it is needless to give them provisions for the journey. All these ceremonies are prescribed by the Brāhmins as a means to their livelihood and are worth no more than that. Hence the endeavour to propitiate the gods through religious ceremonies—to satisfy them by prayers—is vain and illusive. Religion is the invention of individuals desirous of deceiving their fellowmen in order to further their own selfish interests. There is no particular place named heaven; even the Vedas themselves doubt the existence of a world beyond. If a man goes to another world after death, why does he not come back drawn by the love of his friends and relatives? When once the body is reduced to ashes, how can it ever go to another world? When we die, everything ends there. We do not enter into a region of pain, or of darkness unrelieved by a single ray of light. That God is the judge of our actions also does not stand to reason, because in that case partiality and cruelty on His part would be inevitable. If He visits us with the evil consequences of our sins, He becomes our enemy for nothing. Therefore it is better not to have a God than to have a cruel and partial God. There is no such thing as God, the supreme author and governor of the world, an omniscient spirit; the senses cannot reach Him. *Adrishṭa* (fate), the principle of causality, and inference itself are also denied. The Vedas reveal no signs of infallibility. So how can we ascertain that an all-knowing, all-pervading and all-powerful spirit exists? Nature and not God is the watchword of this school.

As a consequence of this kind of destructive criticism, *kāma* or the fulfilment of desire was considered to be the *summum bonum* of human life. At this stage the Vrātyas or the Aryans of previous and later migrations were incorporated into this sect. They too, like the Lokāyatikas, challenged everything including the caste system, the sacrifices and the Vedas and were bitter opponents of orthodox Brāhmaṇism. Of these Vrātyas, we hear of as many as sixty heretical teachers. Strengthened by the support of these Vrātyas, the Lokāyatikas exhorted people to strain every nerve to work out their immediate earthly welfare instead of running after heaven. The result of this movement was an aspiration for freedom, by which they meant an all-round freedom—freedom for the individual as well as for society, for man as

well as for woman, for the rich as well as for the poor, for individuals and for classes. They called upon all to cast off their agelong shackles and march shoulder to shoulder towards freedom. The wonderful result of this struggle for freedom was the rise of the Buddhistic culture. Buddha's views against the Vedic sacrifices, the memorizing and fruitless repetition of the Vedic *mantras*, the caste system, the authority of the Vedas and the worship of the deities, the magic rites and the ascetic practices—have their counterpart in the views of the Lokāyata. It is perhaps because Buddhism was greatly influenced by the Lokāyata school that we find in later accounts of this system the doctrines of Buddha and Chārvāka almost amalgamated and the name 'Chārvāka' sometimes applied to Buddha. India had been seething with free-thinking and Buddha was the product of this freedom. No man ever lived so godless, yet so godlike a life as he did. The *Vishṇupurāṇa* has a record of this stage of the school. It refers to a sect of people of very ancient origin who were free to live wherever they liked, unworried by conventions, pure at heart and blameless in action. Virtue or vice they had none; they lived in an atmosphere of perfect freedom in which men could move without the fear of conventional dogmas of religion and social usage. But the people were not satisfied merely with social and religious freedom; politics became incorporated with the Lokāyata school, which ignored *ānvīkshikī* (metaphysics) and *trayī* (Vedas) which dealt with the supersensuous, and appreciated *daṇḍanīti* (politics) and *vārttā* (economics) as the only branches of knowledge deserving special cultivation. The earthly king became the only God. So long *kāma* or pleasure was considered to be the only good of human life; now *artha* or material advantage was added to it. As the Lokāyatikas captured the hearts of the cultured as well as the common people, all became earnest in working out their immediate earthly welfare. The result of this movement was the origination and propagation of different arts and sciences. Vātsyāyana mentions some sixty-four names of Indian fine arts which flourished probably in this period of Indian materialism. Kambalāśvatara, Ajita Keśakambalin and many other materialists also wrote their works on Indian materialism during this period. The *Sāmānnaphalasutta* preserves the following record of Ajita's view: There is no such duty as the giving of alms, or the performance of sacrifices or the making of offerings. Good and evil deeds produce no results, and there is no such thing as this world or the next. There is neither father

nor mother nor beings springing into life even without them. There are no recluses or Brāhmaṇas who having realized the meaning of both this world and the next make their wisdom known to others. A human being is made up of four elements. When he dies, the earth element in him returns to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire and the airy element to the air. Four bearers remove his dead body till they reach the burning ground; men utter forth his eulogies, but there his bones are bleached and his offerings end in ashes. The talk of gifts is the doctrine of fools. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is a prophet there. Fools and wise men alike, on the dissolution of their body, are annihilated; after death they are not. This Ajita flourished during the lifetime of Buddha. Up to that time politics was not taken up by the Lokāyatika; so there is no trace of it in the teachings of Ajita. In later accounts, specially in the record preserved by Kṛishṇa Miśra, it is mentioned very distinctly. Kṛishṇa Miśra gives an almost perfect account of the doctrines of the Lokāyata school: "Lokāyata is always the only *śāstra*. In it, only perceptual evidence is authority. The elements are earth, water, fire and air. Wealth and enjoyment are the objects of human existence. Matter can think. There is no other world. Death is the end of all."

POST-BUDDHISTIC PERIOD

This prosperity and success of the Lokāyata system ended in corruption and misrepresentation. Extreme freedom gave birth to licentiousness. Supreme bliss was transformed into sensual pleasure, the enjoyment of which in its gross form became the only end of human life. The elevated teachings of Bṛihaspati were metamorphosed into the eroticism of his wicked followers. Let us enjoy pleasure alone, they said. It is the only thing which is true and good. The only reasonable end of man is enjoyment. We know pleasure is never pure, never free from pain. But because pleasure is mixed with pain, should we therefore reject our life? Should we fling away sheaves of paddy rich with the finest white grains because they are covered with the husk and dust? Should we refrain from plucking lotuses because there are thorns in them? Shall we not take fish because they have bones and scales? Should we exclude rice from our meal only for the trouble it will give in husking? Who will not soothe his mind and body in ambrosial moonlight though there are spots in the moon? Shall we not enjoy the pleasant

breeze of summer because there is a little dust in it? Should we not prepare food for fear of beggars? Unmixed happiness is not available in this world, yet we cannot overlook the least bit of it. The only good of life is the individual's own pleasure. We should fully enjoy the present; to sacrifice for the future is unwarranted and perilous. The present is ours; the past is dead and gone; the future is doubtful. The present is all that we have; let us make the most of it. With this credo the Lokāyatikas of that remote period of Indian history preached and practised an extreme form of hedonism. At this stage Indian materialism got the additional designation of Chārvāka. The word means 'entertaining speech.' "While you live, drink; for once dead, you never shall return." "As long as he lives, let a man live happily; even borrowing money, let him drink ghee." The propagation of this cult was the first step towards the downfall of the system of Lokāyata. At this stage of Indian materialism the Buddhists and Jains came to the field of philosophy to preach spiritualism. In their first appearance they pretended to be the successors of the old heretics, *i.e.* the followers of Bṛihaspati, by directing their attacks mainly against the doctrines relating to sacrifices as actually preached and practised in the Vedic school. They became, like the Lokāyatikas, very popular for the time being, as the minds of the people were still under the sway of materialistic doctrines. But as time went on, the state of things began to change. The Chārvākas came to know what these new-comers really were. They led their opposition against the orthodox Buddhists and Jains as they had previously done against the Vedicists. The result was that the Lokāyatikas were opposed both by the Vedicists and by the Buddhists and Jains. By this simultaneous attack from various sides they were for the first time pushed to the corner. The philosophers of the Vedic school now became very strong; aided by the spiritualistic doctrines of the new heretics, they stood as successors of the sages of old and repelled the attacks on the eternal principles of spirituality. As time passed, one Vedic school after another opposed the heretics in general, both old and new – the Lokāyatikas, Buddhists and Jains. They opposed the materialistic views of the old heretics and the anti-Vedic doctrines of the new.

The pioneer of these advocates of the orthodox Vedic school was perhaps the sage Gotama, who adduced very strong arguments against the theory of *dehātmavāda* (which preaches that the body is the self) of the old heretics and established the theory that the body is different from

the soul. Then came Kaṇāda who made an endeavour to refute the theory of *svabhāvavāda* or naturalism of the old heretics by propagating the theory that the diversity of creation cannot be due to nature, which is unconscious. The diversity, he said, is produced from the atoms, which are unconscious, through the will of God in agreement with the doings of one's previous births. After him, Kapila, who is regarded by some as representing the oldest trend of philosophy, formulated his arguments in favour of dualism, for which the field had already been prepared by his predecessors. Then came Patañjali with his system of Yoga and tried to establish the existence of God. When, through the influence of these teachers, the mass mind was almost inclined towards spiritualism and belief in the transmigration and spiritual nature of the soul, Jaimini appeared and made an attempt to establish by argument that the Vedas were infallible and authoritative; that *karma* or action was more powerful than even God, if there was any; and that for the sake of the purification of the mind the performance of rites was indispensable. When, under the influence of Jaimini, the minds of the people became prepared, by the performance of duties sanctioned by the Vedas, for conceiving the spiritualistic soul, and the influence of anti-Vedic doctrines and tendencies was, for the time being, almost worn off, Vyāsa came to the field and preached his spiritualistic or idealistic philosophy. Lokāyata, being thus opposed by these powerful adversaries, wavered and leaned towards spiritualism. This stage may be called the second or the middle stage of its downfall, when it admits, gradually, the identification of the self with the sense-organs, the vital principle and the mind, shaking off its old doctrine of the identification of the self with the body. The first view, in which the self is identified with the sense-organs, is based on the fact that consciousness and bodily movements follow the initiative of the senses and that the judgement expressed in "I am blind," which shows this identification, is universally accepted as valid. Opposed further by the spiritualists, it maintains that the vital principle is really the source of intelligence, for on it the senses depend for their existence and operation. When this view too was attacked, its sponsors maintained that consciousness was a quality of the mind. The other organs were only the means of indeterminate sense knowledge. It was the mind that introduced the elements of determinateness. Moreover, the mind by its power of volition controlled the outer organs and might persist and function even when the latter were absent. Therefore the mind was

the true self. All these have been recorded by Sadānanda in his *Advaita-brahma-siddhi.* He speaks of four different materialistic schools, the chief point of contention among whom is the conception of the soul. One school regards the soul as identical with the gross body, another with the senses, a third with the vital principle, and the fourth with the organ of thought. Again, the Lokāyatikas had so long maintained that perception was the only source of knowledge. Now being severely attacked by its opponents, who maintained the authority of inference, it showed for the first time its leaning towards admitting inference as a source of knowledge. At first it said that for practical purposes probability was sufficient. At the sight of smoke rising from a spot we have a sense of the probability of fire and not of its certainty; this is enough for all practical purposes, and there is no need to assume the existence of a distinct kind of evidence called inference. When further pressed, this school accepted inference as a means to right knowledge as it was useful in our daily life. But it rejected the mechanical form of inference proposed by the Buddhists and others as being utterly impracticable for daily use. In other words, it divided inference into two classes—one class referring to the future and the other to the past. It accepted the second and rejected the first, the inference about what has never been perceived, as for example, the future world, God and the soul. Purandara flourished in this period as an advocate of the Chārvāka school. Śaṅkara, the commentators Kamalaśīla and Abhayadeva, Jayanta, the author of the *Nyāyamañjarī,* and the unknown author of the *Sarvamata-saṁgraha* record his views. Being further pressed, this school accepted, at this stage, even ether as an element—a fact adverted to by Guṇaratna.

As they were supported by the Buddhists and the Jains in their attack on the Vedic sacrifices, the old heretical oppositionists again became very powerful. They got their general name of *nāstika* in this period Vedic rites proper were gradually more or less pushed to the background. New scriptures of the Vedic schools were in course of preparation, fully adapted to the needs, tastes and tendencies of the changing times, but not entirely divorced from all connection with the Vedas. Voluminous works were written which satisfied the varying temperaments of the people. But elements of different natures were expressly visible in these schools. By way of compromise with the old heretical school, whose influence still predominated in the country, they included and adapted the popular doctrines regarding indulgence of the senses, and as successors of the

spiritualistic schools, they gave them an esoteric purpose and thus modified them to some extent. Since that time, the period of the great Hindu revival after the fall of Buddhism, India has been popularly Vedic; *i.e.* Paurāṇika and Tāntrika, in her outlook, though the Chārvāka system must have been in existence even so late as the time of Haribhadra, Guṇaratna, Śāntarakshita, Kamalaśīla, Siddhasena, Abhayadeva, Kṛishṇa Miśra, Śrīharsha, Jayanta, Sadānanda, Mādhavāchārya and others who have criticized its theories in their works. It was Śaṅkarāchārya and his school who did not even consider the Chārvāka school to be a system of philosophy. The great reaction against Chārvākism was started by Mādhavāchārya who pronounced the Chārvāka system to be the lowest system of philosophy and scored a most decisive victory over it. Through lapse of time the original works of the Bṛihaspati school, the extreme materialistic system of India, either perished owing to natural causes or were destroyed by its powerful rivals. The Buddhistic and Jain schools, being spiritualistic in essence, did not meet with total annihilation. As to the materialistic school, it may be that for a considerable time its views became more and more feeble and unpopular until it lost independent existence and was absorbed into other schools of spiritualistic philosophy.

VI

SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY (B)

ADVAITAVĀDA AND ITS SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE

The illusoriness of the individual self is apparently the central notion of Advaita Vedānta. Every vital tenet of the philosophy– Brahman as the sole reality, the object as false, *māyā* as neither real nor unreal, Īśvara as Brahman in reference to *māyā*, *moksha* (liberation) through knowledge of Brahman and as Brahman Himself—may be regarded as an elaboration of this single notion.

An illusion, unlike a thinking error, excites wonder as it is corrected. One's apprehension of something as illusory involves a peculiar feeling of the scales falling from one's eye. To be aware of our individuality as illusory would be then to wonder how we could feel like an individual at all. As we are, it is indeed only in faith, if at all, that we accept the illusoriness of our individuality. But even to understand the position, we have to refer to some spiritual experience in which we feel an abrupt break with our past and wonder how we could be what we were. A person behaves as though he believed he were his body, and although he never explicitly says that he is his body, he never also ordinarily feels detached enough from the body to wonder how he cannot yet get rid of the belief. The notion of *adhyāsa* or the false identification of the self and the body would never occur to a person who has no experience of himself as a spirit and of the object being as distinct from the subject as another person is from oneself. It is only one who felt such a distinction of the self and the body that would wonder at his implicit belief in their identity. He can take the identity to be illusory, only if he feels it to be impossible and cannot yet deny its appearance. Vedānta starts with the notion of *adhyāsa* and presupposes such an experience of spiritual detachment from the body including the empirical mind.

We can conceive this spiritual condition as a deepening of the form of moral consciousness in which we not only repent of our past action but find it hard to imagine how we could perform it. In this consciousness, our past being is felt not only to be strangely alien to us but as an intellectual absurdity, as apparently at once subjective and objective, at once I and me. One at best thinks of one's body as me and not as I; but in repentance, unless it is a senseless whipping of a dead horse, one

is aware of the self that is castigated as not merely me but also as I; not only as a thing of the past, alienated or objectified, but as still tingling with subjectivity. In the further stage in which the past appears unintelligible, this past I is not only sought to be disowned but is cognitively viewed as a sort of you (*yushmad*) that is yet I (*asmad*), a contradiction that yet appears. This alienated I which is not mere me is the individual self, and it is on this spiritual plane and not lower that one is cognitively aware of one's individuality. One is aware, however, here of the individual self as a contradiction or as somehow at once true and false, true as the unobjective subject and false in so far as it appears as another I (you), as at once me and I. The notions of the individual self, of the individuality or me as false, and of the eternal self as the I that is never me, are born in one and the same spiritual consciousness.

The individuality is understood as me, *i.e.* as the illusory objectivity of the subject and not merely illusory identity with the object taken as real. The identity of the self and the not-self has the form of the self, being in fact the embodied self and not the conscious body. The individual self means the self feeling itself embodied, the embodiment being only a restrictive adjective of the self; and the illusoriness of the embodiment is the illusoriness of the body itself and not merely of the self's identity with it. The idea of the object in fact as distinct from the subject is derived from the idea of the embodiment, which itself is born in the consciousness of the individual self as false in respect of its individuality.

There is, however, a complexity. The me is taken as illusory not primarily because it is objective, but because the individual self already appears to itself false in so far as it takes itself to be an objective subject, to be a sort of you which is at once me and I. As the individual self is felt to be false, it is realized that the I cannot be me; but this does not prevent the me or the body from appearing as I. There are apparently two illusions—of the I appearing as you (objective subject) and therefore also as me (object), and of the you appearing as I. In the spiritual consciousness in which a person wonders how he could be what he cannot be, he corrects the former illusion, but not the latter, for unless the past self were still present, there could be no sense of intellectual absurdity. His past self (you) is still somehow he, though he sees he cannot be that self. Under the first illusion he is aware of the me or the body as only felt, as his embodiment or limiting character; and the

correction is his realization that such a body was only his individual illusion. In the other illusion that continues, the body appears to be a substantive fact, distinct from him and yet as somehow he. With the correction of the first illusion, he sees that this appearance also should be illusory, but he still does not actually disbelieve it. Hence it is that he wants this illusion to be dissipated and meantime realizes that it is not his individual illusion, but a cosmic illusion, the dissipation of which would mean for him realization of the body and the entire world, of which it is the point of reference, as illusory.

To be conscious of oneself as individual or me is to be conscious of the me as illusory and of the subject or I as the truth. The me is the prototype of objectivity, and to feel it to be illusory is to be aware of the possibility of objectivity itself being illusory. We take a particular object to be illusory only as we believe in the objective world, but we could never conceive the illusoriness of the world itself unless we started with the illusoriness of the me. Were it not also for this starting illusion, an illusory object would not be conceived as it is conceived in Advaita philosophy, namely, as *anirvāchya*, as an unassertible that is yet undeniable. The illusion of a snake being corrected rouses wonder. Wonder should mean that this (rope) being a snake is a contradiction that yet was presented, but there is apparently no actual consciousness here of a contradiction presented as such, viz. of this being at once snake and rope. The spiritual consciousness of one's illusory individuality is, however, explicit consciousness of the contradiction of the self being not-self as having been believed. It is the illusion of the individuality, therefore, that suggests the theory of objective illusion called *anirvāchya-khyātivāda.*

This brings in the concept of *māyā* or the principle of illusion as what cannot be characterized either as real or as unreal. It is primarily the illusion through which the self believes (in willing and feeling) that it is an individual. As this belief persists even when he sees that the self cannot be individual, the individuality appears neither as real nor as unreal, for if the belief were removed, there would be no individual self to see the unreality of individuality. The principle of individuality, then, is prior to the individual's actual consciousness of himself as individual and of this world as his experience (*bhoga*); and as yet this individuality is what cannot be real, it has to be taken as the cosmic principle of illusion. *Māyā* is the principle of individuality, the begin-

ningless nescience that the individual self has to conceive as positively conditioning his individual being as also his subjective ignorance.. To the individual, there are many individuals, and so *māyā* may be taken as the corpus of the many beginningless individualities. Again, as the world is understood as the system of experiences of the individual self, which apart from the self are but empty distinctions and forms, *nāma-rūpa* as they are called, *māyā* may be characterized as the manifold of *nāma-rūpa*—the name and form—which has no self-identity and yet is undeniable.

This last conception of *māyā*, however, is intelligible only through the conception of *māyā* as the cosmic principle of illusory individuality. As cosmic, it has to be understood in reference to the unindividual self or Brahman, though only as what is not Brahman. Brahman has, however, no necessary reference to *māyā*; He can be, but need not be, understood as what is not *māyā*. Understood as what is not *māyā*, or, as it is figuratively put, as shining against *māyā* without being identified with it, or as a Master using this principle as His servant, He is Īśvara, the Lord of the individual selves and the Creator of the world. The world is understood as the system of the experiences of the selves, and as they believe themselves to be individual so far as they will, the experiences are to be taken as their *bhoga* accordant with their *karma*. Īśvara then is conceived as actualizing their *karma* into their *bhoga* or experience, and thus manifesting the manifold of *nāma-rūpa*, which as experienced is just this world or *jagat*.

Īśvara has different relations to the individual selves and to the world. He is the Creator of the world, but not of the selves, the notion of creation of souls being foreign to all Indian philosophy and not to *Advaitavāda* only. Creation is understood as manifestation in the soil of *māyā*. Brahman in a sense becomes the world without losing His transcendence. The world is an absolute appearance, at once real and unreal, real as Brahman, the cause that continues in the effect, and unreal as alienated from Him. It cannot, however, be said similarly that Brahman becomes the *jīva*; the *jīva* is Brahman and only views himself as other than Brahman, the otherness being no absolute appearance, but only the content of his wrong belief. As explained, however, the principle of illusion itself has to be taken by the *jīva* as cosmic, and hence though his individuality is not an absolute appearance, Brahman in relation to him absolutely appears as Īśvara.

Īśvara in Advaita Vedānta is conceived as an absolute emanation from Brahman, though He has been sometimes erroneously supposed to be Brahman as merely viewed by the *jīva* in reference to himself and the world. This reference to himself and the world is not his thinking only; that creative thought (*īkshā*)—"Let me be many," etc.—belongs to Brahman and is not simply allegorically referred to Him by the *jīva*. At the same time this manifold that is manifested by Him is manifested as (partially) unreal, as already 'in the jaws of death,' as in fact as much retracted as created. Hence His creativity is like that of the magician; as the creativity of absolute appearance, His freedom or *śakti* is neither absolutely real nor unreal, and this is just how the cosmic *māyā* is characterized.

As absolutely free in respect of creation, as Brahman Himself with this absolute freedom or *māyā śakti*—a determination that means no restriction of His being—Īśvara is not only not a false idea of the *jīva*, a mere symbol adopted for his *upāsanā* (worship). He is not also an absolute appearance like the world. Īśvara is as much unconstituted by *māyā* as Brahman, and both are characterized by the same epithets—*nitya-buddha-śuddha-mukta* (eternal, omniscient, pure, free). Īśvara has a dual form, as wielding *māyā-śakti* and thus immanent in the world (*vikāravartin*), and as dissociated from it, transcendent (*triguṇātīta*) and merging back into Brahman. As transcendent, Īśvara is conceived as what is not *māyā*, as determined not by *māyā* but by freedom from *māyā*, as other than the world that is put forth by Him as an appearance, while Brahman is understood without reference to *māyā* and the world. The current conception of Brahman and Īśvara as the higher God and the lower God appears to be a fallacious exaggeration of this simple distinction.

Brahman is the eternal Self that has not only no positive determination but has not even the negative determination of consciously rejecting positive determination. He is indeed characterized as *sat* (existence), *chit* (knowledge) and *ānanda* (bliss), but these are not determinations, being each of them the unspeakable absolute viewed by us as beyond the determinate absolutes *sat*, *chit* and *ānanda* formulated by our consciousness. The individual self has not only to correct for himself his subjective illusion of individuality, not only to wait for the cosmic illusion of individuality to be corrected but also to contemplate all correction to be itself illusory. He has to contemplate *moksha* not as

something to be reached or effected or remanifested, not even as an eternal predicament of the self, but as the self itself or the *svarūpa* of Brahman. The self or the absolute is not a thing having freedom but is freedom itself.

The individual illusorily thinks he is not free and wants to be free. To his consciousness, accordingly, there is the necessity of a *sādhana* or discipline to attain freedom. This discipline to him must be such as will lead him to realize that his bondage is an illusion and that he is eternally free. To know the truth about himself can be the only way of attaining freedom, and the discipline therefore is primarily that of knowing (*jñāna*) and secondarily that of willing and feeling (*karma* and *bhakti*). The latter is in the first instance helpful as a preparation for knowledge, as securing the spiritual attitude in which the inquiry into spiritual truth can start. In reality it is more than mere preparation, since with the progressive transparency of the mind effected through any discipline, the truth begins to shine in, though it may not be in the intellectual way. Knowledge that is demanded for freedom is spiritual being rather than the detached consciousness of a spectator, being knowledge of the self not as distinct from but as one with the knowledge. The spiritual being that is secured by *karma* and *bhakti* cannot therefore be very different from *jñāna*. The clarity of spiritual being is implicitly or explicitly the clarity of knowledge.

Vedānta is primarily a religion, and it is a philosophy only as the formulation of this religion. All religion makes for the realization of the self as sacred, but the religion of Advaita is the specific cult of such realization understood explicitly as self-knowledge, as sacred knowledge and as nothing but knowledge. Without rejecting any other *sādhana*, it prescribes knowledge as its distinctive *sādhana* and regards it as self-sufficing and requiring no supplementation (*samuchchaya*). The self is to be known—accepted in the first instance in faith which as confirmed, clarified and formulated by reason would be inwardized into a vision. This work of reason is philosophy, which is thus not only an auxiliary discipline but an integral part of the religion and its characteristic self-expression.

Advaitism as religion and philosophy in one is at once individualistic and universalistic in its spiritual outlook. Religion is nothing if not individualistic: it is an inwardizing of one's subjective being, a deepening

of one's spiritual individuality, this being the unspoken inner function even of a religion with the salvation of all as its professed objective. Philosophy on the other hand is essentially universalistic in its attitude, presenting a truth that is for all, and is not merely a mystic experience of the individual philosopher. As an explicit religion, Advaitism insists on the conservation of one's spiritual individuality or *svadharma,* while implicitly as philosophy, it recognizes the *svadharma* of everyone else as absolutely sacred, being in this sense the most catholic and tolerant among religions. Again as an explicit philosophy, it takes every individual self as the one self or reality, and at the same time as an implicit religion, it denies the world that is common to all and retires into the solitude of subjectivity. In either aspect it appears to combine the boldest affirmation with the most uncompromising denial.

Advaitism stands for a strong spirituality, for efficient practice of idealism, for unworldliness that is neither sentimental nor fanatical. It not only asserts the detachment or freedom of the self from the world, it boldly denies the world, though it does not take even the illusory object to be merely imaginary (*tuchchha*). So too, while it prescribes *nivṛitti* or renunciation of the world in spirit, it demands that it should be practically and methodically achieved through such discipline as is suited to the *adhikāra* or actual spiritual status of each individual, and may not involve even in the case of the highest *adhikārin* a literal adoption of the hermit's life. While the spirit is taken as the only reality, the object is understood not as absolute naught, but as absolute appearance, as a necessary symbolism of the spirit. Logic, law and the revealed word itself are all in this sense symbolism—unreal in themselves and yet showing the reality beyond. The object has thus to be accepted in order to be effectively denied. One has to be a realist to outgrow realism. It is for the strong in spirit to attain the self, and strength consists not in ignoring, but in accepting facts, accepting the conditions of the spiritual game in order to get beyond them.

Advaitism aims at the absolute freedom of the self, freedom from all relativity, including the relativity of good and evil. Freedom from law is however to be achieved by the willing of the law, by the performance of one's moral and spiritual duty without desire—desire not only for pleasure but even for spiritual merit, and by merging one's individuality in objective or institutional spiritual life which represents a *yajña* or the sacrificial concert of gods and men. It would imply the strenuous culti-

vation of a dispassionate serenity of soul and the strength that it implies to keep out illusions and stand unruffled in one's subjective being.

Toleration is to Advaita Vedānta a religion in itself; no one who realizes what any religion is to its votary can himself be indifferent to it. The claim of a religion on its votary is nothing outside the religion and is itself as sacred to others as the religion is sacred to him. While then an individual owes special allegiance to his own religion or *svadharma,* which chooses him rather than is chosen by him, he feels that the religion of others is not only sacred to them but to himself also. This in fact is the practical aspect of the Advaitic view of all individual selves being the one self. The oneness is not contemplated in the empirical region, and there is no prescription of universal brotherhood in the sense that the happiness of others is to be promoted as though it were one's own happiness. There is indeed the duty to relieve distress, but such work is to be performed as duty rather than as a matter of altruistic enjoyment, the dry detached attitude of duty being consonant with the spirit of the religion of *jñāna.* The brotherhood that is practically recognized in this religion is the brotherhood of spirits realizing their *svadharma,* the *dharma* of each being sacred to all. If then in this view it is irreligious to change one's faith, it is only natural to revere faiths other than one's own. To tolerate them merely in a non-committal or patronizing spirit would be an impiety, and to revile them would be diabolical. The form in which the truth is intuited by an individual is cosmically determined and not constructed by him, and the relativity of truth to the spiritual status of the knower is itself absolute. Even the illusory object in this view is a mystical creation (*prātibhāsika srishṭi*), the three grades of reality that are recognized—the illusory, the relational and the transcendental—being in fact grades of this absolute relativity.

The doctrine of *adhikārī-bheda* is an application of this epistemological notion of absolute relativity to the specifically religious sphere. The difference of *adhikāra* or spiritual status is not necessarily a gradation, and so far as it is a gradation it does not suggest any relation of higher and lower that implies contempt or envy. The notion of *adhikāra* in fact means in the first instance just an acceptance of fact or realism in the spiritual sphere. It is a question of duty rather than of rights in this sphere, and a person should be anxious to discover his actual status in order that he may set before himself just such duties as he can efficiently perform in spirit. It is a far greater misfortune here to

overestimate one's status than to underestimate it. A higher status does not mean greater opportunity for spiritual work, since work here means not outward achievement, but an inwardizing or deepening of the spirit. Again, from the standpoint of toleration, one not only respects the inner achievement of a person admitting an inferior status, but can whole-heartedly identify oneself with it; the highest *adhikārin* should feel it a privilege to join in the worship of the humblest. There is aristocracy in the spiritual polity; spiritual value is achieved by the strong and is much too sacred a thing to be pooled. At the same time every individual has his sacred *svadharma* and has equal opportunity with everyone else to realize or inwardize it.

The merit of *Advaitavāda* lies in having explicitly recognized that spiritual work is this inwardizing, the deepening of faith into subjective realization, the striving after self-knowledge. This work can start from any given point, any spiritual status or situation that happens to be presented. Men are intrinsically higher and lower only in respect of this inner achievement. The problem of altering traditional society, of equalizing rights in order to create opportunities for self-realization, has accordingly a subordinate place in the Advaitic scheme of life, being recognized mainly negatively as the duty of abstaining from acts of conscious injustice. This scheme of life would view with positive disfavour iconoclasm in any shape or form, any violent tampering with an institution that is traditionally held to be sacred; but it would not also apparently require one to artificially vitalize such an institution if he believes—not by hearsay, but after loyally trying to work it—that it is moribund or dead. Spiritual realism would demand of him both reverence for and dissociation from what was sacred. One sacred custom can only be superseded by another sacred custom, the former being either reverently allowed to die a natural death or incorporated in an ideal or symbolic form in the latter. There is no room in Advaita religion for the duty of profaning one god for the glorification of another.

The idea of hustling people out of their reverence in their own spiritual interest would be scouted in this religion as a self-stultifying profanity. Social life and tradition are viewed as sacred, as a *yajña* being performed through the ages, the sacredness being the shine of the one self, the shadow of eternity. It is the life of the gods, and we can help it best by merging into it, by realizing it as our subjective life. This subjective realization may sometimes come spontaneously, but so

far as it can be effected by *sādhana,* it can be effected by each individual for himself. He can indeed help others in the work by education, but he can educate only in the measure he has himself realized this life. He can wish and pray that others' self-realization might be expedited, but for an *ordinary* person to suppose that he can and ought to energize and vitalize other spirits is to the religion of Advaita a delusion and a curious mixture of arrogance and sentimentality.

Much of what is attributed here to *Advaitavāda* is the implied creed of Hinduism and Hindu society. This philosophy is the most satisfying formulation of the distinctive spirit of Hinduism, and in this sense it may claim to be a synthesis of other systems of Indian philosophy, which all seek to formulate this spirit; and it has also explicitly influenced the historical evolution of Hinduism. As it is not only a formulation of the religion but is itself the religion in the simplified and unified form of the realization of subjectivity or self-knowledge, it is sometimes characterized as a rationalistic religion; and there is a tendency to isolate it in the abstract and to interpret it as disowning all Vedic and post-Vedic worship and ceremonial. But the abstract cult of self-knowledge derives its whole meaning from the concrete religion of worship and ceremonial, and is recognizable as a religion only as its concentrated essence. It represents a protest against the concrete religion only so far as the latter resists inwardization; but it implies no rejection but only an interpretation of the concrete religion. The Advaitin would wholeheartedly join in the traditional worship and would be false to himself if he professed contempt for it, though he would recognize that the contemplation of the abstract significance is itself a part of the worship and at a certain stage may be the whole spiritual activity.

The contemplation that is demanded is more than mere philosophic thought, being a specific enjoyment of the thought as sacred and representing a new stage of spiritual consciousness. The truth has to be felt as a self-revelation, as a light that shows itself. Light is a sacred symbol, not a mere metaphor, from the contemplation of which the Vedāntic conception of the self itself may be taken to have emanated.

The Advaita discipline of *jñāna* is primarily a protest against the discipline of *karma,* of moral (and ceremonial) activity which is apt in all ages to be taken as a self-sufficing religion. The discipline of *karma* is important as a preparatory chastening of the soul, but taken as a religion by itself, it is understood to work against the attainment of

moksha. To will is to energize in *ahaṁkāra* (egoism), even though it be willing without desire, the specific willing to deny will, to sacrifice one's individuality. At the same time such willing without desire tends unconsciously to dissolve the *ahaṁkāra,* though the tendency requires to be confirmed by *bhakti,* by the dedication of the spiritual merit of the willing to the Lord or by the feeling of merging oneself in the cosmic *yajña,* the symbol of the life divine. All good willing means self-purification, and although it requires to be superseded so far as it involves *ahaṁkāra,* the supersession is itself effected through willing in an attitude of detachment, in the implicit consciousness of the self being beyond *ahaṁkāra.* Hence Advaitism, far from encouraging a premature quietism or renunciation of *karma,* positively prescribes *karma,* though rigorously as a duty and not for gain, and conceives it possible even for one who has risen above morality to perform *karma* in *lokānugraha,* for the education of others and for the conservation of the social order.

The religion of *jñāna,* however, is in no sense a protest against the religion of *bhakti.* To it the higher stages of *bhakti* at any rate not only mean soul-clearing but also involve the enjoyment of the truth in one's being. It is indeed demanded that the felt truth may be self-revealed as known truth, but this knowledge is itself understood as an intuition which amounts to ecstasy and does not in any sense mean a supersession of *bhakti.* Although *bhakti* implies individuality, it represents the individual's joy in surrendering his individuality. The *bhakta* may feel his individuality restored through the Lord, but that is a mystery of divine life with which the Advaitin would not dally. The individual's own achievement terminates with the surrender of individuality.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ADVAITA OR NON-DUALISM

The philosophy of Advaita is the title under which the metaphysics of Vedānta will be treated here. The system of thought characterizing the Upanishads or the final portion of the Vedas is known as Vedānta. It is philosophy in the sense that it makes an enquiry into Truth and Reality; but, unlike pure speculation, it claims to arrive at positive results. In other words, the Truth it reveals is not a mere theory, liable to modification with the advance of scientific knowledge, but is positive and ultimate, verified and verifiable. It does not take its stand on the shifting facts of phenomenal life, but is firmly rooted in those of life in all its aspects and in the very nature of consciousness itself. Being the science of Reality it avails itself of all the sources of knowledge, viz. experience and intuition, and embraces all states and conditions through which life passes or is supposed to pass. Non-dualism denies that number can enter into the constitution of Reality.

"Great scientific discoveries," says Mr. Wildon Carr, "are often so simple in their origin that the greatest wonder about them is that humanity has had to wait so long for them. They seem to lie in the sudden consciousness of the significance of some familiar fact, a significance never suspected because the fact is so familiar." This observation particularly applies to the facts on which Vedānta is built up. The states which punctuate life are presented to us persistently and we experience them every day of our lives; and yet it is the ancient Upanishads and they alone that have discovered their significance, which has enabled them to arrive at ideas of Truth and Reality defying time and change.

It may be questioned whether no thinker has hitherto subjected the states to his scrutiny and what is the peculiar virtue attaching to the Vedāntic method. Who knows not that sleep is a state of rest for the brain, and dream but a fantastic affection of the nerves? Psycho-analysis is engaged in the problem of exploring the region of the Unconscious, and of accounting for certain maladies by referring them to repressed conations. There is indeed some kind of felicity which we experience in deep sleep, which otherwise is only a state of unconsciousness. What more can the labours of scientists and philosophers reveal as to the nature

of life or Reality? How can observations be pushed into the region of unconsciousness except by studying the changes wrought on conscious life? Now we quite admit that some attention has been paid to these two states by scientists, and medical men especially; and we may justly hope for fresh additions to our knowledge as time passes. But Vedānta owes its significance to its unique attitude towards life, which it views from an angle of vision altogether its own. While others concentrate their attention on the world before us which is taken to comprehend all the reality that we can know, and while sleep and dream-experiences are utilized to explain the phenomena of waking life, Vedānta proposes to deal with life as it manifests itself in all the three states and so determines the nature of Reality as a whole. The two view-points differ fundamentally. In the one, the waking world represents all our real interests, and sleep and dream are gently shoved aside as the mere appendages of waking; but in the other, each of the states is given a right place and is invested with equal significance. The man contemplating them easily rises to a condition in which his individuality and narrow views are automatically shed, and the time-place-change-ridden world ceases to molest him. In the one case we are hopelessly merged in a mysterious world which baffles all efforts to solve the enigma, in the other the results are so grand that they exceed all expectations. Besides, in speaking of sleep and dream our intellect which can grasp things only as external objects plays a trick with us which we never suspect. Though they are independent of waking, we yet reduce them to the terms of waking. When did he sleep? How long?—are questions which hide the contradictions they involve. They are not like questions relating to waking acts, such as, when did he come? How long did he stay? In the latter case the acts are placed in waking time, and quite correctly. But we extend the same form of expression to sleep and dream, though these are *not* waking acts and hence cannot be measured in terms of waking duration. "When did he sleep?"—is a plain contradiction, for it would mean, at what point of waking time did he sleep?—implying thereby that sleeping is a waking act! Similarly, the states are not external things which we cognize by means of our intellect. They are known to us as immediacies by intuition. We intuit sleep and dream, and, what is more surprising, we intuit our waking also. For, consider the dilemma—do we wake first and then perceive the world, or do we perceive the world and then wake to it? The latter conception

is self-contradictory, since perception presupposes waking. The former is equally untenable as the order in which the acts take place—waking, perceiving—requires a basis of time, and waking time would commence before waking! It is thus evident that the sequence of the states in which we naively believe is no sequence in one time-order. If it were otherwise, the states would be continuous and their difference in character would be an inexplicable puzzle. Dream-events would then have to be placed in waking time and space, leading to a grotesque confusion by no means removable. A man lying on his bed would have to account for his being suddenly transported to a scene and surroundings thousands of miles away. Time cannot be inserted between state and state, and only the Spirit remains to connect them. Thus the study of the states cannot be carried on solely through the intellect which is bound by time and space, but through the aid of intuition by which, as Bergson says, we place ourselves by sympathetic insight in the middle of a state. We need not observe it merely from outside or translate the experience into the terms of an alien. Now no one can affirm that such a study has been hitherto attempted or accomplished, except by Vedānta.

We shall now deal with the analysis of the three states as effected by Vedānta. Śaṅkara, its greatest exponent, has systematized the teachings of the Upanishads in his comments on the *Brahma-Sūtras* which have condensed them under various topical headings. In his comments on the *Sūtras*, the Upanishads and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, we find a rational, consistent and exhaustive treatment of all the problems of Truth and Reality as they arise in the course of his exposition of Vedic Monism.

WAKING EXPERIENCE

In his introduction to the *Sūtras*, Śaṅkara, imbued with a truly scientific spirit, discusses the foundation of empirical life. We can discover in him no traces of a theological or scholastic leaning. "Subject and object—the Self and the non-Self - are so radically opposed to each other in notion and in practical life that it is impossible to mistake the one for the other." After this grand beginning he adds, "Yet we find that the mistake is universal and we can never trace it to its source, for our common life cannot do without this initial error." Without identifying the Self (subject) with the non-Self, viz. the body, the senses and the mind, we could not describe ourselves in terms strictly applicable to the latter. We could not say, "I am lean or stout," "I am walki

or sitting," "I am blind or deaf," "I feel, I perceive or act." Hence we unconsciously confound the pure subject or the witnessing consciousness with its own objects, and conversely, we confound the ego with the witness, whereby the real unattached character of the pure consciousness is lost sight of altogether. Admittedly this is due to a fundamental illusion on which all our waking activities are based; and to attain to Truth and Reality we must, realizing this illusion, rise above it by means of a rational enquiry. Reason which points out the illusion must also be competent to release us from its hold. Śaṅkara is not alone in drawing our attention to the illusory nature of empirical life. Plato, Kant and Hegel adopt the same strain, and in recent times, Bergson, equipped with all the knowledge of modern science, arrives at the same conclusion. The intellect, he says, disguises Reality, misrepresents it and presents to us a static world, while the Reality is pure movement, change, or the wider consciousness. According to both Śaṅkara and Bergson the illusion is necessary to practical life, though none the less it is an illusion. Śaṅkara does not favour the reality of the idea as against that of the object. The testimony of consciousness itself establishes their distinctness. While the one, viz. the idea, is admitted to be real, this reality can be maintained only by contradistinguishing it from that of the object. Still the reality of the idea and the object cannot be held to transcend the state in which both are experienced. In other words, their claim to reality is valid *within* the state, not beyond. This is a philosophical view that disposes of the dream-experience also. If we are true to consciousness, if consciousness is true to us, the objects and notions of dream are presented as indisputably real at the time, and are discovered to be illusions only after dream gives place to waking. We cannot suppose that waking experience can survive waking, any more than dream-experience, dream. For that would be self-contradictory. Waking life may thus seem to be reduced to a long dream; but, as Locke would say, "Even then the thinker and the critic being equally involved in the dream, their mutual relations remain the same as if the condition was one of waking." Hence the external world with its multiplicity of other minds and objects, together with the internal world of judgements, feelings and volitions, like the ego cognizing them and engaged in action and enjoyment, is all on one level of reality which correlates them. It is wrong, therefore, to imagine that Vedānta is solipsistic, that while it concedes reality to the ego, it denies it to the non-ego.

Nevertheless, this does not conflict with the fundamental principle of Śaṅkara that practical life is made possible only by the spontaneous ascription of the qualities of the subject to the object, and *vice versa*. For the reality of the experience of each state is ineluctably confined to it, the reality is such only for the state, is only relative, not absolute. That waking life taken by itself is a mystery teeming with endless contradictions in whatever way we view it, and that the army of scientists and philosophers carrying on an incessant fight with nature to discover the matrix from which things originate and grow are faced with an ultimate *ne plus ultra* in all their investigations, are unquestionable facts to which all human researches testify. The very categories of thought are so many riddles; substance, quality, action, the universal, the particular, relation, space, time, causality, change—these are a phalanx of grenadiers whom every thinker has had to encounter in a close fight, of which the issue has remained doubtful to this day. Sir James Jeans in *The Mysterious Universe* concludes with these words: "Our main contention can hardly be that the science of to-day has a pronouncement to make, perhaps it ought rather to be that science should leave off making pronouncements: the river of knowledge has too often turned back on itself." The view of modern science is given as follows: "To sum up, a soap-bubble with irregularities and corrugations on its surface is perhaps the best representation....of the new universe revealed to us by the theory of relativity. The universe is not the interior of the soap-bubble but its surface....and the substance out of which this bubble is blown, the soap film, is empty space welded onto empty time."

This modest estimate of the power of science is but fitting, for Vedānta declares that the whole universe spread before us, as well as our achievements in it, is but a manifestation of Pure Consciousness. To find the ultimate Truth in the universe *itself* is a hopeless task, but to peer through it and detect the Reality that it disguises is the first duty of every rational thinker. For, situated as we are, our view of the world can be only external, and we must proceed from knowledge to knowledge which can never be final, since it cannot be of an object as it is in itself, but as it is known. We shall now examine the dream-state with two or three preliminary remarks.

Waking or dream is not a state in the strict sense of the term. state implies change occurring in the soul or its object. When we compare waking with dream, the soul assumes the position of a witne-

of the two, and no change can be allowed in the witness. The two states seem to offer themselves successively for trial, but as they are not events in one time-series, their sequence is an illusion. Neither can we suppose a change in the objective order which would demand a continuity of the same time-series. Moreover, we labour under the disadvantage of having to judge from memory of dream which cannot be called up to confront us as a present experience, and this memory is itself of a strange character. Memory ordinarily refers to the past—a past time moving backwards infinitely from the present moment at which it terminates, that is to say, to a continuous time-flow related to the present. Dream-experience, however, does not belong to this time-series, and cannot be included in its past. Again, just as we cannot know when waking begins, so we cannot know when dream begins, for both seem to be uncaused. A cause connects one event with another of the same time-order and the cause of a state would have to be inside the state, so that to transcend the state in order to discover its cause would be not merely illogical but impossible. Further, the soul as the witness of the two states intuits both, and that is how we know both. Hence the witnessing character of the soul claims special consideration. It behaves as an entity free from attachment to the bodies, the minds, the sense-groups and the percepts of the contrasted states, and becomes a metaphysical element which can be realized only as the 'I,' but with the 'I' divested of the egoity of waking or dream. While it is difficult and impracticable for us to eliminate, in waking, this Witness from the ego-complex, and the Witness might seem to be a mere abstraction, our ability to remember dream and appropriate it to ourselves proves that nature does for us the analysis which we are unable to do for ourselves. She does this in virtue of the undeniable fact that the Witness is the Reality, the essence of our being. In discussing sleep, we shall come upon another feature of the Witness which then passes off into Pure Consciousness.

DREAM STATE

From the waking point of view, dream is a case of typical illusion, or rather hallucination. Without admittedly an external ground a whole world rises into view, and no suspicion is aroused that we are bamboozled. Scene after scene follows originating feelings and acts with the stamp of genuineness. We are actors in the drama, playing fantastical parts, enjoying and suffering we know not how or why. There is no limit to

the grotesqueness of the pageantry, overleaping the bounds of waking possibility. Yet at the time there is no surprise; everything looks natural. We take things at their face value. All the elements of waking are reproduced: time, space, change. In the very midst of the drama, we might jerk into waking, and, behold, it was all a dream! The usual explanation offered is that the impressions formed on the waking mind remain latent in the background of the unconscious and suddenly gain scope for activity, manifesting themselves in the shape of dream-experience. Sleep is the region of the Unconscious and we are then admitted behind the scenes to the sight of how the impressions, in their various degrees and strength, act and react upon one another in the deeps of our nature. No impression apparently ever dies, and, when it is denied adequate scope in waking, obtains it in dream, which is a realm of life for the latent impressions. The space and time are creations of the mind, and the relation of cause and effect is improvised. The intellect suspends its censorship and our critical faculties are laid to sleep. Such is the dictum of waking reason. But this theory of impressions loses sight of the fact that if the theory be right, an impression has to be endowed with the power to create a world of realities at a moment's notice, rather, without any notice at all. If the mind by a fiat can create actualities, where is the need or place for matter which is the object of absorbing study for a scientist? How can this indispensable factor of life be brushed aside so lightly? What is sauce for the goose must be sauce for the gander If the reality of matter in waking life depends on our belief in our close observation and experimentation, how is our involuntary belief in the reality of our dream occurrences to be accounted for? How can we take two contradictory attitudes towards life, the one solipsistic and the other realistic? This explanation is therefore suicidal and demolishes the very foundations of science. We can, besides, never notice the beginning or the origin of a dream. All our notions of propriety are outraged, without still engendering any surprise in us. Our consciousness which guides our judgement suddenly turns capricious, and one that lies down in Calcutta might find himself in a moment, as it were, in London. A single moment might expand into days and years. The dreamer might be transformed into a bull, a goat or an insect. And the learned explanation is belated. It comes after the illusion is over, for there are no certain marks or characteristics by which we can identify a dream as such at the time. In truth, dream cannot be defined; otherwise, w

could not fail to detect the trickery when it repeated itself a second time; but a man's, even a philosopher's life must include dreams to his dying day, and nature's power to delude is irresistible, supreme. A dream can indeed mimic all the features of waking, but one element remains triumphant and beyond its utmost power to mimic, and that is Consciousness. All the rest is plastic in the omnipotent hands of dream, and can be moulded into any shape it pleases. Time, space and causation are its avowed slaves, and obey its autocratic bidding. Consciousness alone defies its tactics and remains an unruffled witness of its whims.

We have hitherto viewed dream as an object of the waking mind, as an external object. We shall now examine it from within, by placing ourselves sympathetically in its midst. This is properly to judge dream as dream, without the waking bias. Dream now appears to be a perfect replica of waking. A world is unrolled before us; we never notice its suddenness or its incongruity with waking; on the contrary it comes with all the impress of waking. Time, space and change are inevitably present. No element of life is missed—other minds, natural scenes, familiar faces and objects, the earth below and the star-studded sky above. We think, feel and act. We refer happenings to the past, and forecast them for the future. We remember dreams and relate them to friends. There is no suspicion of the state being a break, a discontinuity from waking: no fear that it may be sublated in the future. Miracles are common occurrences which do not strike us as anything extraordinary. We acquiesce in all, we appropriate all. Memories and emotions stream in, giving birth to strange conations. We converse with gods and ghosts. Sometimes the future is foreshadowed. We acquire new powers, occupy new positions; nothing is impossible. We fly without wings and fall from hill-tops down, down through endless space. Nevertheless, we believe that all is real and nothing shocks us. After waking we condemn dream as an irrational, self-contradictory and unreal illusion, and resolve to be no more befooled. But in the next dream there is the same masque enacted and the same helplessness on our part to detect it, and this is repeated without end to our eternal chagrin through all our living days. It will not do to brush aside this aspect of life as a mere phantasy. "There are few subjects," writes Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, "which philosophers have more persistently forborne to work out, not to say neglected, than the philosophic import of dreams." To regard that dream-experience is unreal is to subordinate it to waking, and to accept

the biassed decree of the latter against a sister-state. And on what is the claim of waking to reality based? Evidently on its own pronouncement. If so, is not dream entitled to equal reality according to its own pretensions? If it is objected that waking is never stultified whereas a dream is, the answer is, how can a state which is accompanied with a sense of waking stultify itself while it continues? A state which is believed to be waking can never be conceived as liable to stultification while it lasts, and every *present* state claims to be waking, flinging to its rear a stultified dream. Compare the instance of a dream within a dream. No state can be disloyal to itself. A dream proper is never known to be such at the time. A stultified state appears as a past dream and the present is *ever* waking. No state is self-identical. Thus a sympathetic examination of dream leads to the conclusion that it is a rival state as real as waking; and owing to the indeterminable discrepancy between the two in the time-flow, added to the unconscious and timeless interval between, they must be adjudged equal independence, as different realms of Reality of which they are expressions. The word 'interval' used above is, owing to a defect of language, meant to denote what is timeless. For if a time-interval were imagined, it would connect waking and dream and make them a single continuous state, which would militate against all experience. Waking-time rules waking and stops with it, and dream-time is coeval with a dream. The interval is metaphysical. It is Pure Consciousness.

We are now free to consider the results obtained at this stage of our enquiry. The examination of dream was made possible only by our individuality being laid aside. The mind and the body constitute our personality and our individual life depends on our connection with them. These two factors can hardly be supposed to be identical in both waking and dream, as our experience is to the contrary. So are the two worlds distinct. In setting the states side by side in our study, we have mentally disentangled ourselves from both and have attained to an attitude in which, free from the trammels of individuality, we comprehend the two manifestations of Reality as unstinted wholes—an attitude quite different from that in which we think of the waking world. In the latter case the world is not seized as a whole, since, as our object of attention, it is separated from ourselves and placed right against us in thought. We conduct our examination of dream, not as one ego contemplating the other, but as the soul divested of its egoity altogether. The simple experience denoted by the words, "I dreamt," raises us to the level of th

witness and above that of the ego. The soul is thus proved to be an entity at the back of the mind, taking its stand as the metaphysical basis of life. The monobasic view, confined to waking, of theology throws it on the mercy of the scriptures or revelations to establish the soul or God. They are matters of faith. But Vedāntic analysis makes them indisputable elements of life and identifies them. The world is a correlate of the mind, concomitant with it. The question of other minds is limited to the fugitive states and is devoid of meaning with reference to the soul as their Witness. The soul thus sheds its individuality and becomes Universal Spirit, beyond the region of *meum* and *tuum*. The mind perceives the world, while the soul or spirit intuits both waking and dream, projects both, and absorbs both. The difficulty that perplexes the enquirer, viz. "When I am sleeping, is there not a world outside in which simultaneously there are other minds awake and active, whom I rejoin when I awake? How does my sleep affect the real affairs of the world which go on uninterrupted for all *my* changes of state?"—this difficulty now vanishes. For the individuation implied in *my* sleep and the waking of *others* ceases when the comparative view of the states is taken. This is possible only with the individuality dropped. Moreover, the waking world composed of other minds and matter, with which waking connects me and from which sleep releases me, is strictly bound up with waking, and to aver that my waking or my waking world persists when I am sleeping is not only illogical but inconceivable. The world has no status outside of my waking. The physical organism together with its brain, nerves and breath is limited to waking. To carry it over to another state, where another set obtains free play, is unwarranted. Similarly, birth and death, the evolution of the world, are integral parts of waking, and beyond it, meaningless. Solipsism or Subjectivism is easily transcended, for the Witness is no ego and Reality attaches to the former alone. Thus we have arrived at an entity which is the universal basis of life, which is All Life, beyond time, change and individuality. Why then should we examine sleep? For the simple reason that it is the primary state without which waking and dream would be impossible. We dream in sleep and wake from sleep.

Meanwhile we shall advert to some philosophical problems which receive their solution from our enquiry so far. The question of perception dissolves itself. The Spirit manifests itself as matter and mind, which appear as the correlated elements of experience in each state. Their metaphysical basis is one, and this affinity in their source accounts for

their mutual adaptiveness. The Spirit as mind perceives Spirit as matter. The puzzles of Realism and Idealism evaporate. For the principle on which we explain waking perception must apply equally to dream perception. If in the one case our knowledge is real, so must it be in the other. No purpose is served by affirming or denying the reality in either. Pragmatism is right in regarding judgements as only truth-claims with a tentative value. Every manifestation of life or Spirit must necessarily promote life-purpose. For life is supreme and its apparent frustration by death is but a delusion. Death itself is a manifestation of life which transcending the states is immortal.

DREAMLESS SLEEP

We commonly believe that deep sleep is a state of absolute consciousness. What can we know of it? In answering this question, we must bear in mind that waking, dream and deep sleep are states that we intuit and that cannot create any conceivable break in life. They are known as immediacies and are not observed externally. Hence our knowledge of them is more intimate and perfect, less liable to error or misunderstanding, than that of objects. I see a chair, and my notion of it agrees with that of several other minds, and practical life is pivoted on such agreement. But as to what a chair is in itself apart from my perception, generates a problem which has endlessly exercised the intellect of scientists and philosophers. Our knowledge of objects must be infinitely progressive, because of the disability with which we start, because we cannot know them as we know or realize our own feelings and sensations. The very structure of the intellect precludes the contrary. But this habit has so grown upon us that we forget the limitations of our power to know, and instinctively believe that that knowledge alone is true which we acquire by observation and experiment. We call it scientific. The states which cannot be so handled we are prone to ignore, as not allowing of the scientific method of approach. Now there must be something fundamentally wrong in this attitude, since the states are the *sine qua non* of life, the elements of which it is made up. The world which is the theatre of our activities, enjoyments and ambitions, with its comic and tragic sides, is unfolded to us in only one of them. In the other there is a mimicry of it, and in the third it is conspicuous by its absence. Experimental Psychology, which presumes that the nature and the capacity of mind can be accurately known and measured by "behaviour," cannot

go to the root of the matter. It takes its stand on the outside and forms its views from what it observes. This is opposed to the very nature of mind, viz. to conceive it as an object and study it as an alien, when all the while we have the privilege of knowing it immediately by reference to our own feelings and sensations. The scientific description of sleep from our observation of the condition of the sleeper's body is, in the words of the Upanishads, to beat the ant-hill and imagine the snake inside to be killed. With whatever care we pursue our method of external observation, we shall never realize the nature of sleep or dream. As to waking, we are still more helpless. We cannot observe before we wake; and as all our acts are circumscribed by waking and involve it, we can never arrive at an objective notion of its nature. For it is as much an intuition as the other two. The only reliable source of knowledge about them is our intuition, and a study of the latter gives us a more, not less, scientific view of them than we have of external objects.

We have found that the entity that connects waking and dream is not the ego of either state, but the Witness or the Spirit which is free from individuality. We have now to ascertain the principle which pieces together all the three. We have first to tackle deep sleep. This is produced in three or four ways. First, in the natural manner; secondly, by means of drugs like chloroform; thirdly, by the practice of mental concentration known as *yoga;* or fourthly, through devout meditation. The nature of the experience, however, does not vary, for in each instance the mind that alone can detect difference ceases to operate. As the sleep which comes to us naturally every day is the only form familiar to us universally, and as even the *yogins* cannot help sleeping, a close study of sleep is rendered possible to all, and obviates the necessity of that of the other forms. Though fancied to be a mere blank, a state of unconsciousness, we shall presently realize that it is the home of Reality, the temple of God, and the true nebula giving birth to both mind and matter. It is the treasure-house of all truths; and in spite of our prepossessions we shall know it as the rock-basis of life.

To begin with, we have to dispose of the common notion that sleep is unconsciousness. This evidently is a serious misapprehension. For conscious beings as we are, though we may have a notion of unconsciousness, the notion when examined will be found to have no content. A notion is formed in consciousness and the latter cannot conceive its own absence, while it is there to testify to itself. Unconsciousness cannot

be a link in the chain of life: and we could never speak of sleep if it did not constitute an integral element of conscious life. So it is not a mere idea. A person complaining of sleeplessness does not suffer from an inability to form the idea. As Wildon Carr observes: "When we say that a man is unconscious in his sleep, we do not mean by unconsciousness a complete absence of consciousness, as when we say that a stone is unconscious. We mean that the consciousness which is present is blocked or hindered from being effective. Rouse a man from his sleep . . . . and consciousness returns." Besides, the statement, "I was unconscious during sleep," contradicts itself. For how can you say that you were unconscious unless you were *conscious* of your unconsciousness? If one retorts, "I know now that I was unconscious," his position is not improved. How can you now refer to or describe a past occurrence unless it was part of your experience? And an experience of a conscious being presupposes consciousness at the time of the experience as well as at the time of recollection. Further, the memory of sleep points to it as a period of felicity or bliss essential to life. It is thus futile to argue that sleep is a period of absolute unconsciousness. We can never be *aware* of such a state. We cannot own it or describe it as thus and thus.

"I was aware of nothing, neither of myself nor of the world." This is how a man roused from deep sleep describes it, and thereon hangs the whole possibility of metaphysics as a positive science. If a man says he was aware of nothing, he must have been *aware* of this awareness. Do what we may, we cannot rid ourselves of awareness in some form or other. "I was not aware of myself or of the world." This disposes of the ego and non-ego in sleep, and discloses their eternal concomitance. I was not aware of the non-ego, because I was not aware of the ego. Just as the presence of the one necessarily demands and depends on the presence of the other, the absence of the one must spell the absence of the other. In waking we perceive the world, because there is the ego to perceive it. In sleep we are aware of neither, because neither is present. To suppose an outside world flourishing all the same by the side of the sleeper is not to the point. It is illogical. The world persisting is obviously the waking world connected with the individual sleeper, which is cognized by the waking critic, but the sleeper has shed his individuality when he has passed into sleep, into Pure Spirit, and no world can attach itself to spirit. For the world is seen to be concomitant with the individual ego, and it is the mind, the senses and the body

that individuate Spirit. When, however, these shackles of determination are flung off as in sleep, still to hold that the world exists in relation to Spirit, is neither rational nor consonant to experience. The world comes and goes with the waking state; and as I can change my states, so I can, when I move into the next state, switch off the world, which is my cumber in waking, along with the ego, its counterpart. The recognition of this truth requires some clear thinking, as the mind and the present ego act as clogs impeding the higher view revealed by intuition.

What then is the awareness characterizing deep sleep? It is not one craving an object and an ego. It is not of the subject-object variety that we are familiar with in waking and dream. It is what Vedānta calls the Transcendental or Pure Consciousness. We shall call the other the empirical consciousness, and the life predominated by it the empirical life. We shall now more closely examine sleep as Pure Consciousness. In the first place, it is a state of absolute unity. In the absence of time and space there is no room for change or plurality. Rāmānuja indeed believes in the persistence of the ego, and some other thinkers in that of the non-ego also, then in a latent condition. But evidently they are wrong. For we have seen how the entity which alone links up waking and dream as the Witness, is already divested of egoity, and our present examination of sleep is rendered possible only by the persistence of the same Witness in sleep also, that is to say, of the Witness divested of the psychic set (mind and senses) and the physical body, which are the individualizing elements. Time ceases to operate outside of the states and is absent from sleep. Hence the ideas of latency or patency which are confined to the sphere of a time-order are inapplicable to the contents of sleep. We carry over to sleep our waking bias when we conceive multiplicity in a potential condition in it: and we forget that it is an independent state to be judged and understood by itself and not to be translated into the terms of the others whereby we should forfeit the advantage of a new experience. There is neither a potential world in sleep nor an actual world beside the sleeper, the Scylla and Charybdis to be avoided in Vedāntic sailing.

In the next place, it is not a state[1] *in* which Pure Consciousness

[1] This is only the view of a group of modern thinkers The orthodox school of thought represented by Śaṅkara, Sāyaṇāchārya and others considers 'dreamless sleep' (*sushupti*) as a *state* in which *avidyā* inheres in its causal form. The assumption of the state of *sushupti* as Pure Consciousness, *i.e.* 'a state of absolute unity' without the least vestige of *avidyā* being latent in it, results in the consequent negation of the indispensableness of any spiritual discipline so strongly enjoined in the Śruti and by the *āchāryas*. In fact, it is only in the

abides, but is itself Pure Consciousness. The popular view that it is a state is due to a misapprehension of its true nature which a careful analysis can alone reveal. For it is timeless and changeless and to call it a state under the circumstances is a misnomer. The Witness has transformed itself into Pure Consciousness, for without it we could have no knowledge of sleep. But its report of the non-existence then of the ego and the non-ego shows that it has assumed the rôle of Pure Consciousness. It is hence clear that the Witness of the ego and the non-ego in the other states is also the Witness of their absence, and that the Witness and Pure Consciousness are identical. A mirror reflects objects presented to it, but in the absence of objects it ceases to be a reflector, though the power to reflect is ever inherent in it.

In the third place, the states are independent expressions of Reality, so many wholes in which Reality manifests itself: for, being free from time and space, it is indivisible. For the same reason, not only waking and dream are each a whole but every one of their constituents is such. The plurality perceived within a state stands as an obstacle to our recognition of the indivisibility of Reality. "Standing undivided amidst beings, yet appearing as divided" (*Gītā* XIII.17). But in sleep we have Pure Consciousness, presented as the whole which is the master-key with which we have to unlock the doors of the other states. The metaphysical nature of the latter is thus revealed as Pure Consciousness which determines the value and the nature of the rest. We thus arrive at the equation:

Waking = Dream = Pure Consciousness.

Having analyzed the states we are in a position to discuss those philosophical questions which obtain a final solution in the light of Vedānta. First, what is Reality? Since the three states exhaust all life and experience, Reality is that which invariably accompanies the states and persists in the midst of and in spite of the varying contexts. It is thus seen to be Pure Consciousness which pervades all life, whose nature is such as to make even an idea of its non-existence unthinkable. In defining Reality as that whose non-existence cannot be conceived or imagined, both Śaṅkara and Bergson agree. But whereas Bergson,

state of *samādhi* attained through a rigorous course of spiritual discipline that this veil of nescience which persists in a latent form even in dreamless sleep is torn off: and as a result the Supreme Reality, the abiding Witness in all the three states of waking, dream and sleep, is realized as the *Turīya* (transcendent) divested of all the tentacles of *māyā*. *Vide* Śaṅkara's commentary on *Māṇḍ. Up.* 5, 7, on *Māṇḍ. Kārikā*, 13, 14, on *Chhānd. Up.* 8.3.1-3 and on *Vedānta-sūtras* 3.2.9; *Pañchadaśī* 1.39, 41; *Vedānta Paribhāshā*, ch. 7.—ED.

whose observation is limited to the waking state, identifies Reality with unceasing change, Śaṅkara identifies it with Pure Consciousness or the Witness, not subject to change. For the Witness of change cannot change. Pure Consciousness is not merely the Reality but the All. Its remaining single and secondless in sleep, its indivisibility and its ubiquity through life shows that it is the radical principle on which hang the wholes, waking and dream. It includes its manifestations, it is all-inclusive. This knowledge is the truest, the highest that we can or need possess. It is the Absolute Truth, relating as it does to the all-inclusive Reality; and from this standpoint it is clear that Bradley was right in declaring that truth and knowledge merge in Reality and are one with it. The authority of the Vedas which unfold this Truth becomes unquestionable. Their testimony is the voice of life and experience. To deny it is to strangle that voice. On the contrary, if the Vedas be interpreted to support Dualism, they must forfeit their claim to reveal the Oneness reached by a rational analysis of life, and their authoritativeness will pass into an arbitrary assumption.

One may imagine that the methodology of Vedānta, which eschews external observation and experiment, is defective inasmuch as it fails to throw light on the nature of the world. This is a grave mistake. In studying the inner life, we rise above its manifestations, and get at the very root from which the ego and the non-ego of the states branch out. Yet the relation is not organic, but metaphysical. Reality does not develop, by a process in time, into waking and dream, but seems directly to manifest itself as the latter. There are no intermediate stages. Reality does not bring into being what was *non est,* but apparently becomes its own "other," for even while appearing as the objective world, it remains an undiminished Whole. And the advantage of the inner analysis lies in this that it discloses Reality no less than our identity with it. It is we before whom the states are furled and unfurled, it is we who are resolved in sleep into Pure Consciousness which like a canopy covers the whole of life and that is life. It is our Self that co-ordinates the states. Placed beyond time and generating the time-flow of each state, it is immortal and by immediate experience we know it to be Perfect Bliss. This is the Highest Being which the Upanishads call Brahman. It gives being to the objects and occurrences of the states as well as to the states themselves, and this imparted being is real within each state. A state and its contents mutually determine their own reality, but as a

manifestation this reality is not ultimate. Since we are real and the objective world is Reality, we can never know unreality. The contents of the state as much as the states themselves, however, when viewed as separate from Pure Consciousness, fade into nothing. They are mere abstractions, void of reality. Again, Reality as the Eternal Witness cannot rightly be treated as an object, and number and quality which apply to objects cannot be predicated of it. Being an immediacy, it allows of no doubt, hypothesis or predication concerning its nature. It is not transcendent, but transcendental. It is the Absolute, bearing no relation to any other. For in the absence of time and space no relation can exist between Reality and its manifestations, since the terms of the relation cannot meet on the same level of reality.

The question how the world arose is altogether impermissible. Causality works only in time, and the waking world must find its cause in waking which circumscribes the sphere of causation. Neither can we ask why we wake and dream—for we intuit the states, and those intuitions being the prices of our mental and bodily activities are primary and so beyond the pale of time and causation. We can now indeed turn our minds forwards and backwards, but when we approach the question of the origin of the state that brings forth the mind, we realize our limitation and are struck dumb. Waking limits the sphere of causation. This, however, does not affect our conclusions. Pure Consciousness being the All, waking and dream can only be its expressions, no less than the worlds which they bring into view. Their fugitiveness and contingency mark them as realities of the second or subordinate degree.

We shall now advert to another interesting point of enquiry. What is the nature of Pure Consciousness or the Witness? Is it, as Pure Being, a concrete or an abstract idea? If it is abstract or empty of all contents, it cannot give rise to the states or to their worlds, for nothing can come out of nothing. If on the contrary it is concrete, it already contains in solution all the elements that afterwards crystallize into creation. In this case the Unity is not an undiluted Absolute, but a real complexity in a subtle condition. Non-dualism would be a mere web of fancy and so also the various degrees of reality. This objection has been raised by Hegel against Vedānta, from a total misconception of its position. The Pure Consciousness of Vedānta is neither an idea nor an object. It is the Witness which converts everything else into an object, and is known to us more intimately as our Self than any object can possibly be. It

cannot be classed in any of the categories of thought as these are products of thought, and no category can precede consciousness which it presupposes. Thus the dilemma whether Pure Consciousness is an abstract or a concrete idea is meaningless. To treat Pure Consciousness as an object would be to do injustice to its nature. But not to be an object is not to be nothing. It is more real than any other, because it is our own Self, whose reality is a primary assumption with us, is a truth we start from, before we ascertain the reality of other things. To question its reality is to question whether we live. Hegel started with the error that the world of perception and all life must be derived from an original principle by a gradual dialectic process which assumes everything going before as implicit in a present idea which is its explication, so that the movement of ideas being circular, every idea is a microcosm, differing from others only in the proportion in it of implicit and explicit elements. This self-movement without a goal or an aim is an unintelligible mystery. Vedānta does not trace the world to the Absolute either directly or indirectly. Its truth is based on facts of experience. In sleep we find Pure Consciousness without a second and in waking and dream the worlds unroll themselves before us, in addition to Pure Consciousness. Since this view exhausts all reality, we can legitimately suppose only that the second element in the states, viz. the world, is but the original Pure Consciousness without loss of integrity, appearing as the object to itself. As there is no change in Pure Consciousness, this second element appearing as an alien must be a delusion. It is not alien. Thus to resolve all into Pure Consciousness is the highest function of reason. It is wrong to derive waking or dream from sleep. All three are independent of one another, and the temporal relation of posterior or anterior is the creation of our own time-ridden mind. There is no time to connect them. Only a comparative survey of the states enables us to assess their metaphysical value.

Two important considerations force us to recognize this truth. First, the notions of 'I,' the subject or consciousness, are peculiar in their nature and inhibit plurality in strict thinking. We cannot conceive two 'I's,' two subjects or two consciousnesses, unless these are turned into objects. This radical fact no pluralism can explain. Secondly, why we believe even illusions to be real at the time, baffles all psychology, and is rendered intelligible only in the light of the truth that as we are real we can never experience unreality, neither perceive or conceive it. That

it was an illusion is an afterthought, which then deals with the reality of *that* discovery. In this manner, we transfer in every instance our reality to the object of knowledge. Both the 'I' and the world bear on them the sure proofs of their origin in Pure Consciousness. Like Pure Consciousness, the 'I' cannot be pluralized and the world is out there only for a cognizing consciousness. This concomitance of the world with consciousness must point to a common source of both in which they have their kinship.

As children fear darkness, says Schopenhauer, so do people fear annihilation. Exactly similar is the fear of Brahman, devoid of qualities and individuality. But the fear must be overcome, if we are to face facts and not indulge in comforting fancies. Is there, however, room for fear? Gauḍapāda remarks: "They conceive fear in what is free from all fear" (*Māṇḍūkya* III.39). How then is this repugnance to Brahman to be accounted for? In the first place, when we try to comprehend it, we require it to be described in terms of what we know in waking life, that is to say, in empirical terms. It must be presented as an individual person with power, wisdom and mercy, in short, as the God of Theology, who alone can hear our prayers, hasten to our help, absolve us from our sins, and be our Saviour. But our experience of sleep is a precise negation of these features. Who can be satisfied with Pure Consciousness? This feeling evidently proceeds from the waking bias that ever predominates over our judgement. If in its true nature Brahman cannot be described in familiar terms, we ought not to conclude that it is nothing. Our whole nature revolts against such a view and we cannot conceive nothing. Our Self surely is not nothing. On the contrary, the aim and object of manifestation would seem to be the objective realization of the greatness of Brahman as expressible in names and forms. The ideas of power etc. displayed in life must be traced to Brahman and we cannot define or describe it in other terms. To make it acceptable to our empirical conception, even personality must be imposed on it. Thus the interpretation of sleep as a negation of all that we know is but a natural criticism from the view-point of waking. It is an external view. In itself, it is a Unity consisting of Consciousness and Bliss and divested of all alien elements. Since such is our essence, our opposition to it is futile.

Those that cannot make up their minds to accept the unadulterated truth, are free to regard Brahman as clothed with attributes which the

manifestations suggest and justify. In fact, dream and waking are nature's comments on sleep. All the power, mental, physical and moral, that they display, all the goodness, mercy and wonder that we discern in them, must be ultimately traced to Pure Consciousness, though these manifestations do not affect it in the least. Says the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (X.41): "Whatever is glorious, good, beautiful and mighty, understand thou that to go forth from a fragment of My splendour." Metaphysically there is no evil as there is no alien, although from the empirical view both are real and give rise to Ethics. Theology contemplates Reality clothed with attributes, though it does not realize the true basis on which its faith must eternally stand. Vedānta supplies that basis. God then is not fictitious, but is the Real of reals. Our faith in Him is not without its fruit, for life is Brahman, and no unreality can be smuggled into it. Still the path of Reason is distinct from that of Faith. While knowledge removes the fetters of ignorance *immediately,* faith steeps us endlessly in dualistic life in which perfect peace cannot reign, from which contradictions cannot be banished. The dualities of common life are appearances whose essence is the One.

Ethics is the eldest-born of Vedānta. As the interests of the individual are secured by the relation of the soul to God as one of Self to Self, so the ends of morality are ensured by the recognition of the same Self in others. The *Gītā* declares (XIII. 29): "He that sees the One Ruler existing everywhere cannot injure another who is his own Self, and so attains the Highest Goal." And the goal is harmony and peace. The sense of individuality and the seeking of individual interests are wrecked on the rock of Universal Identity, the refusal to perceive any other entity than Self, or Brahman, which is the All and includes *all.* Theology which emphasizes distinctions can neither enjoin aimless self-denial nor ensure God's sympathy. For, if God and the souls are essentially distinct, their interests may collide and never be identical. On the contrary, he who realizes his oneness with God, the all-inclusive Being, triumphs over his narrow views induced by a sense of individuality, and can find no evil in life that does not ultimately tend to confirm his conviction. To set the seal on it, he becomes pure in thought, word and deed, which are its inevitable forms of expression. "Vedānta," says Paul Deussen, "is the greatest support to morality." It fixes the standard of right and wrong and explains the instinct

imbedded in us in the form of the categorical imperative or the preference of the good over the bad.

The æsthetic feeling or the sense of the beautiful is due to a temporary suppression of individuality and objectivity, to an unconscious realization of Oneness. This can never be explained by Pluralism. Culture, training and personal predilections are contributory factors. But the effect, viz. annihilation of 'otherness' would be impossible if the 'other' were absolutely real. The æsthetic delight is a metaphysical experience, bringing to light the essentially blissful nature of Spirit. For beauty is externalized bliss.

In accounting for the second element in life, Vedānta propounds a theory. Brahman manifests itself as the world in order to obtain an objective view of itself. It suffers separation into the subject and the object, and through eternal change it contemplates its own inexhaustible nature. Self-expression is for self-realization. Brahman works assiduously in the person of the scientist to ransack all corners of nature to make them intelligible. Hence the progress of science is bound to be unlimited. The Vedāntic spirit supplies the most powerful stimulus to the cultivation of science in all departments of life. While the truths so discovered cannot be final, owing to the ceaseless change that rules the universe, they can never affect the Vedāntic truths which envisage all the three states and relate to a sphere transcending time. The reader will carefully remember that Vedānta has fulfilled its function when it has established the One Reality which is all-inclusive and which resolves everything into itself leaving no remainder. The doctrines of *māyā* and *avidyā* are offered only to help the aspirant to rise to the plane of the Absolute Oneness, for the appearance of an outstanding second element might operate on him as a hold-back. When the Oneness is reached, however, there is no worry with a second.

The eschatology of Vedānta is among its dogmatics. It concerns the fate of unenlightened souls, and as its pronouncements are neither verifiable nor refutable, they must be tested only by the moral principles they involve. On the one hand the soul is eternal, and on the other, its embodiment must continue while it remains ignorant of its true nature. Hence the doctrines of *karma* and rebirth are formulated to determine its course through its spiritual evolution. Heaven and hell are described as places in which the souls of the dead experience joys and sufferings respectively as the strict consequence of their deeds in life—"according to

acts and culture"—and not as reward or punishment (*Kaṭha* V.7). When the period is over, they take new births, the nature of which is determined by the moral sum of deeds in the previous life. Their migration from body to body continues until enlightenment occurs, which puts an end to further migrations and brings on release. God as our truest friend guards and guides the soul through all its wanderings and can never desert it, for He is its very Self. His solicitude for its well-being never ceases till it is safely landed on the shore of deliverance. No soul is left to perish in the waters of *saṁsāra* (transmigration). Sin which arises from attachment to non-Self creates a distance between us and our very Self, God. Prayer, meditation and worship bring about communion, and facilitate approach. Those that lean on faith must pass through a very strict discipline in life, practising self-control, celibacy and renunciation, devotion and service, worship and meditation. Through the grace of God so obtained and through special experiences they receive enlightenment leading to release. A Vedāntin cannot decry these means warranting a pure and disinterested life, for he alone can truly appreciate the adamantine basis on which they rest.

We shall now briefly consider the doctrines of *māyā* and *avidyā*, which as we have seen have no place in the strict system of Truth.[1] *Māyā* is the power with which Brahman is regarded as invested, in order to account for the phenomenal life. The term is also used to indicate the phenomena. The contradictions which run through all empirical life point to its unreality by itself and demand a basic Reality to make it effective. The belief in objects taken by themselves comes to us naturally and is due to *avidyā* or ignorance of the Truth. Empirical life endowed with an existence independent of God is common delusion, the source of all evil. In truth, Brahman neither creates nor destroys. It is above change and time and is beatitude itself. In the strictest sense we are Brahman. Much of the unpopularity of Vedānta is due to the reckless manner in which the Truth is expounded. The idea that all is Brahman is inspiring, while the notion that all is *māyā* or illusion is to most people disconcerting, paralysing. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* in its own gripping style refers to the Absolute and the relative phase of the same Reality: "Shining with all sense-faculties, without any senses; unattached, supporting everything; and free from qualities, enjoying them" (XIII.15). The one is the transcendental and the other the empirical view.

[1] For a fuller idea see the writer's *Vedānta or the Science of Reality*.

The reader who has so far followed the Vedāntic reasoning will readily perceive that the question of a cause never arises with regard to *māyā* or *avidyā*. *Māyā* is a theoretical concession to the *avidyā*-ridden soul to satisfy its craving for an explanation of the world, and *avidyā* or ignorance must in all cases be traced to the absence of enquiry. The order of evolution is fixed and immutable: First, *avidyā* or ignorance, and then intellection. Causation cannot precede ignorance, for it presupposes intellection. Knowledge is the implacable foe of ignorance which it completely destroys. Causation is defunct in the plane on which *māyā* and *avidyā* work.

There is an impression that Vedānta is mysticism and that the latter is the culmination of its teaching. The two, however, are wide and distinctly apart. The Upanishads no doubt deal largely with *upāsanās* or meditations which aim at the experience of mystic Oneness and the ecstasy resulting from it. This is evidently meant for those who avoid discussion and reasoning. The rational portion stands out more prominently and the methodology is based on it. The distinction between the two is radical and far-reaching. Mysticism seeks private experience by conscious effort, while Vedāntic reason builds on universal experience. Although philosophy must throw light on all kinds of human experience, its Truth cannot be drawn from special experiences, however rare; for the latter are not within the lives of all. Vedānta aims at knowledge of Truth; mysticism ecstasy.

In contemplating life we seem to be spectators of a strange drama, a play of shadows in the shape of the states enacted before us. The actors and the scenes are ourselves transmuted, without the least loss of our integrity. So long as we take the shadow for substance, we are merged in joys and sorrows, in birth and death. When we remember that it is but a shadow and that Reality can cast no shadow, the play now known to be an illusion deceives us no more, and the states rolling and unrolling themselves before us fool us no more. We are left to admire the greatness of Brahman which can project such scenes and withdraw them into itself, leaving no trace behind. To dispel the fear of illusion Santayana suggests a way. It is "to entertain the illusion without succumbing to it, accepting it openly as an illusion and forbidding it to claim any sort of being but that which it obviously has; and then, whether it profits me or not, it will not deceive me."

THE ESSENTIALS OF VEDĀNTA

WHAT DOES VEDĀNTA MEAN?

Vedānta is knowledge that has for its aim the solution of the mystery of all existence. In a sense every man has an explanation of the universe known to him, though it cannot be said that he has solved all the doubts that have presented themselves. What the Vedāntist, however, does is to make a systematic, nay, the most comprehensive enquiry possible. From time immemorial Indian thinkers fully recognized the fact, so often overlooked, that a man can grasp only what he has the capacity to think about or perceive, and that the same truths are viewed in a variety of ways according to different stages of intellectual development or different mental attitudes or tastes. The Indian or Vedāntic philosophers have in view this fact when they present their solutions in a number of ways. This feature causes not a little confusion in the minds of those that approach Vedāntic literature from the modern Western or Westernized standpoint. Some have taken it to be religion and some, mysticism. Others have thought that it is theology or scholasticism. And yet others have considered it to be the rudiments of scientific thinking. A few, however, believe that it is a philosophic interpretation of the universe. All these views are both correct and incorrect; for Vedānta is all these. Vedānta attempts to sum up the whole of human knowledge, as far as possible. It considers every kind of human knowledge or experience to be a step in the ladder. At one stage it is religion, at another it is mysticism, and so forth. It recognizes even atheism or agnosticism as a step. It takes a bird's-eye view of all sciences and arts also. It ignores or discards nothing of human experience. At its highest stage Vedānta is *pure* philosophy. It seeks not an imaginary or hypothetical, but a verifiable or true explanation of the whole of existence.

That Vedāntic thought made great progress in the past is generally acknowledged. But whether it has kept itself abreast of the recent advances in science and philosophy is doubted by many. For latterly it only helped to produce a colossal literature in theology and scholasticism or to drive men to mysticism. It was left to Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa to present Vedānta in a manner suited to the modern mind. He

has shown that Vedānta includes and implies all stages and varieties of human experience and knowledge, and that it is not opposed to the latest developments of science and philosophy.

OF WHAT USE OR VALUE IS VEDĀNTA?

Vedānta is a treasure of which no conqueror can deprive India and make her poor, but of which she can freely give to all mankind, and make not only the receiver but also the giver equally rich. It actually and truly blesses him that gives and him that takes, inasmuch as it seeks, as the goal of all existence, universal or supreme good (*parama purushārtha*). While every religion and every school of mysticism vouchsafes its joys or satisfactions only to the individual or individuals entering its fold, Vedānta seeks, without inflicting the humiliation of proselytization, the good of all men, nay, of all beings, and that in the highest degree, though at first sight such an object appears too ambitious to be within actual human reach. Further, every religion, no doubt, promises the highest good or bliss after death, whereas Vedānta aims at realizing such good in this world. In this respect, its object conforms itself in the strictest sense to the laws of verification known to the most modern scientist.

Vedānta naturally starts with an enquiry into the nature and means of satisfying human cravings or desires, which, when not satisfied, beget sorrow or suffering. Many a Western critic has misunderstood this feature of Vedāntic enquiry and characterizes it as a pessimistic philosophy. But it only starts with such universal facts as stimulate best the spirit of enquiry. What distinguishes Vedānta from all other human pursuits is that it does not rest till it attains the goal of *universal good*, by eradicating all sorrows of life. This it seeks to reach by probing the mystery of existence. It may not be possible for everyone to reach what is called the Ultimate Truth or bring about the highest good. To the extent men approach this truth, do they achieve and promote universal good. Therefore great souls seek to help humanity in attaining what is called Supreme Knowledge (*Brahmajñāna*), which is inseparable from universal good, the goal of Vedānta. This truth sought by Vedānta is beyond the reach of religions and sciences.

WHO IS QUALIFIED TO MAKE VEDĀNTIC ENQUIRY?

The first condition to be satisfied by a seeker after the highest truth

is for him to possess the requisite competency. Now there are different degrees, or, as it is sometimes thought, different views of the same truth. There are, as already said, truths of religion, mysticism, science and different philosophic schools, marking the steps so far reached. But the peculiarity of Vedânta lies in that it comprehends all of them and aims at the highest or all-unifying truth. He who is satisfied with any particular kind or degree of truth other than the highest, and is not eager to get at the latter, is not qualified for Vedāntic philosophy. The seeker after this end should possess the 'strength' and 'determination' needed to continue till the goal is reached. He must be able to command perfect 'concentration' or one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*) of mind. Such concentration means the complete elimination of all *personal* preconceptions (*ahaṁkāra* and *rāga*). These disciplines are made possible in the modern world in science, provided the determination to reach the very end is persistent, which unfortunately is absent in most of the scientists. The scientist often lacks this determination, because he fears he may have to forego some of those things that he is most attached to in the world. To give an instance, some eminent scientists, though they see at times that the causal relation is no more than one's own intellectual conception or an idea, cannot yet rise above the belief that it somehow inheres in the objects themselves. These men think so because of their attachment to the world. It is when their minds can rise above, or free themselves from the coils of this 'causal' complex that they can get at the Vedāntic point of view. Nor is the scientist able to rise to that pitch of complete detachment which demands greater sacrifices (*vairāgya*) than are commonly made. The old Indian discipline which combined *yoga* (mental control) and *vichāra* (enquiry) has fallen into disfavour. The modern Hindu student of philosophy is prepared for *vichāra* alone without the necessary *yoga*, which demands the fulfilment of many ethical disciplines. The Indian philosophic preparation for the pursuit of truth is known as *sādhana*. As this course of preparation is slow and gradual, men are made to pass through the stages called religion, theology, scholasticism and mysticism, including a taste for art before they attempt *śāstra-vichāra* or what is known as enquiry on scientific lines, in these days. At each stage men are made to think that they are near the goal, lest they should feel discouraged. They are, therefore, made to discard doubt, and rely solely upon faith. The pursuit known as *philosophic* enquiry (*tattva-artha-vichāra*) marks the last step.

Vedānta is often interpreted as signifying only this last stage, though in reality it covers the whole field of human knowledge including the last step, which is its most distinguishing feature.

Philosophy commences when one sees the fallacy of relying upon authority or tradition, including scriptures or the testimony of others, however extraordinary. Philosophy, further, repudiates all mystic attitudes or ecstatic visions which manifest themselves in such expressions as '*I* know,' '*I* have seen' or '*I* have felt,' and cannot rely upon them as absolute truth, without testing them.

After one has thus qualified oneself, that is, after one is able to eliminate all personal preconceptions either by rigorously applying the scientific method or by fully undergoing yogic discipline, one may embark upon the rational interpretation of existence, *i.e.* philosophic enquiry. Men at the helpless or child stage have to rely upon the help of others, and have therefore to begin with some kind of belief, suited to their own temperaments, in an unseen or more powerful Being, or some existence after the death of the body, or in the reality of the objective world. At this stage the mind finds satisfaction in what it attains to, and clings to it. But when it grows in vigour, it begins to *doubt* and asks for proofs. Doubt is dangerous, as the *Bhagavad-Gītā* points out, inasmuch as it tends to unsettle the mind. It must be got rid of at least by dogmatic faith. Faith is the sheet anchor of such minds. But to those that possess the strength and capacity to think acutely, doubt is a stimulus to further enquiry. As the *Nāsadīya Sūkta* or the *Uddhava-Gītā* indicates, doubt is the mother of knowledge. Philosophy first develops the thirst for emancipating oneself from the slave mentality of relying upon tradition or authority or upon one's own unverified knowledge. Since this emancipation is a gradual process, every man is in one sense a philosopher, to the extent to which he is able to pursue truth. Religion and mysticism seek to live in a world of faith and vision, whereas science and philosophy try to live in a world of verified facts.

THE NATURE OF THE TRUTH OF VEDĀNTA

All systems of philosophy, wherever found or developed, are but approaches to the common *end* or summit of Vedānta, which is the end of all knowledge. This end or goal of Vedānta is thus described: It is that which being known, everything becomes known, and which being attained, nothing else remains to be attained. The urge or impulse to

attain to this goal manifests itself in the earliest stages as efforts to satisfy one's cravings or wants and to overcome fears, all of a physical character. In the higher stages it seeks to satisfy all intellectual as well as spiritual wants and overcome fears of all kinds. To attain the former, men make use of religion and science, and to attain the latter they pursue philosophy, especially Vedānta. Vedānta, therefore, does not despise religion or science but seeks their co-ordination. All disciplines from religion upwards tend to 'purify,' 'sharpen' or make 'one-pointed,' the *buddhi* or reason—not the intellect as so many writers on Vedānta say. But it should not be understood that one can straightway start the study of philosophy before this capacity to 'depersonalize' (effacement of the ego) is attained.

Such a seeker has to be warned against a serious error, into which men often fall in the attempt to recognize truth. All men naturally love truth and seek it. And satisfaction is thought to be the index of truth. But a Plato dissatisfied knows more of truth than an unthinking person satisfied. It is satisfaction that determines the truths of religion, mysticism, theology and often of the scientists also. A Max Planck or a Bertrand Russel prefers to stick to the *causal* relation merely because it gives them *satisfaction*. The theologians and scholastics, who wrangle about logical or grammatical interpretations, rely *finally* upon personal satisfaction, which evidently varies. The test of the highest truth in Vedānta consists in the inconceivability, and consequently the impossibility, of difference in it. Mere satisfaction, joy or bliss experienced by one is no criterion of *truth* in Vedānta. The two must go together, though truth is independently sought.

WHAT IS EXISTENCE?

Vedānta studies all experience by first analyzing it, as is most commonly done, into two factors, the knowing agency (*kshetrajña*) and the known or knowable world (*kshetra*), which are, roughly speaking, similar to the 'mind' and 'matter' of European thought. The correspondence, however, is but a rough one. For, in the West, philosophers do not seem to have as yet analyzed 'mind' and 'matter,' or 'subject' and 'object' so completely as the Vedāntists have done. The knowing factor does not include, in Vedānta, the contents of 'mind' such as thoughts, feelings, ideas, which are treated as 'mind' in Europe and America. They are treated as the 'known' or the object in India,

and are put into the same category as percepts. Vedānta recognizes two classes of *objects*, mental and physical, *i.e.* internal and external. The witness (knower) is thus separated from what is witnessed (known), *i.e.* the entire panorama of the physical and mental worlds. The reason for such an analysis is that the two factors belong to distinct categories. The seen or known is inconstant, whereas the witness only sees the changes and is as such non-varying.

THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS DIVISION

Such men as are struck by the impermanence of the objective world, and particularly of this physical body, seek the comfort and support of religion, theology, mysticism or the like. Such others as cling to the objective world, believing it or at least the changes to be real, because of the pleasure they yield, are realists, most of whom are scientists also. They do not ignore the 'objects' known as mental. Only they rely most upon the 'seen' or known, internally or externally. Those few, on the other hand, that investigate both mind and matter, *i.e.* the 'witness' and the 'witnessed,' the subject (knower) and the object (known), and seek the absolutely real, are philosophers. They do not fall back upon mere intuition or imagination, as do the first group of men; nor do they ignore any part of the mental factor, as do the second group, or take the known world to be real because it is a source of pleasure to them. What the philosopher, according to Vedānta, seeks is not comfort or joy, but truth. He who knows the truth of *all* existence is said to attain Supreme Knowledge, which is seen to comprehend the universal good.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY THE WHOLE OF LIFE OR EXPERIENCE?

This is in fact the central problem of the philosophy of Vedānta. European and American philosophy is based upon the data of the waking state, in other words, of a fraction of experience, while Vedānta takes all the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep, or the whole of experience, into consideration. Western philosophy, again, takes the waking data as the *standard* of Reality, and with this standard it evaluates the experience of dream and deep sleep; whereas Vedānta places all the three states on the same level and enquires into their worth as 'reality.' The philosophic conclusions of the West cannot, therefore

attain a view of the *whole* truth. Vedānta is the only road leading to it, for it considers *the whole of experience.*

Without going into detail, it will suffice here to say that the study of the three states leads one, first, to the fact that the entire world of the waking state is as much a creation of the mind as the world of dreams, and as both the worlds disappear in deep sleep into the mind, the entire objective world of the waking and dream states is *unreal* or *illusory.* They *appear* to be real for the time being. Vedānta is neither realism nor idealism, but unrealism so far as the object world goes, and Ātmanism so far as the substance in itself is concerned; for the whole world of mental creation emanates from and returns to the mind substance. The knowledge that everything is Ātman cannot be attained unless one rises above the thought or concept of Ātman, *i.e. lives* or has his being identified with everything, the *all.*

THE GOAL OF VEDĀNTA

The true test of the worth of Vedānta lies in its bearing on *life* now and here, not in any *speculative* hypothesis or any *intellectually* constructed system. The only question is: Does Vedānta explain the whole of life, and at the same time help the realization of *universal* good, in actual life? These are not two separate questions but are the obverse and the reverse, so to say, of the same question. Generally men view the highest good as one's own supreme bliss in this or in some future life, taking the individual standpoint, and rest satisfied with it. This is religion or mysticism. Though, as religion, Vedānta starts with the welfare of the *individual,* yet it does not stop till the whole of mankind, nay, the whole of the world of life, is embraced in its conception of the highest good. Man is not happy unless he has the satisfaction of possessing as much as possible of what is outside of him. At first he seeks wealth and all the means of happiness which are outside of him. He wants wife, friends and neighbours, or society; and he feels that their joy or sorrow is his joy or sorrow. In a word, he feels that their well-being constitutes his well-being. He next learns that the good of the other creatures and man's good are interdependent. Vedānta goes a step further and says that the good of even the plant world involves the good of man. In fact, Vedānta points out that what constitutes the body of man also constitutes in different combinations the material world. What constituted the human body a minute ago is now part of the body

of entities outside and *vice versa.* His body is food for others, as other objects are food for him. In fact, this exchange is so continuous that it is impossible to say whether there is anything that can be called one's own at any time. It is a vain belief or delusion to think that there *permanently* exists anything separate as one's own body. Similarly, the individual mind is made up of the thoughts or ideas of his parents, neighbours and ancestors, nay, of the world known to him. Nowhere in the mental world of the individual can a line be drawn to indicate what is exclusively his own. His passions and feelings and cravings came to him with his body from his parents, *i.e.* inherited from his ancestors. Next, as regards what is called the self: Everyone refers to his self as "I." What is the characteristic of this "I?" What is its general mark? It must be the common factor or feature of all the "I's" with all their differences. Eliminating the latter, which change with every man and every moment, the common feature "I" is the only permanent factor known. In a word, *individuality* cannot be defined as a permanent feature. Whatever exists permanently is the universal only. "The One remains, the many change." Individuality is a notion which, when enquired into, lands us in the universal, the all. The firm conviction that the *one* is the all, attained by constant and deep enquiry into the meaning of *life* in all its aspects, is the goal of Vedānta. This attainment is impossible unless one constantly looks into one's own life and actually sees in it the *all.*

WHY IS PHILOSOPHY CONSIDERED SO DIFFICULT?

The fact that there exist so many schools and systems, each differing from the others, and sometimes even hostile to each other, and the most disheartening fact that the number is multiplying every day, make one seriously doubt whether there can be any philosophy that will be universally or absolutely true. It may be asked whether after all it is not wiser to avoid this wild-goose chase, if some kind of mysticism or religion will not give one the peace of mind or joy that one needs in life. This great maze of thought regarding Ultimate Reality is, says Vedānta, due to the circumstance that men confine themselves to the experiences of the waking state only, in which man's valuation of truth depends upon his *intellect.* So long as he is guided by the intellect, philosophies will only multiply and be more a hindrance than a help in attaining a *final* solution. All philosophical wranglings so often me

with in the world are of the intellect. To such intellect-ridden minds, religion or at best *yoga* or mysticism is the best antidote. In fact, the best philosophers of modern and ancient Europe, who have soared to some of the highest peaks of the intellect, and have written the most admirable works, have lost themselves finally in some kind of mysticism. But Vedānta teaches that the real solution is to be sought not in the intellect, nor in mere intuition or ecstasy, but in *reason* which takes the *all* of life into consideration. It is therefore said, "In reason seek thou shelter." It is the whole of life with which reason is concerned. In other words, it is this knowledge of *kshetra* and *kshetrajña* that is the subject-matter of *reason*, and not the knowledge of matter alone, nor of mind or of spirit alone, to which the intellect addresses itself and multiplies systems, perhaps, to the weariness of mankind.

THE BEST GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY

There is a time-honoured conviction of the Hindu mind that the best exposition of the philosophy of a man is the life lived by him. It is, therefore, insisted that 'association' (*saṅga*) with holy men is indispensable. Where, however, this is not possible, a study of the life is the next best course. Now, it is evident from what we know of the greatest Vedāntins, from Śrī Rāma, Janaka and Śrī Krishṇa down to Śaṅkarāchārya and Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, that they did not, after their philosophy ripened, hide themselves in mystic contemplation in caves and forests or sit statue-like on river banks or mountain tops, but wore themselves out working with all their might for the world around them, wherever the call came from. Such was the way in which they sought the fulfilment of the object of their existence. Before realizing the highest truth, they did have recourse to all the disciplines known as religion, mysticism (*yoga*) and studies of various kinds, even enquiries along different lines: But all these were dropped when they reached the world of philosophic truth.

VEDĀNTA AND SCIENCE

THE SPIRIT OF THE MODERN AGE

The present age is undoubtedly an age of free-thinking and criticism. The human intellect has been released from the dogmatism of the past, and the pet old notions and theories are, as a result, fast melting away before the rays of its searching scrutiny. Every time-honoured conception, whether social, political or religious, is being recast in the new mould of thought, and nothing is accepted as valid until it has been satisfactorily tested by human reason. Rightly has Immanuel Kant observed in his *Critique of Pure Reason,* "Our age is an age of criticism, a criticism from which nothing need hope to escape. When religion seeks to shelter itself behind its sanctity and law behind its majesty, they justly awaken suspicion against themselves, and lose all claim to the sincere respect which reason yields only to that which has been able to bear the test of its free and open scrutiny." This spirit of criticism born of a dissatisfaction with the existing order of things has invaded every branch of human knowledge both in the East and in the West; and it is a hopeful sign of the times that as a result of this bold and free enquiry into the ultimate truth of things, a disposition to bring into synthesis the manifold findings of science and philosophy, of sociology and politics, and thereby to harmonize the apparent conflicts in the realms of thought, is already in evidence for the betterment of human life. The old antagonism between science and philosophy has almost been reduced to a minimum through the untiring zeal and creative endeavours of the mighty intellects of this rationalistic age. And it must be said to the credit of Vedānta that to-day Western science no longer contradicts but finds in this philosophy, the crowning glory of Oriental thought, a happy fulfilment of its noblest aspirations, and the hierophants of both the branches of knowledge, through mutual understanding and sympathy, have already created opportunities to usher in a new era in the history of mankind.

TWO LINES OF APPROACH TO TRUTH

It cannot but be admitted that much of the unseemly jealousy, hatred and rivalry amongst nations is due to a lack of sympathetic

understanding of one another's history of life, tradition and culture. Neither the East nor the West ever seriously attempted to know each other's mind and assimilate the best features of each for their mutual well-being. The West has so long been in ignorance of the boldest spiritual flight of Oriental genius, and the East has likewise failed to take advantage of the scientific achievements of the West. This ignorance, studied or otherwise, of each other's cultural trend and wisdom has in no small measure been productive of antagonism and conflict between the two in the past. Every student of the history of Comparative Philosophy now admits that 'the journey to the mental antipodes being longer than the journey to the physical, the West has forced its way into the latter and has grabbed while grabbing was good and completely ignored the spiritual.' As a matter of fact, the two minds, Eastern and Western, though cognate to each other in form, kinship and sympathy, had their distinctive lines of growth and expansion. The ancient Hindus by the very nature of their position and environment developed an introspective mentality and started in search of the ultimate verity of life by analysing the internal world, whereas the ancient Greeks and their faithful followers, the people of the West, proceeded in pursuit of the same through a scientific analysis of the external phenomena and it is indeed curious to note that the vibrations of both the minds ultimately tended to produce similar echoes from the goal beyond. But unfortunately both the East and the West till recent years failed to co-ordinate their respective findings, and thereby kept unbridged the wide gulf existing in their view-points of life and its destiny.

WHAT SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY AIM AT?

It is interesting to note that in India there has never been any such clash between the findings of science and those of the philosophy of Vedānta. The reason is not far to seek. In India the ultimate motive of investigation into truth and the mode of application of the scientific achievements were attuned to the same spiritual end; and the results of scientific enquiries found their echoes in the spiritual realizations of the master-minds of the land. But in the West the case has been just the opposite. The scientific achievements of Occidental geniuses, on account of their materialistic outlook, have served mainly to pander to the baser instincts of man by releasing his passions, and have oftener than not ranged themselves as a mighty force to antagonize the sacred aims and

purposes of the spiritual life. But to-day it is really refreshing to find that according to the best minds of the West 'philosophy and science are not regarded as watertight compartments, but are permitted to influence each other as parts of one organic whole of knowledge,' and the lines of demarcation between Realism and Idealism at the present day have become very indistinct. For science has been taking its legitimate share in the problems of philosophy and has arrived at almost the same end. Sir Oliver Lodge in an illuminating article entitled "Science and God" has beautifully summed up the entire process of research in the domain of Reality. "The revelation of science," he says, "is that that which occurs here in the physical universe, occurs everywhere; that the laws are the same throughout. In other words, the universe is really one and there is no conflicting or opposition power......So that if there be a God who understands and is responsible for anything, He must be responsible for everything, that the God of this earth is the God of the whole heavens, and that there is none other; that His power and influence extend to the remotest confines of space, from eternity to eternity, and that in that majestic and one Reality, however little we as yet apprehend in nature, we and every part of the material, and of mental and spiritual universe, too, live and move and have our being." Thus what with the unfoldment of knowledge and what with the indefatigable labours of the modern scientists of the East and the West, the boundaries of distinction have almost vanished; and a *rapprochement* between the two schools of thought as well as between the East and West has been greatly facilitated. The one outstanding feature in the gradual toning down of the spirit of antagonism between the two branches of human knowledge is the unconscious orientation of Occidental thinking to the Indian conception of the highest truth of life. What at one time was twitted by the West as preposterous in the Hindu philosophy, has now been acknowledged as the finality of human aspiration by the leading Western scientific thinkers and the 'supermen' of Arthur E. Christy have already joined hands in love and admiration for the consummation of a cultural synthesis between the East and the West. It is needless to point out that the output of those secular institutions where Bunsen burners and Bessemer crucibles are in use, cannot but harmonize with the mystic experiences of the Upanishadic seers so as to wed the life of the West to that of the East indissolubly.

VEDĀNTA, THE SCIENCE OF REALITY

It should be borne in mind that the above-mentioned conflict between these two departments of knowledge has hitherto centred round the determination of the exact nature of the ultimate Reality. It is the glory of Vedānta that it sounded long ago a death-knell to all the apparent conflicts and contradictions, and proved itself to be the only 'Science of Reality' which has been competent to solve for mankind the eternal problems about God, soul and the universe. The Vedāntists proclaim God to be the Cause of all causes, and the manifold world of human experiences as the elaborated mode of that one eternal Entity. Besides, what is called 'creation' is, according to them, but a process of evolution and involution. The finer state is the cause and the grosser state the effect—a fact which is an everyday experience of man in this world of phenomena. The raindrop that sparkles in the sunbeam is nothing but vapour drawn from the ocean; but this vapour ultimately comes down in the shape of raindrops only to be transformed into vapour again. Thus the things that are destroyed only go back to their finer forms. Similar is the case with the universe as a whole. After each cycle all gross manifestations return to their final state—the primal substance, of which all the things of the universe in the form of motion, vibration, thought, resistance, object, etc., are but various modifications. The Prakṛiti of the Sāṁkhyas is the same as what we understand by Nature or Matter, and the *pralaya* (dissolution) is only a state of equilibrium of the three forces—*tamas* (inertia), *rajas* (activity) and *sattva* (the balance of the two). When the equilibrium is disturbed and one of the three forces gets the better of the other two, motion sets in and 'creation' begins. The Śruti considers this projection and dissolution of the universe as the outbreathing and inbreathing of God. Thus what lies in a potential or causal form at the end of a cycle manifests itself as the effect at the beginning of 'creation,' and this gradual manifestation of the cause in its gross form is what the scientists understand by 'evolution.' The Vedāntists have gone a step further in their quest of truth: they assert that there can be no evolution without a previous involution; for evolution presupposes involution. There is thus a world of significance in the expression, *ex nihilo nihil fit*—out of nothing, nothing comes. The same thing which appears as cause becomes amplified and evolved as the effect in the end. The whole series of evolution from the protoplasm to the perfect man involves one intelligent

Substance which is the same throughout the process of 'creation' as well as before and after it. The theory that intelligence evolves in process of evolution is untenable because, as we have already pointed out, the beginning and the end being the same, it is only the intelligence involved in the protoplasm that unveils itself until it becomes manifested in the perfect being. It is therefore quite reasonable to hold that "the perfect man who is at one end of the chain of evolution was involved in the cell of the protoplasm which is at the other end of the same chain......The intelligence which is involved in the beginning becomes evolved in the end. The sum total of intelligence displayed in the universe must therefore be involved universal Intelligence unfolding itself. This cosmic Intelligence is what the theologians call God. That is why all the scriptures say, 'In Him we live and move and have our being.'"

Indeed, the multiple forms that we see in the world are but the varied expressions of that one cosmic Intelligence—the Supreme Being. He is thus the material and the efficient cause of this universe, inclusive of time and space, causes and effects. He is infinite Knowledge, infinite Bliss and infinite Existence, pervading the whole chain of creation. In short, He is One without a second. In Vedānta, this Supreme Reality has been termed Brahman—Existence-Knowledge-Bliss Absolute; and this is the most universal of all generalizations. Rightly has Swami Vivekananda said, "You and I are little bits, little points, little channels, little expressions, all living inside of that infinite Ocean of Existence-Knowledge-Bliss. The difference between men and animals, between animals and plants, between plants and stones, is not in kind, because everyone from the highest angel to the lowest particle of matter is but an expression of that one infinite Ocean, and the difference is only in degree." It is the one *immanent* Principle that pervades all forms of matter and energy, and apart from It nothing has a reality of its own.

The Advaita Vedānta emphatically says that it is only through our ignorance (*avidyā*) that we consider this universe with its multifarious names and forms as distinct from the Ātman—the Universal Self. This *avidyā*, the *Chitsukhī* holds, is beginningless and is of the nature of a *bhāva* (a positive entity), but is removable by knowledge (*jñāna*). It has two aspects: the *āvaraṇī śakti* (veiling power) which hides the real nature of Brahman, and the *vikshepa śakti* (projecting power) which projects the relative reality of the universe. It is neither existent nor non-existent,

but something the exact nature of which is indefinable (*anirvachanīya*). It is this *avidyā*, says Śaṅkara in his *Bṛihadāraṇyaka-bhāshya*, that presents things as separate from the Ātman—the Brahman of the Upanishads; for it is the nature of *avidyā* to cause differentiation in what would otherwise be a unitary experience. But from the absolute (*pāramārthika*) standpoint there is nothing but the Ātman—the one *transcendental* Reality which is changeless and eternal. The rigorous monism of Śaṅkara would never admit the co-existence of two absolute realities, such as the Noumenon and phenomenon. It is only the Noumenon that exists and the phenomenon has only an empirical reality.

Thus it is clear that the Reality is one, and beyond time, space and causation. It appears as many only when it is viewed through the prism of name and form. The Advaitists generalize the whole universe into one entity which appears as manifold only through our ignorance. They call this theory of theirs *vivartavāda* (apparent manifestation), and substantiate their position through the well-known illustration of the rope and the snake, where the rope appears to be snake, but is not really so. Thus they hold that the whole universe is identical with that Being. It is unchanged, and all the changes that we see in it are only apparent, and are caused by *deśa, kāla* and *nimitta* (space, time and causation), or according to a higher psychological generalization, by *nāma* and *rūpa* (name and form). It is name and form that differentiate one thing from another. In reality they are one and the same; for from the Absolute standpoint the Ātman alone and nothing else exists. Thus it is the Advaita Vedānta that for the first time in the history of the world struck this sublime note of unity in the domain of spirit and matter.

THE GOAL OF SCIENCE

The modern scientists have almost come to the very same conclusion, though in a different way. The present tendency of science is towards the recognition of the ancient Hindu doctrine of one Substance. Rightly has Sir John Woodroffe remarked in his *Universe as Power-Reality*: "When the Western science attributes unity, conservation and continuity to matter, energy and motion in a universe of obvious plurality and discontinuity, what it is in fact doing is to show that none of its conceptions have any meaning, except on the assumption of the unity and unmoving continuity of consciousness in the sense of the Vedāntic Chit.........Matter is really indestructible and the glory of the modern scientific achieve-

ments lies in the fact that it has dematerialized matter and has made the way for the Vedāntic conception of *māyā* and has further recognized that from its *materia prima* all forms have evolved: that there is life in all things and there are no breaks in nature.... ....There is no such thing as 'dead matter.' The well-known experiments of Dr. J. C. Bose establish response to stimuli in organic matter. What is this response but the indication of the existence of that *sattva guṇa* which Vedānta and Sāṁkhya affirm to exist in all things, organic or inorganic? It is the play of Chit in this *sattva,* so muffled in *tamas* as not to be recognizable. Consciousness is throughout the same. What varies is its wrappings. There is thus a progressive release of consciousness from gross matter through plants and animals to man." He further says, "My own conviction is that an examination of Indian Vedāntic doctrines shows that it is, in most important respects, in conformity with the most advanced scientific and philosophic thought of the West, and that where this is not so, it is science which will go to Vedānta and not the reverse." In short, practical science is charged with the mission of finding out the unity of things, and already the scientific inventions have helped in no small degree to establish the idea of the unity of mankind, to diminish particularization and to foster a wide view of the universe and its meaning. For science is nothing but the finding of unity. When it will reach perfect unity, it will stop from progressing further. Thus Chemistry will cease to advance when it discovers one element out of which all others can be evolved. Similar will be the case with Physics when it is able to find out one energy of which all the others are but manifestations. Thus, to attain unity through multiplicity is *the goal of science;* and all branches of it are bound ultimately to arrive at this conclusion. It is not surprising to find that manifestation, and not creation, is the watchword of science to-day. In fact, what the Hindu has been cherishing in his bosom for ages is going to be verified and taught in more forcible language by the latest findings of science. Thus we see that all human investigations and strivings both in the external and in the internal world eventually dissolve into one synthetic search for the highest truth. Metaphysics being an ontological science is concerned with the discovery of the Cause of all causes, the Supreme Reality; whereas science begins with an investigation into the universal laws of objective phenomena, which furnish tangible data for the apprehension of the ultimate unity that stands behind all that we perceive. Whatever be the technical difference between the functions of

science and of philosophy, both ultimately lead to the discovery of the one governing principle—the final goal of all human research. For "Truth is one; the sages only call It by various names" (*Ṛig-Veda* I.164.46).

A RESUMÉ OF PAST SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS

It is really refreshing to find that with the advance of scientific knowledge, the old notion about Nature as 'an ocean of mechanism surrounding us on all sides' is disappearing. A retrospect of the whole process of scientific investigation and the net results achieved by the leading scientists of the West since the golden days of the Renaissance reveals a gradual process of abstraction—a fact which has become typical of modern science. It is admitted on all hands that Physics, by virtue of its being concerned with positive data and having greater scope for experiment and observation than other branches, is the vanguard of the material sciences, and that it is the physicists who by their patient study and research have brought about a complete revolution in our old notions regarding the elements out of which the physical universe is built up. For our present purpose, the age of Galileo (1564–1642) may be taken as a great landmark in the history of scientific researches and discoveries. The greatest contribution of Galileo to the scientific world is his analysis of the conception of motion. In his opinion the really important properties of the world are those that can be mathematically defined. The entire cosmos, he says, is built out of atoms possessed of four properties, viz. size, shape, weight and motion, and these atoms acted on by forces produce by their combination the whole material universe. In other words, the object of the science of Physics, according to him, is to prove that every phenomenon is explained in terms of motions of little particles. Thus the real world around us is conceived by Galileo to be quantitative.

This theory received a systematic treatment later at the hands of Dalton who removed much of the vagueness attaching to Galileo's theory and placed the system on a more logical and scientific basis. In his opinion every substance of the physical universe is the product of a combination of two or more of the ninety chemical elements existing in the world. And to explain the three different states of matter, viz. solid, liquid and gaseous, which are observed in nature, he evolved the theory of heat which, he held, produced changes in matter from solid to liquid and from liquid to gaseous, and increased the atomic and molecular

motions of bodies as well. This hypothesis no doubt covered a large ground and explained a wide range of phenomena, but not all of them. In spite of his explanations, the notion of atoms remained as vague as before.

Consequently this conception of atoms as ultimate particles of matter had to give way to newer scientific revelations. A series of experiments made towards the close of the nineteenth century brought it clearly home to the minds of the scientists that the atom was not a simple entity. Sir J. J. Thomson, the celebrated English scientist, by a careful adjustment of two plates (*i.e.* positive and negative electrodes) inside the two ends of a glass tube emptied of air, and connecting them to a source of electricity, produced a strange phenomenon: A stream of what is called cathode rays was found to issue from the negative electrode in straight lines. This led him in 1897 to put forward the theory that these rays consisted of electrically charged particles which were found to be nearly two thousand times smaller than the hydrogen atom, the lightest known atom in the world. These particles came to be called electrons and were recognized as the real basis of the material world. Thus the scientists practically bade adieu to gross matter and soared into the realm of Energy. In fact, this theory seemed to make the whole world of matter completely *unsubstantial*.

But even this failed to meet the various complications that arose; for electrons by themselves are not sufficient to build up atoms of matter, which are electrically neutral, whereas electrons being negatively electrified are mutually repellent and as such useless for constructive purposes. The finding of a positive electric charge was a dire necessity to ensure stability to an assemblage of such electrons. This difficulty was soon overcome by Sir Ernest Rutherford who is credited with the famous theory according to which an atom resembled a 'miniature solar system.' The positive charge was supposed to be located at the centre of the atom and the negatively charged electrons, like so many planets, spun round it like a miniature solar system. Thus the central positive charge was held to be just sufficient to counterbalance, electrically, the sum of the electrons moving round it. But even this theory failed to satisfy completely the critical spirit of later scientific minds. Max Planck's *Wave Theory of Radiation* and the *Quantum Theory* of the celebrated Danish physicist Niels Bohr, though grand and valuable in themselves, were also insufficient to tackle the intricate problem of the physical universe. All the

above theories about an atom had to yield to the purely *mathematical* theory which gradually gained the upper hand.

According to it the electron is no longer conceived as a particle, but as a *system of waves*, and the fundamental entities are no longer 'picturable.' Thus the old conception of a permanent substance has to give way to an abstract notion—a collection of mathematical symbols. For, as Mr. Sullivan has put it, "these waves are located within what is called a 'configuration space.' This configuration space is certainly not ordinary physical space, for the reason that each electron requires a three-dimensional configuration space to itself. Thus two electrons require a space of six dimensions in which to exist; three electrons require a nine-dimensional space, and so on. It is evident therefore that the configuration space is not real space, and in this sense the wave system that represents an electron is a mere mathematical device and not a description of a physical reality." Mr. Minkowski's conception that the universe in which events exist is of four dimensions and that it is our minds that split up this universe into three dimensions of space and one dimension of time, serves only to support the above conclusion. So, it can no longer be asserted with positive certainty that a given set of data can determine the behaviour of the next set of affairs—the causal link in the strictest sense being hardly ascertainable to explain the happenings of things in Nature. Thus strict determinism cannot be assumed to play any substantial part in the behaviour of the ultimate elements of the physical world, and, curiously enough, this gradual elimination of determinism from the field of scientific study and research is in keeping with the spirit of the latest findings of modern science.

Einstein's *Restricted Principle of Relativity* published in 1905 as well as the *Generalized Principle of Relativity* published ten years later tended only to confirm the modern belief in the validity of mathematical theory. For 'whatever words science may use for its concepts, light-quantum, distance, mass, four-dimensional continuum, electron, or whatever they be, we find in each case that each of these words stands for a body of mathematical relations,' and consequently 'science does not tell us anything about the substance of the elements out of which we have built up the perceptual world. It tells us merely mathematical specifications of those elements.' From the above it becomes clear that the material universe is much more subjective than the ancient scientists supposed, and 'the modern scientific man is sufficiently conscious that he is only

talking about certain mathematical relations when he talks about the entities out of which he intends to construct the universe.'

CONCLUSIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE

From the foregoing retrospect it is now easy to follow how this process of abstraction became the characteristic feature of modern science. With the passage of time and the rapid march of events science has explored many an unknown region of Nature; and its startling pronouncements are found to echo in no small measure the metaphysical findings of hoary antiquity. To crown all, modern science exhibits a persistent tendency to eliminate altogether the hitherto supposed distinction between mind and matter—a phenomenon which is epoch-making in its character, for the scientists by dematerializing matter have practically opened the door for the Vedāntic conception of *māyā*. It is the ancient Indian doctrine that both mind and matter are modes of one and the same substance and as such they are akin to each other. This fact has been accentuated by some of the distinguished scientists of the modern age. Dr. A. S. Eddington says in *The Nature of the Physical World*: "The frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shadows is one of the most significant advances In the world of physics we watch a shadowgraph performance of the drama of familiar life. The shadow of my elbow rests on the shadow table as the shadow ink flows over the shadow paper. It is all symbolic, and as a symbol the physicist leaves it. Then comes the alchemist Mind who transmutes the symbols. In the transmuted world new significances arise which are scarcely to be traced in the world of symbols; so that it becomes a world of beauty and purpose—and, alas! suffering and evil." "To put the conclusion crudely, the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. The realistic matter and fields of force of former physical theory are altogether irrelevant except in so far as the mind-stuff has itself spun these imaginings." "The external world has thus become a world of shadows. In removing our illusions we have removed the substance, for indeed we have seen that substance is one of the greatest of our illusions." Thus we find that this great scientist is in perfect agreement with the Vedāntist in regard to the conception of mind and matter, and has indirectly introduced in the realm of matter the inevitable doctrine of *māyā* which the Vedāntist accepted ages ago for the explanation of this *unsubstantial* world of phenomena. The conclusions of Sir James Jeans, another great scientist of the modern

world, deserves also a careful consideration. In *The Mysterious Universe* he remarks: "To-day there is a wide measure of agreement which on the physical side of science approaches almost to a unanimity, that the stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality; the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine.. ..The old dualism of mind and matter which was mainly responsible for the supposed hostility seems likely to disappear, not through matter becoming in any way more shadowy and unsubstantial than heretofore, or through mind becoming resolved into a function of the working of matter, but through substantial matter resolving itself into a creation and manifestation of mind." The very same view has been reiterated by him in his later work *The New Background of Science*. He opines: "Our last impression of nature, before we began to take our human spectacles off, was of an ocean of mechanism surrounding us on all sides. As we gradually discard our spectacles, we see mechanical concepts continually giving place to mental. If from the nature of things we can never discard them entirely, we may yet conjecture that the effect of doing so would be the total disappearance of matter and mechanism, mind reigning supreme and alone." "Broadly speaking," he further says, "the two conjectures are those of the idealist and realist--or, if we prefer, the mentalist and materialist views of nature ...The present day science is favourable to idealism. In brief, idealism has always maintained that, as the beginning of the road by which we explore nature is mental, the chances are that the end also will be mental. To this, present-day science adds that, at the farthest point she has so far reached, much, and possibly all, that was not mental has disappeared, and nothing new has come in that is not mental."

Thus we see that the great truths that were visualized by the ancient sages of India have in modern times found a clear reaffirmation in the scientific world after years of diligent research and experiment. As already shown, one unit energy vibrates through the entire creation from man down to the plant and the mineral, and these varieties are but the expressions of the one Entity, the First Cause. This infinitude and oneness of things has been the conclusion of material science. The zero of arithmetic or the geometrical point has in it the conception of infinity. Chemistry has likewise found out that there is but one element to which the ninety different elements supposed to constitute this world by their combination can be reduced. That one eternal element is identical with

the energy of the physicist, the First Cause of the metaphysicians, the zero and the point of the mathematicians. "Physically speaking, you and I, the sun, the moon and stars, are but little wavelets in the one infinite ocean of matter, the *samashti*." The Vedānta, going a step further, shows that behind this idea of unity of all phenomena there is but one Soul permeating the whole universe, and that all is but one Existence, one Reality without a second. It is our ignorance alone (*avidyā*—notion of name and form) that brings about a dichotomy in what is but one undifferentiated mass of Pure Consciousness (Sat-Chit-Ānanḍa).

It is now evident from the above observations that the antagonism between science and philosophy is vanishing with the progress of scientific knowledge; for the findings of science are strengthening and not undermining the foundations of philosophy. The two meet at a point where humanity stands as one indivisible entity, and it is this basic unity which both science and philosophy seek to find out. Therefore science would fail in its noble task of promoting human brotherhood if it cater only to the animal instincts of man and be an instrument of destruction in the hands of politicians. Likewise, if philosophy do not foster a spirit of fraternity among mankind on the basis of its spiritual oneness, it too would stultify its sacred mission. We doubt not that if the savants of both departments of human knowledge realize their responsibility and proceed to their common task of betterment of human life and society, the world would be a playground of mankind instead of a battlefield. In conclusion, it must be said to the credit of science that with the advance of knowledge the outlook of the scientific world has undergone a great revolution: the old dogmatism has almost vanished, and the door has been kept open for a co-ordination and synthesis of the newer revelations gathered from the unfathomable womb of Nature. Says Professor Eddington: "If the scheme of philosophy which we now rear on the scientific advances of Einstein, Borh, Rutherford and others is doomed to fall in the next thirty years, it is not to be laid to their charge that we have gone astray. Like the systems of Euclid, of Ptolemy, of Newton, which have served their turn, the systems of Einstein and Heisenburg may give way to some fuller realization of the world. But in each revolution of scientific thought new words are set to the old music, and that which has gone before is not destroyed but refocussed."



SRI SANKARACHARYA

Courtesy: Mr. O. C. Gangoly

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚAṄKARA

Of all Indian thinkers Śaṅkara is perhaps the most misunderstood, although it can be said without any fear of contradiction that throughout his extensive writings he has nowhere been ambiguous. He combined in him profoundness of thought and clearness of expression—a combination so rare in philosophical writings. It is curious, therefore, that such a writer should be so badly misunderstood. This may be due to the fact that his philosophy tolerates no human weakness and requires its followers to sever their connection with all that is dear to their heart. Our attachment to worldly objects is so deep-rooted that we would not willingly part with these, even if it be for the sake of truth. It is possible, therefore, that our worldly-mindedness would unconsciously obscure our vision and we would try to interpret things in a manner that would fit in with our own pet beliefs and likings. The majority of his critics followed the principle of giving the dog a bad name and then hanging it. Most of their criticisms are uncalled-for and are attributable to sectarian zeal. Again in recent times attempts have been made to discredit the traditional interpreters of Śaṅkara. This is sheer craze for novelty, unless it be due to a desire for notoriety. We can emphatically assert that Śaṅkara's writings leave no room for contradictory interpretations on any particular subject. Of the charges generally levelled against him the most serious is that his philosophy reduces the objective world to nothingness. Any one honestly going through any of his numerous works will easily see that none of the charges can be proved against him. In these pages I shall try to briefly state his position and leave the reader to judge for himself.

Śaṅkara is an out-and-out follower of the Śruti (revealed knowledge or the Vedas). He starts with the view that the essence of reality must be its absoluteness: it must remain ever the same, unconditioned by time, space and causality. It follows from such a conception of reality that the human intellect, conditioned and varied as it is, has not the remotest chance of ever comprehending it in its entirety. Hence revelation is the only source of knowledge regarding the ultimate reality of the universe. Nevertheless, Śaṅkara fully appreciates the value of reasoning in an inquiry into the nature of reality. He says that in

matters of philosophical inquiry, unlike the discussions on *dharma* (duty), perception, inference and other human evidences are as indispensable as the Śruti, because the inquiry has its consummation in direct realization and because reality is an established fact. But arguments, independent of the Śruti, are never tolerated. These are, indeed, to be adopted, where necessary, but only to supplement the Śruti.

His stupendous success would not have been possible, had he been a mere propounder of philosophical theories. The great reformer revolutionized the Indian mind by himself translating those theories into practice and chalking out a practical course of discipline for the real seeker after truth and bliss everlasting.

The world abounds with evils. Suffering seems to be the lot of every individual. The Naiyāyikas (logicians) have gone so far as to declare definitely that there is nothing like pleasure in the true sense of the term in all worldly affairs. It is only pain which is foolishly accepted as pleasure. Everybody desires to attain happiness and avoid pain. In fact, all our endeavours are directed towards that end. Desire for salvation is nothing but a desire to get rid of all kinds of pain, which truly constitute our bondage. But how to attain a perfect state of happiness?

To root out sufferings it is proper to investigate their cause. How do we account for the wrongs of which the world is full, and the apparently undeserved sufferings which befall its inhabitants? There must be a cause to account for the difference between man and man, between one object and another. If suffering be a result, it can only be the outcome of our own acts. It is absurd to hold that A suffers for the fault of B. So Indian philosophers maintain that every individual reaps the consequences of his own deeds, whether performed in this life or in former lives. Most intimately connected with this doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul is the universally accepted law of *karma*. Nothing can be lost. The law of *karma* is the counterpart of the law of conservation of energy, in the moral world. Whatever a person may do, he must some day or other feel its consequences. It is also evident that the consequences of all our actions are not experienced in this single life. Every action bears fruit no doubt, but it requires suitable time and environments for its fulfilment; till then it remains as a latent force (*adrishṭa*). So if our life has begun from eternity, the store of our *karma* must necessarily be inexhaustible; for while part of it is being

spent through experience (*bhoga*), fresh *karma* is being added. Hence it is clear that the wheel of *karma* once set in motion will hardly ever stop; rather it will gather momentum at every turn. Unless the wheel can be brought to a standstill, there is again no escape from sufferings, the inevitable results of actions.

But how can the ever-revolving wheel of *karma*—the cause of births and deaths—be stopped? It is idle to think that the eternal store of *karma* can be exhausted through experience. Indian philosophers, belonging to whatever school, are emphatic in their declaration that this can be effected only by *knowledge*. The followers of Śaṅkara hold:

Every individual works no doubt, and by the law of necessity he is bound to reap the consequences of his actions. But we must see if it is in the very nature of an individual to work. If so, it is evident that there could be no escape from it at any time; consequently the cycle of births and deaths would go on unhampered and no salvation would be possible. Even the very attempt at obtaining salvation would add to one's bondage. If an individual is essentially a *kartṛi* (doer), he will ever remain so, for he cannot go against his nature. And as in the normal state of things work can have no end, salvation is out of the question. On the other hand, if it can be proved that the individual is not *essentially* a *kartṛi*, and consequently not a *bhoktṛi* (enjoyer), then and then only would salvation be possible.

That the Ātman is immutable and indestructible is declared by the Vedānta as a self-evident truth. Were it changeable, there would remain none to witness or cognize the changes. Again, no one can deny one's own existence, for he who denies would surely exist and therefore be the Ātman. It is evident, therefore, that the Ātman is neither the body, nor the senses, nor the mind, inasmuch as all these are in a state of flux. It may be noted that the *ahaṅkāra* (the ego) is in existence only in so far as it is understood with reference to events. Is there anything underlying the *ahaṅkāra* which might be supposed to exist independently of all mental activities? If so, that might be accepted as the Ātman, the reality, the everlasting and unchanging essence of individuals, in so far as it is unaffected by the psychic as well as physical changes, and at the same time forming the Noumenon of which all mental and bodily changes are phenomena. But the difficulty of discovering it is apparent. Apart from the Śruti, the only other means at our disposal for recognizing it is the mind. But the mind, being itself phenomenal and having

inherent limitations, can have no claim to comprehend the Ātman. Further, anything discovered with its aid must necessarily be coloured by it. It is impossible to comprehend anything unaffected by the psychic process.

Śaṅkara ably proves that the subject (*vishayin*) can never be the object (*vishaya*). The 'I' can never be anything other than the 'I.' When I say that I have known myself, what I have actually known is not the self, but something other than it. Whatever becomes an object of knowledge becomes, by that very fact, something other than the self. So the knower is unknowable. The body, the *manas* (mind), the *buddhi* (intellect), and the *ahaṅkāra* are all objects of knowledge and variable and are not therefore the Ātman. Rationally speaking, the subject should never be the object, yet it is a habit of human nature—a necessity of thought—to transfer the essence and qualities of one to the other, or to identify the one with the other. In fact, all our actions, both mental and physical, are possible on the assumption that the Ātman is identical with either the mind or the body or with both. It is evident, therefore, that our ordinary conception of the 'I' is altogether wrong, that the true 'I' is neither the body nor the mind, and is as such unknown and unknowable. But it should not be taken as a message of despair. The truth about the Ātman is that it ever remains the subject. If it would ever become the object, it would cease to be what it is. It is desirable, therefore, that the Ātman should always remain the subject, and as such be not knowable. So an individual is in essence the Ātman, never affected by the mental and bodily changes, which are all extraneous to it.

This being the nature of the true Ātman, it is clear that It is neither the *kartṛi* nor the *bhoktṛi*. So in reality It is ever free. To think that It is in bondage is wrong, and is due to sheer ignorance of Its essential nature. The Ātman is falsely identified with the *anātman* (non-self), and hence the bondage. Bondage is therefore not real. It exists only so long as one fails to realize the unaffected nature of the Ātman, and identifies It with the not-self. As soon as the true Ātman is discovered, the illusory bondage disappears. So says the Śruti: "All knots of the heart are cut asunder, all doubts are dissolved and all *karmas* are ended, when the highest Brahman is realized as one's own Self" (*Muṇḍaka* II.2.8). So salvation is no new state of existence, it is no acquisition.

Having once accepted the authority of the Śruti as unquestionable and final, Śaṅkara did not flinch from its inevitable consequences. His

adherence to Vedic authority is so complete that he would not tolerate any compromise, even when his interpretation of the Śruti came in conflict with experience. Such contradiction he explained away by boldly declaring that 'Brahman alone is real, the world is false; the individual is Brahman and none else'—which very accurately sums up the fundamental doctrines of his philosophy.

The Śruti says, "Thou art That" (*Tat tvam asi*). The individual (*jīva*) is taught to be perfectly identical with the absolute Brahman. And Śaṅkara takes the Brahman as essentially *nirguṇa* (without any attribute), *nishkriya* (without any activity or movement), *niravayava* (without any part), *nirupādhika* (unconditioned and absolute) and *nirviśesha* (having no distinguishing element in It, a simple homogeneous entity). Even the words *sat, chit* and *ānanda,* he says, do not imply any quality or differentiation in the being of Brahman, but what they simply mean is Pure Being, Pure Consciousness and Pure Blessedness, each implying the other. Now the *jīva* is evidently just the reverse of it. How could it then be identical with Brahman?

Again, the world which is always in a state of flux is said to have the self-same Brahman as its cause (*kāraṇa*), both material (*upādāna*) and efficient (*nimitta*). In what sense could this phenomenal world be spoken of as emanating from, subsisting in and finally merging in the Absolute Brahman? How could the non-relational Brahman be linked with the relational world, a world containing the individuals, *jīvas,* as well? Śaṅkara says that in no way could this impossibility be made possible. And ultimately it must be held that the world is not, nor did it ever exist, neither will it exist in future. The only truly existing thing is Brahman, and all else is naught. So Gauḍapāda in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* (II.32) says: "There is neither dissolution nor creation, neither bondage nor any spiritual aspirant, neither any seeker after liberation nor one that is liberated—this realization is the highest Truth." Now this negation of the world of time, space and causality in the being of Brahman, the ultimate Truth (*paramārtha-satya*), is itself an attempt to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the Śruti and experience. But any such attempt at reconciliation would be tantamount to bringing down the Śruti within the realm of logic, whereas the importance of the Śruti depends not upon its rationality, but upon its authority. So all such attempts would go against the very spirit of the Śruti. Yet so long as we are what we are, that is, slaves of rationality, the absolute self-

sufficiency of the Śruti can have little appeal to us; a rational explanation of the contradiction becomes necessary, and that is the task of the philosopher.

Śaṅkara explains it by what is known as *māyā* (illusion) or *adhyāsa* (superimposition)—the principle of unifying contradictions—contradiction between the self and the not-self, the ego and the non-ego, the subject and the object, the cause and the effect, Brahman and the world. Contradictions, as we know, can never be reconciled. But no experience would be possible unless and until they be *somehow* unified. *Māyā* is therefore the principle that *mysteriously* unifies contradictions, and is as such inexplicable and indefinable (*anirvachanīyā*). In other words, it is the principle of identification of contradictions, or the principle that makes one thing appear as what it is not. You take a rope to be a snake; this is *adhyāsa*. You take Brahman to be the world; this, too, is *adhyāsa*. In reality there is no snake, no world, and there should not be any superimposition; the one cannot be the other. Yet it is the inherent nature of man to identify truth with falsehood. This principle of *adhyāsa*, therefore, is such as has no reason to exist, and yet is most indispensable for all human affairs. It is the law that regulates all our actions and all our movements, nay, it is the law that makes the world what it is. Although it is indefinable, yet it is no abstraction and has a most concrete existence so far as the phenomenal world is concerned.

The Vedāntists have discussed the problem of error very thoroughly and have come to the conclusion that illusions are due not so much to the knowledge of the object this way or that, as to the absence of the knowledge of the object as such. This want of knowledge (*ajñāna*), however, must not be understood as mere negation of knowledge. It is not an *abhāva*, but *bhāvarūpa* (a positive entity), although from the standpoint of Brahman, the ultimate Reality, its existence is altogether denied.

Now the *jīva* could be said to be identical with *nirviśesha* Brahman, only if his jīvahood be held to be a mere appearance; in other words, if his jīvahood is taken to be a mere superimposition upon Brahman, and as such false. Śaṅkara actually holds this view and says that it is Brahman that appears as the *jīva* through ignorance or *adhyāsa*.

Again Brahman, retaining Its Brahmanhood intact, could be called the cause of the world, only if the world is taken to be a mere appearance or superimposition; in other words, if Brahman be taken to be the

ground (*adhishṭhāna*) of the world-illusion. The rope does not lose its 'ropeness,' even when it is mistaken for a snake. Brahman certainly cannot be said to transform Itself into the world. It only *appears* as the world because of *adhyāsa*.

From what has been stated above it follows that the world is a figment of *māyā*, a mere appearance. But an appearance cannot have, even temporarily, an existence independent of that of which it is the appearance. The Sāṁkhya holds that the world is an evolution (*pariṇāma*) of Pradhāna, which, it says, is a self-existing, independent principle. But matter by itself is inert (*jaḍa*), devoid of sentiency, and its movement towards the evolution of an ordered world is simply unthinkable. Vedāntic *māyā*, on the other hand, is said to be an entirely dependent principle. It can be conceived only in reference to Pure Being and Pure Consciousness. Brahman being the only Reality, nothing can be conceived without being related to It. *Māyā*, therefore, by itself is not sufficient to account for this phenomenal world. So the Vedāntists do not hold *māyā* to be the cause of the world. Rather it is said that Brahman is the cause or ultimate ground of the world. But when Brahman is said to be the cause of the world, It must necessarily be supposed to be conditioned (*sopādhika*); absolute (*nirupādhika*) Brahman can have nothing to do with the world. And the *upādhi* (condition) that conditions Brahman as the cause is *māyā*.

So the world has no absolute reality (*pāramārthika satyatva*). It has an apparent and relative reality. The world-perception goes on unimpeded till one realizes what one really is, that is, Brahman. Idealists deny reality to the external objects. Śaṅkara is not prepared to attribute reality even to the mental events. But he maintains that so long as Brahman is not realized, that is, so long as the empirical world continues to be perceived, both the external and internal worlds are to be accepted as a *fact*, neither more nor less. Hence the world too has a reality of its own, which, as distinguished from absolute Reality, may be called *vyāvahārika satyatva*, that is, reality as far as it is necessary for all practical purposes. The objects of dream, although known as false on awakening, are real within the limits of the dream. Similarly, the world is also relatively real and is said to be false (*mithyā*) only when knowledge dawns. It should be specially noted that although the world is false, yet it is not altogether non-existent (*alīka*) like the son of a barren woman. Śaṅkara is even prepared to grant some reality to the *rajju-*

sarpa (the snake in the rope), which he calls *prātibhāsika satyatva* (seeming reality) as distinguished from the other two kinds of reality.

The Śāṅkara Vedānta stands for the theory of *vivarta*, which may be defined as (1) the appearance of a higher reality as a lower one, as for example, when the transcendental (*pāramārthika*) Reality (Brahman) appears as the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) reality (the world), or when an empirical reality, say a rope, appears as a seeming (*prātibhāsika*) reality (snake); (2) or *vivarta* is the appearance of *chit* (consciousness) as *jaḍa* (the non-conscious); (3) or *vivarta* is that state of the cause which is neither different from nor identical with the cause, and as such is inexplicable. It will be noted that the arguments adduced by the *Ārambhavādins*[1] and the *Pariṇāmavādins*[2] are equally weighty, although they hold contradictory views—the former taking the effect to be different from the cause and the latter taking the effect to be substantially identical with the cause. Śaṅkara, however, does not accept or reject either of these views. He says that all that can be said with any amount of certainty is that the effect has no existence independent of the cause, and that which has no existence by itself cannot be said to have any reality in the true sense of the term. So the effect neither is nor is not, for if it were absolutely non-existent, no activity would be induced. The world we see before us is neither real nor unreal nor both real and unreal. Hence it may be logically termed as really indefinable (*anirvachanīya*). This is the fundamental position of the theory of illusory appearance.

We may conclude by briefly noting down the findings of Śaṅkara in his study of the Vedānta:

1. Knowledge or Consciousness absolute is the Reality, that is, Brahman. Brahman is *nirguṇa*, *nirviśesha*, absolute Consciousness. It is one, indivisible, without a second, having in itself no *bheda* (difference) —either *sajātīya*, *vijātīya* or *svagata*.[3]

2. The *jīva* is essentially the same as Brahman and is therefore self-illumined, unlimited and ever free. His limitedness and all its consequent effects are due to the *upādhis* or conditions, which again appear through *avidyā* (nescience) and as such are unreal. Eliminate the *upādhis*, and the apparent duality ceases; the *jīva* no longer retains his

[1] Those who hold that an effect is something newly created, e.g. the logicians.

[2] Those who hold that the effect existed in its cause, e.g. the Sāṁkhyas.

[3] Meaning respectively 'of the same species' (as of one tree from another), 'of a different species' (as of a tree from a cow) and 'within itself' (as of the branches, leaves, etc.).

separate identity. The sense of personality is bondage, that of universality is freedom. To be Brahman is not to be regarded as the loss of individuality; it is not extinction, rather it is the expansion of one's individuality into the infinitude of Brahman. The *jīva* is always Brahman; during bondage the *upādhis* screen this truth from him; in the state of freedom he shines forth as Brahman—as what he always is; nothing new happens.

3. Brahman simply *appears* as the world (including individuals as well) through *avidyā*. The world has a phenomenal reality, but no reality of its own. *Avidyā*, too, is no entity separate from Brahman, but is indefinable and negligible.

4. Brahmanhood is realized by the knowledge of the absolute identity of the *jīva* and Brahman. The dictum *Tat tvam asi* reveals this identity. *Mukti* (liberation) is nothing but the realization of this identity. It is quite possible even in this body, that is, even when living (*jīvanmukti*).

5. Permanent bliss can never be a result of work. It is directly attainable by knowledge (*jñāna*), and once enlightenment has been obtained no work is necessary. But till then all prescribed works must be scrupulously performed, as these certainly help realization (*vide Brahma Sūtra Bhāshya* on 1.1.4, 4.1.16; *Upadeśa Sāhasrī* 1.6.-26, etc.).

THE VIŚISHṬĀDVAITA OF RĀMĀNUJA

Viśishṭādvaita is a philosophy of religion; and therefore it gives a synthetic view of the spiritual experience of God or Brahman. It affirms the Upanishadic truth that by realizing Brahman everything is realized. Mere philosophy is a theoretical speculation on the nature of Reality, and its conclusions are not final. More often than not, the philosopher is stranded on the shores of scepticism. Reason is the instrument that philosophy employs. But Reality or Brahman can only be intuited and not inferred by reason. If speculative philosophy is thus barren owing to the inadequacy of reason, a faith that has not passed the test of reason is blind. Spiritual experience by itself is subjective and lacks definiteness and universality. Hence arises the necessity in religion for the application of the critical method of philosophy. Vedānta is what may be called a rationalistic religion, or a religion satisfying the demands of reason. It is not mere speculative thought nor is it a faith in dogmas. The spiritual truths that constitute it are revealed in the Vedas, realized by the *ṛishis* (seers) on their mystic intuition of Brahman, and justified by reason or critical intelligence. Revelation is supersensuous and supra-rational: it concerns itself with what is beyond the perception of the senses and the power of reasoning, but it is not antagonistic to perception and reason. Otherwise it would be a dogma deduced from a mere faith, which is hostile to the spirit of philosophic enquiry. Vedānta as a true philosophy of religion avoids the extremes of blind faith in authority and of belief in the omnipotence of reason. Faith in what is revealed in the scriptures has to be verified by intuition or personal experience, and intuition should conform to the rational demands of certainty and universality. It is reason that mediates between faith and intuition, and makes the truths of revelation realizable and those of intuition intelligible. In expounding the nature of Reality according to Viśishṭādvaita, Rāmānuja harmonizes the claims of revelation, intuition and reason. His synthetic genius is evidenced in his liberal interpretation of the term 'scriptural authority.' He accepts as the word of God not only the Vedas, but even the ***Pañcharātra***, and the utterances of the Āḷvārs are ranked by him as being equally authoritative. The real proof of the Being of God is the Being in God.

Rāmānuja applies this pragmatic test of verifiability to prove the authoritativeness of the *Pañcharātra* and the sayings of the Āḷvārs. Brahman is absolutely true, good and blissful. These eternal values, Truth, Goodness and Bliss, which are enshrined in the Vedas are declared in the *Pañcharātra* as well, which is therefore, according to Rāmānuja, a direct revelation of God and synopsis of spiritual truths which can be verified pragmatically from personal experience. Consequently, the *Pañcharātra* as the word of God is as valid as the Vedas. The Āḷvārs are specialists in religious experience; and in their Tamil utterances they have recorded their experience of God. Since they are the seers of the Truth, their sayings are as trustworthy as the Vedic verities. The eternal spiritual truths of Vedānta are universally verifiable and are therefore authoritative. Viśishṭādvaita recognizes the verifiability of the Vedic truth in spiritual experience. The supreme *sat* (Existence) is one, though its seers call It by various names. Āḷvārs or mystics may express it psychologically in various ways. The Vedāntic liberality consists mainly in the harmony it effects between revelation and realization, and the invitation it extends to humanity to experience the beatitude of Brahman.

Viśishṭādvaita relies on the valid knowledge given in sense perception, inference and revelation, and affirms the truth that Brahman is the ground of all existence and the goal of experience, the first and the final cause of all things. The true synthetic insight into this philosophy and religion is afforded by the Upanishadic text *Brahmavid āpnoti param*, 'The knower of Brahman attains the Highest' (*Tait. Up.* II.1). This text exhibits the unity of the threefold system of Vedāntic wisdom known as *tattva* or philosophic apprehension of Reality, *hita* or the moral and spiritual methods of knowing it, and *purushārtha*, the knowledge of Reality which is the *summum bonum* of life. *Tattva* is the ultimate knowledge of Brahman as the immanent ground of existence; *hita* is the moral and spiritual means of realizing Brahman; and *purushārtha* is the attainment of Brahman which is the home of eternal values like Truth, Goodness and Beauty.

Tattva is a consideration of Reality under the aspects provided by the three regions of philosophic knowledge, viz. epistemology, ethics and æsthetics. Considered under these aspects, Reality has three essential attributes which, in Viśishṭādvaitic terminology, are known as *ādhāratva*, *vidhātritva* and *śeshitva* (the qualities of being the ground, the supporter and the whole). According to Rāmānuja, Reality is determinate and

can be defined by stating its essential qualities. The Upanishads declare Brahman to be real (*satya*), self-conscious (*jñāna*), infinite (*ananta*), sinless (*apahatapāpman*), and blissful (*ānanda*). Brahman is the absolute that is good, true and blissful. It is the source and sustenance of all; and all things exist for Its satisfaction.

From the logical and metaphysical point of view, Brahman is defined as real (*satya*), conscious (*jñāna*) and infinite (*ananta*). In Rāmānuja's theory of knowledge, knowledge, in all its levels of sense-perception, inference and spiritual intuition, is valid and is an affirmation of Reality; and his theory of *dharmabhūta-jñāna* or consciousness as an attribute as distinct from substantive consciousness avoids the defects of Realism and Idealism. Realism insists on the reality of the external world and of external relations, and thus saves knowledge from the perils of subjectivism. But it creates a gulf between thought and things, and is unable to bridge the gap. Idealism, on the other hand, reduces things to thought, defines reality as a mental or spiritual construction, and saves knowledge from the perils of materialism. But its constructions are likely to be purely subjective. The theory of *dharmabhūta-jñāna* states the reality of the subject-object (*chit-achit*) relation. *Chit* and *achit* can be distinguished by logical thinking, but they cannot be divided. Their relation is eternal; and Brahman expresses Itself in their intimate relationship. Both the *chit* and the *achit* (sentient and non-sentient beings) connote the Absolute and are parts of it. They exist eternally, and are not external to Brahman, the supreme *sat* or Existence. *Dharmabhūta-jñāna* has a threefold function: It can know things as they are in reality; it is self-luminous; and it can reveal the Absolute. It is thus a vital link between *chit* and *achit*, Īśvara and nature, self and God. At present, it is cribbed and cabined by the imperfections and limitations imposed by *karma;* but when it is purified, it can break through the bonds of finiteness, expand into infinity and bring about an immediate intuition of God. Finite knowledge is now confused and fragmentary; but when it is perfected, it becomes clear and whole. Finite consciousness has thus really an infinite possibility; it can perceive the *achit* or matter as it is in its entirety, recognize the self as the centre and source of consciousness, and realize the Absolute as the all-self which is the ultimate subject of all knowledge. Every judgement thus refers ultimately to the whole of Reality or Brahman. Even the negation of certain attributes in Brahman has a positive import,





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and the well-known negative definition of Brahman as '*neti, neti,*' 'not thus, not thus,' brings out only the impossibility of an adequate description of Brahman in terms of finite categories; it does not mean the denial of finite things or beings. It negates the finiteness of the Infinite and not the finite itself. Predication is the essence of Reality. It is possible to state what Reality is or has, and the Upanishadic predicates like *satya, jñāna* and *ananta* are metaphysical attempts to define the nature of Brahman.

The metaphysical conception of Brahman as real (*satya*), conscious (*jñāna*) and infinite (*ananta*) brings out the truth of Viśishṭādvaita that Brahman *is* and *has* reality, self-consciousness and infinitude. The universe of the sentient (*chit*) and the non-sentient (*achit*) has its ultimate source or ground in Brahman and derives its essential nature and function from Brahman which is known as the indwelling self (*antaryāmin*) of all beings and the real Reality within all of them. *Chit* and *achit* exist, but they have their meaning and value only in the universal spirit that is their immanent self. There is difference in denotation but identity of content between Brahman on the one hand and *chit* and *achit* on the other. The purity and perfection of Brahman are not affected by the perishing nature of Prakṛiti (*achit*) or matter and by the moral imperfection of the finite self (*chit*). The world of nature really serves as an environment for the liberation of souls or the making of *muktas*.

Brahman is the *sat* without a second which wills the many and differentiates Itself into the manifold of sentient and non-sentient beings. This view does not deny the plurality of existents. What it denies is only the sense of plurality. The *sat* is the all-inclusive unity or the Absolute that imparts substantiality to all beings and thus sustains their existence and value. Though Brahman is the ground of all changes, It in Itself does not change. While *achit* undergoes modifications in its essential nature, and while the intelligence of souls is subject to contractions and expansions on account of their *karma*, Brahman is entirely free from these alterations and alternations. Hence Brahman is defined as 'the real of reals' (*satyasya satyam*). Likewise, the term 'higher than the highest' used of Brahman in the Upanishads refers to the supreme Self which is the home of all eternal values. Brahman is not only real; It is also intelligent (*jñāna*). It is the Self underlying all; and the ultimate subject of experience. While It abides within the sentient and the non-sentient, It is not touched or tainted by their imperfections.

When the Upanishad defines Brahman as knowledge, it refers not merely to consciousness but also to self-consciousness, because any act of consciousness presupposes a self. Brahman is therefore referred to as 'the light of lights.' It illumines the suns and the stars, and is the inner light of the individual self. *Achit* is devoid of consciousness, but it exists for a conscious subject. *Chit* is and has consciousness, and it is distinguishable from *achit,* though not separable from it. Brahman, which is the super-subject of all experience, is distinguishable from the finite self and the world of matter or non-sentient things, but cannot be divided from them. The attribution of infinitude (*ananta*) to Brahman, while denying the finiteness of the Infinite, does not deny the reality of finite beings. The infinitude that is predicated of Brahman is not that infinity which refers to the last term in a spatio-temporal series. Nor does it mean either bare endlessness or negation of the finite. The true infinite is infinite of its own kind, and is therefore absolute. The Absolute is self-related; but it is not out of relation with the finite. The infinite enters into the finite and communicates its character to it. But it does not at the same time lose its purity. When the Upanishad employs the term 'not thus,' it does not deny the world. What it denies is the limited nature of Brahman. Negation is not absolute negation. No judgement of quantity brings out adequately the infinity of perfections that belong to Brahman. When we define the Absolute as the true Reality and the subject of all experience, we do not reduce the infinite to an infinite number of attributes. Every attribute no doubt refers to Reality. But when we say that the world of self and non-self constitutes the nature of Brahman, we do not mean that the self is a mere adjective which brings out the quality or nature of the Absolute. The self has not only an adjectival nature; it has also a substantive being. It exists, but it derives its meaning from the infinite or supreme Self which is the ground of all existence. Thus from the metaphysical point of view, Brahman may be defined as real (*satya*), conscious (*jñāna*) and infinite (*ananta*); It is the supreme *sat* which sustains all beings as their ultimate ground. It is the all-self which is the true subject of all experience. It is the absolute, self-related super-subject. While the world of the intelligent and the inert is caught up in the vortex of a ceaseless change, Brahman remains immutable and infinite.

The conception of the Absolute as the all-inclusive Reality thus satisfies the philosophic quest for unity. The metaphysical mind seeks

to reduce all experience to a systematic unity in terms of such relations as whole and part, substance and attribute, cause and effect. The whole is defined as the universal that pervades the parts and gives them a meaning. Hence it is regarded as an identity that persists in and through difference. Employing the relation of substance and attribute, Viśishṭādvaita regards all beings as depending upon and deriving their substantiality from Brahman. The *sat* or the substance is the subject or the all-self that explains the nature of consciousness. Consciousness is ever a relation that exists between a perceiving or thinking subject and an object that is perceived or thought of, and Brahman as the super-subject is not only consciousness but has consciousness. The idea that Brahman is the cause of all things does not imply that creation is an act having a beginning in time. The universe of the living and the non-living is an eternal cyclic process with *pralaya* (dissolution), and *srishṭi* (creation) alternating each other. In *pralaya* the world remains latent as a real possibility; and *srishṭi* is the actualization of what is possible. The entire creative process is the self-expression of the Absolute. God reveals Himself in creation. The logical idea of cause cannot be sundered from the ethical concept of purpose. The process of nature and the progress of man can be explained only as the self-actualization of the divine will. Brahman as the *sat* without a second wills the many and becomes the manifold of sentient and non-sentient beings; and the purpose of the cosmic process is to provide an opportunity for the *jīva* or finite self to realize its divine destiny.

The philosophic intellect no doubt strives to reduce the whole of experience to a single unity; but it fails to satisfy the demands of the moral consciousness. The *sat* without a second may be the logical highest; but it is indifferent to the deeper ethical values of human life. The definition of Brahman has therefore to be restated in the language of moral philosophy using such terms as the ruler and redeemer. God is not only the ground (*ādhāra*) of the universe; He is also the controller (*niyantṛi*) of those that are to be controlled (*vidheya*). What logic perceives as the supreme Self or *Purushottama* possesses an infinity of moral perfections. The Upanishad points out the ethical character of the Absolute when it attributes to it such qualities as *apahatapāpmatva* (sinlessness). The Mīmāṁsaka insists on the meticulous performance of the rites prescribed in the Vedas. The Vedic imperative insists more on the performance of duty than on the knowledge of the deity who is the

source of all good. The Vedānta, on the other hand, regards the knowledge of Brahman as more important than the performance of *karma*. The good, according to the Vedas, is the attainment of heavenly pleasures, which, according to the Vedānta, are evanescent and have no intrinsic value. The supreme good, according to the Vedānta, is the apprehension of Brahman and the consequent attainment of eternal life and everlasting bliss. The supreme good of Brahman cannot be bartered away. Brahman alone, which is the inner and immortal ruler, ever holy and perfect, can impart Its eternality and blissfulness to the finite self. To the logical intellect, Brahman is immanent in all beings as their inner ground; but Ethics refers to Its transcendental eminence and holiness. Although It is the pervading unity of all beings, It is not perverted by the evils, errors and imperfections of the universe. The Lord is the righteous ruler of the world dispensing justice according to the deserts of each *jīva*. The theory of *karma* does away with the notion of an omnipotent God who rules the world by an arbitrary fiat of His will. Īśvara is righteous and absolutely good; and there is no caprice or cruelty in the divine nature. The goodness of God as the creator of creatures functions through the moral freedom of man, and hence there is really no contradiction between the infinite might of God and the moral freedom of man. Īśvara is not an absentee God that makes the world and lets it go. Nor is He identical with the created universe. If whatever is be divine, then there would be no need for release (*moksha*). While being immanent in the universe, God also transcends it. The idea of immanence guarantees the intimacy of union between God and the finite self; and the concept of transcendence justifies the absolute infinity and perfection of the Godhead and inspires religion, reverence and humility. The imperfections of the universe do not affect the absolute goodness of God. The responsibility for these imperfections is traceable to the moral freedom of the finite self. The existence of evil and sin without doubt derogates from the goodness of God. But it is a sacred mystery, and wisdom consists in abolishing evil rather than in accounting for it. The finite self has the freedom either to grow into the goodness of God or lapse into wickedness and vice.

The theory of *karma* is the application of the law of cause and effect to moral experience. It brings to light the inner working of the righteousness of God, and affirms the impossibility of predicating arbitrariness and cruelty of the divine nature. The problem of unmerited

suffering does not really affect the omnipotence of God. Justice consists in the equitable apportionment of rewards and punishments according to the nature of the *karma* of each *jīva*. In this manner divine righteousness realizes itself by making the finite self the cause of its own destiny. *Karma* on the psychological level implies that every action must have its effect and that there is retributive justice. What a man sows, he reaps; and not even the gods can alter the course of the moral law. In its ethical aspect, the law of *karma* affirms the freedom of the self. Freedom is a real possibility, and the *jīva* can control its moral propensities imbedded in its psychological equipment (*sūkshma śarīra*: subtle body); the individual can make or mar his future. But on the religious level, the law of *karma* is futile. The incessant urge to evil and the ever-increasing burden of sin implicate the self in the endless cycle of *saṁsāra* (transmigration). *Avidyā* (nescience) and *karma* form an endless cycle, and their effect cannot be removed by death or retribution. *Mukti* (liberation) would be impossible if divine justice functioned through the mathematical rigour of the law of *karma*. Therefore ethical religion requires that the legal conception of *karma* should be transformed into the religious idea of redemptive love; *kṛipā* or the grace of God transfigures the rigorous law of *karma* and becomes the ruling principle of religion. The contrast between the holiness of God and human culpability and sinfulness would leave no hope of salvation unless the saving grace of God mediates between the two and transforms the ruler into a *rakshaka* (saviour); *karma*, then, becomes an attitude of absolute self-surrender. From this angle of vision, even the law of retribution or *daṇḍana* has redemption as its inner motive. Punishment for sin is born of God's mercy. Redemption is the central motive of divine incarnation. *Avatāra* (incarnation) is the entry of divine love into cosmic history in its critical moral situations in order to arrest the progress of sin. Overpowered by mercy and tenderness, God realizes His godliness by saving the sinner and seeking the saint. The idea of *avatāra* does not imply any kind of limitation or self-limitation. It shows the infinite creative power of love. From this point of view even *pralaya* and *sṛishṭi* are merely an expression of the divine will to redeem all beings. When the universe is steeped in sensuality and sin, the Lord in His infinite mercy suspends for a while the cosmic process and thus deprives the self of its instruments of evil; this is *pralaya*. *Sṛishṭi* affords a fresh opportunity to the *jīva* to pursue the path of duty and ascend to the world of grace.

The idea of God as ruler and redeemer does not remove the contradiction between *karma* and *kṛipā*. Retribution and redemption do not and cannot co-exist. While the law of requital does not inspire any hope of *mukti* or salvation, the law of redemption leads to divine arbitration. The dualism between *karma* and *kṛipā* cannot be overcome by ethical religion. The seriousness of the moral consciousness and the reality of the sinfulness of sin fail to bring out the spontaneity and freedom of the divine life. The defect is removed by the æsthetic philosophy of God as the Beautiful. The Upanishad defines Brahman as the Effulgent One that illumines suns and stars and as the Inner Beauty, different from the finite self. Brahman is the Infinite Beauty; and the cosmos is the expression of the creative urge and spontaneity of the divine will to be beautiful. Brahman is no doubt beyond Prakṛiti (matter) and its *guṇas* (attributes). It is in truth partless (*niravayava*) and attributeless (*nirguṇa*). But in order to draw away the finite self from its ugly career of *saṁsāra*, It assumes a spiritual form of surpassing beauty. The absolute *sat* becomes the divine alchemist by the magic of Its love (*ātma-māyā*) and transforms Itself into the cosmic beauty that pervades the whole universe and into the beauty that resides in the heart of all beings. But it is the beauty that is inherent in the incarnation of the Lord that really brings out the æsthetic meaning of reality. The Lord of splendour takes delight in sporting with the finite self with a view to transmuting it into its own nature. The world is really beautiful; but it is mistaken to be ugly by the finite self owing to its feeling that it is identical with the body.

Viśishṭādvaita gathers up the conclusions reached in metaphysics, ethics and æsthetics, and presents them in their true perspective by its own distinctive theory of God as Brahman and the universe as the *sarva* (all). Metaphysics defines the nature of the Absolute or the cosmic ground by means of the relation of *ādhāra* and *ādheya*. Brahman is the *sat* without a second that sustains all existence. It is the Self which is the true subject of all experience, the true infinite which is immanent in the finite and transcends it. Brahman is thus real (*satya*), conscious (*jñāna*) and infinite (*ananta*). Ethical philosophy refers to Brahman not as the ultimate ground but as the absolute good, and defines the relation between God and the world in terms of Īśvara or *niyāmaka* (ruler) and *niyamya* (ruled). The supreme *sat* becomes Īśvara or the moral ruler of the universe and its redeemer. Æsthetic philosophy

defines the Absolute as the beautiful and the blissful. These determining qualities of Brahman as employed by the Upanishad are usually stated in Western thought as the eternal values of the true, the good and the beautiful housed in the Absolute. Each attribute of Brahman expresses the infinite perfection of God in its own way; but it does not exhaust the nature of Brahman. The relation of *śarīra* and *śarīrin*, the body and the soul, formulated by Viśishṭādvaita as existing between God and the world of sentient and non-sentient beings, brings out the synthetic co-ordination of these ultimate values. The *jīva* as the essential and eternal self is distinct from the body; but as the *śarīrin*, it makes the body live, controls and co-ordinates its functions and uses it as an instrument for its own satisfaction. In the same way, Brahman is the *śarīrin* or soul of the universe, because It is the source and sustenance of all beings in the world, and because the functioning of the cosmos is an expression of its satisfaction or *līlā*. The relation of body and soul harmonizes the three relations stated already, viz. the relations of *ādhāra* and *ādheya* (support and the thing supported), *niyāmaka* and *niyamya* (the controller and the controlled), *śeshin* and *śesha* (the lord and his servant). The relation of *ādhāra* and *ādheya* is from the point of view of metaphysics which defines Brahman as real (*satya*), conscious (*jñāna*) and infinite (*ananta*). This relation emphasizes the inner unity of Reality. The relation of *niyāmaka* and *niyamya* brings out the transcendental goodness (*apahatapāpmatva*) of God and His redemptive impulse. The relation of *śeshin* and *śesha* satisfies the highest demands of ethics and æsthetics by defining God as the supreme Lord for whose satisfaction the world of *chit* and *achit* lives, moves and has its being. The relation of body and soul combines all the three together and serves as an analogical representation of a spiritual truth. Spiritual truths are only spiritually discerned. The intuitions of the Infinite cannot be adequately grasped by the intellect. Reality is essentially spiritual, and the sensuous setting employed by the intellect can only bring out the inadequacy of explaining supersensuous truths by metaphors drawn from sense perception.

The finite self is not a self-subsistent entity existing by its own right. It is really an organ of the Absolute, drawing its sustenance therefrom and serving as a willing instrument for Its cosmic purpose of redemption while life pulsates through every cosmic part and determines its form and function. That God is the life of all life is the central idea of

Viśishṭādvaita. In its practical aspect it insists on the idea of God as redemptive love and lays down the path of *bhakti* (devotion) or *prapatti* (self-surrender) as the means to the attainment of eternal bliss. He who desires release (*mumukshu*) specializes in spiritual quest, and the nature of this search is elaborated by Rāmānuja in his scheme of *karma-yoga*, *jñāna-yoga* and *bhakti-yoga*. The *Śrī-bhāshya* insists on a sevenfold culture of mind and body (*sādhanā-saptaka*) as a preparatory discipline to *bhakti*. The discipline consists of physical and mental purity, performance of the duty relating to one's own station in life, freedom from elation or depression and the practice of ceaseless meditation on God. The *jīva* owing to its feeling that it is identical with the body seeks the pleasures of sensibility in this world and in *svarga* (heaven). It is caught up in the endless cycle of births and deaths in the sub-human, human and celestial worlds. This is bondage or *bandha*. *Moksha* consists in the attainment of freedom from the shackles of *saṁsāra* by seeking the redeeming love of God. The first step in the building up of *bhakti* is the practice of duty for duty's sake (*nishkāma-karma*) without looking either for the subjective feeling of pleasure or for the objective one of utility. The *jīva* attains self-sovereignty and is no longer bound by the attractions of the pleasures of sense. When the *jīva* sheds its body-feeling and attachment, it realizes its own nature as *ātman* or the soul, as different from Prakṛiti or matter; when the false self of Prakṛiti is removed, the real spiritual self is realized. *Karma-yoga* thus finds its consummation in *jñāna-yoga* or the method of self-realization. But the latter is only a half-way house to devotion. In self-realization the *jīva* is stranded in solid singleness (*kaivalya*); it is self-centred and not God-centred. *Bhakti-yoga* recognizes the need for shifting the centre from self-consciousness to God-consciousness. The spiritual joy or serenity (*śānti*) that arises on the level of the state of the single soul should be replaced by the religious consciousness that God is the source and centre of all finite life, and that all selves gravitate towards God. This knowledge enables the *jīva* or the ego to renounce its egoity (*ahaṁkāra*) and resign itself absolutely to the will of God. Ethical religion thus undergoes a gradual transformation from the idea of *nishkāma-karma* to the concept of service to God. Acts with selfish ends are first transmuted into those without ulterior motives. The rationale of *nishkāma-karma* is the recognition that the *jīva* is the *ātman* and not Prakṛiti. The next step in the process of transmutation is the

conversion of *karma* into *kaiṅkarya* or consecrated service to God and humanity. Every kind of work is thus transformed into a worship of God.

While the ethical religion of Rāmānuja lays stress on the ideal of absolute self-surrender to the will of God, it is his mysticism that brings out clearly the nature of God as love and character of *bhakti* as the intense yearning for communion. The mystic has a genius for God; and he is sustained by the indwelling love of God who is the very life of his life. When the finite self is freed from its selfism by a process of self-annihilation or self-stripping, it is caught up to God and develops an infinite longing for His love. This infinite longing of the mystic (*mumukshu*) can be satisfied only by the Infinite. The sense of sin as the failure of the finite self to obey the will of God is traceable to the sense of alienation from God and the forgetfulness of its home in the Infinite. The self somehow forgets its divine destiny and is stranded in the world of *saṁsāra*. When its spiritual sense is awakened, it thirsts for God; and the agony of separation experienced by the mystic at this stage is recorded in such outpourings of the religious heart as the *Gopī-gitā*, the sayings of Nammāḷvār and the Gospel of Ramakrishna. Spiritual hunger can be satisfied only by the realization of God. In the state of separation the self loses colour and warmth, and even the sense-organ pines for the light of God. Without Him, life itself becomes a burden. The intensity of this yearning is accompanied by physiological symptoms like sleeplessness, suspension of physical activities and bodily deterioration. Mentally there is a gradual wasting away in desperation resulting in spiritual inanity and blankness. The Lord of love is likewise seized by soul-hunger; and scorning His heavenly aloofness and infinite glory, He invades the mystic's soul and longs for union with him. In the ecstasy of the unitive experience that follows, the agonies of the dark night of the soul are forgotten, and its separative existence is swallowed up in the ocean of bliss that is Brahman. The soul is then ravished out of its fleshly feeling and soaked in eternal ecstasy. In the unitive experience the self is deified, and there is a new inundation of vitality resulting from the consciousness of eternal bliss.

This unitive experience does not last long; and it is a feature of the *līlā* of love that there is an alternation between the bliss of union and the anguish of separation. But the elusiveness and evanescence revealed in the game of love do not satisfy the mystic's quest for the stability of

eternal life. Owing to the hazards and hardships experienced in the spiritual adventure, the *mumukshu* longs for the life everlasting that transcends the world of space-time. The body-self is only a particular mould of space-time and a concretized form resulting from *karma*. When the body made of *karma* is dissolved, the finite self sheds its mutability and becomes immortal. The freed soul has a vision of its divine destiny. It ascends to its home in the Absolute. This is the *summum bonum* which is sought by all beings. Even the process of nature is designed for the spiritual procession of the *ātman*. The realization of Brahman by all beings is the one increasing purpose running through the ages. *Mukti* is not only the immediate apprehension of Brahman but also the attainment of His *paramapada* (supreme status) which transcends the empirical concept of space-time. He who knows Brahman attains the highest and is free from the entanglement of *antya-karma* (last or funeral rite). Brahman is not only the whole or the Holy but is the home of the eternals and their values. *Mukti* as the integral experience of Brahman defies the logical understanding and cannot be adequately described or defined in logical terms, though it is often clothed in anthropomorphism. The self realizes its essential and eternal nature and is deified and thus attains the being of its being. Its consciousness limited by *avidyā* and its result, *karma* in the empirical world of space-time, now expands into omniscience and cosmic consciousness. It is a state of unitary consciousness in which the self is immersed in the bliss of Brahman and its thought expires in enjoyment. Its will is effaced or fulfilled in the will of God who is really the endeavour as well as the end of every act of service. The will to Truth and Goodness that is in God is eternally self-realized. Īśvara does not therefore require the help of man as a fellow-worker to fulfil His redemptive end. Spiritual service thus implies not the loss of will but the merging of the finite in the infinite will. *Mukti* is on the whole freedom from the individualistic outlook and the attainment of divine vision and divine bliss. In that state the sense of separateness of the *jīva* alone is abolished and not the *jīva* itself, and the free and freed spirits form a community owing to the common nature of their deified attributive consciousness; and their freedom is expressed either in helping humanity to regain their freedom or in the enjoyment of the bliss of divine communion.

Viśishṭādvaita guarantees God and salvation to all finite beings, human, sub-human and celestial. It is therefore a religion of harmony

and hospitality. It does not stop with affirming the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. It goes a step further and asserts that God is the inner life and soul of all beings. Its idea of God as the soul of the world brings out the immanence of God in all beings, spiritual intimacy and the goodness of God. As every *jīva* is big with Brahman, the realization of the Absolute is a real possibility. The spiritual knowledge of the *jīva* as different from the embodied self, and as gravitating towards God affords a lofty view of the destiny and value of the finite self; and the view that God is immanent in all faiths for the purpose of cosmic redemption inspires the feeling that the God of all religions is ultimately one, though the seers and sects may give expression to Him in different ways.

THE NIMBĀRKA SCHOOL OF VEDĀNTA

There are generally the following four main classes of the Upanishads:

One class is headed by the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, where the principal teacher, the sage Yājñavalkya, in his discourse on *Brahma-vidyā* (the process of meditation on Brahman), in the assembly of sages in the council of King Janaka, has taken Brahman in His transcendental aspect. On the foundation of this class of Śruti is built the Absolute Monism (*Nirviśesha Advaitavāda*) of the rationalistic Śaṅkara—the loftiest ideal, the highest philosophical flight, where the noumenal aspect of Brahman is considered as the only reality, and the universe as a mere phenomenal evolution on the Noumenon.

Another class, consisting of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* (III.7), the *Muṇḍaka Upanishad* (II.1.4 and 2.5) and the like, has taken Brahman in His immanent aspect. On the basis of this class of Śruti the devotional Rāmānuja has built his theory of Qualified Monism (*Viśishṭā-dvaitavāda*)—with which we are primarily concerned—where Brahman is considered as *saguṇa* or with attributes, as all-powerful and as the controller of the universe which forms His body.

There is another class of Śruti that supplies the basis on which stands the theory of Dualism (*Dvaitavāda*) of the strongly pious Madhva. These Śrutis declare that "two birds—the individual self (*jīva*) and the Universal Self (Brahman)—inseparable friends, reside in the same tree, *i.e.* the body; the former enjoys the fruits of his previous actions and the latter remains as Witness"—(*Muṇḍaka* III.1.1.); "There are two unborn (without births)—the Ruler, the Omniscient Universal Self, and the ruled, the ignorant individual self" (*Śvetāśvatara* I.9).

Another class of Śruti, such as the *Kena Upanishad* (II.3), the *Kaivalya Upanishad* (I.6), the *Amṛitabindu Upanishad* (verse 6) and the *Brahma Upanishad* (verse 35), holds that Brahman is incomprehensible in His entirety by the human intellect. On the basis of this class of Śruti is built the theory of Inconceivable Differentiation as well as Unification (*Achintya-bhedābheda-vāda*) of the devoutly emotional Śrī Chaitanya Deva, as set forth in his discourse with the Vedāntic scholars of Benares.

Nimbārka, the peaceful and well-composed philosopher, has also written a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa; it is know

as the *Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*. The commentary is very brief and contains no attack on different rival theories. "But its greatest charm," to quote the words of Pandit Kokileswar Sastri, "lies in its remarkable perspicuity of diction and clearness of expression," and its greatest recommendation is that it makes a wonderful adjustment of the different views of all the different commentators, though, it should be remembered, Nimbārka flourished at an age much earlier than that of many of these commentators or interpreters of the Vedānta. There is a controversy regarding the time of his advent. One class claims him as a contemporary of Nārada, which view is based on an expression of Nimbārka himself in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* (I.3.8), wherein he speaks of himself as a disciple of Nārada. Another class considers him as of comparatively recent times, because of his all-embracing theory regarding the Supreme Self, which is in a nut-shell the sum total of the views of all the commentators, and which is therefore considered as a gradual development of all the different commentators. It is, however, admitted on all hands that the theory of Nimbārka is as old as that of the ancient sage Auḍulomi, whom Bādarāyaṇa himself mentions in his *Brahma-sūtra* (I.4.21; III.4.45; IV.4.6).

It is extremely difficult, rather impossible, for the finite individual self (*jīva*) to get all at once a clear conception of the infinite Universal Self, Brahman, and more so to express Him in adequate terms. Different commentators of the *Brahma-sūtra* seem to have given apparently different versions of the true nature of Brahman; but the curious thing is that they have all based their conclusions on the infallible authority of the Śruti, which is the outcome of intuition or supersensuous perception of the seers of old called *ṛishis*. To doubt any of these conclusions is to doubt the Śruti itself, which is regarded by the wise as a sacrilege, as the Śruti is the corroborated testimony of the results of intuition of different seers, attained by each independently in his quest after the realization of the Supreme Self or Brahman. Amidst these notes of difference let us listen to the sublime note of the memorable couplet of the Śruti regarding the true nature of Brahman: "Who is incomprehensible, unspeakable, infinite in form, all-good, all-peace, immortal, the cause of the universe, without beginning, middle or end, without rival, all-pervading, all-consciousness, all-bliss, invisible and inscrutable" (*Kaivalya Up.* I.6). Each commentator has given a view of Brahman as revealed to him and as most suited to his taste. But it will not be

doing equal justice to all the commentators to say that the version of one commentator is the only true representation of the infinite Brahman in His entirety, while the rest are wrong, as this will be questioning the validity of the Śruti itself. The Śruti, being the outcome of experiments carried in the domain of the supersensuous, has the same force in spiritual science as the results of experiments carried on in the domain of the sensuous have in natural science, only with this difference that the former, which is called revelation, is absolutely free from error. So in order to form a true view of Brahman, the infinite Spirit, there must be, for the reason stated above, an adjustment of all the views of the different commentators, though Brahman in His infinite capacity might remain incomprehensible, unspeakable and inscrutable all the time. All these great commentators stand on the authority of the Vedānta; we should humbly bow down to them all and maintain that all these different versions about the true nature of Brahman are perfectly true, as they are equally weighty and as Brahman, according to the Śruti, can only be apprehended and not comprehended. Though to our limited knowledge these versions may appear conflicting, they are applicable equally in their entirety to Brahman unconditioned by time, space and causation. This conception of harmony amongst different creeds regarding the Supreme Self is preached also in the *Yogavāsishṭha Rāmāyaṇa* (*Nirvāṇa*, II.97).

Fully equipoised and perfectly tranquil, Nimbārka, without any quarrel with any other commentator, propounds, rather supports, the theory of Monism standing side by side with Dualism (*Dvaitādvaita-vāda*), taking Brahman both in His absolute and relative aspects as seen through different perspectives. In this school Brahman is regarded as both the efficient and the material cause of the universe; Brahman is both *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*—with attributes and without attributes—as He is not exhausted in the creation, but far transcends it. The universe is not, according to this view, unreal or illusory, but is a true manifestation, a real modification (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman, the only ultimate Reality; it may however be said to be unreal only in the sense that it is mutable and has no separate existence from Brahman. The universe this school holds, is identical with as well as different from Brahman (*Bhedābheda*), even as a wave or a bubble is the same as and at the same time different from the waters of the ocean. The individual self is a part of as well as identical with the Supreme Self (*Bhedābheda*), and is controlled by Him till emancipation; and emancipation, the

absolute freedom, lies in assimilating the true nature of the Spirit Infinite, which is attained only by an equal association of real knowledge (*jñāna*) and true devotion (*bhakti*). Real knowledge reveals the true nature of the all-pervading Spirit, Brahman; and true devotion gives rise to an all-absorbing love culminating in a complete surrender of the finite self to the Supreme Self, when the finite self, still retaining his individuality in respect of enjoyment, has his will subservient to, or exactly the same with, that of Brahman. Even in his released state the *jīva* may be said to be different from as well as identical with Brahman—which is Dualism standing side by side with Monism (*Dvaitādvaita*). The emancipated self, according to this view, is revealed in his own pristine glory, but not in the form of a deity, nor in any other borrowed form; and thus being released from his previous state of bondage wherein he felt himself as an entity distinct from Brahman, he abides in the glory of his own true Self which is no other than Brahman Himself. And though a part of Brahman, he realizes himself as united with, and at the same time separable from Him. Being united with Brahman he becomes endowed with the attributes of Brahman and attains equality with Him only in respect of enjoyment, but not in respect of exercising authority in matters of creation, preservation and dissolution of the worlds; he is no longer subject to mutations effected by births and deaths and other causes, nor is he bound to return to the world and to undergo rebirths except for some universal good (*Brahma-sūtra* IV.4.17-22); but he possesses for all time the supreme consciousness of being one with the Lord. Nimbārka admits Brahman to be both active and inactive—active in respect of the phenomenal world, and inactive in respect of the noumenal world, which is by far the greater portion of Him.

I. DVAITĀDVAITA

Dvaitādvaita-vāda, or the theory of Monism standing side by side with Dualism, is a combination of two contrary views. This combined theory seems apparently paradoxical; but this is the only rational solution that can do equal justice to the two classes of Śrutis, separately advocating the two apparently contrary views stated above. The Śruti unequivocally declares: "Two forms of Brahman there are indeed—the material and the immaterial, and mortal and the immortal, the movable and the immovable, the direct and the indirect" (*Bṛih.* II.3.1). These two forms, broadly speaking, are the phenomenon and the Nou-

nenon; of them "all these phenomena are mutable, the inner Spirit is said to be immutable; the absolute immaculate Supreme Brahman is immutable" (*Yogaśikhā Up.* III.16). Of these two forms of Brahman only one form is revealed to a person at one time. The phenomenon is perceived by the agitated mind, and the Noumenon is perceived by the tranquil mind. We perceive the phenomenal world through the organs of our senses; but these organs, such as the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the skin, do not function unless the mind be after them. As for instance, our eyes may be quite open and fixed on a thing, still we do not see the thing if our mind be engaged in some other thought; similar is the case with the other organs. So by the suspension of the functions of the mind, which is thus brought to a tranquil state, all the organs of sense come to a standstill; consequently the vision of the phenomenal world ceases; and with the disappearance of the mutable phenomena, the only other thing, the immutable Noumenon, reveals itself. "When one perceives only the Supreme Self spiritually, the vision of the entire phenomenal world ceases" (*Jābāladarśana Up.* X.12). With the disappearance of the shell, appears the inner kernel.

The phenomena may be said to constitute the entire objective universe, and the Noumenon the conscious subject perceiving the phenomena. This conscious subject exists in any of these four states: (1) the waking state, (2) the dream state, (3) the state of dreamless sleep and (4) the superconscious state, also called the *turiya*, the fourth state or the state of *samādhi*. In the waking state the contemplative mind follows the gross organs of sense and perceives through them the phenomena or the gross world. In the dream state the contemplative mind, through the subtle organs of sense, perceives the subtle impressions left in the mind in the waking state, or reflected in the mind from the outside phenomena while the gross organs of sense remain inactive; and the truth or otherwise of dreams depends on the purity or impurity of the mind at the time of dreaming such dreams, as the contemplative mind itself turns into Brahman when it foregoes its contemplative nature and becomes perfectly pacified. The rigorous uniformity of time, space and causation characteristic of the waking state is almost entirely lost in the dream state, where anything may occur in an inconceivably short or long time or space, and may be caused by anything. In the state of dreamless sleep the mind loses its contemplative nature, becomes pacified and ceases, together with the senses, to function; the subject and the

object are unified in one undifferentiated mass of consciousness. There is freedom from all troubles that usually beset cognition; the consciousness of variegated objects in the waking and dream states turns into an undifferentiated consciousness in dreamless sleep. Hence it is said to be a state of comparative bliss, though not of absolute bliss, the veil of ignorance still being there. In the fourth or the superconscious state, consciousness, the subject, returns to itself; the object merges in the subject, and there is complete cessation of the phenomena. In other words, they merge themselves in the Noumenon, which exists in its own pristine glory, as devoid of all connotations and incomprehensible in terms of the phenomenal world. "The fourth state is considered to be that which is cognizant neither of internal objects nor of external objects, nor of both, which is not a mass of consciousness, which is not intelligent nor unintelligent, which is unseen, which is beyond use, beyond acceptance and beyond indications, which is unthinkable and indescribable, which is a state of sole cognition of the Self with complete cessation of the phenomena; which is all-calm, all-bliss and non-dual. This is the Self and He is to be known" (*Māṇḍūkya* 7). "Where there is duplication of consciousness, phenomena are heard, seen, smelt, tasted and touched. But where there is unification of consciousness, free from cause, effect and action, non-vocal, unparalleled, without any precedent, that is simply beyond human expression" (*Maitreyī Up*. VI.7). "In case of duality the individual self sees other things, smells other things, tastes other things, speaks of other things, hears other things, attends to other things, touches other things and knows other things. But when to the individual self everything turns to be the Self, then in that state which is to be seen by whom, which is to be spoken of by whom, which is to be heard by whom, which is to be attended to by whom, which is to be touched by whom, which is to be known by whom; who can know Him, by whom the individual self knows everything?" (*Bṛih.* IV.5.15).

All these Śrutis prove that when consciousness is of the phenomena, there is Dualism, and when it is of the Noumenon, *i.e.* when consciousness returns to itself, there is Monism. But the existence of the individual self in the Noumenon is also not stationary or absolute, as will appear from the Śruti: "From unity to diversity and from diversity to unity I pass and repass" (*Chhānd.* VIII.13.1). This shows that the passing of the individual self from Dualism to Monism and again from Monism to Dualism is frequent, even as the sleeping state follows the

waking state and the waking state follows the sleeping state till the attainment of the emancipated state, the state of absolute freedom, when "he enjoys all desires with the omniscient Brahman" (*Taittirīya Up.* II.1.2), thus retaining his own individuality in respect of enjoyment, and being at the same time conscious of his union with Brahman, and becoming omniscient thereby. "He becomes the lord of himself; his movements are unfettered in all the world" (*Chhānd.* VII.25.2); "If he desires the vicinity or presence of the fathers, by the mere fiat of his will they present themselves" (*Ibid.* VIII.2.1).

It is the common knowledge of the *yogins* that meditation on the Infinite Spirit begins in Dualism, there being two distinct entities, viz. the meditator and the meditated, and that it ends in maturity in Monism in the state called *samādhi*. "When meditation becomes steady, the mind assumes the state of the thing thought of, and forgets its own identity" (*Pātañjala Yoga Sūtra* II.3); "When the mind forgets the existence of both the meditator and the act of meditation, and assumes gradually the state of the thing thought of, in perfect stillness like a lamp undisturbed by the wind" (*Adhyātma Up.* 35). Thus from the actual experience of the *yogins* in *samādhi*, the *turīya* state or the state of existence in the Noumenon, one naturally comes to the conclusion that the real nature of Brahman is Dualism underlying Monism, which seems to be the only rational conclusion that makes a happy adjustment of all the views expressed in different classes of Śruti.

II. BHEDĀBHEDA

The theory of *Bhedābheda*—that the individual self is different from as well as the same or identical with Brahman—has been supported by Bhāskara also in his interpretation of the Vedānta system of philosophy. This theory is as old as that of the ancient teacher Auḍulomi. "The individual self," according to this theory, "is a part of the Universal Self, Brahman, as can be understood from the expression of difference (*bheda*) between them as expressed in the Śruti; on the other hand, the Śruti has expressed itself otherwise also, viz. the individual self is identical with or the same as the Universal Self, Brahman" (*Brahma-sūtra* II.3.42).

As a wave is both different from the ocean (being only a part of the ocean), and the same as or identical with the ocean (both being simply water), so is the individual self both different from the Universal Self

(being a part of the Universal Self), and the same as or identical with the Universal Self in respect of consciousness (*chaitanya*).

There is a higher idea still. A wave in its agitated state caused by the wind is different from the vast sheet of water, though a part of it; but the same wave, in its tranquil state, becomes the same as or identical with the sheet of water. So the mind in its agitated state caused by desire, in following the senses, becomes conscious of the ego or the finite self, and perceives the phenomena; and the same mind in its tranquil state unruffled by desire ceases to function through the senses, and perceives the Noumenon, when the cognition of the phenomena ceases. The mind in its agitated state is indicative of the individual finite self, and in its tranquil state, of the Universal Infinite Self. "When the mind becomes agitated, in following the sense-objects, the phenomenal world is perceived. Tranquillity of the mind is called emancipation. The mind is therefore to be brought to a tranquil state by the knowledge of the Supreme" (*Yogaśikhā Up.* VI.58). "The mind, free from agitation, is said to be the *summum bonum* of life; that is also the worship; and that is also called emancipation in the conclusion of the scripture" (*Mahat Up.* IV.101).

III. SAGUṆA AS WELL AS NIRGUṆA

Brahman is considered, according to the Nimbārka-school of thought, both as *saguṇa* (with attributes) and as *nirguṇa* (without attributes). All the scriptures have described Brahman as having a two-fold characteristic, viz. (1) He is transcendent, all-peace and absolute; (2) He is all-pervading, all-powerful and relative (*Brahma-sūtra* III.2.11). Brahman is possessed of attributes: "His desires prove true; He is all-pervading as *ākāśa* (space); from Him proceed all actions, all desires, all scents, all tastes; He is all-embracing" (*Chhānd.* III.14.2). Brahman is at the same time without attributes: "One becomes released from the grip of death by knowing Him who is beyond the reach of the ear, the touch, the eye, the taste and the smell; who is eternal, without change, without beginning and without end; and who is the permanent Reality behind the phenomena" (*Kaṭha.* I.3.15).

It has already been said that Brahman has two forms, viz. the mutable phenomena and the immutable Noumenon. "Two forms of Brahman there are indeed—the material and the immaterial; what is material is unreal (mutable); what is immaterial is real, that is Brahman

and that is Light" (*Maitreyī Up*. VI.3). "What is material is transient, what is immaterial is eternal" (*Mahānārāyaṇa Up*. 2). Brahman is active, possessing the six attributes, omnipotence, etc., in respect of the phenomenal world; He is at the same time inactive, immutable, without sound, without touch, without form, without taste, without odour and free from death and decay; *i.e.* no attribute or quality can be predicated of Him in respect of the noumenal world, which is by far the greater portion of Him, where He is seated in His own pristine glory, enjoying the bliss inherent in His own Self.

IV. ACHINTYA

The Śruti declares Brahman to be incomprehensible (*achintya*), unspeakable and inscrutable (*Kaivalya* I. 6). By this the Śruti means that Brahman cannot be brought completely within the purview of the human intellect, and that discussion regarding Him can go only up to the furthest limit of human capacity, and evidently not beyond that; that is, Brahman, though capable of being apprehended, can never be comprehended. We hear the echo of this idea in "the Unknown and the Unknowable" of Herbert Spencer and of the Agnostics. "He who holds that Brahman cannot be comprehended knows Him; but he who holds that Brahman can be comprehended knows Him not. Brahman is unknowable to them who think that they know Him, and He is knowable to them who think Him unknowable" (*Kena Up*. II.3). The Śruti also declares that though not fully comprehensible, Brahman is not altogether inapprehensible. "He is not comprehensible, nor inapprehensible: He is to be meditated upon in the light that He is incomprehensible; *i.e.* to think of nothing is to meditate on Him; then only the impartial (existing equally in every thing) Brahman can be perceived" (*Amritabindu Up*. 6).

The inscrutable creative power inherent in Brahman has been adopted by the Nimbārka school of thought as the cause of the universe, in place of the theory of "*māyā*" of Śaṅkara, though "*māyā*," it should be remembered, is another name for "the creative energy of Brahman capable of making the impossible possible." "They call it *māyā*, having inscrutable cause and effect, yielding an unimaginable efficacy and appearing like a dream and a jugglery in the world" (*Devī Purāṇa*). So the difference between the two schools of thought seems to be more in words than in reality.

V. THE MATERIAL AS WELL AS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE

Brahman, according to this school, is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. The objection that as a potter requires some material such as clay for the construction of a pot, so Brahman must be dependent upon some materials out of which the universe is to be evolved, is met by this statement that in all cases materials are not necessary; as for instance, milk itself is transformed into curd (*Brahma-sūtra* II.1.23). Another objection, viz. that as Brahman is without parts, it is quite reasonable to say that if He be the material cause, in the act of creation He becomes entirely transformed into the universe is refuted on the authority of the Śruti which declares that like a spider spinning a cobweb out of itself, Brahman has evolved the universe out of Himself, and that in so doing- which shows that He is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe- He is not exhausted in the creation, but retains by far the greater portion of Himself which is beyond the creation. Brahman being, according to the Śruti, all-powerful, it is perfectly within His power to be so evolved and, at the same time, to remain mostly beyond such evolution (*Brahma-sūtra* II.1. 25-29; *Chhāndogya* III.12.6).

Nimbārkāchārya has thus accepted the theory of real modification (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman, holding that this phenomenal world has no separate existence from Brahman, who has transformed Himself into phenomena without impairing His own status of Noumenon; and this is attributed to the inscrutable creative power of Brahman. This school, however, does not use the word *māyā*.

The conflicts and differences that persist in the religious world will surely vanish if we turn to the well-balanced and synthetic line of thought adopted by Nimbārkāchārya. If we cast our eyes downwards from the mountain-top inequalities of the planes at once disappear. The religion of Vedānta is a very catholic one; it has no quarrel with any religion whatsoever. Rather it embraces in its bosom all the religions of the world. With the lamp of Vedānta as our guide, we shall have no more quarrel with any member of any professed religion on earth. If we can only strain our souls to such a lofty pitch, all the differences on the way will vanish; aversion will give place to affection, enmity to amity and selfishness to selflessness. With the realization of the Universal Fatherhood of God a universal brotherhood will be restored, turning this earth into heaven, purged of all dissensions and differences.

THE REALISM OF ŚRĪ MADHVĀCHĀRYA

A GENERAL SKETCH

Śrī Madhvāchārya is a commentator on the *Brahma-sūtras* or the aphorisms of Śrī Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa or Kṛishṇa-Dvaipāyana. He is spoken of and recognized by the scholars of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as Ānanda Tīrtha or Pūrṇaprajña, and this last appellation is adopted by the author of the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* in reviewing this system.

In the twelfth century there lived a very pious Brāhmin, now known only as Madhyageha Bhatta (the master of the middle house) in a village not very far off from the modern town of Udipi, in the western part of the Madras Presidency. Having lost his first-born son, he with his wife practised for twelve years severe austerities and prayed to his Deity Ananteśvara at Udipi. His extraordinary piety and devotion bore the desired fruit, and the Lord was so gracious as to bless him with a son who became an embodiment of piety and devotion, of intuitive insight into every branch of knowledge and divine inspirations. Born with such tendencies and spirit, the child, even at a very tender age, went out into the woods to enjoy his divine thoughts there alone. Some time later he journeyed alone to the temples in the surrounding country and there astounded the visitors with his exemplary ways of worship. The child was named Vāsudeva by his parents. He had his *upanayana* (ceremony of the sacred thread) at the due age and was put to a Vedic school for some two or three years. There the apparently playful and inattentive Vāsudeva gave proofs of his uncommon intelligence and memory and soon took leave of his village teacher. Inspired with a clear sense of his high mission to restore true Knowledge to worthy souls, he soon decided to embrace the life of an ascetic and went in search of a holy preceptor. He found one in Achyutapreksha at Udipi and under him spent a short period of probation, too. Having convinced the *guru* of his fitness and also having comforted his parents, especially his mother whose tender appeal and prayers he would not refuse to listen to, he hastened to become a *sannyāsin* as soon as a brother was born to him, and received initiation from his teacher who called him Pūrṇabodha or Pūrṇaprajña.


The young *sannyāsin* put forward his objections to the exposition of




SRI MADHVACHARYA

a dignified and edifying subject of study. Accordingly he shows that the genuine Vedas in all their branches support only this view, and that Śrī Vyāsa's *Sūtras* point to the same conclusion by explaining the [illegible] conflict of some Vedic texts.

Logically, then, the Vedas are understood by this teacher as presenting the whole universe under two main categories: (1) the independent or *svatantra* Being, and (2) the dependent or *asvatantra* existences. The independent Being is but One and is absolutely perfect, of infinite power and excellence, and eternally and infinitely blessed in every respect; He is the one Omnipotent, Omnipresent, Omniscient Being; and all these ideas of the Supreme Being form the connotation of the term 'Brahman.' Therefore He is fit to be known and contemplated as Brahman. He is without a second one equal to Him and without another as superior to Him. It is this Supreme Being that is also spoken of as Vishṇu in the light of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* which explains the term so as to preclude the wrong idea that it is a sectarian name of the deity. It may be noted here that the word 'Brahman,' though appropriated to the Supreme Being in some passages and in this discourse, has various other denotations even in the Vedic literature. The *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* explaining the term 'Vishṇu' really affords a commentary on the idea of Brahman introduced in the first *sūtra* of Śrī Bādarāyaṇa. A table of the categories with their various ramifications is subjoined below for a clear understanding of the realistic philosophy of Śrī Madhvāchārya:





Chetana (ego)
Those assailed by misery
Eternally free from misery (Lakshmī)
The released (in heaven)
Those in *saṁsāra* (the embodied existence)
Eligible for release (in heaven)
Devas (gods)
Rishis (sages)
Pitṛis (fathers)
Pas (emperors)
Naras (men)
Ineligible for heavenly bliss
Those who are fit for *tamas*
Those who are eternally in *saṁsāra*
Those that have fallen into *tamas*
Those yet in the embodied existence
Achetana (non-ego)
Nitya (Eternally unchanged, the Vedas)
Nityānitya (Eternal principles with modified or changing aspects)
Anitya (Destructible)
Purāṇas etc.
Time
Prakṛiti (matter)
Asaṁsṛishṭa (subject to minimum modification)
Saṁsṛishṭa (wholly modified) *Brahmāṇḍa* (the gross universe and all the things in it)
Buddhi
Manas
Ten organs
Five objects of senses
Five *bhūtas* (gross elements)

With reference to the dependent existences shown in the foregoing table it will be seen that they are conceived as existences in no way limiting the absoluteness or perfection and infinite character of the one independent Supreme Being whose pervasiveness and powers remain unlimited and unchecked by them. This contrast between the two main entities is an indispensable requisite for making sensible all the endeavours made by the intelligent limited beings and the final purpose sought to be attained by them.

Again, the positive dependent existences, viz. the intelligent beings of all classes and grades and the unintelligent matter (Prakriti) which is subject to ever so many modifications for furnishing the former with the means and materials for their working towards the final goal, are separate entities or existences. The spiritual beings are not all of the same kind, of the same capacity and quality. This idea of separate existences also includes gradations, in the absence of which the idea of separateness cannot firmly stand.

The fundamental position with regard to the dependent spiritual beings is that they are essentially intelligent and are embodiments of varying tendencies. These tendencies cannot be conceived as mere abstractions, and therefore the tendencies and the essential attributes are held to form severally the being or the thing itself in a concrete sense. This view can help one to understand how Śrī Madhva's system speaks of the three classes of *jīvas* (souls) according to the essential attributes and the tendencies of each *jīva*. Thus one class is distinguished as consisting of *jīvas* of purely divine attributes, spoken of in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* as *daivī sampad*—a class in which the devotion to the Supreme Being asserts itself as the all-absorbing characteristic; hence this class is fit for *vimoksha* (liberation) as the *Gītā* puts it, *i.e.* to realize the Lord as He is and to be blessed in His uninterrupted presence. In contrast with this class comes the class of spiritual beings who are appropriating to themselves all the supreme attributes and nature of the Lord. From the conception of the spiritual beings as embodying the tendencies and from the observation of the workings and destinies of some it is naturally conceived that there is another class where the *jīva* is not purely of the first or of the second class, but a mixture in some degree of these and those tendencies and as such a concrete existence by itself like the first or the second. Apart from the direct realization of these existences, the recognition is a logical necessity for explaining the gross world and

its activities, and it is only a corollary to be recognized like the difference in existences for a consistent explanation of the universe in general. This third class has no decided ideas of attaining the supremacy of the Lord or of being one with Him, which character may be described as indifference. Consequently this class in its final state is not absolutely blessed or absolutely damned in hell, but only remains saturated with the same mixed and undecided notions as it does in the mundane life.

From the words of Bādarāyaṇa, "And there being an inferior (class of beings)" (*Brahma-sūtras* II.1.16), we understand that the Vedas speak of one God or unlimited Supreme Being, though seemingly limiting circumstances exist—an idea quite indispensable for the inception of the very idea of absoluteness. In fact, the idea of absoluteness is not the exclusion of a second or other existences as is often supposed, but it is *svātantrya* (independence) and being in every way infinite and unlimited in respect of its infinite excellent attributes. All this is taken as fully condensed into the connotation of the term 'Bhagavān' (as well as Brahman or Vishṇu). Hence the very first mention thereof is made in the *Tattva-saṁkhyāna* thus: "Independent is Bhagavān Vishṇu."

In the light of the foregoing points it is easy to see that Śrī Madhva's system cannot be called Dualism; for it does not recognize two or more independent existences; nor does it admit any such description of the dependent existences as might point to the possibility of the Supreme Lord being limited by them. On the other hand the conception of the Godhead is that the Supreme Being is perfect and infinite in respect of space, time and His qualities and powers. How the existence of other things does not limit Him has to be conceived in the beginning only by means of the analogy of light passing through a transparent medium without being limited by it. When, on the other hand, the Supreme Being is infinitely subtler and more powerful than light, all the dependent existences are in relation to Him only transparent mediums which have no power whatever to limit Him. This analogy is actually instituted by Śrī Bādarāyaṇa in *sūtra* II.3.25. When yogic powers are developed, this character of the Supreme Being is directly perceived even as huge objects are perceived by the eyes—a point which even the modern science also recognizes. Thus Śrī Madhva's system, or rather Śrī Bādarāyaṇa's system, is only the Realism of this tenable character with one absolute or *svatantra* Being and many little things called the

dependent existences, eternal and eternally witnessing the supremacy of the one Independent Existence.

The recognition of the two main categories is psychologically and logically induced by that of the three instruments of evidence (*pramāṇas*), viz. *pratyaksha* (perception), *śabda* (verbal testimony), and *anumāna* (inference), so far as they are unimpeached. Since nothing is said to exist or denied in the absence of or against such evidence, the thinker can easily see how the Realism of Śrī Bādarāyaṇa and Madhva is capable of holding its place, and that the Vedas, naturally and entirely truthful, support only the realistic view with proper limitations of both the gross and the subtle existences, to the exclusion of all other views. At this stage and in the light of the foregoing facts, it should be admitted that the *jīvas* are not eternally blessed, but they have to develop their tendencies and dynamically attain to the destinies determined by the laws which are strictly enforced by the Supreme Being, so that the essential nature of one does not change for that of any other.

When the *jīvas* are conceived to be of three classes, their relation to God is necessarily not the same and must differ as the class differs. Above the *jīvas* and next to the Supreme Being, the intelligent Prakṛiti, popularly known as Lakshmī, is admitted as presiding over all other dependent spiritual beings as well as the unintelligent entity which by its modifications is made to furnish the *jīvas* with all the gross means and materials for their working towards higher perception and due attainment of the final goal according to the essential tendencies of each class.

Though the three classes are thus recognized, Śrī Madhva naturally gives his main attention only to the spiritual life to be led by the *jīvas* of the first class that recognize the supremacy of the Lord, work towards attaining His grace and vision, and finally become released from the mundane life to enjoy their blessed nature uninterruptedly with the realization of the Supreme Being. Accordingly, in his small work called *Sadāchāra-smṛiti*, he has given a brief sketch of the spiritual life to be led by the worthy souls, which constitutes the course of *sādhanā* (discipline).

The direct perception of Brahman is produced by the study of the scriptures and other things only when devotion etc., are added to them. "Whatever the preceptor who is possessed of all auspicious marks, full of wisdom and devotion to the Lord (Vishṇu), graciously imparts to the pupil, does not fail to bear its intended fruit. However, it is only by

virtue of devotion and other qualities, which the individual soul eternally possesses as part of his essential nature, that he obtains the grace of the preceptor; hence, only from his devotion etc., that perception arises." Over and above the different steps pointed out in the book, devotion (*bhakti*) is distinctly shown as an essential attribute of this class of *jīvas*. As the *Maṭhara Śruti* says: "Devotion alone leads him to the Supreme; devotion alone reveals Him; in the power of devotion is the person; devotion only is the best (of means)."

As the Supreme Being of His own accord reveals Himself in consideration of the soul's devotion and bestows upon him final beatitude, devotion becomes the foremost of all the means, and consequently it is spoken of as the only means. This is also said in the *Māyā-vaibhava*: "The Supreme Being Vishṇu in consideration of the aspirant's devotion reveals Himself and bestows final beatitude (on him). The intense love which proceeding from a knowledge of His greatness becomes the tie between the Lord and the soul, is called devotion; and that indeed is the (chief) instrument of the Supreme Ruler." In fact, all duties performed must be the outcome of that natural *bhakti* and must end in further developments thereof, till the *jīva* is finally released from the mundane life and allowed to enjoy the eternal presence of the Supreme Being. The Āchārya not only proved the importance of *bhakti* by his exemplary life, but also furnished references and quotations in his running commentary on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, which afford a glorious view of the *bhakti* cult handed down as an invaluable legacy for all future generations.

The spiritual life of the other two classes of *jīvas* may on the face of it also appear to be regulated by the same Vedic literature, but the practice and theory are vitiated by the subtle and important difference in the views entertained about the means as well as the goal. Though all the three classes may claim to be followers of the Vedic system, their destiny is totally changed by the standpoints severally adopted. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* accordingly describes these tendencies as also their destinies, as *sāttvika* (pure), *rājasa* (active) and *tāmasa* (dull).

In a general way every *jīva* seeks after the final and everlasting state in which the miseries experienced in the mundane life are got rid of absolutely.

Śrī Madhva's Realism differs from every other realistic system in that it recognizes, in pursuance of the limits imposed by the *pramāṇas*,

not only difference but also what is fundamentally true and cannot be a gradation (*tāratamya*). In short, his view is that if gradation be taken away, difference also will go. Accordingly the *Bhedavāda* of the Sāṁkhya or Yoga, or of Rāmānuja or Nilakaṇṭha has no value in his view.

In the foregoing pages has been given a general survey of the salient features of Śrī Madhva's realistic system. We shall now deal with the subject under several heads for the easier grasp of the general reader.

PRAMĀṆAS

Śrī Madhvāchārya, the foremost among the realistic philosophers, starts his system on the broad and the only edifying basis of man's having the faculties by which correct knowledge arises. The intelligent spiritual being, for the present the *jīva*, is primarily an embodiment of certain faculties and the knowledge which he acquires by the function of these faculties through the physical organs as well as of the knowledge which he possesses, by virtue of his own nature, of certain things like his own self, such as time and space. The means of such knowledge should be first explained.

Pramāṇas are the means or the instruments by which things are perceived as they are; that is, the knowledge produced by them remains uncontradicted. The knowledge of a thing is directly related to the thing itself, and the instruments acquire their value only through it. For this reason the knowledge is the first evidence, to which the instruments are subsidiary; for they are mere handmaids of the faculty of understanding, not part of it. The chief sources of knowledge to be acquired by the atomic *jīva* in respect of the Lord and the vast universe in which he is placed are the following: First, the five organs of sense and the mind, and these along with the intelligent spirit (*jīva*) who is endowed with them constitute *pratyaksha* (perception). The second is verbal testimony (*śabda*) which is of far greater range than *pratyaksha*; this consists of the eternal Vedas, the infallible means of conveying the truth, and also the words of the truthful and sincere preceptors and speakers. The third is reasoning or ratiocination which is really the province of logic. These three naturally functioning produce knowledge of unquestioned validity. If any item of knowledge is later on found to be invalid, it is due to defects in the process. In the wake of these *pramāṇas* Śrī Madhva presents

every idea, and every quotation from the Śrūti or Smṛiti is meant to uphold this position.

The authoritativeness of the verbal testimony is peculiar to the Indian philosophy, showing how all the past, present and future things are grasped or are conveyed through the descriptive power of the word. Therefore the word acts like the senses in relation to a sphere far wider than theirs, and it also serves as the repository of the knowledge brought in by them.

Valid inference drawn from valid premises constitutes the *anumāna* or reasoning. Therefore the logical principles do not directly or independently form a source of knowledge, but they are only proofs of the relations that can possibly exist between the facts or ideas furnished by the first two when a question or doubt arises.

Now the Āchārya says that the Vedas by themselves represent nothing but truth, though man may on account of his defects wrongly understand them. Secondly, the testimony of men based on their understanding may refer to truth or to what is not true according as their powers and impulses differ. Necessarily, then, reasoning is sound or vitiated according as its basis is correct or incorrect. Many other *pramāṇas* are spoken of by other theorists; but the Āchārya shows how they are really included in the above three, if they really are means at all.

In accepting these three fundamental means, the Āchārya insists on the law of consistency being respected as the vital aspect of all correct knowledge and of the correct functioning of the instruments. Thus there is no antagonism between his accepting the Vedas as absolutely true and his respecting at the same time the principle of logic which cannot but draw upon facts furnished by sound sense-experience or unimpeached testimony.

REALITY

When the means of correct knowledge are thus admitted, the things to which such knowledge refers must be granted to be real. The things so presented may be either destitute of all changes or undergoing changes. The change does not and cannot make them unreal. Only the state of the changing thing may be limited in time. It has been observed that incorrect knowledge alone refers to unreal things. The knowledge which refers to things as existing while they do not at all exist, or which refers to things actually existing as not existing, is false knowledge, and the

things so referred to are unreal. Hence the objective world, according to this system, is real in so far as they are referred to by correct knowledge.

BHEDA OR DIFFERENCE

In this gross world many things are invariably perceived as different from one another, and in most cases it is not possible to speak or think of them as identical. In a physical substance, several pieces are perceived as distinct from each other, though they are recognized to be of the same kind. The pieces have mutually the property of resistance, and none of them can be thought of as resolving into any of the other pieces. On the other hand, the spiritual or intelligent beings fall into a thoroughly distinct class, presenting characteristics totally different from those of the physical substance. One common feature is that both are existences for all time. The spiritual beings that are working in the gross world for their development and attainment of lasting destinies, are all found to be comparatively of very little understanding and power, and require the guiding grace of the one perfect Intelligence, blissful, omnipotent and omnipresent, who has nothing to develop, nothing to attain, but remains only maintaining the laws under which each class of spiritual beings may naturally come. Thus the Āchārya's system recognizes *bheda* or difference among the Supreme Intelligent Being, the little and yet eternal and immortal spiritual beings called *jīvas* absolutely subject to His rule, and the physical substance or substances essentially eternal and employed by the Lord for investing the working *jīvas* with various conditions necessary for their varied development. Thus in this system difference is to be realized in the following five ways: (a) The Lord is distinct from the limited intelligence; (b) He is distinct from unintelligent matter; (c) one *jīva* is distinct from another; (d) *jīvas* are distinct from matter; and (e) when matter is divided, the pieces are distinct from one another.

Frequent discussions are held in his work to show how the ideas of difference cannot be all illusory or conventional, for the very reason that conventionality depends upon the existence of difference, and where there is no difference, no convention is necessary or observed. The most familiar illustration is space, and it is with reference to space itself that the possibility of separate existence of individuals of an exclusive nature, which mostly resist one another, is an overwhelming fact; hence space

is conceived like time as having parts, which may be recognized and distinguished by the introduction of conditions or the adoption of conventions.

PERVASIVENESS OF THE SUPREME BEING

The Supreme Being has been described as omnipresent, *i.e.* not limited by space or time, and present in every atom of other substances as well as outside. This means that the other two entities do not form a resisting medium to His presence. It should at the same time be noted that this pervasion or omnipresence, being one of the important differentiating characteristics, does not make the Supreme Being a formless mass of substance, like a heap of clay in the potter's yard. At every point and as a whole, it has to be conceived as having the features of a personality not inconsistent with the exercise of His powers in His boundless wisdom.

DIFFERENT JIVAS

Among the little spiritual beings called *jīvas* that are working in the world towards some destiny or other, difference between one individual and another is a matter of perception and observation in the light of the varying experiences of pain and pleasure on the part of each *jīva*. If the difference in experiencing pain and pleasure be denied as illusory, the only answer to it is that illusion itself is yet unaccounted for. The law of causation cannot countenance any such position. Having thus recognized the difference between individual *jīvas*, the Āchārya calls our attention to the gradation among *jīvas*, as there are beings endowed with higher and lower capacities, though they are all said to be essentially atomic; and this is in fact a necessary part of the idea of difference and of the possibility thereof.

SAṀSĀRA OR THE MUNDANE LIFE

The *jīvas* are by nature intelligent, *i.e.* capable of understanding and extending their knowledge without any change in their essential self. But they by nature are not perfect in respect of knowledge; they have to work and develop towards their destiny. For this purpose the physical body and organs are created for their working. When thus each *jīva* is invested with a body and a set of organs, he is said to be created, *i.e.* brought into mundane life. This state is called *saṁsāra*.

Through it he has to work hard for many lives till he attains the development which entitles him to realize his essential nature, a state which is called *mukti* or final release. As the *jīvas* fall into three classes according to their essential nature, their destinies are also different. It may be everlasting bliss, or everlasting sufferings, or a mixture of blessedness and misery.

KARMA

As distinct from the Sāṁkhya, this system does not attribute any self-directed activity to the primal physical substance called Prakṛti or Pradhāna; it really belongs only to intelligent beings, though under the control of the Supreme Intelligence. The *jīvas* have therefore to work finally for knowledge, and any activities not contributing to it are left out of account.

Unlimited in every way is the Supreme Being, while the *jīva* is but something like a geometrical point. Still his intelligent nature is capable of perceiving the Supreme Being—a point which the Āchārya has brought home to us by the Purāṇic quotation, "The wise see Mt. Meru and yet do not see it;" that is to say, they have the faculty of perceiving the existence and vastness of Mt. Meru, though they do not comprehend at one view everything connected with it. It can be understood through the illustration of photography.

INCARNATION

In this system incarnation is not at all admitted in respect of the Supreme Being. The term 'incarnation' implies that the intelligent principle is bound up in physical conditions which obscure him and limit his powers. The Supreme Lord, on the other hand, is never touched or affected in any way by the physical substances or conditions which He rules. Therefore the appearance of the Supreme Being in the world is only a revelation out of His own gracious will, and it is an error on our part to think that His personality so revealed is invested with physical conditions and is limited like ours.

THE STATE OF MUKTI

Even in the heavenly world the essential difference among the *jīvas* and among their capacities remains unchanged. But this does not in any way mar their sense of being perfectly blessed—a point which Śrī

Bādarāyaṇa deals with in aphorism III.3.34. Śrī Madhva commenting on it says:

"From the absence of equality among the released (in heaven), variance (jealousy etc.) does not arise among them; for all have attained to the direct knowledge of Brahman, and are free from defects or shortcomings, in which respect they are all equal; and there is the grade of the superiors, to which the souls of lower grades are indebted. This may be illustrated by the case of the pupil who has betaken himself to the preceptor (who leads him to Brahman). All this is said in the *Tura Śruti*, 'The classes of souls in the world of bliss are various and of various grades. But they are not at variance (with each other); for they all know Brahman, and are free from faults.' Even in the world (mere) inequality of rank does not become the cause of variance (discontent etc.), as is (observed) in the relation of the master and the pupil etc.; then whence could there be any cause of difference among those that have after release attained to real wisdom?"

From the first general sketch and the subsequent brief exposition of the salient points of the system under different heads given above, the reader may have got a clear idea of what Śrī Madhvāchārya has taught. His teachings are mainly based upon the *Ṛig-Veda* in the first place and upon all the Vedas in general, encompassing the Mantra, Brāhmaṇa, and Upanishad portions and also on the genuine Purāṇas that consistently form the commentary on those Vedas. The misrepresentation or misapprehension of some that the system has no strong support in the Vedas should be definitely set aside. According to his system *purushārtha*, the chief good to be attained by the thirstling intelligent being is real and worth attaining. The *jīva* is endowed with real means of working towards it, and the law of causation is not set aside. The knowledge attained by working through the means and conditions instituted by the Lord is attained through His guidance and grace. The *jīva* knows and realizes the Lord in a manner and degree quite sufficient for his purpose. When he has attained the final state, he really enjoys his blissful heavenly life in the constant worship of the Lord and of those higher than himself.

The dignity of Śrī Madhva's system as a philosophy is very well maintained in the consistent explanation it gives of ideas pertaining to this life and the future states, only by accepting the three indispensable

entities and the peculiarities of each; and it is constantly shown how every other position involves self-contradiction nearing or ending in Nihilism.

The misery which makes the present mundane life hateful is due to the non-realization of things as they are and their relations as they are; when the correct realization is attained, *mukti* is vouchsafed. Thus all our moral aspirations are shown to be well founded and real, and the attainment is also real. And only this unbroken chain of aspirations, the means of attaining them, and the attainment thereof in a conscious state confer true dignity on a philosophical view. Therefore we should all endeavour to consider and realize Śrī Madhva's propositions, and with his grace pray to the Lord for the revelation of His own blessed nature to our limited vision.



SRI VALLABHACARYA

THE SYSTEM OF VALLABHĀCHĀRYA

There were several schools of thought in the Vedānta even before Śaṅkarāchārya, but as the works of these pre-Śaṅkara writers are now lost to us, it is not possible to get a systematic account of their views, and consequently the history of the Vedānta really begins with the system of Śaṅkarāchārya. In course of time the doctrine of *māyā*, as taught by Śaṅkarāchārya, invited criticism from Vedāntins like Bhāskara, who is probably not removed from Śaṅkara by more than two centuries. Meanwhile the question of women and the Śūdras began to engage the minds of thinkers like Rāmānujāchārya, who joined Bhāskara in vehemently criticizing Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Upanishads and the *Brahmasūtras*. The age of *jñāna* (knowledge), it appeared, was fast disappearing and was quickly followed by that of *bhakti* (devotion). The wave of *bhakti* has remained strong from the times of Rāmānuja right up to the present day; and the history of this period is the history of the Āchāryas (teachers) like Nimbārka, Madhva, Vallabha and Chaitanya, and of the activities of many saints and writers. All these thinkers advocated *bhakti* in one form or the other and helped the cause of humanity; and in doing so they were obliged to criticize Śaṅkara. Vallabhāchārya (1473-1531 A.D.) tells us that he was asked by the Lord Kṛishṇa to appear in the form of Agni in this world and to offer a correct interpretation of the Upanishads and the *Brahmasūtras*, as these sacred works were misrepresented by Śaṅkarāchārya. Vallabhāchārya following the divine commandment taught a system which is generally known as the *Śuddhādvaita* system of Vedānta. The significance of the word *śuddha* is quite apparent. It clearly shows that the non-duality as taught by the Upanishads can be very well explained even without the help of *māyā*, which appears in the system of Śaṅkara. The Advaita is pure, without *māyā*; both the *kāraṇa* (cause) and the *kārya* (effect) are pure, and not due to *māyā*; they are one. The *Śuddhādvaita* system can therefore be rightly described as a criticism of the system of Śaṅkarāchārya.

Unlike his predecessors, Vallabhāchārya accepts four basic works, generally known as *prasthānas*, viz. the Vedas or the Śruti literature, the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Bhāgavata*, and tells us that in case of doubts, the help of the *prasthāna* next in order should be taken

in order to remove them. The doubts in the Vedas should therefore be removed in the light of the *Gītā;* those in the *Gītā* in the light of the *Brahmasūtras;* and those in the *Brahmasūtras* in the light of the *Bhāgavata,* which is, in fact, the ripe fruit of the desire-yielding tree in the form of the Vedas. The Upanishads and the *Brahmasūtras* form one group; while the *Gītā* and the *Bhāgavata* form another group. Both the groups, however, teach the same doctrine. All other works which teach a doctrine not opposed to the four *prasthānas* may be accepted as authoritative. The *Bhāgavata* embodies all the experiences which Vyāsa enjoyed in his meditation and is therefore called the *Samādhi-bhāshā.* Vallabhāchārya has written some works in order to explain the teaching of the four *prasthānas.* He has commented on the *Brahmasūtras,* the *Sūtras* of Jaimini and the *Bhāgavata,* but unfortunately all these works are incomplete. His *bhāshya* (commentary) on the *Brahmasūtras,* generally known as *Aṇu-bhāshya,* is available up to III.2.33, the remaining portion being supplied by his second son, Viṭhṭhalanāthajī. It is generally believed that Vallabhāchārya first wrote a more extensive *bhāshya* on the *Brahmasūtras,* which may be called *Bṛihad-bhashya* and then wrote a summary in the form of the present *Aṇu-bhāshya* and that the manuscripts of the *Bṛihad-bhāshya* and the *Aṇu-bhāshya* were destroyed by the widow of Gopīnāthajī, the eldest son of Vallabhāchārya, on account of some family quarrels with Viṭhṭhalanāthajī. Only some pages of the manuscript of the *Aṇu-bhāshya,* containing the portion up to III.2.33, were procured by Viṭhṭhalanāthajī, who thought it proper to complete it. The *bhāshya* on the *Jaimini-sūtras* is preserved only in some fragments which are lying in Pandit Gattulalaji's Library in Bombay. The commentary on the *Bhāgavata,* called *Subodhinī,* is available on the first three *skandhas* (books), six chapters of the fourth *skandha,* the tenth *skandha* and four chapters of the eleventh *skandha.* He has also written another work called *Tattva-dīpa-nibandha* in three parts which are known as *Śāstrārtha, Sarvanirṇaya* and *Bhāgavatārtha,* and commented upon it. There are also sixteen small treatises written by him which try to summarize the teaching of the whole system. Vallabhāchārya holds the *Bhāgavata* in high esteem and emphatically declares that one who thoroughly understands its sevenfold meaning is sure to enjoy liberation. It is with reference to *śāstra* (scripture), *skandha, prakaraṇa* (section), *adhyāya* (chapter), *vākya* (sentence), *pada* (word) and *akshara* (syllable). The first four are given in the last part of

the *Tattva-dīpa-nibandha,* and the remaining three in the *Subodhinī*. There are no independent commentaries on the Upanishads and the *Gītā* from the pen of Vallabhāchārya, but he has discussed a pretty large number of Upanishadic passages in the *Anu-bhāshya* and the *Subodhinī,* and summarized the teaching of the *Gītā* in the first part of the *Tattva-dīpa-nibandha.*

The highest entity is Brahman, which is *sat* (existence), *chit* (knowledge), *ānanda* (bliss) and *rasa* (sentiment). No other Vedāntin has ever taken into consideration the aspect of Brahman as consisting of sentiment, although it is clearly stated in the *Taittirīya Upanishad.* This Brahman is, according to Vallabhāchārya, Pūrṇa (whole), Purushottama (the best of beings), and thus the highest God is personal. Brahman possesses many divine qualities of which *jñāna* and *kriyā* (activity) are important. It is devoid of worldly or material qualities, and the negation of qualities in Brahman, mentioned in the Upanishads, evidently refers to the absence of material qualities. It possesses a body which is called *vigraha* and which is made up of *ānanda in toto.* Its *ānanda* is infinite. It is omnipresent and eternal. It is both the doer (*kartṛi*) and the enjoyer (*bhoktṛi*). Out of sport It has created the universe out of Itself, and is both the efficient and the material cause of the world, which is, again, sustained by It and is absorbed in It. As the world consisting of people, both happy and unhappy, is Brahman's creation out of Itself through sport (*līlā*), It is not open to the faults of cruelty and inequality. Brahman does not undergo any change even when It develops Itself into this universe. This is generally known as the doctrine of *Avikṛitapariṇāma* (unchanged transformation). This conception of Brahman is solely based on the Upanishads etc., and there is scope for ratiocination. In accepting Brahman as It is described in the Upanishads, Vallabhāchārya has undoubtedly proved himself to be most loyal to the Vedas, and has therefore the best claim to the title of *vaidika.* The *pūrva-kāṇḍa* (first or ritualistic portion) of the Veda describes the *kriyā-śakti* (power) of Brahman, the *uttara-kāṇḍa* (last portion) describes the *jñāna-śakti,* while the *Bhāgavata* describes Brahman, the Lord, as associated with both *kriyā* and *jñāna śaktis.*

Next in order to Brahman or Pūrṇa Purushottama is what is known as Akshara (immutable) or Akshara Brahman. It possesses *sat, chit* and limited *ānanda.* It is the abode (*dhāman*) of Parabrahman. It appears in various forms according to the status of the Parabrahman. It may

appear as *Vaikuṇṭha-loka* when the Lord appears as residing in *Vaikuṇṭha*. It may appear as the foot (*charaṇa*) of the Lord when He appears in the form of *Antaryāmin* (the indwelling ruler), and also when He appears in the form of an incarnation. It also appears as the foot in the *ādhidaivika* (celestial) forms of the Lord. In the *Taittirīya Upanishad*, where the Lord is described as *ānandamaya* (blissful), the Akshara appears as the tail (*puchchha*) of the Lord. It is the *ādhyātmika* (corporeal) form of Parabrahman. When the Lord wants to give *moksha* (liberation) through *jñāna*, He manifests four forms, viz. Akshara, *kāla* (time), *karma* (work) and *svabhāva* (nature). The Akshara, then, appears in the forms of Prakṛiti (primal matter) and Purusha (soul); and the Prakṛiti develops into the *jagat* (universe) through different stages. The Prakṛiti is therefore called the cause of all causes. The negative descriptions in the Upanishads such as *asthūlam* (not gross) refer to this Akshara which is meditated upon by *jñānins* only. Although the distinction between the Parabrahman and the Akshara Brahman and the superiority of the former are clearly stated in the Upanishads, the *Gītā* and the *Bhāgavata*, they somehow seem to have escaped the notice of all the predecessors of Vallabhāchārya. He is the first teacher who has drawn our attention to this distinction. Like Akshara, *kāla*, *karma* and *svabhāva* are different forms of the Lord, inseparable from Him and serving one purpose or another in the creation of the world. Vallabhāchārya further admits twenty-eight *tattvas* (principles) in the process of creation, viz. *sattva* (purity), *rajas* (activity), *tamas* (inertia), Purusha, Prakṛiti, *mahat* (cosmic intelligence), *ahaṁkāra* (egoism), five subtle elements, five gross elements, five organs of action, five organs of knowledge and *manas* (mind). Akshara, *kāla*, *karma and svabhāva* are no doubt existing even before the creation of the universe; still they are not to be included in the list of the above-mentioned *tattvas* as they are general causes inseparable from the Lord. These twenty-eight *padārthas* (categories) are called *tattvas* because they are causes and are not separate and independent as in the Sāṁkhya system. Although the names of the *padārthas* are the same as those of the Sāṁkhya system, their characteristics differ, and they should not therefore be confounded with the Sāṁkhya categories. For instance, the three *guṇas* (components), which constitute the Prakṛiti in the Sāṁkhya system, are separate from Prakṛiti in this system; the *indriyas* (organs) are developed from the *rājasa aham-*

kāra and their *devatās* (deities) are developed from the *sāttvika ahaṁkāra;* the *indriyas* and *manas* are atomic and eternal.

The Lord was alone, without a second, in the beginning. He desired to be many for the sake of play, and as He desired, thousands of souls came out of the Akshara instantaneously like sparks from fire. In special cases the souls may come out from the Lord Himself. The human soul is therefore a part (*aṁśa*) of Brahman; he is eternal and atomic (*aṇu*). For the sake of sport the Lord desired that the element of *ānanda* (bliss) should disappear from the human soul, which consequently became subject to bondage and wrong knowledge. The soul is never produced nor does it ever die. It is only the body that remains subject to creation and destruction. As long as the soul is associated with the body, birth and death are metaphorically predicated of it. The soul is neither omnipresent nor does it vary in size according to the body it inhabits, but it is atomic. It experiences everything in the body through its quality of *chaitanya* (intelligence) which pervades the whole body. It is the knower, the doer and the experiencer; but all these qualities are derived from the Lord. The soul is thus quite real and not a product of nescience, as in the system of Śankara. Souls are varying in their nature, as the Lord wants variety for the sake of sport; and they can therefore be grouped into three classes, viz. (1) those that are busy with worldly matters, (2) those that follow the Vedic path according to the prescribed injunction, and (3) those that worship the Lord out of love, which is engendered only through the divine grace. These three classes are technically called *pravāha, maryādā* and *pushṭi* respectively.

The universe is the effect of Brahman and is therefore real and non-different from It. It represents the *ādhibhautika* (material) form of Brahman. The element of *sat* is manifest in it, while the other two elements of *chit* and *ānanda* are latent. The universe has been created by the Lord out of His own self for the sake of sport, on the analogy of a spider and its web, without His undergoing any change. The creation of the world is simply the *līlā* of the Lord. The origination, existence and destruction of the world are due to Brahman. In nature it is completely different from the world of dreams, and is therefore not unreal like the experiences of a dream. The view of Śaṅkarāchārya that the world is the figment of nescience and unreal, has been strongly criticized by Vallabhāchārya, who takes his stand on the four *prasthānas* and does not allow human reasoning to interfere. It is very interesting to note that

Vallabhāchārya has distinguished the real universe, the *sat* aspect of Brahman, from the unreal *saṁsāra* (world) which is caused by the *avidyā* (nescience) of the souls. As already remarked, the Lord wants diversity in the world for the sake of sport, and for that purpose He makes the souls subject to His power of *avidyā*, which is the root-cause of ideas of mine and thine. The *saṁsāra* is solely made up of *ahaṁtā* (egoism) and *mamatā* (idea of possession). Every soul is therefore required to put an end to this *saṁsāra* in the manner which will be explained latter on.

There are generally three paths leading to *moksha*, viz. *Karma-mārga*, *Jñāna-mārga* and *Bhakti-mārga*, and all the different schools of Vedānta differ in laying emphasis on the elements of *karma*, *jñāna* and *bhakti*. According to the *Śuddhādvaita* system, the Lord manifests Himself in the five forms of *kriyā* or sacrifice, viz. *Agnihotra*, *Darśa-paurṇamāsa*, *Paśuyāga*, *Chāturmāsya* and *Somayāga*, in the *pūrva-kāṇḍa*, and in the form of *jñāna* in the *uttara-kāṇḍa*. One who performs the Vedic rites according to the letter of the Vedas and gets the knowledge of Brahman as given in the Upanishads, enjoys *moksha* in the form of divine joy. To such a man the Lord, described in the Vedic literature in the above six forms, manifests Himself. He goes by the path of *devayāna* and gradually attains *moksha*; but if he comes to enjoy the special grace of the Lord, he gets *moksha* immediately after his death. If a person does not attain the knowledge of Brahman and still performs the Vedic rites correctly without any desire, he pleases all the gods concerned in the sacrifices and consequently enjoys *ātmānanda* (the bliss of the soul). The word *svarga* (heaven) etymologically means 'that which is perfectly earned,' or the happiness of the soul, which is unmixed, eternal and different from the supreme joy which is enjoyed by the chosen few. But he who performs different sacrifices simply with a view to fulfilling particular desires, goes to the popular *svarga-loka*, where he enjoys different kinds of happiness till his merit is exhausted, and returns to the world of mortals, to move in the cycle of birth and death. One who attains the knowledge of Brahman and is thoroughly convinced that everything in the world is Brahman, is a real knower of Brahman and is absorbed in the Akshara Brahman, and not in the Parabrahman or Pūrṇa Purushottama; because, as already stated, he meditates upon the Akshara Brahman and looks upon it as the final reality that has no other higher stage. But if this knowledge of Brahman is associated with devotion, the devotee is absorbed in the Pūrṇa Purushottama. This

absorption is higher than absorption in the Akshara Brahman. But there is still another stage which may be described as the highest. When the Lord wants to favour a particular soul—and be it remembered that in showing His favour He is not guided by any other consideration than His own will—He brings out the soul, gives him a divine body like His own and plays with him eternally. In this play, which is technically called *nitya līlā*, the Lord remains subordinate to the devotee and gives him the pleasure of His company, which is generally known as *bhajanānanda* (the bliss of devotion) or *svarūpānanda* (one's own bliss), which is referred to in the *Taittirīya Upanishad* and the *Bhāgavata*. This divine bliss is only the gift of the Lord and cannot be obtained by any amount of human effort. This idea of gift, of divine grace, is called *pushṭi*[1] in the system. The best illustration of divine grace (*pushṭi*) is found in the case of the Gopīs, who are rightly described by Vallabhāchārya as the teachers who have opened the path of *pushṭi* to the world at large. Those who enjoy this divine grace, automatically begin to love the Lord and look upon Him not only as their Lord or husband, but as everything. The doctrine of regarding the Lord as everything is called *sarvātmabhāva* (immanence), which should not be confounded with the *sarvātmabhāva* of the *jñānins*, because in the latter men of realization see Brahman everywhere, while in the former the devotees see everything in the Lord. The Gopīs posessed this attitude in a remarkable manner, with the result that the Lord had to remain quite obedient to them. The experience of *svarūpānanda*, which is decidedly higher than that of *Brahmānanda*, is the highest conception of *moksha* in the *Śuddhādvaita* system. The Lord is full of *rasa* (sentiment), and out of the eight *rasas*, *śṛiṅgāra* or love is the most important. Now as *śṛiṅgāra* has got two aspects, viz. *saṁyoga* or union and *viprayoga* or separation, there are two stages even in the *rasa* which the devotees enjoy. In the company of the Lord they enjoy the happiness of the union, while in His absence they suffer from the separation and think of Him all the time, so much so that they cannot see anything but Kṛishṇa, the Lord. According to some the second stage is superior to the first stage.

Vallabhāchārya has clearly distinguished the *pushṭi-mārga* from the *maryādā-mārga*. In the latter a person has to follow the dictates of the

[1] For a fuller conception of *pushṭi* see the writer's paper on "The *Pushṭi Mārga* of Vallabhāchārya" in the Haraprasad Memorial Volume, Calcutta.

Vedas and practise *śravaṇa* (hearing) etc., until he comes to love the Lord, who, taking into account his efforts, grants him *sāyujya* (mergence in His body). In the *pushṭi-mārga,* however, one—of course through divine grace—loves the Lord and practises *śravaṇa* etc., only out of love, and not with a view to producing love. The *maryādā-mārga* is open to the male members only of the first three castes, viz. Brāhmaṇas, Kshatriyas and Vaiśyas, while the *pushṭi-mārga* is open to all without any reservation. It knows no sex, caste, creed or nationality; and this is abundantly confirmed by historical and literary evidence.

In short, whatever is done by the devotee of the *maryādā-mārga* is done on the strength of the Vedic injunctions and in conformity with them, while the devotee of the other path does everything out of his natural love and for the sake of the Lord.

Vallabhāchārya saw that his own times were most unfavourable to *karma, jñāna* and Vedic or *śāstrīya bhakti,* and that people in general, and women and Śūdras in particular, had no chance of ameliorating their status from the spiritual viewpoint. The duties of the different *varṇas* (castes) and *āśramas* (orders of life) could not be satisfactorily discharged, and the Vedas, although most effective in the past, had ceased to be so not because they were useless, but because the people could not put the Vedic teaching into practice and sacrifices were impossible. The Āchārya has tried to show that over and above the paths of *karma, jñāna* and Vedic *bhakti,* there is one more path, that of divine grace, which, if once enjoyed, makes our life divine. The doctrine of grace is clearly referred to in the Upanishads, the *Gītā* and the *Bhāgavata,* and although Rāmānuja and others admit it to be an all-saving factor, it must be said to the credit of Vallabhāchārya that the way in which he has dealt with this question is unique. The followers of the other Vaishṇava schools also believe in the power of divine grace, but their mode of worship is *maryādic,* as they look upon the Lord as the great God endowed with infinite qualities and possessing great powers. Their worship is not prompted by love, which is possible only through the grace of the Lord. The followers of the *pushṭi-mārga,* however, worship the Lord not because He is the Paramātman or the Highest Entity, but because they ardently love Him. The worship of these devotees is therefore *snehātmaka* (consisting of love), and the Lord who is thus loved and worshipped is called *Gopījanavallabha* (the beloved of the Gopīs), a term which is very significant in the system.

The Gopīs are the pioneers in this line and others who follow them enjoy the same divine bliss. The mode of worship that has been followed in the system up to the present day is based on the spirit of the Gopīs. One who follows the *pushṭi-mārga* aspires to be a Gopī and worships the Lord in that attitude. In fact, all souls represent the feminine principle and have the Lord as their natural husband.

As regards the daily life of a devotee of this type, the Āchārya tells us that one should first of all dedicate one's own self and belongings including all the members of the family to the Lord, Kṛishṇa, who appeared in the world for lifting the people of all classes, and particularly those who are not in a position to attain *moksha* by their own efforts. There is a sacrament or *saṁskāra* called *Brahmasambandha* which has to be performed for establishing the lost contact between the soul and the Lord and thereby removing his weaknesses and qualifying him for worship. The devotee, after performing it, worships the Lord making a free use of his own body and property, and thereby destroys the *saṁsāra,* which is of the form of 'I' and 'mine.' This sacrament can be performed by all persons irrespective of their caste and creed. The unreal *saṁsāra* is thus removed by the dedication of the body and wealth to the cause of the Lord, and not by the renunciation of the world. We are told by the Āchārya that in the *Kali-yuga* formal *sannyāsa* (monasticism) without the spirit of renunciation is detrimental to spiritual progress, and that it is justifiable only when one is unable to suffer the pangs of separation from the Lord. The Āchārya himself took *sannyāsa* in his last days, when he thought that he could not live in the absence of the Lord and that his own body was an impediment to the highest bliss which he would enjoy in the company of the Lord. The worship of the Lord requires the services of all the members of the family, and all of them are promised the highest bliss that always results from the worship or *sevā* (service). The highest form of *sevā* is mental; in this stage the devotee thinks of the Lord alone. If the head of the family finds that some of the members of his family are unfavourable to him in the *sevā,* he is advised to leave them and pass his time in the *sevā* quite alone. This mode of service makes the whole family free from worldly ties even in the householder's life, and their whole life becomes divine. This has been very well illustrated in the life of Viṭhṭhalanāthajī, the second son of Vallabhāchārya.

The duties of the four *varṇas* and *āśramas* cannot be satisfactorily

performed in modern times; and even if they are carried out for show, they fail to give us any reward. When there is a conflict between the *Bhagavad-dharma* (the service of the Lord) and the *varṇāśrama-dharma*, a devotee of the *pushṭi-mārga* has to prefer the former, and may perform the duties of *varṇāśrama* when he finds leisure in his *sevā*, but under no circumstances at the cost of the service of the Lord. This is the real *ātma-dharma*, while the duties of the *varṇas* and *āśramas* are simply duties relating to the body; and between the *ātman* and the body, the former is decidedly superior to the latter.

It is thus obvious that a follower of the *pushṭi-mārga* devotes his own self and belongings to the Lord and passes his whole time in His service. He has completely lost his independent existence in the world and cannot therefore possess any property. Whatever he requires, he first dedicates it to the Lord and then makes use of it simply through His permission. When everything is dedicated to the Lord, the devotee cannot in any way exercise the right of ownership over anything. Thus it is impossible for a follower of the *pushṭi-mārga* to be immoral, for it is based on renunciation, not enjoyment. Although its doors are open to all—men and women, people of the upper three castes and Śūdras, and even those who are morally fallen (*patita*) and seem to have lost all chances of spiritual uplift—it does not encourage immorality. It should not be looked upon as a license for doing any immoral thing without any responsibility; it simply promises safety to all those who follow the doctrines of the school. The essence of the *pushṭi-mārga* is to establish connection between the soul and the Lord, and this is possible in many ways. One may be constantly angry with the Lord and still get *sāyujya*. It is immaterial whether it is anger or jealousy or devotion or passion that serves as the connecting link; what is required is connection. It should however be noted that those who are connected with the Lord through love (*sneha*) enjoy the privilege of partaking in the *nitya līlā* of the Lord and of enjoying *bhajanānanda*, while others simply get *sāyujya*.

If for some reason this kind of *sevā* is not possible to anybody, he should not be disappointed. The Āchārya tells us that such a man should throw himself at the feet of the Lord and remain at His mercy. This method is called *prapatti* or self-surrender.

The form of the Lord that is generally worshipped in the system is known as Śrī Govardhananāthajī, popularly called Śrī Nāthajī, who is

the embodiment of the twelve *skandhas* of the *Bhāgavata*, and whose shrine is situated at Nāthadwār in Mewar. In other words, Śrī Nāthajī represents the very form of the Lord which is taught by the *Bhāgavata*. The twelve *skandhas* of the work are identified with the twelve parts of Śrī Nāthajī's form, the tenth *skandha*—which describes the *rāsa-līlā*—being identical with the heart. The image of Śrī Nāthajī was, according to the traditions of the school, revealed to the Āchārya on the hill of Girirāja and was later on brought to Nāthadwār.[1] It represents the highest form of the Lord known as Pūrṇa Purushottama. All other images represent the *vibhūtis* (powers) and the *vyūhas* (manifestations), and not the highest form. The worship of the Lord is therefore called *sevā*, while that of the *vibhūtis* is called *pūjā*. The *Śuddhādvaita* system again accepts the four *vyūhas*, viz. Vāsudeva, Saṅkarshaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, with their respective functions of giving *moksha*, removing the burden of the world, creating, and establishing *dharma*. These *vyūhas* are inferior to Pūrṇa Purushottama, who has got the privilege of lifting up even those who are entirely helpless. In the different activities of Krishṇa one can easily determine, from the nature of His actions, whether the particular form is the highest one or a *vyūha* or *vibhūti*. The Āchārya has given an excellent criterion for distinguishing one form from the other. In this manner, he is very emphatic in recommending the *sevā* of Śrī Nāthajī and thereby proves his originality. He is not at all indebted to any of his predecessors in his teaching of the *pushṭi-mārga*. The theory that Vallabhāchārya simply carried on the traditions of one Vishṇusvāmin is untenable.[2]

This is a short account of the system of Vallabhāchārya, and as the space at our disposal is limited, no reference is made to the literary and religious activities of his descendants and followers. The Āchārya, when he placed the conception of *pushṭi* as illustrated in the *rāsa-līlā* before the world, anticipated certain difficulties on account of mis-

[1] Vallabhāchārya inherited from his father, Lakshmaṇa Bhatta, the image of Madanamohanajī accompanied by Śrī Rādhā on one side and Lakshmī on the other. This represents the form of Krishṇa which is associated with the *rāsa-līla*. In course of time when Viṭhṭhalanāthajī divided his property amongst his seven sons, he gave seven *svarūpas* (images) to them for *sevā*, which are still worshipped in different places by his descendants. All these are included in the perfect and original form of Śrī Nāthajī. The later writers of the school have tried to show that these different forms represent particular *līlās* of Krishṇa. Although Rādhā is worshipped in the company of Krishna in this school, she does not enjoy as much prominence as she does in the Vaishṇavism of Śrī Chaitanya.

[2] For a full discussion of this subject see the writer's paper on "Vishṇusvāmin and Vallabhāchārya" in the proceedings of the seventh All-India Oriental Conference, 1933, Baroda.

understanding with its evil consequences, and therefore sounded a note of warning many a time. He tells us that the episode of the Gopīs and the Lord is both real and allegorical. If it is taken to be real, it must be clearly borne in mind that there is no tinge of sensualism in the *rāsa-līla,* even though its description in the *Bhāgavata* appears to be more or less worldly; not only that, but one who listens to this account of the Gopīs and the Lord with devotion becomes free from all the diseases of the heart and enjoys bliss. Some of the verses written by Vallabhāchārya in this connection deserve a careful study. If one is disposed to interpret the *rāsa-līlā* as allegorical, one can say with him that the Gopīs represent the Śrutis, and when they enjoy the company of the Lord, it simply means that the Śrutis teach only one thing and it is the Lord. The Āchārya has considered this most important question from all viewpoints and has asked his followers not to imitate the Lord, but to serve Him and hear the account of His doings. Nay, when he was on the point of leaving this world, he, standing in the Ganges, gave a message to his sons and followers in words that should be written in letters of gold. He said, "My dear followers, you should *always* serve the Lord to the best of your abilities; you should not look upon the Lord Kṛishṇa as an ordinary master in the world; once you become His, He will always take care of you. But if you, somehow or other, forget the Lord and think of worldly matters, you shall fall." The message of the Āchārya as embodied in his teachings is indeed sublime and inspiring and will serve as an infallible guide to all lovers of truth in the realization of the ultimate end of human existence.